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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a study of Louisiana's political, social,
and economic development during World War II. Louisiana in 1939 was
a rural, agricultural, poorly-educated, racially segregated, one-party,
southern state.

By 1945, however, many aspects of life in Louisiana

had changed.
Louisiana’s political development during the war years was marked
by the temporary displacement of the Longite faction of the Democratic
party by the reform faction of the party.

Even though reformers Sam

Jones and James H. Davis captured control of the executive branch of
the state government, Longites remained strong in the legislature and
in minor state offices.

The Longite holdovers retained enough politi

cal clout to prevent full implementation of the reform program and
preserved their faction’s political base.
Both teachers and students left their schools in order to partici
pate in the war effort.

In addition, schools took on the task of edu

cating their students and the general public for the new wartime
demands.

The state's economy was marked by increased industrialization
during the early 1940s.

Demand for implements of war stimulated in

dustrial production throughout the country, and Louisiana was no ex
ception.

Despite large war plants constructed in the state, however,

Louisiana remained predominately rural.

Increased income caused by

the demand for agricultural products raised the living standard of
Louisiana farmers from the low levels of the 1930s.

vi
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Louisianians living on the homefront had to adjust to many
changes.

Consumer goods virtually disappeared "for the duration";

family members and friends disappeared in the vast American war ef
fort ; holidays lost many traditional trappings; and two groups whose
social and economic equality had long been suppressed made claims for
their share of recognition.

Blacks and women used the scarcity of

traditional laborers to move into jobs formerly dominated by white
males.

Even though their gains proved to be temporary, their emergence

from the economic shadows established the foundation upon which later
economic and social improvements were made.
between 1939 and 1945.

Louisiana was transformed

The old state, however, was still visible

underneath the layers of change.

vii
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INTRODUCTION

Louisiana politics in 1939 was still dominated by the heirs of
Huey P. Long, whose organization had retained control of the state's
political system following Long's assassination in 1935 and which con
tinued to overshadow the weak anti-Long opposition-

In 1939, Governor

Richard W. Leche could survey a state he controlled.

The upcoming

gubernatorial campaign to elect Leche's successor promised to be
relatively uneventful.

Leche's own 1936 landslide victory over the

anti—Longite faction of the Democratic party seemed to indicate that
the Longites would have little trouble in the foreseeable future main
taining their control of the state.

No candidate powerful enough had

emerged from the political opposition during Leche's term to challenge
the Longites, and even if such a candidate had emerged, the Longites
remained firmly entrenched and widely popular.
Unpredicted developments during 1939, however, affected all as
pects of life in this rural, agricultural, poorly-educated, racially
segregated, unsophisticated, Southern, one-party state.

The "Louisiana

Scandals," exposed to public attention in June toppled the Long
machine, while the beginning of the European conflagration in Septem
ber eventually brought new people with new ideas, millions of federal
dollars, and accelerated urbanization and industrialization to
Louisiana.
Louisiana in 1939, therefore, stood on the threshold of unprece
dented political, social, and economic change.

The criminal behavior

of individual Longites seriously undermined the organization, while
American support of massive national defense efforts and military
viii
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involvement in the war itself greatly altered the state's economy and
society from the outside.

Louisianians on the homefront elected to

live under two anti-Longite administrations between 1940 and 1945,
learned much about European and Asian geography, took jobs in industry
made higher wages than ever before, moved from one location to another
and worried about family members or friends in the United States armed
forces.

Changes wrought by events set in motion during 1939 left

Louisiana in 1945 far different from what it had been before.
The Longite organization's defeat in the 1939-40 election initi
ated major changes in political policies and performance during the
war years.

The venality of several Longites and their temporary

banishment from the center of power produced an effective bifactional
political system in which both Longite and anti-Longite Democratic
candidates became viable contenders for public office.
This study, therefore, begins with a summary of Huey Long's suc
cessful appeal to the ordinary Louisianian's desire for a share in the
state's politics and economic opportunities, controlled for decades
by New Orleans machine politicians and rural parish aristocrats.
Long's sudden and unexpected death left his organization leaderless.
By 1936, a coalition of top Longites had seized control of their fac
tion.

But without Long to supervise them, his heirs committed ex

cesses which so weakened Longism’s hold on Louisiana's government that
the anti-Longite opposition was given its first meaningful opportunity
in twelve years for a return to power.
When "reform” anti-Longite Governor Sam H. Jones took the oath of
office in the spring of 1940, France was about to be overrun by
ix
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Hitler's Wehrmacht.

Events both at home and abroad were thus con

verging upon Louisiana, to produce unforeseen problems, responses,
and results.
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CHAPTER I
LOUISIANA IN 1939: THE LEGACY OF
HUEY LONG AND HIS ASSOCIATES
The new year, 1939, dawned fair and mild in Louisiana.

In New

Orleans the temperature on Sunday, January 1, 1939, reached into the
60s during the afternoon before falling to a low in the mid-40s.

Mon

day, January 2, again was mild; gentle easterly winds blew across the
city where the temperature at halftime of the Sugar Bowl football game
was 65 degrees and reached a high of 73 degrees later in the afternoon
Louisianians struggled back to work Tuesday morning, many exhausted by
the three-day holiday week-end.
Overall, the New Year's holiday in 1939 seemed deceptively normal
It was the last year of a trying decade which had witnessed the near
collapse of the American economic system.

Presidents Herbert Hoover

and Franklin Roosevelt, each in his own way, had struggled to cure the
system's ills after its 1929 debacle which ended the giddy 1920s.

Be

fore the fateful year of 1939 ended, however, the world and Louisiana
were transformed, and never again would the old patterns, attitudes,
or relationships precisely fit the circumstances of the new order.
Germany plunged the world into the horror of global war for the second
time in the twentieth century with Chancellor Adolph Hitler's dawn in
vasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.

The great European democracies

Britain and France, belatedly realized the uselessness of their ac
commodating policy toward Hitler’s expansionist demands and declared
war on Germany.

Many Americans hoped that the new conflict would be

contained on the European continent and that the United States would
remain uninvolved.

These hopes proved unfounded.

President Roosevelt

1
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in 1939 began revisions of the Neutrality Acts passed during the 1930s
to prevent American involvement in armed conflict.

In direct conflict

with President Woodrow Wilson's pleas to the American people for
neutrality at the beginning of World War I, Roosevelt said that "I
cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought. . . "

Through

out 1940 and 1941, the President followed the dual course of helping
the Allies (Britain and France) as much as possible and girding the
United States to defend itself in case the country was attacked.

Des

pite Roosevelt's aid to the Allies in the European war, direct United
States involvement in the conflict did not begin until December, 1941,
when negotiations with the Japanese over conflicting interests in the
Pacific failed to achieve results, and the Japanese launched their sur
prise attack on United States military and naval installations in
Hawaii.
Full United States participation in the war led to permanent
changes in Louisiana:

its depression-ravaged economy improved because

of the influx of federal money into army camps, payrolls, and numerous
war industries; while Louisiana's people adjusted themselves to life
in a modern age of grave threats to national security.

The most sig

nificant change in Louisiana politics during the war years, however,
came about not because of the war but because of the venality of the
state’s elected officials who had grown fat and careless in office.
In 1939, that carelessness led to the temporary downfall of the estab
lished order in state politics, the "Longite" faction of the Democratic
party headed by Huey P. Long from 1928 until his death in 1935, and
thereafter by his heirs.

From the 1939 "Scandals" arose a new politi

cal order — effective bifactionalism, in which both Longite and anti-
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Longite Democrats became mutually competitive in statewide elections.
Louisiana’s ruling political organization from 1928 until 1939
was the creation of one man, Huey P. Long, who wrenched control from
the previous aristocratic ruling class and shaped it to meet his own
goals.

His virtual dictatorship of the state re-shaped both the form

and substance of Louisiana politics, and the events of 1939, along with
their subsequent repercussions, cannot be understood without assessing
Long's background and political career.
Huey Long based his organization directly on the votes of Louisi
ana's ordinary people, who had become discontented with the control,
corruption, and neglect of their interests and needs by the previous
ruling faction dominated by the Regular Democratic Organization of New
Orleans.

The RDO, "Old Regulars," or "Ring," as the association was

variously called, together with upstate cotton planters, constituted
a tight oligarchy which had kept Louisiana under the control of busi
ness, industrial and planter elements from the 1880s until 1928.

T.

Harry Williams best described this "government by gentlemen" as "con
servative in make-up and outlook, devoted to the past and satisfied
with the present, dedicated to the preservation of privilege, and
staidly corrupt." Before 1928, successful gubernatorial candidates
generally obtained victory by winning the support of the Old Regular/
upcountry alliance.

Huey Long, however, spoke directly to the people

of Louisiana, often over the opposition of the "Ring's" local political
boss and in so doing attracted large blocs of votes for himself, his
candidates, and his programs.

Williams also credits Long with posses

sing a political charisma which enabled him to attract popular support
on the basis of his personal appeal.

That quality, added to his
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forceful speaking style honed by his experience as a successful
traveling salesman, created Long’s solid base of support on which he
rose from an obscure Winn parish boyhood to the Railroad Commission,
the governor’s office, and ultimately to the United States Senate.^
Huey Long’s family background provided him with a keen appreci
ation of the ordinary citizen’s needs- Long was bo m August 30, 1893,
in a log house on the farm of his father Huey P. Long, Sr., near the
small, north-central Louisiana town of Winnfield, seat of Winn parish.
Arthur Schlesinger described Louisiana to be "as natural a breeding
2

place for radicalism as its swamps were for fevers.”

During the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Winn parish inhabitants, "row
crop" cotton farmers (not planters), subsistence farmers, or smallscale stockmen, eagerly embraced radical political reforms designed to
alleviate the hard lot of the ordinary people.

During the 1890s the

parish became strongly Populist, providing the Populist candidate for
governor in 1892.

Following a visit by Socialist presidential candi

date Eugene V. Debs in 1908 Winn voters elected Socialists to their
school board and policy jury, and in 1912 gave Debs more votes than
3
they gave Republican presidential candidate William Howard Taft.

*T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1966), pp. 67, 69; T. Harry
Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 4.
2

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 42.
3
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 13, 17, 23; Schlesinger, The Politics of
Upheaval, p. 43; Reinhard H. Luthin, American Demagogues Twentieth
Century (Boston, The Beacon Press, 1954), p. 239; Alan Brinkley, Voices
of Protest Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), pp. 10-12.
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This heritage of radical protest, added to the individual person
ality of Huey P. Long, ultimately produced a revolution in Louisiana
politics.

Huey’s brother Earl commented that as a boy Huey was "ner

vous" and curious — always wanting to know how things operated.

Earl

also observed that even though a reputation for physical cowardice
dogged Huey, he had no fear of standing up politically for something
he believed right.

By 1918 Huey had concluded that the old oligarchy

had worked too long with larger national corporations to exploit
Louisiana’s resources and cheat her citizens.

This conclusion con

vinced him to run for the Third (North Louisiana) District seat on the
Louisiana Railroad Commission.

The Louisiana Railroad Commission (soon

to be renamed the Public Service Commission) then regulated pipelines
and utilities as well as railroad rates and practices.

Long realized

that while the commission appeared to be an almost moribund board
manned by political hacks, it offered a platform from which an ambitious
young politician could launch a successful career.

Besides, the

Louisiana Constitution stipulated no minimum age for Railroad Commis4
sion members and Long was only twenty-four years old.
Huey Long, with Earl's assistance, campaigned vigorously for the
Railroad Commission seat against the overconfident incumbent, Burk A.
Bridges, who ran a low-key, colorless campaign.

As a result of their

combined efforts’
, Huey was nominated in the second Democratic primary
—4

Williams, Huey Long, pp. 119-121; Schlesinger, The Politics of Up
heaval , p. 51; Luthin, American Demagogues, p. 239; Earl Long, "Last
of the Red-Hot Poppas," (phonograph recording, News Service Records,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1961). Huey Long first captured public atten
tion when he opposed an increase of streetcar fares in Shreveport.
Russell B. Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, January
9, 1984.
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by a slim 635-vote margin.

Democratic nomination then was tantamount

to election because the impotent state Republican party rarely entered
candidates in general elections.

In this first of his campaigns, Huey

Long discovered the usefulness of his ability to change his mood or
his subject to bring forth maximum response from his listeners.

He

began to emerge as the newly-released voice of the Louisiana "redneck,"
pent up too long under oligarch rules.^
Huey Long did not forget his constituents after his election.
Many of his critics expected him to be merely another southern dema
gogue who had promised much, would deliver little, and eventually
stumble into cursing blacks and Yankees in order to hoodwink the voters
into electing him to office again.

While on the Railroad/Public Service

Commission, Long championed the interests of the ordinary people, suc
cessfully forced the public utilities and railroads on the defensive
and actually brought some rates down.

As Long told Forrest Davis,

fulfillment of his campaign promises created an important distinction
between him and other Louisiana politicians:

"I would describe a dema

gogue as a politician who don't (sic) keep his promises.

On that basis,

I'm the first man to have power in Loozyanna (sic), who ain't (sic) a

Williams, Huey Long, pp. 122-125; Schlesinger, The Politics of Up
heaval , p. 51; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, pp. 15-16; Richard B.
McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster Louisiana's Earl K. Long (Baton Rouge,
Claitor's Book Store, 1967), p. 32; G. Dupre Litton, The Wizard of Winnfield (New York, Carlton Press, Inc., 1982), p. 12; Cabell Phillips,
From the Crash to the Blitz 1929-1939 (New York, The Macmillan Company,
1969), p. 302; Parker Long, Sr. and Harley Bozeman interviewed by Joe
Tullier, July 21, 1966, Louisiana State University at Alexandria Oral
History Collection; Harley Bozeman interviewed by T. Harry Williams,
January 7, 1959, transcript copy, T. Harry Williams Papers, Department
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Williams Collection);
Russell B. Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, Januarv
16, 1984.
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demagogue."^

Moreover, he could not afford to forget the voters-

He

had plans for a higher office,' and he needed their continuing support.

Long reached for the top in his first try for the governorship in
1924, conducting a vigorous campaign against Old Regular candidate
Henry L. Fuqua and Lieutenant-Governor Hewitt Bouanchaud, but finished
third in the first Democratic primary.

Even though he lost, Long had

become well known statewide, and began the groundwork for the next
gubernatorial election immediately after his 1924 defeat.^
In the 1928 campaign Long again faced two opponents:

incumbent

governor Oramel H. Simpson who had become governor upon Fuqua's death
in 1926, and Congressman Riley J. Wilson.

The main issues of the cam

paign were Huey Long and his proposals to improve the conditions of
the common people of Louisiana:

toll-free bridges, state-owned "free"

school textbooks, more road construction, improved state social ser
vices, and opposition to Old Regular and corporate rule.

Conversely,

Wilson, a self-made man and ardent spokesman for conservative beliefs,
called for restricted, economical government, and low taxes.

Simpson

recognized the need for an increasingly activist state government, but
his statements indicate that his reform streak ran shallow: he favored
free textbooks only if the money needed to buy them could be raised

^Williams, Huey Long, pp. 4-5; Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval,
p. 45; Forrest Davis, Huey Long: A Candid Biography (New York, Dodge
Publishing Company, 1935), p. 38; Monroe Lee Billington, The Political
South in the Twentieth Century (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1975), p. 43; Daniel M. Robison, "From Tillman to Long: Some Leaders
of the Rural South," Journal of Southern History, August, 1937, p. 303.
^Williams, Huey Long, pp. 191-213. Long formally announced his 1928
candidacy on October 16, 1926, more than two years before the election.
New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 17, 1926.
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without increasing taxes.

Faced with the rising tide of Longism,

Wilson and Simpson finally attempted to persuade Louisiana voters that
Long represented an attempt by communism to take over the state.
Neither Wilson nor Simpson found the political strength to overcome
Long’s appeal.

Long finished first in the first Democratic primary

with 126,842 votes to Wilson's 81,747 and Simpson's 80,326.

Because

Wilson and the Old Regulars chose not to continue the struggle into
the second primary, Long won by default -8
Long's administration continued Louisiana's lengthy tradition of
powerful governors who aggregated power through actual practice as
9
well as through constitutional provision. — Once in office, he fully
developed the powers inherent in the Louisiana govemship's control of
budget formulation, selection of legislative officers, patronage, and
the letting of state contracts.

Despite efforts by the old political

establishment to absorb and thus neutralize him immediately after his
election, Long turned his attention to organizing the legislature so
that his adherents held the positions of power.

The pliant president

of the senate and speaker of the house yielded the historic duty of
their offices to appoint committee members and allowed the governor
to dictate assignments.

He obtained control of patronage with which

—

Williams, Huey Long, pp. 244-281; Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride
The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship (New York, William Morrow &
Company, 1941; reprint ed., Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Com
pany, 1971), pp. 13-35.
9
Ed Renwick, "The Governor," in Louisiana Politics Festival in a
Labyrinth, ed. by James A. Bolner (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1982), pp. 75, 77; Edwin W. Edwards, "The Role of the Gov
ernor in Louisiana Politics: An Historical Analysis," Louisiana His
tory, Spring, 1974, p. 115.
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to reward loyal followers when he appointed his friends as chairmen of
the Highway Commission, the Board of Health, and the Conservation Com
mission.

In the legislature, Long often became his own floor leader,

rallying his troops and issuing orders on key bills.

To the consterna

tion of the conservative opposition, he passed a bond issue for hardsurfaced roads which the state badly needed, but which horrified the
conservatives whose political upbringing led them to recoil from public
indebtedness.

He financed the new "free" schoolbooks program with in-

^
creased
severance taxes.10

With these measures, Huey Long began moving Louisiana into the
twentieth century.

His obsession with time, however, along with the

strength of his opposition, caused him to move more ruthlessly and
swiftly than previous governors.

Long hoped to establish his programs

while his opponents were still in disarray.'*'*' The opposition's residu
al strength became fully, evident in a special session of the legisla
ture which met in March, 1929, to consider a tax that Long proposed to
place on the refining of oil in Louisiana.

Long's opponents instead

gathered enough support in the House of Representatives to impeach him

Williams, Huey Long, pp. 230-311; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, pp.
22-24; Hodding Carter, "Huey Long: American Dictator," in The Aspirin
Age 1919-1941, ed. by Isabel Leighton (New York, Simon and Schuster,
1949), pp. 349-350.
**Williams, Huey Long, p. 298; Russell Long, "Remarks," War and Poli
tics Symposium, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
April 27, 1979, typescript copy author’s collection; Russell Long in
terviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast January 9, 1984; R. Norman Bauer in
terviewed by T. Harry Williams, May 4-5, 1962, Williams Collection.
Bauer, a reformer and ally of Sam Jones, maintained that Long moved
quickly "not because he loved Louisiana or wanted to help people, but
because he wanted to put Huey Long up."
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on a wide array of charges.

He managed to thwart this threat with a

whirlwind campaign of circulars, speeches, and promises, but became
confident of success only when fifteen senators (one more than enough
to block the two-thirds vote necessary to convict him) signed a "round
robin" pledge that they would not vote to convict the governor because
they believed that the charges against him were invalid. 12

Even though

Long had defeated his opponents and remained in office, the impeachment
scare increased his determination to gain complete control of Louisiana.
He spent the remainder of his life acquiring enough power to prevent
further challenges to his position and his program. 13
While still consolidating his position in Louisiana, Long ran for
the United States Senate, to which he was elected in 1930, and in
which he assumed his seat in 1932.

14

The Senate did not easily accept

the new junior member from Louisiana, and Long did not especially care
for the Senate.

Except for progressives George W. Norris and Burton

K. Wheeler, Long thought that the Senators constituted a collection of
12

Williams, Huey Long, pp. 347-419; Carter, "Huey Long," pp. 350-351;
Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 70-76; Russell Long interviewed by Gus
Weill, broadcast January 9, 1984.
13
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 409-410; Carter, "Huey Long," p. 351.
14
The two year delay resulted from Long’s refusal to resign the gover
norship and leave Louisiana in the hands of lieutenant-governor Paul
Cyr who had become his political enemy. Long claimed the Senate seat
only after Cyr had himself sworn in as governor to replace Long. Cyr
maintained that Long could not be both governor and senator, and that
Long’s Senate term began with the new session of Congress, even though
Long had not claimed his seat. This move allowed Huey to have Cyr re
moved from office, thereby allowing state senate president Alvin 0.
King, a Longite, to become governor until the 1932 election when Huey
engineered the election of the pliant Oscar K. Allen, one of his boy
hood friends from Winn parish.
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stuffed shirts.

The Senate, in turn, at first looked upon Long only

as another southern demagogue and considered his frequent absences and
his repudiation of his committee assignments as an attempt to avoid the
hard work of the Senate.

Even when he appeared on the Senate floor

more frequently during late 1934 and 1935, many of Long’s colleagues
regarded his vituperative personal attacks and prolonged filibusters
as grandstand plays designed to further advertise his ideas on a na
tional stage.^

Huey and the Senate never came to terms because they

found that neither could dominate the other as they wished.
Following the United States Senate race in 1930, Long consolidated
his hold on Louisiana.

The Old Regulars began defecting to him when

New Orleans business and political leaders recognized his strength in
the city and realized that they would have to cooperate with Long in
order to maintain state funding for the city's needs.

In 1934, after

he had moved to the Senate and managed the election of acquiescent
Oscar K. Allen as governor of Louisiana, Long dominated a series of
special sessions of the legislature which in undue haste considered
and passed laws giving the governor unprecedented power and stripping
the opposition of virtually all its few remaining sources of support.^
By 1935, Huey Long stood unquestionably at the helm of Louisiana

^Williams, Huey’Long, pp. 559-560; Schlesinger, The Politics of Up
heaval , p. 53; Brinkley, Voices of Protest, pp. 74-77; Sindler, Huey
Long's Louisiana, p. 83; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman
Volume One Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Com
pany, Inc., 1953), pp. 145-146; Merle Miller, Plain Speaking, An Oral
Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York, Berkley Publishing Corporation,
1974), p. 161.
^Williams, Huey Long, pp. 481, 738-740; Billington, The Political
South in the 20th Century, pp. 73-74.
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and also had become a national political figure through his Share Our
Wealth movement.

His greatest failure was his inability to come to

terms with President Franklin Roosevelt.

He had supported Roosevelt's

quest for the presidency in 1932, but broke with him when Long became
convinced that Roosevelt’s New Deal did not go far enough in its ef
forts to ease the people's suffering.

Long subsequently launched his

Share Our Wealth movement in 1934 and continued battling Roosevelt,
both on the national stage and for control of federal patronage in
Louisiana until his death.^

Speculation about a possible Long run

for the presidency in 1936 ended abruptly when he was shot in Baton
Rouge on September 8, 1935, while managing yet another special session
of the legislature in the new skyscraper capitol he had built to sym
bolize Louisiana's dedication to, and confidence in, the future.
died two days later.

Long

His assassin was a young Baton Rouge physician,

Carl A. Weiss, who evidently committed the murder because Long was at
tempting to gerrymander out of office Weiss's father-in-law, state
judge Benjamin Pavy.

18

Williams, Huey Long, pp. 481, 378-740; Brinkley, Voices of Protest,
pp. 68-69; Earl Long, "Last of the Red Hot Poppas”; Robert E. Snyder,
"Huey Long and the Presidential Election of 1936," Louisiana History,
Spring 1975, pp. 117-144; Michael KirtzV'Earl Long’s Political Rela
tions With the City of New Orleans," Louisiana History, Summer, 1969,
p. 242; Brinkley, "Huey Long, The Share Our Wealth Movement, and the
Limits of Depression Dissidence," Louisiana History, Spring, 1981, pp.
131-132; Glen Jeansonne, "Challenge to the New Deal: Huey P. Long and
the Redistribution of National Wealth," Louisiana History, Fall, 1980,
p. 332. Jeansonne maintains that the Share Our Wealth Society "fore
shadowed a national campaign designed to extend to the nation the dom
inance he [Long] exercised in Louisiana." For a brief sketch of Long’s
failure to unite with other prominent Roosevelt critics to present a
serious challenge to the president, see also Sheldon Marcus, Father
Coughlin The Tumultuous Life of the Priest of the Little Flower (Bos
ton, Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 84-85.
18
Williams, Huey Long, pp. 859-876; Luthin, American Demagogues, p.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

Long’s body lay in state in his capitol, and his funeral attracted
a crowd estimated at 125,000.

He had not forgotten the people of the

hills and hollows while in office and they did not forget him. "Huey's
Preacher," Gerald L. K. Smith, provided a forceful eulogy.

Governor

Allen, State Senate President-pro-tempore James A. Noe, State Speaker
of the House Allen J. Ellender, State Supreme Court Justice John B.
Fouraet, Long followers Robert Maestri, Seymour Weiss, and Abraham
Shushan slowly carried Long's body down the capitol steps and to a
nearby grave in the capitol gardens.

Long's belpved LSU band led by

"his" bandmaster, Castro Carazo, played his theme song "Every Man A
King" transposed into a minor key. 19

Long left behind a powerful but leaderless political organization,
and an almost mystical memory on which the organization could perpetu
ate itself.

A sizeable bloc of his hill country people virtually

canonized him and formed the foundation of continued Long machine rule.
As late as the mid-1970s, long after bifactionalism had ended in
Louisiana, campaign portraits of Huey Long still hung in places of
honor in the homes of elderly Louisianians.
A contemporary news magazine surveyed Long’s political heirs

270; Hermann B. Deutsch, The Huey Long Murder Case (Garden City, New
York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 29-135; David H. Zinnman,
The Day Huey Long Was Short, September 8, 1935 (New York, Ivan Obolen
sky, Inc., 1963), pp. 113-118, 183-192.
19Glen Jeansonne, "Partisan Parson: An Oral History Account of the
Louisiana Years of Gerald L. K. Smith," Louisiana History, Spring, 1982,
p. 153; Anne Price, To Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Louisiana
State Capitol 1932-1982 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, State Times and Morning
Advocate, 1982), p. 22; Dawson Corley, "Huey’s Capitol Idea," Louisiana
Life, January/February 1982, p. 74; Castro Carazo interviewed by T.
Harry Williams, March 26, 1961, Williams Collection.
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shortly after his death and divided them into two groups:
working behind the scenes to keep the machine

running

"insiders"

smoothly, and

"outsiders" — the vote-getting political front of the machine. 20
These two groups included "insiders" Seymour Weiss, who had handled
the Long organization money and tax payments, and Robert Maestri, Con
servation Commissioner.

"Outsiders" included Public Service Commis

sioner Wade 0. Martin, Sr., Senator James A. Noe, and Representative
Allen Ellender, but no one man in either group had an undisputed claim
to Long's mantle.

Instead, the Long machine pledged the day after

Long died to follow Governor Allen's lead when he called a caucus later
to agree upon the slate of candidates for the next year's campaign.
However, the machine soon began to fall apart.

Too many men with

strong egos and ambitions had campaigned in Huey's shadow too long.
Some observers considered Gerald Smith's eulogy to be a political
speech in which Smith attempted to establish himself as Long's politi
cal heir.

Approximately ten days after Long's death, however, Smith

persuaded Noe to rim for the governorship.

21

Even though it suffered from a lack of focal leadership, the Long
organization in late 1935 still retained numerous political assets,
among them the governorship and its attendent array of powers, as well
as the memory of Huey Long with which to appeal for the votes of the
people now enjoying the increased state services Long had provided.
on

"Mourners, Heirs, Foes," Time, September 23, 1935, pp. 14-16.

21

Zinman, The Day Huey Long Was Shot, pp. 189-190; Kane, Louisiana
Hayride, p. 153; "Schism Among Long’s Political Heirs,” The Literary
Digest, September 28, 1935.
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Just as significant for Louisiana's political future, the organization
controlled an environment ripe with opportunities for abuse of power
and public trust.

Long had almost completely obliterated the checks

and balances of the democratic process with his concentration of powers
in the office of the governor, his domination of the legislature, and
his discrediting of the state's newspapers.

Hamilton Basso observed

Long's heirs and accurately predicted what would soon unfold:

"From

now on the boys who own the cow get the cream, every ounce of it, and
the skimmed milk as well." Huey Long also had recognized the oppor
tunities for graft created by his machine's tight control of the
state, and doubted his associates' ability to withstand the temptation.
As he accurately remarked, "If those fellows ever try to use the powers
I’ve given them without me to hold them down, they’ll all land in the
22

penitentiary."

This organization settled on a ticket for the 1936 campaign
headed by New Orleans Appeals Court Judge Richard Webster Leche for
governor, and Earl Kemp Long for lieutenant-governor.

The Leche-Long

slate handily defeated that of opposition candidate Cleveland Dear of
Alexandria by drawing sixty-seven per cent of the vote in an election
Perry Howard has described as "the peak of the Long surge that had
23
scattered the Bourbon Democrats into disarray."
22

Carter, "Huey Long American Dictator," p. 357; Sindler, Huey Long’s
Louisiana, p. 128; Hamilton Basso, "The Death and Legacy of Huey
Long," The New Republic, January 1, 1936, p. 218.
23
Carter, "Huey Long American Dictator," pp. 357-358; Kane, Louisiana
Hayride, pp. 159-162; Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisi
ana (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed.
1971), p. 263; John T. Hood, Jr., "History of Courts of Appeal in Lou
isiana,” Louisiana Law Review, April, 1961, p. 552. One student of
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The new administration established itself as the true heir of
Huey Long by visibly continuing programs of public works and public
assistance.

Longites in high position also began to steal money from

the state at every opportunity, the top leaders clothing themselves
in the trappings of an aristocracy.
built lavish homes.

They dressed expensively and

They flashed rolls of $1,000 bills as an essen-

tial accouterment of a well-groomed gentleman. 24 For three years the
members of the Leche administration surveyed a state they controlled.
They made peace with Franklin Roosevelt — something Huey had never
done — and thus added more federal patronage to available state jobs.
In 1939, however, a disgruntled former member of this ruling circle,
James A. Noe, began final action that toppled the state administration
and sent shock waves all the way to Washington.
Noe broke with the organization because it failed to nominate
him for governor in 1936.

In 1937 he began collecting affidavits

certifying thefts in state government, but found himself unable to
interest the United States Justice Department because he lacked sub
stantial proof of his allegations.

Noe turned to the federal justice

system because he had no faith in state courts and prosecutors sub
servient to the Long organization.

Noe also distrusted the state's

major newspapers, "lyingnewspapers," as Huey had dubbed them, because
the Scandals period accurately observed that "Huey liked money but
loved power; ’Governor Dick' [Leche], on the other hand, liked power
but loved money." Davy Brooks, "A Turn of Events: Earl Long and The
Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940 and 1948," The Southern His
torian, Spring, 1984, p. 38.
24
Alva Johnston, "Louisiana Revolution,” Saturday Evening Post, May 11,
1940.
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many Louisianians would dismiss any corruption story as merely another
biased charge of the anti-Long newspapers' ongoing campaign against
the organization.

Noe decided, therefore, that he needed photographic

or other valid proof of his affidavits in order to prove their validity.
Subsequently, he added photographers to his staff of researchers.

At

first, their pictures proved useless because no photographs actually
showed a theft of property that could be unquestionably identified as
25
property of the state.
On June 7, 1939, however, Noe's luck changed.

The telephone in

his Monroe home rang before.daylight.that morning, and Hicks Batts of
the Louisiana State University construction department informed him
that a truck loaded with window frames was leaving a workshop at LSU
bound for the construction site of a house in Metairie owned by James
McLachlan, a colonel on Governor Leche's staff.

Noe quickly relayed

this information to the city editor of the New Orleans States, his
friend F. Edward Hebert.

Hebert assigned reporter Meigs 0. Frost and

photographer Wilfred D'Aquin to meet Noe's WNOE radio station manager
Ray Hufft who could guide them to the Metairie construction site where
they were to take clear photographs of the truck unloading its cargo
25
Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 267; George E. Simmons, "Crusading News
papers in Louisiana," Journalism Quarterly, December, 1939, pp. 325326; Elmer L. Irey and William J. Slocum, The Tax Dodgers The Inside
Story of the T-Man's War With America's Political and Underworld Hood
lums (New York, The Fireside Press, Ltd., 1949), pp. 98-99, 101; F.
Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans” The Life and
Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisi
ana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana.
1976), pp. 118-120; Betty Marie Field, "The Politics of the New Deal
in Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1973), p. 397.
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on private property.

They found the truck on the highway and followed

it to the McLachlan house.
and parked their car.

There they drove around a street comer

Frost remained in the car to keep the motor

running in case they needed to escape quickly, while D'Aquin and Hufft
crawled through a vacant lot and took the photographs from the cover
of high weeds.

D’Aquin had to crawl partially from the cover provided

by the weeds in order to use his bulky Graflex camera properly.

A

horse pastured in a vacant lot watched them intently, causing Hufft
to fear they would be detected.
materials.

The workers continued unloading the

The truck bore no identifying marks, and the rear license

plate was smeared with mud, but photographs of the front of the truck
revealed the license number which States researchers traced to LSU
through records in the secretary of state's office.
meticulously checked every angle of the story.

The States staff

They traced the license

numbers of several automobiles parked at the construction site and
found that their owners worked for George Caldwell, LSU superintendent
of construction.

Additional contacts with the men’s relatives re

vealed that they were in New Orleans "on a job."

Jefferson Parish

assessment records revealed that the construction site belonged to
Mrs. James McLachlan.

Finally, neighbors in the Metairie suburb con-

firmed that the McLachlans were indeed building the house. 26
Hebert and McMillan, ’’Last of the Titans, pp. 123-124; Kane, Louisi
ana Hayride, pp. 267-268; Irey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, pp. 101102; Field, "The Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," pp. 397-398;
Simmons, "Crusading Newspapers in Louisiana,” p. 326; John Wilds,
Afternoon Story: A Century of the New Orleans States—Item (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, Louisiana State University Press, 1976), pp. 239-240; Alva
Johnston, "The Camera Trapped Them," Saturday Evening Post, June 15,
1940, p. 22; New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 26, 1939.
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Hebert delayed the story for two days while his staff re-checked
the facts, and then published a page-one article which carefully de
tailed the episode and caused a sensation throughout the state.
attempted to explain away the apparent wrongdoing.

Leche

He declared that

the sale of LSU products to individuals was not unusual, citing the
public sale of LSU dairy products as an example.

Other state officials

clearly contradicted each other as they desperately attempted to cover
themselves.

Leche maintained that the McLachlans purchased the window

frame materials at a commercial lumber yard, that university workers
constructed the window frames while otherwise unemployed, and that the
McLachlans used their private funds to pay them for their work.
George Caldwell, when asked whether he could verify the governor’s
statements, replied that "My (record) books were open once, but they’re
closed now." LSU President Dr. James Monroe Smith later stated in a
news conference that the McLachlan work done in the LSU carpentry shop
was not in accordance with LSU policy, a contradiction of Leche's
statement made six days earlier.

Smith also commented that Caldwell
27
must have been "befuddled" about the record books.
In addition to Noe’s private investigation which led to the
States revelation, United States Treasury Department officials also
had kept a watchful eye on Longite state officials since the 1937
settlement of income tax claims against them.

In 1938, Rufus W.

Fontenot, collector of Internal Revenue at New Orleans, convinced

^Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," pp. 126,127; Kane,
Louisiana Hayride, pp. 269-270; Johnston, "The Camera Trapped Them,"
p. 22; New Orleans States, June 13-15, 1939.
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Elmer Irey of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Washington to resume
an active investigation of Louisiana*s politicos.

By mid-1939 special

agent James M. Cooner found that Dr. Smith had spent sums of money far
in excess of his salary.

Subsequent investigations revealed that

Smith had obtained sizeable sums of public money for his personal use:
he had sold $130,000 worth of stock in 1938; he purchased 2,000,000
bushels of wheat and pledged as collateral $500,000 in mostly unauthor
ized and unsold (occasionally completely forged) LSU bonds.

Smith’s

salary at this time totaled $10,000 per year. 28
Irregularities at LSU proved to be only the tip of a system of
statewide corruption unequaled in Louisiana history.

Even Louisi

anians, long used to venality in their state officials, had had enough.
J. J. Foumet, president of the Louisiana Police Jury Association, ob
served even before the States revelation that " . . . due to the weak
ness of human flesh and the great pleasures and the many luxuries that
money does buy, men in public life, in too many instances, are unable
to resist successfully always the evil influences of a money-mad age,
and are selling our people down the river.” Following the first reve
lations, the Board of Directors of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce
called on President Roosevelt, Congress, and the Attorney General of
the United States to conduct a thoroughinvestigation for the purpose
of "bringing to light . . . every misdeed affecting the good State of
Louisiana." Other Louisianians expressed their disgust in diverse
OQ

Irey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, pp. 99-100; Hebert and McMillan,
"Last of the Titans,” p. 126; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 275-279;
Field, "The Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," pp. 398-399.
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ways.

A correspondent using the pseudonym "John Gauthier" wrote to

Hammond attorney James H. Morrison, "They have stole (sic) even the
stink from the pole cat."

The Scandals also inspired at least one

Louisiana poet to compose the following doggerel verses on the subject:
Sing a song of monkey money
Pocket full of swag
Four and twenty blackguards
Caught in a bag
And when the bag was opened
They all began to moan
’Headed for Atlanta (the nearest federal prison)
But not there a l o n e . ’ 2 9
The federal government quickly responded to the developing situ
ation in Louisiana with a full investigation headed by 0. John Rogge,
chief of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, who commanded a
force of seventeen treasury agents.

Together with postal inspectors

and other federal investigators, Rogge came to Louisiana with the in
tention of prosecuting errant state officials on charges of income
tax evasion.

When he began his investigation, however, he found that

most machine leaders had been painstakingly honest in reporting their
incomes, from whatever sources, just to prevent the kind of indict
ments Rogge envisioned.

As Rufus Fontenot informed Elmer Irey:

"All

we did (in the 1937 tax evasion cases) was to teach 'em (sic) to cut
29
Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 264; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the
Titans," p. 124; J. J. Fournet, "A Message From President Fournet,"
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1939, p. 3; Minutes of the Meeting
of the Board of Directors of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce, July
13, 1939, (microfilm copy, Microform Room, Troy H. Middleton Library,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana); "John Gauthier"
to James H. Morrison, August 6, 1939, poem, n.d., 1939, James H. Mor
rison Papers, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana
University, Hammond, Louisiana.
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Uncle Sam in on their graft."30
State officials had been less careful with state money.

The new

business manager at LSU, Troy H. Middleton, found in late June, 1939,
that "We didn’t know whom we owed, if we owed anyone." University
officials had placed all income into one fund from which they made
all expenditures without bids, purchase orders, or full knowledge of
the status of the budget.

Rogge discovered, however, that some state

officials had made mistakes which would enable him to prosecute them
for violation of federal mail fraud laws.

He prosecuted James Monroe

Smith, Seymour Weiss, and three others on this charge because the
check for $75,000 they had received in a fraudulent deal (the Bien
ville Hotel case in which the University paid twice for the building's
furniture) was mailed from a bank in New Orleans to a bank in Baton
Rouge after being cashed.

The court held that the use of the mails

in this way was a direct result of the cashing of the check by one of
the defendants, and all were convicted. 31
The details of

the Bienville Hotel case revealed the intricate

maneuverings by which private individuals profited from public office
and political connections.
ville Hotel, "lock,

The case stemmed from the

saleof the Bien

stock, and barrel, ready for immediateoccupancy,"

OQ

Jerry Purvis Sanson, "The Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940"
(M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1975), p. 29; Irey and Slo
cum, The Tax Dodgers, p. 99; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 335-337;
Field, "The Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," p. 400; TimesPicayune, June 26, 28, 1939.
31Alva Johnston, "They Sent a Letter," Saturday Evening Post, June 22,
1940, p. 29; Frank James Price, Troy H. Middleton A Biography (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 128-133.
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to LSU for use as a dormitory for student nurses studying at the LSU
Medical Center in New Orleans.

The state subsequently purchased the

hotel's furnishings a second time.

Prosecutors charged that on or

about October 20, 1936, Smith drew a check for $75,000 on LSU funds
deposited in City National Bank in Baton Rouge, ostensibly to pay for
the furniture of the Bienville Hotel, which the state had already
bought.

He made the check payable to the National Equipment Company

and gave it to Monte E. Hart, former co-owner of the Bienville, at an
undetermined location in East Baton Rouge Parish.

Hart brought the

check with him to New Orleans and cashed it at the City Branch of the
Whitney National Bank where he received $25,000 in cash and deposited
$50,000 to the credit of the National Equipment Company.

He then gave

the $25,000 cash to J. Emory Adams (Mrs. Smith's nephew) in New Orleans.
Adams divided the money with Smith in an unspecified location, Smith
receiving $14,000 while Adams kept the rest.

Meanwhile, Hart drew a

$25,000 check on the National Equipment Company funds made payable to
Louis C. LeStage, a Standard Oil Company lobbyist, who subsequently
gave $16,000 to Seymour Weiss, former Bienville co-owner along with
Hart, at the Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans.

After the investigators

had exposed these questionable dealings, Smith and the others were
charged with a bill of information in Orleans Parish where Hart cashed
the check.

The defendants protested that jurisdiction was improper,

that the alleged crime had occurred in East Baton Rouge Parish where
Smith had given Hart the check, and that the trial should be moved
there (where the defendants had a more friendly district judge). The
trial judge overruled their motion, but the Louisiana Supreme Court
agreed that LSU lost the funds when City National Bank paid the check
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in Baton Rouge, and that Smith was responsible for the funds in Baton
Rouge where they had been entrusted to him.
moved to Baton Rouge.

The trial was ordered

Nevertheless, all defendants were convicted. 32

The investigations and subsequent indictments continued through
out the summer and fall of 1939.

The splashiest of the Scandals trials

occurred in June, 1940, when Governor Richard Leche himself went to
court.

Leche was charged with participating in several illegal deals,

including irregularities in the construction of Leche Hall, an admini
stration building at Louisiana Technological Institute at Ruston.
His trial, however, focused on a kick-back scheme with an Alexandria
automobile dealer named George Younger.
in 1937 for a profit of $57,931.06.

Younger had sold 138 trucks

In 1938 he sold only 95 trucks,

some to the state, for a profit of $53,349.50.

In addition, he re

ceived a $5,000 "refund" on state sales tax payments.
ted that Louisiana must have "tax-paying in reverse.").

(Rogge commen
Younger testi

fied that he paid James Thomas, a lobbyist and friend of the late Huey
Long, a $53,000 "commission" on the sales.

Thomas then stated that

he gave $31,000 of the money to Leche and distributed the rest among
legislators.

Leche in his testimony fatally damaged his own defense.

He denied receiving the $31,000 from th'e Younger truck deal, but ad
mitted under Rogge’s relentless questioning that he had received
$67,000 in an oil deal with Seymour Weiss, and that his $75,000 St.
Tammany parish home had cost him personally only $10,000.

Leche also

32
Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 336-337; State of Louisiana v. James
Monroe Smith, Et. Als., No. 35,603 Supreme Court of Louisiana, John B.
Fournet Papers, Troy H. Middleton Library, Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
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admitted that he had received an $11,000 yacht bought with Conservation
Department funds and presented to him as a gift from "friends," and
that the sale of Huey Long’s old newspaper, The Progress, had made him
$215,000 profit.33
Despite his protestations of innocence, Leche was convicted and
sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

He entered the Atlanta Federal

Penitentiary on December 31, 1941. 34 Following a disbarment trial at
which Leche again denied any involvement in the Younger deal, and at
which Mrs. Leche testified that at the time of the alleged deal in
1938 she and her husband were out of state, the Louisiana State Bar
Association struck Leche's name from the roll of practicing attorneys.
The Bar in its petition stated that Leche had been convicted of a
felony in a United States District Court, was serving his sentence,
and that his name should therefore be removed from the roll.

The

petition, however, did not cite any of the specific facts upon which
the conclusion could be drawn that Leche was guilty of misconduct.
The Bar Association instead relied on the general contention that a
convicted felon should not be a practicing attorney.

The Louisiana

Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bar Association, but Justice John
B. Fournet, a Long stalwart, produced a dissenting opinion which
stated that the Bar Association should present evidence of each act
which had resulted in Leche's imprisonment so that Leche could
33Irey and Slocum, The Tax Dodgers, p. Ill; Kane, Louisiana Hayride,
p. 333; Times-Picayune, June 12, 1940.
34Times-Picayune, June 12, 1940; Shreveport Journal, November 14, 1941;
Town Talk, December 30, 1941, March 17, 1943.
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adequately prepare his defense. 35
Leche remained in prison until June 27, 1945, when he was re
leased from the federal penitentiary in Texarkana, Texas, following
three and one-half years' incarceration.

At the time of his release,

the United States Attorney in New Orleans, Herbert W. Christenberry,
announced that the government had dropped two of its remaining charges
against him (one involved a questionable LSU landscaping deal in which
an original bid of $45,855.68 mysteriously escalated to $122,000; the
other involved "Ruth," the 40-foot yacht he received from "friends").
But the justice department did not drop charges that Leche had con
spired to violate the Connally "Hot Oil" Act.

Leche, Seymour Weiss,

and Freeman W. Burford had allegedly produced through the Pelican Oil
and Gas Company 488,000 barrels of illegal oil above the allowable
production from thirteen wells in the Rodessa field in northwest
Louisiana.

Leche's share evidently amounted to 10 cents per barrel

of oil and a share of the pipeline profits, a total of $67,000.

Leche,

however, was never tried on these charges and eventually received a
full pardon in 1953 from President Harry S. Truman.

36

35Louisiana State Bar Association v. Richard W. Leche, Supreme Court
of Louisiana No. 36,352, Fournet Papers.
36
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 29, 1945; States, May 23, June
28-29, 1945; Town Talk, June 28, 1945; Times-Picayune, January 24,
1953; Field, "Politics of the New Deal in Louisiana," p. 403. Tru
man's pardon of Leche led some observers to recall Truman's own politi
cal beginnings associated with the corrupt Pendergast machine in
Kansas City, Missouri.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

Leche maintained throughout his ordeal that he was a martyr suf
fering at the hands of the conservatives who were never able to defeat
Huey Long.

He tried repeatedly to portray the investigators and news

papers uncovering the Scandals as villains attacking him because he
was a friend of Huey and the poor people.

The newspapers, he said,

"ignore completely the true facts of which they were aware, and pub
lish instead a story containing cheap and untrue insinuations . . . "
Just before he entered federal prison, he quite accurately remarked:
It was no easy task to succeed an unusual
individual like Huey Long. Nor, was it
easier to placate, to the great advantage
of the state, the enemies he accumulated.
It was by no mean achievement to bring
peace to a state torn by eight years of
bitter political strife and to restore
amity to our relations with the national
government.37
Leche received support from his friends in organized labor.

A

pro-Leche booklet circulated in 1941 asked, "Why is Labor’s Best
Friend Being Crucified in Louisiana?" and answered, "The Demagogues
Want Him Incarcerated.

Ten Years Imprisonment on a Technicality.

Political Vengeance Was Satisfied." Many more Louisianians, however,
agreed with a poem in the Louisiana Bumble Bee which caustically com
mented

37
Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 126; Town Talk,
December 30, 1941.
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Tokens here and shakedowns there
Has (sic) made Brother Dick a m i l l i o n a i r e . ^
The major newspapers also felt no hesitation at probing further
into the state's sordid affairs.

As each day brought forth a new

scandal, journalists kept the state's attention riveted on the docu
ment.

Their attitude is best summarized in a Times-Picayune edi

torial:
By misuse of his sweeping powers, Governor Leche
made himself largely responsible for the scanda
lous record compiled during and under his admin
istration. He set an evil example which wrought
great mischief and might have had disastrous
consequences but for the timely exposures and
punishments of those who aided in its setting.
. . . in the case of the governor who profited
financially from the scandalous practices that
flourished under his administration and then
strove so desperately to avoid sharing the con
sequences with other convicted offenders, com
ment upon the vindication of justice seems a
public d u t y . 29
Dr. James Monroe Smith became Louisiana's other most celebrated
felon besides Leche.

Smith's imprisonment included both state and

federal incarcerations.

He entered the Louisiana State Penitentiary

at Angola on November 18, 1939, attired in a regulation denim suit
38
Michael J. Cousins, ed., Organized Labor's Tribute to the Record
of Governor Richard W. Leche The Record Speaks for Itself (New Or
leans, n.p., November, 1941), Fournet Papers; The Louisiana Bumble
Bee, n.d., clipping in Richard W. Leche Papers, Department of Archives
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge.
39Simmons, "Crusading Newspapers in Louisiana," pp. 325-333; TimesPicayune, December 30, 1941.
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with three-inch-wide black and white stripes - The former status of
the new prisoner failed to impress Warden L. A. Jones, who announced
that Smith would cut sugar cane for harvest and that he "will be
given the same treatment as any other prisoner, no better and no
worse." On November 14, 1944, the pardon board recommended a commu
tation of Smith's sentence, and Angola warden D. D. Bayer announced
that he would recommend a "double good time" early release.

These

actions reduced Smith's original eight to twenty-four year sentence to
twelve years and made him eligible for parole in thirty days.

Governor

Jimmie Davis announced on April 3, 1945, that he had released Smith on
recommendation of the state pardon board and commuted his sentence to
time already served.

Nevertheless, Smith still faced a detainer from

the federal government to serve a 30-month sentence on conviction for
income tax evasion.

He left Angola on April 5, 1945, and went im

mediately to federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia.

He received a parole

from the United States Parole Board in Washington, D.C., on January
10, 1946, and left Atlanta on February 5.

Following his release,

Smith returned to Angola as director of rehabilitation and worked
there until his death in June, 1949.

Smith applied his long training

in education to reforming the prison's work policies, attempting to
institute a careful screening program to direct prisoners into jobs
which would prepare them for legitimate occupations upon release.
Lack of state support limited the success of his work, however.

40

40
Mark T. Carleton, Politics and Punishment The History of the Louisi
ana State Penal System (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1971), pp. 135, 148-149; New Orleans Item, November 20,
1939, April 4, November 5, 1945, January 17, February 21, 1946; Morning
Advocate, November 15, 1944, April 4, 6, 1945, January 18, 1946. While
at the federal prison in Atlanta, Smith taught correspondence courses
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In his statement issued just before entering prison, Richard
Leche had remarked that "I am happy that .... the vast improvements
attained during my administration will long outlast the ten years I
am about to serve for an offense which I never committed."

Investiga

tion of the record, however, reveals that Leche’s administration
achieved only a mixed success in "vast improvements."

It did continue

traditional Longite construction and state service programs.

Typi

cally, while members of the administration enriched themselves at state
expense, they neglected to provide adequate facilities or services for
many of the most unfortunate of Louisiana's citizens —
state mental hospitals and prisons.

inmates of the

A thorough investigation of Cen

tral Louisiana State Hospital at Pineville and the East Louisiana
State Hospital at Jackson, both treatment centers for mental patients,
conducted by State Supervisor of Public Funds Jerome Hayes in 1941,
revealed that at Central between December 1938, and November, 1940
some "employees" carried on the payroll performed no work; that pur
chases totaling $117,706.10 were made without public bids; and that
over $10,000 was due the state from non-indigent patients.

During

that same period, athletic contests for the patients were dropped,
the poultry farm abandoned, and patients housed in old firetraps
equipped with improperly-maintained fire extinguishers.

Trash blocked

fire escapes, and helpless and elderly patients were assigned to
third-floor rooms.

Hayes' investigation found patient care as inade

quate as the physical facilities at both hospitals.
study stated:

As one recent

"Wade Long's administration at Jackson was, simply

in English to inmates of other federal prisons.
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stated, an abomination." Agricultural land became weedlots, the or
chards lay abandoned, fields were rented out and equipment sold.
Recreation for patients was discontinued.
unplayable.

The tennis courts became

Even the simple recreation provided by reading rooms and

organized walks was dropped.

Moving pictures were no longer shown

after Long argued with the Jackson citizen who owned the projector
and promptly reclaimed it.

As at Central, fire fighting equipment

was not in good repair and no practice fire drills were conducted. 41
Unfortunately, the reformers did not immediately correct condi
tions in the state's mental hospitals.

In September 1940, four months

after Sam Jones became governor, expenditures for food at East Louisi
ana State Hospital fell to 10.6<? per day per patient.

Cooking equip

ment included only six steam-jacketed boilers, so that only boiled
food could be prepared.

Beef stew and greens sometimes were served

for thirty days at a time.

By August 1941, however, Jones' admini

stration had raised the number of acres in cultivation at Jackson
from 40 to 1200 and had let contracts for over $100,000 in new equip
ment and physical improvements.
on profit.

The focus, however, continued to be

The state made $622.23 in May 1941; $1,942.49 in June;

and $2,366.95 in July.42
Just as Louisiana's mental patients were mistreated, so were its
convicts.

Huey Long set the tone for his machine’s penal administra

tion when he hired Robert L. "Tighty" Himes as general manager of the
4^Richard Lawrence Gordon, "The Development of Louisiana's Public Men
tal Health Institutions, 1735-1940," Volume II (Ph.D. dissertation,
Louisiana State University, 1978), pp. 438-441.
/o
Morning Advocate, September 18, 1940; Town Talk, August 26, 1941.
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Louisiana State Penitentiary in 1931.

He praised Himes for "the close

manner in which he has guarded every fund and every property of
(Louisiana State) University . . '. that is the kind of man we need at
the penitentiary." Long endeavored to maintain the prison as cheaply
as possible at whatever cost in prisoner labor or treatment.
cessors continued his policy.

His suc

By 1940 their goals for the prison in

cluded keeping the prisoners securely behind bars and making the
prison "as light a burden on the tax-payers as possible."
no mention to reform or rehabilitation.

They gave

Concentration on discipline

and control led to beatings administered by guards to prisoners during
Longite control as a result of which about forty died. 43
Even though the Long machine often presented itself as the friend
of the common people of Louisiana, obviously certain groups were ex
cluded from this friendship, quite probably for practical political
reasons.

The mental patients and prisoners did not vote, and rela

tively few of the general voting population ever witnessed conditions
which existed in the mental hospitals or the prison.

Money spent on

highways and public buildings was much more visible and thus worth
more politically.
During the summer and fall of 1939 these shortcomings were over
shadowed by the Scandals which were the top news story and topic of
conversation in Louisiana.

The Scandals had broken just as Louisiana

began the 1939-1940 gubernatorial campaign.

Louisiana politics is

_

Carleton, Politics and Punishment, pp. 126-134; States, June 25,
1941.
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seldom dull, but the revelation of the Scandals added to the normal
factional stridency.

In addition, the vibrant campaign style of such

1940 candidates as Earl Long and James H. Morrison, produced a rowdy
campaign even by Louisiana standards.
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CHAPTER II
THE 1939-1940 LOUISIANA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
The Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of 1939-1940 was a major
point of departure in the state's political history.

Before Sam

Jones' victory over incumbent Governor Earl Long in February, 1940,
anti-Long Democrats had been merely an impotent minority protesting
political and fiscal abuses within state government.

While Huey

Long’s election to the governorship in 1928 spawned a sharply polarized
political system in which recognizable "pro-Long" and "anti-Long" fac
tions within the Democratic party vied for control, it was Jones' elec
tion that proved that the Long political machine was not invincible;
that reformers within the state Democratic party could at last carry
the anti-Long banner in Louisiana and win a state-wide election.

The

1940 contest ushered in two decades of competitive bifactionalism.
During the next five hard-fought state campaigns, both factions were
viable contenders for capturing control of the state government, al
though the only one to elect two successive governors during the next
twenty years was the anti-Long reform group, which elected James H.
Davis to follow Jones in 1944.

The Longs recaptured the state govern

ment in 1948, lost to the reformers in 1952, but returned to power in
1956.

The 1939-1940 campaign and election, therefore, initiated an

evolution of modern Louisiana one-party Democratic politics into a
close approximation of the traditional American two-party system.
The major issue of the 1939-1940 campaign was unquestionably the
Louisiana Scandals which unfolded just as the campaign began.

Other

issues arose before the first Democratic primary in January 1940 —
34
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the beginning of World War II abroad, military records of the candi
dates during World War I, continued apparent corruption in Earl Long's
short administration, and eventually the race issue — but the pri
mary issue remained the Long machine's systematic looting of state re
sources while Richard Leche had been governor.
The gubernatorial candidate most damaged by the corruption issue
was Huey’s younger brother, Earl Long.

Machine leaders had selected

Earl to run for lieutenant-governor in the 1936 election because of
his name and his close kinship to the martyred Huey.

In 1939 they

chose him as their gubernatorial candidate largely by default.
Earl Long was born August 26, 1895, in a log house other than the
one in which Huey had been born.

(Huey Long, Sr.'s family lived in

three log houses before he built his two-story frame home in Winnfield.)
Earl recalled in later years that they were closer than any other two
members of the family.
student.

While in school, Huey proved to be the better

He had a fondness for learning that Earl lacked, even though

the younger Long was capable of learning much about a subject if it
interested him.

Earl was also more inclined toward physical violence

than was Huey.^
Earl became involved in Huey’s political career from the begin
ning.

In the 1918 contest for a seat on the Railroad Commission and

*Earl Long, "Last of the Red-Hot Poppas," (phonograph recording)
(Baton Rouge, News Records, Inc., 1961); Richard B. McCaughan, Socks
on a Rooster Louisiana's Earl K. Long (Baton Rouge, Claitor's Book
Store, 1967), pp. 8, 14-15, 19-20; G. Dupre Litton, The Wizard of Winn
field (New York, Carlton Press, Inc., 1982), p. 12; Morgan D. Peoples,
"Earl Kemp Long: The Man From Pea Patch Farm," Louisiana History, Fall
1976, p. 385; Parker Long, Sr., and Harley Bozeman interviewed by Joe
Tullier, July 21, 1966, Oral History Collection, Louisiana State Uni
versity at Alexandria.
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in the 1924 gubernatorial race, Earl performed yeoman work tacking up
signs, distributing posters and leaflets, and learning the fundamental
rules and tactics of politics.

Following study at Loyola University,

Earl was admitted to the Louisiana bar, even though he had not ac
quired a law degree.

In 1928, following Huey's gubernatorial election,

Earl became attorney for the state inheritance tax collector in New
Orleans, a political "plum" because even though Earl received over
$14,000 yearly salary, the duties of the job were so light that he
spent most of his time in Baton Rouge performing political odd jobs
for Huey.^
Despite the closeness of their boyhood years and their early
years together, the two brothers found themselves publicly at odds
in 1932.

In 1931 Earl decided the time had come for him to run for

public office, and he asked Huey to support his gubernatorial candi
dacy.

Huey refused, and also refused to support Earl in a campaign

for the lieutenant-governor’s post.

Huey maintained later that he was

being criticized enough for trying to create a personal dictatorship
in Louisiana, and therefore he could not support his brother for a
state office.

Also, Huey was already committed to Oscar K. Allen's

candidacy for the governorship, and he was too shrewd a politician
to place two men from the same parish at the head of his ticket.
Nevertheless, Earl ran a futile independent campaign for lieutenant~~2

McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, p. 14; Litton, The Wizard of Winnfield, p. 15; Margaret Dixon, "Governor Earl K. Long," Baton Rouge
Morning Advocate Magazine Section, May 9, 1948, p. 7; T. Harry
Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 315-316.
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governor against Huey’s candidate, state senator John B. Foumet.

o

The bitter feelings caused by the 1931—1932 campaign surfaced
during United States Senate investigations into alleged improprieties
in the 1932 election of John H. Overton of Alexandria, Huey's candi
date for Edwin S. Broussard's Senate seat.

The Senate eventually de

cided to seat Overton, but the hearings provided a public forum in
which Huey and Earl each attempted to blacken the reputation of the
other.

Earl testified that Huey had stolen votes during a 1930 elec

tion and that he gave and took bribes.

Huey often shouted during

Earl’s testimony, "That’s a d(amned) lie!", to which Earl replied
sharply, "I stood with you as long as I could, but you run (sic)
wild!" After his break with Huey, Earl was no longer attorney for
the inheritance tax collector, but in 1932 became Louisiana counsel
for a Hew Deal agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.

By 1934

the brothers had reconciled, and both helped elect Foumet to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.

Earl also returned to a state job as counsel

to the State Tax Commission.
Huey's death in 1935.

They continued on amicable terms until

When he heard that his brother had been shot,

Earl rushed from Winnfield to Baton Rouge where he visited Huey on
4
his deathbed.
3
McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 39-40; Litton, The Wizard of Winn
field, pp. 13-14; Huey P. Long, Every Man a King The Autobiography of
Huey P. Long (New Orleans, National Book Company, Inc., 1933), pp.
260-262; Russell B. Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB,
January 9, 1984.
4
McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 39-40, 42-54, 57, 270-282; Litton,
The Wizard of Winnfield, pp. 13-14; Stan Opotowsky, The Longs of Lou
isiana (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1960), p. 139; Russell B.
Long interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, January 9, 1984.
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Following his return to favor, Earl could not be ignored by the
Long machine leaders who met to choose a ticket for the 1936 election.
Some of them were uneasy with his forceful personality and refused him
the gubernatorial nomination, choosing instead the more polished and
urbane Richard Leche, but offered Earl the second spot on the ticket.^
Earl Long served a relatively uneventful term as lieutenantgovernor from his inauguration in May 1936 until June 1939.

He re

mained in the background while the dapper Leche and his associates ran
the state and filled their bank accounts.

The question of Earl's in

volvement in any of the Scandals remains unresolved.

If he was not

involved in the corruption, why did he not report it or move more
forcefully against it in 1939? Allan Sindler answers this question
by maintaining that Earl hoped to be elected governor in 1940 and
feared that Leche might not endorse him.

Earl knew that he could not

win the governorship without the support of either Leche o.r the state
machine headed by Robert Maestri.

Because he did not wish to lose

either of these potential sources of support, Earl kept quiet about
whatever he knew of corruption.

The fact that Earl himself was a top

member of the administration should not be overlooked.

It would have

been difficult and politically unwise for him to expose his associates.
Earl Long was not convicted for any offense arising from the
Scandals, but he was indicted along with four other officials for
allegedly ordering that ten people employed by the New Orleans dock

^McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, pp. 57-58; Litton, The Wizard of
Winnfield, p. 15; Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hayride The American
Rehearsal for Dictatorship 1928—1940 (New York, William Morrow & Com
pany, 1941; reprint ed., Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Company,
1971), p. 154.
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board just before the second Democratic primary in 1940 be paid whether
or not they appeared for work.

The indictment was later quashed be

cause it was improperly worded, and the case was not revived.

Never

theless, Long had to defend himself for the rest of his political life
from charges that he had profited at state expense during his lieuten
ant-governorship.

During the 1939-1940 campaign, for example, Andrew

P. Tugwell charged that Long had "supplied LSU, the Normal College,
the Pineville Asylum, and possibly other institutions with a large
part of their pork and beef requirements."

James Domengeaux charged

during the 1948 gubernatorial campaign that Earl Long had absconded
with $500,000 during the Scandals period but had escaped prosecution
because the federal government was too involved in more important
cases in Louisiana and because the war also brought an end to the in
vestigations.

The effect on the voters caused by the aura of corrup

tion surrounding Earl Long is graphically illustrated by a letter Mrs.
Mary Flogel wrote to James H. Morrison in 1939:

"Its (sic) a lots

(sic) of voters around here (Tunica) certainly dont (sic) want Earl
long (sic) for Governor becaus (sic) he was with the crowed (sic) when
they were doing the Stealing (sic) & wouldnt (sic) open his mouth
g

untile (sic) they were caught . . . "

Despite his apparent innocence,

Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana State Politics 1920-1952
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 145; New Orleans TimesPicayune, July 30, 1939, July 24, 26, August 8, 1940; Times-Picayune
New Orleans States, July 28, 1940; Morning Advocate, October 3, Decem
ber 12, 1940; "New Light on Earl's Record," Radio Address by Congress
man James Domengeaux, typescript copy, William Walter Jones Collection
of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
(hereinafter cited as Jones Collection); Mrs. Mary Flogel to James H.
Morrison, December 10, 1939, James H. Morrison Collection, Center for
Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, Hammond, Louisiana
(hereinafter cited as Morrison Collection).
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Earl Long bore a large measure of the public blame for the Scandals.
Just after the McLachlan window frame story broke and the investi
gation into Dr. James Monroe Smith's personal finances surfaced,
rumors that Governor Richard Leche planned to resign from office be
gan to surface on June 22, 1939, around both Baton Rouge and Washing
ton, D.C. Leche maintained that his health no longer permitted him to
remain in office.^ Many people in Louisiana, however, suspected that
Leche hoped to fade quietly into the background without further in
volvement in the Scandals.
After he decided to resign, Leche set state administration law
yers to work researching the correct procedure for resigning the
Louisiana governorship.

Only one Louisiana governor had resigned be

fore 1939 — Thomas Boling Robertson, elected in 1820, resigned in
1822 — but records of how he technically completed the action had
been lost.

Following discussion of several harebrained schemes,

Leche decided that he would merely resign by issuing a proclamation

Leche apparently did have health problems with chronic arthritis.
In letters he received early in 1939, months before any hint of the
Scandals, his correspondents either mentioned his poor health or sent
hopes that he was feeling better. Also, Leche told an interviewer in
February, 1939, that he suffered "a million shooting pains" in his
legs and had recently been bedridden because of them. Governor Albert
B. (Happy) Chandler to Leche, January 18, 1939; W. W. Cunningham to
Leche, January 29, 1939; Earle Christenberry to Leche, February 14,
1939; D. M. Ellison to Charles M. Colvin, February 23, 1939; E. A.
Conway, Sr. to Leche, March 9, 1939; New York Journal and American,
February 25, 1939, Richard W. Leche Papers, Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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that he was no longer governor.

(He was upstaged in his resignation,

however, by the surprise resignation of LSU president Dr. James Monroe
Smith who had no such technicalities of resignation to worry about.)
Nevertheless, Leche signed his formal resignation and issued his dec
laration that he was no longer governor on June 26, 1939. Leche’s
resignation led to Earl Long’s inauguration to the first of his three
terms as governor.

Leche undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief as he

commented "It's all yours now, Earl." The new governor in his first
official statement characteristically captured the mood of the Louisi
ana public and announced that his new administration would take as its
motto a text from the book of Proverbs:

"Better a little with righ

teousness than great riches without right."
statement," an anonymous observer remarked.

"That’s a significant

9

Even though Earl Long quickly settled into the governor's office,
he did not immediately receive the full endorsement of all the Longite
allies.

Through much of September, 1939, some of the New Orleans

Old Regulars expressed displeasure at the prospect of automatically
endorsing him.

One faction thought the New Orleans component of the

Long machine was becoming increasingly subordinate to the state organ
ization and suggested that the city and state groups should settle on
g

One rejected scheme called for Leche to leave the state and have
then-acting-governor Earl Long appoint him a justice of the peace so
that when he took the oath for that office he would vacate the gover
nor’s chair. Another scheme, still bizarre, but not quite so circui
tous as the first, called for the attorney general to appoint Leche
as his assistant so that again Leche would vacate the governor's office
when he accepted another state job.
9McCaughan, Socks on a Rooster, p. 65; Times-Picayune, June 23, 25,
27-28, 1939.
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a compromise candidate-

An even more extreme group favored the Old

Regulars splitting with the Long machine entirely and supporting an
independent candidate.

Concurrently, "some of the North Louisiana

hoys" announced that a permanent alliance with the Old Regulars might
not have been in the best interest of the state machine.

Long’s

position was affirmed, however, on September 21, when a caucus of
state administration leaders endorsed him as their candidate for
governor.

Old Regular leaders present at the meeting interpreted a

separate endorsement of New Orleans city attorney Francis Bums for
attorney general as a compromise in their favor.^
Although his chances appeared to be improving, Governor Long
recognized that the linchpin in any agreement between the Old Regulars
and the Louisiana Democratic Association would be New Orleans mayor
and LDA president Robert Maestri.

(One New Orleans magazine remarked

that Maestri was "the man [Long] probably admires most in the state.")
Long announced on September 4, probably with more hope than concrete
assurance, that none of his opponents could bring "power enough on
earth" to keep Maestri from supporting him.

The night after the state

association caucus had endorsed him, Long traveled to New Orleans to
confer with Old Regular leaders.During late night meetings with
Maestri and other leaders from St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson
parishes, Long discussed a possible special session of the legislature
to repeal one of Huey’s state laws depriving sheriffs of control over
hiring and firing their deputies, a law which the local political

^New Orleans Item, September 3, 5, 17, 20, 22, 1939.
**Ibid., September 5, 23, 1939; The Punch, July 1939, p. 7.
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leaders disliked.

The Old Regulars, though, extracted even further

concessions in exchange for their support.

The deal eventually struck

between the two sides obliged the Old Regulars to support Long in the
1939-1940 governor’s race in exchange for Long’s promise of a special
legislative session to repeal a number of state laws offensive to
local interests which had been enacted during Huey’s, Allen’s, and
Leche’s administrations — and Long’s promise to support Old Regular
candidates in the 1942 New Orleans city campaign. 12
Despite their seeming agreement, Earl Long worked feverishly un
til almost mid-October keeping Old Regular support.

On October 10 he

held an all-night conference with Old Regular ward leaders at Maestri’s
Roosevelt Hotel suite.

He met with each ward leader individually be

cause he feared that an open caucus would permit those opposed to his
candidacy to convince those still wavering to withdraw their support.
A majority of the Old Regular leaders reportedly assured him that they
could carry their wards for him, but a small group scattered throughout
the city told him that they considered him a negative candidate.
Nevertheless, they agreed to support Long because of a previous agree
ment with Leche, Maestri, and Allen Ellender to support state associ
ation candidates in 1939-1940 in exchange for state support for the
Old Regulars in the 1942 campaign.

As a result of this series of

meetings, and in order to smooth over any remaining problems, the
two sides created a steering committee composed of Dr. Joseph A. O’Hara
of the state board of health, Edmund Burke, first ward representative

TF~
Item,

September 24, October 11, 1939.
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from the LDA, Old Regular vice-chairman James Reilly, Commissioner of
Public Property Joseph J. Skelly, and James Comisky, the third ward
Old Regular Leader.

Long met with Skelly and Comisky the next day at

his Jung Hotel suite in an attempt to keep them from endorsing one of
three anti-administration candidates reportedly seeking their help.
When asked whether the Old Regulars would support him, Long replied,
"I don't know." The next day, however, the Old Regulars and the Old
Regular women's organization endorsed Long, the women's organization
pointedly noting in its resolution that "through all of the storms
of scandal that have rocked the state (he) remains untouched and his
honesty unquestioned. . ."13
Harmony had apparently been restored between the LDA and the Old
Regulars by late October.

A joint Old Regular-LDA rally on October 26

packed New Orleans Municipal Auditorium with thousands of spectators
as Long opened the New Orleans phase of his campaign.

James L. Reilly,

then acting chairman of the Old Regular caucus, joined him on stage.
But problems between Long's
throughout the campaign.

followers and Old Regulars persisted

The next threatened break occurred early in

November when Robert J. Silva, leader of the Eighth Ward Democratic
Club, announced that he had resigned his job as an inspector for the
state board of health as a gesture of support for twenty of his fol
lowers who had been dismissed from their jobs with the New Orleans
Dock Board.

Silva recalled commitments from Huey that every precinct

captain would have a job, and sharply commented:

"We thought his

—

New Orleans States, October 11-14, 1939; Item, October 13-14, 1939.
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successors would stand by us, but it looks as though we have been
double-crossed."

Silva’s protests lasted four days until his fol

lowers were returned to their jobs.
commented sadly of the episode:

An anonymous Old Regular leader

"It’s just another example of what

we are going to have to put up with as a result of our support of
Earl Long . . . his men are causing breaks in our already thin ranks,
and we can .t afford to have these things get out." 14
This feeling of resignation, of having to "put up with" Earl Long
and his followers persisted in Old Regular ranks throughout the cam
paign.

The New Orleans States commiserated with the dissident Old

Regulars who felt ill at ease with Earl Long.

An October 12 editorial

compared (with some overstatement) the Old Regulars with the state ad
ministration :
The Old Regulars have been guilty of many sins.
Their record is far from white. But in all their
years of political activities, you never saw
their leaders rising from rags to riches. You
never saw them engage in wholesale thefts. You
never saw them stealing from the poor, the maimed
and the crippled. You never saw them growing fat
over hospital contracts . . . the Old Regulars
didn’t steal from'this class of people.
An anonymous Old Regular leader, observing the campaign near the end,
sadly commented:
I wonder what Martin Behrman and some of the real
Old Regulars would say about conditions today.
Here we are forced to endorse Earl Long without
even holding a caucus. We don’t want Earl Long,
the people don’t want Earl Long, nobody but Bob

^Item, October 26, November 4, 6, 1939; States, November 8, 1939.
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Maestri wants Earl Long.*^
Despite their differences, leaders of both the LDA and the Old
Regulars had no choice other than to endorse Earl Long for governor.
As William P. Dillion, LDA fourteenth Ward Leader, told a New Orleans
rally:
We’ve got to win this election. If we don't
— well it’s your meal ticket. We don’t want
any unemployment in the 14th ward. If the
other gang gets in, you'll be out. So think
it over and talk to your neighbors.^
The marriage between Earl Long supporters and the Old Regulars may not
have been convenient, but it was one of necessity.

Long without Old

Regular support stood little chance of election; the Old Regulars with
out Long faced the possibility of four years in the political wilder
ness without allies.

Political realism dominated consideration of

events on both sides and forced their cooperation.*^ Despite his
problems with the threatened Old Regular defection and his embarrass-

*^States, October 12, 1939, January 25, 1940.
*^Ibid., November 10, 1939.
*^By December 1939 the terms "Louisiana Democratic Association" and
"Old Regulars" had become virtually interchangeable. In addition to
securing peace with Roosevelt, Leche had also restored amicable re
lations between the state government and the Old Regulars. The price
of peace (and restoration of some city income denied it by Huey Long)
was that the Old Regulars became the Long organization in New Orleans.
Hermann B. Deutsch, "New Orleans Politics — The Greatest Free Show on
Earth," in The Past as Prelude New Orleans 1718-1968, ed. by Hodding
Carter, William Ransom Hogan, John W. Lawrence, and Betty Werlein
Carter (New Orleans, Tulane University, 1968),-p. 328; Joseph B.
Parker, The Morrison Era Reform Politics in New Orleans (Gretna,
Louisiana, Pelican Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 58-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

ment by the unfolding. Scandals, EarlLong remained the candidate to
beat in

the 1939-1940 campaign.

The eventual victor who overcame the Long machine was Lake Charles
attorney Sam Houston Jones.

Jones was b o m to Robert and Susan Jones

on July 15, 1897, in a two-room log house on his grandfather Moses
Frazar's farm near the small town of Merryville, in rural Beauregard
parish in southwest Louisiana.
boyhood

The physical surroundings of Jones’

in Beauregard parish were

Huey and Earl Long in Winn parish

not too

different

atabout the,same

time.

from thoseof
Onerecent

study of Louisiana’s political culture categorizes Beauregard as the
most southwesterly of ’’North Louisiana” parishes.

As Jones said:

Beauregard’s economy was based largely on timber,
then secondarily on livestock, such as cattle
and sheep; with small piney woods farms growing
upland cotton, and other such crops as com,
Irish and sweet potatoes, and vegetables of vari
ous kinds, but largely subsistence type farms.
This description could just as easily have applied to Winn parish in
the 1890s.
Sam Jones’ earliest political training came from his father who
abandoned farming and sold insurance, managed a store, taught school,
and finally became a minor public official.

When Jones was three his

18Denny Daugherty, ’’From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion" (senior
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1970), pp. 16-17; Sam Jones to
Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy Hv Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection);
David M. Landry and Joseph B. Parker,-"The Louisiana Political Culture,"
in Louisiana Politics Festival inla Labyrinth, ed. by James Bolner
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982),.p..3; Bob Angers,
Jr., "Sam Houston Jones Reform Governor,"'Acadiana Profile, October/
November 1971, p. 6.
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father moved the family to the small town of DeRidder in north central
Beauregard parish where he served on the town’s Board of Councilmen
and as mayor from 1908 until 1912.. During World War I the elder Jones
served on the local draft board and board of health, and capped his
political career with twelve years as Beauregard parish clerk of court
(1916-1928).

His antipathy to Old Regular control of Louisiana and

his political independence influenced his son's political viewpoint.
When Huey Long arose to challenge the Old Regulars, the elder Jones
could not resist his appeal and supported him.

After Long began

building his own powerful control of Louisiana, however, Robert Jones
looked upon his initial support of Huey as a great mistake. 19
Sam Jones later recalled that he was "practically born in a court
house." He began his public career during World War I as clerk of the
draft board of Beauregard paxish.. Army service from 1917 until 1919
interrupted his career, but in 1920 he became his father's deputy
clerk of court, and in 1921 was the youngest delegate to the Louisiana
constitutional convention, where he served on the Suffrage and Elec
tions and the Conservation committees.

On April 3, 1922 Jones became

a lawyer after passing the state bar examination without finishing
college — he attended Louisiana State University from 1915 to 1917 —
and less than one year later received an appointment from Governor
John M. Parker to fill an unexpired term as city judge of DeRidder.
In 1924 a new district attorney for the five parishes of southwest
Louisiana offered him an appointment as assistant district attorney,
19
Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion," pp. 16-20; Jones
to Daughery, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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and Jones accepted, even though the new job required him to leave his
native Beauregard parish and move to Lake Charles in neighboring
Calcasieu parish. 20
Jones left political life after the 1928 election, believing
that active opposition to the powerful Long machine was useless un
less some unforeseen problem greatly weakened its hold on Louisiana
t •. .
21
politics.

The unfolding Louisiana Scandals in 1939 propelled Jones back
into the political arena. When the Scandals broke, Jones was a suc
cessful Lake Charles lawyer, bound by commitments to his wife and his
partners to stay out of politics, even though he still occasionally
toyed with political involvement.

(He had supported Democratic presi

dential candidate A1 Smith in 1928 and was to head Franklin Roosevelt’s
re-election effort in Louisiana’s seventh Congressional District in
1936 to counter the' efforts of the incumbent Congressman who was
20Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion, pp. 16-20.; Jones
to Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty collection; Roster, Members
and Officers Constitutional Convention State of Louisiana of 1921
Also Standing Committees and Rules Governing the Convention (Baton
Rouge, Ramires-Jones Printing Co., 1921), pp. 5, 10, 15, Jared Y.
Sanders and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge;
"Louisiana’s Governor-Elect,” Louisiana Police Jury Review, April,
1940, p. 14; Sam Houston Jones Interviewed by James M. Godfrey, Feb
ruary, 1977, typescript copy, LSU Oral History Collection, Department
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge; Maj. Gen. E. S. Adams to Allen J. Ellender,
February 3, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives,
Allen J. Ellender Memorial Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection); Angers,
"Sam Houston Jones,” p. 6.
21

Jones to Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection; Jones inter
viewed by Godfrey, February, 1977, LSU Oral History Collection.
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boosting Huey Long, but Long’s death: in late 1935 made Jones' effort
unnecessary.) 22
In early August, 1939, a committee of prominent Louisianians
headed by Prescott Foster, son of former Governor Murphy J. Foster,
visited Jones ("they came to me in desperation," Jones later remem
bered) to persuade him to run for governor. Many anti-Longites thought
that at last the time had come for a reformer to turn the Long machine
out of office, and they thought that Sam Jones was the man most likely
to complete the task.

Jones’ lack of political experience was no mark

against him in their opinion.

As Jones recalled later, by 1939 the

anti-Longs had been out of office in Louisiana since 1928 and the fac
tion had no candidate with both major elective experience and a chance
to win the governorship.

Fortunately, Jones had joined the American

Legion following his release from the army, and as he rose through
various offices until he became state commander in 1930, he made a
network of personal contacts and acquaintances all across the state,
thus laying the foundation for an effective campaign.

In addition,

his American Legion service allowed Jones to polish his stage presence
as he spoke in all 64 Louisiana parishes. 23
Jones initially rejected the entreaties that he enter the gover
nor’s race but gave his permission when Foster asked whether they could
22

Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion," pp. 23-24.

23
Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor’s Mansion, pp. 21-22; Sam
Houston Jones interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape re
cording, Daugherty Collection; Angers, ’-'Sam Houston-Jones," p. 6; •
Roland Boatner Howell, Sr.,-Louisiana Sugar Plantations, Mardi Gras and
Huey P. Long: Reminiscences'of Roland Boatner Howell; Sr. (Baton Rouge,
Claitor’s Publishing Division,-1969), p. 168.
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talk to Jones' law partners.

Bis partners and his wife, Louise Gambrel

Jones (to whom the reformers also talked), added their encouragement
to the suggestion that he make the race.

Jones was visibly warming to

the idea, and consulted with his old friend, Vance Plauche, who told
him, "There are times when we have to risk everything for the right.
This is one of them." Even though he received much encouragement to
run for governor throughout August, Jones waited until at least one
of the Longites had been sentenced to prison before he made a final
commitment.

The completion of the Bienville Hotel case in September,

1939, fulfilled this requirement, and Jones tossed his hat into the
ring the day following the successful prosecution.

He did not declare

for the governorship lightly and made advance preparations to move
to Houston, Texas, to continue his law practice there if he lost the
election.^
In the final analysis, the reform streak in Jones' personality
had much to do with his final decision.

Moreover, he was the father

of two small children, Carolyn and the infant Robert Jones, and step
father of William and James Boyer.

In a letter to James B. Aswell,

Jr., Jones revealed the influence his fatherhood had on his decision:
»
I do not want my children to grow up believing
it is all right for the rich and powerful to .
steal from the poor. Neither do I want them
to be taught, by the force of public example,
that the road to success lies through schemes
24
.Daugherty., "From Log Cabin to Governor's Mansion," pp. 25-27; Kane,
Louisiana Hayride, p. 347; Jerry Purvis Sanson, "The Louiisiana Guber
natorial Election of 1940” (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University-,
1975), pp.-22-23.
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for making easy money and disregard for the
Ten Commandments.25
Or, as he said more succinctly during one of his campaign addresses,
"We are fighting for honesty and decency against dishonesty and degra26
dation."
After he overcame his initial reluctance, Jones waged a
vigorous and ultimately successful campaign centered around his pledge
to restore much-needed "Common Honesty" (his campaign slogan) to
Louisiana government, for, as he cogently reminded the voters, "We
are seeing the result of the lack of it in Louisiana affairs today."27
Besides Sam Jones and Earl Long, three other candidates competed
for the governorship in the first Democratic primary.
among them was former governor James Albert Noe.

Most prominent

Noe, a native of

West Point, Kentucky, was b o m December 21, 1893, and began his politi
cal career as a follower of Huey Long.

He was elected to the state

senate in 1932 from his adopted home of Ouachita Parish in northeast
Louisiana, and was serving as president-pro—tempore of the senate when
Governor Oscar K. Allen died in office.

Lieutenant-governor John

Foumet had already been elected to the state Supreme Court, and Noe
became governor of Louisiana.

Noe’s short term as governor lasted

approximately four months (January 28 to May 12, 1936) before Richard
25
Sam Jones to James B. Aswell, Jr., November 15, 1939, James B. Aswell, Jr. and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana- State University, Baton Rouge
(hereinafter cited as Aswell. Collection); "The Jones Family,"
Acadiana Profile, October/November, 1971, p. 12.
26
Sam Jones campaign address (n.d., 1940), Jones Collection.
27
Item, September 21, 1939.
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Leche was inaugurated as a result of the 1936 election, but the feel
of the office suited him. Noe was convinced that he had been cheated
out of the 1936 gubernatorial nomination, and he was determined to
show the state a model administration beginning in 1940, when he
planned to assume'the governorship.

While briefly in office, Noe

opened the governor’s mansion to Huey’s country people and further
gained their favor by naming Huey’s widow to complete Long’s unexpired
United States Senate term. When Noe’s short term was over, he re
luctantly left office and became a staunch critic of the new admini
stration, collecting the affidavits which eventually led to its down* n 28
fall.
After 1936, Noe devoted himself to his personal businesses —
oil and gas leases, real estate, and radio station WNOE in New Orleans
— and to his personal vendetta against "Dick" Leche.

By 1939, the

wealthy Noe was again serving in the state senate and launched his
gubernatorial campaign from that post.

Noe’s political career both

inside and outside the Long camp undoubtedly contributed to his poor
showing in the first Democratic primary.

He had broken with the

machine and could expect no help from it, but neither was he accepted
by the anti—Long voters because of his previous close ties to the
machine.

Noe was thus neither fish nor fowl.

The Louisiana Associ

ation for Clean Government's statement that "The people of Louisiana
23
Robert Sobel and John Raimo, eds .j'Biographical Directory of the
Governors of the United States 1789-1978 Volume II Iowa-Missouri
(Westport, Connecticut,- Heckler Books, 1978), p. 585; Sanson, "The
Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1940,” pp..25-26; Sindler, Huey
Long’s:Louisiana, p. 142; Kane, Louisiana Hayrlde, pp. 155, 191—192;
Times-Picayune, March 19, 1940.
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want to destroy the machine-

Jimmy Noe wants to take it over and run

it for himself," accurately characterized the reform element’s assess
ment of him.

Noe centered his campaign appeals on the old Huey Long

voter who was disgusted with the corruption of the post-Huey Long
machine.

Longites attacked Noe for supposed irregularities in the

amassing of his wealth.

Earl Long, for example, declared on numerous

occasions during the campaign that Noe since the 1920s had been on
the "Crooks to Look Out For" list of the United States Post Office.

29

Despite his paradoxical political stance, anti-Long but not fully a
reformer, Noe ran a strong third in the first primary and had a de
cisive voice in the selection of the new governor in the second primary.
The fourth candidate in the first primary race with thirty-twoyear-old James Hobson Morrison, a graduate of Tulane University and
lawyer from Hammond.

Morrison's legal career had included work for

various groups of strawberry farmers in the Florida parishes, and he
hoped to capitalize on his "friend of the small farmer" image in the
campaign.

Morrison later recalled that he really did not have much

chance to win the governorship in 1940, but the campaign allowed him
to express his contempt for the corruption rampant in public office:
"No matter how strong a political machine gets, some people will stand
up and they will inspire others to follow for election reform . . .
(the election) gave me a chance to show what I had —

the courage of

30
of my convictions.”
29
'
Kane, Louisiana Hayride, p. 431; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p.
269.
30 .......
.......... .....................
Congressional Directory 78th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, United
States Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 43; James H. Morrison
interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, May 13, 1982.
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Morrison’s campaign may easily be classified as the flashiest
conducted by any candidate in the contest, outstripping even the usu
ally flamboyant Earl Long-

The centerpiece of Morrison’s appeal was

his fiery stage presence: on some occasions he called Earl Long a
"slimy little stooge" and shared the stage with a monkey named "Earl
Long" until the beast went mad, but his most colorful innovation was
"Jimmy Morrison’s Convict Parade," a group of his farmer friends who
volunteered to dress as convicts and appear on floats portraying state
officials dressed in convict garb in the act of looting the state.
Morrison recalled years later his appreciation for his friends who
volunteered their time and trucks, and he remembered that costuming
his characters proved to be something of a problem — his farmers
could not afford to buy white pants or to paint black stripes on their
"Sunday white shirt," so they used only the cheapest clothing to construct costumes of traditional prison attire. 31
Despite his shoestring budget which forced him to use the money
collected at each rally to move the "convict parade" to the next stop,
Morrison’s sideshow proved to be.a popular adjunct to his campaign.
Its appearance on Canal Street drew a crowd estimated to be larger
than even the Rex Mardi Gras parade.

A correspondent from Winnfield

wrote Morrison, "When you visit this section, we certainly expect your
parade".

Another correspondent wrote that his family enjoyed the

parade "even better than (the) ’Gang Busters’ (radio) program." With
the convict parade, Morrison in one stroke solved a classic problem
in politics:

that of a minor candidate attracting potential supporters

31Morrison interviewed by Sanson, May 13, 1982.
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to notice him.

His answer included the surface fun-and-games of the

parade — as he said "If you didn’t make a flamboyant campaign, you
might as well stay home" — but after the entertainment attracted a
crowd, Morrison strove to persuade his listeners to support h-im rather
than the other candidates.

Moreover, the "convict parade" was un

doubtedly a graphic reinforcement of the Scandal stories appearing
each day.

The parade’s effect on a poorly educated Louisiana elector

ate should not be diminished, but despite his entertaining campaign,
Morrison finished a distant fourth in the first primary and refused
to endorse either Earl Long or Sam Jones in the second primary. 32
The fifth and very minor candidate in the first primary was Vin
cent Moseley, an Opelousas lawyer. Moseley’s campaign can be accur
ately described as fiercely independent ("not supported by any coterie
or any close corporation of capitalistic capons") and passionately antiLong.

Moseley often appeared to be

running

as much against Huey as

against Earl Long:
I for one can never defend Huey Long. I do not
believe that either you or I can ever condone
his methods or elect a candidate who does, a
candidate who announced 'Huey Long was betrayed’
when he well knew that his was the master mind,
and he the master e v i l . 33

32
B. W. Bailey to James H. Morrison, November 2, 1939, Frank B. Beadle
to Morrison, January 5, 1940, Morrison Collection; Kane, Louisiana
Hayride, pp. 438-439; Times-Picayune, September 30, 1939; Jerry Purvis
Sanson, "James H. Morrison and the 1939 Gubernatorial Campaign," paper
presented to the Edward Livingston Historical Association, May, 1982,
typescript copy, Morrison Collection.33
Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 142.
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The administration, considered Moseley.a minor nuisance.

He was pic

tured in 'Progress cartoons as. a.barely, visible pipsqueak of a man.
The other'candidates generally ignored him unless he made a direct
personal attack bn one of them that they felt compelled to refute.
Otherwise, outside the urban press,' Moseley’s campaign received scant
attention.
Other politicians throughout the state announced their intentions
to run for the governorship, but dropped out' of the race before the
first primary.

Among them were mayor Sam Caldwell of Shreveport,

State Treasurer Andrew P. ’’Pat" Tugwell, and former public service
commissioner and perennially irrepressible ’’Cajun” politician Dudley
LeBlanc.

The 1939-1940 campaign for the Louisiana governorship there

fore, focused upon the personalities, records, and promises of Long,
Jones, and Noe.^
When Richard Leche suddenly thrust the governorship on Earl Long
in June, 1939, Sam Jones had not yet announced hxs candidacy.

Noe was

in the field already, but the new governor’s most vocal critic during
the early weeks of the campaign was Andrew P. Tugwell.

Tugwell at

tacked Long first about the ”de-duct" money taken involuntarily by
the state machine from state employeespaychecks. He began his in
vestigation with a letter to John M. Push, assistant to the general
manager of the New Orleans dock board, asking whether it was true that
34
New Orleans Item-Tribune, September 10, 1939; Vincent Moseley to W.
Scott Heywood, August 11, 1941, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Rec
ords, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as JenningsHeywood Collection); Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 428-429.
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New Orleans mayor Robert S. Maestri had custody of the funds derived
from the payroll deductions:

"It is my understanding that you are

merely one of the state collectors and that the Honorable Mayor
Maestri is recognized custodian of all the funds collected," wrote
Tugwell.

Fush replied that Maestri had "nothing whatsoever" to do

with the deduction funds.

The next day Tugwell quoted from a speech

former governor Leche made on May 24, 1938, in which Leche disclaimed
handling any money from the deductions:

"Dr. O’Hara (Joseph A. O’Hara,

president of the state board of health) is president of it (the
Louisiana Democratic Association, political front for the deduction
money), Mayor Maestri and Mr. Fush are treasurers of it." Tugwell
commented that in view of Leche’s speech, "Mayor Maestri’s denial regarding the shakedown fund is far from satisfactory.”35
Even though he remained unable to.connect Maestri with the deduct
fund, Tugwell's persistent investigation brought LDA finances under
increased public scrutiny.

On July 10, 1939, Dr. O’Hara and Fush re

vealed that they were indeed the custodians of the deduct fund collec
ted by the LDA.

Fush, though, declared that he was "too busy" to show

Tugwell any of the organization’s records, but they would be open for
his inspection if Dr. O'Hara approved.

O’Hara refused to permit any

one to see the LDA records and emerged as a staunch defender of the
deduct system, commenting that the funds "are just like the dues of
almost any other organization of its kind," without explaining which
other states, parties, or factions had an "organization of its kind."
35
Times-Picayune, July 6-7, 1939.
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He also admitted that the LDA funds were indeed the deduct dollars
from state paychecks, thus establishing the connection between the
two sets of funds. When asked if Governor Long had made any move to
change the financing of the LDA, O'Hara replied, "No, not that I've
heard of."3^
O'Hara was correct.

Upon taking office, Earl Long began tidying

up the sloppy payroll procedures of the Leche administration by halting
the practice of carrying employees on the payroll of one department
even though they worked in another department.

He did not, however,

move against the deducts, even though Noe made public the sworn affi
davit of James S. Allain (former clerk in the Louisiana State Auto
mobile License Bureau office in New Orleans) which revealed that
Hubert Haydell, chief clerk in his office, had cashed his $100 payroll
check each month and returned $95 to him without mentioning where the
other $5 had gone.

Furthermore, Frank S. Perilloux, eighth ward

leader for the LDA in New Orleans and chief inspector for the dock
board, stated that contributions equal to five per cent of their
salary were expected of state employees, and added that he collected
an additional one percent for the ward organization because the local
units received none of the "five per cent" money.

Even though Governor

Long intimated that the deduct would be discontinued, the LDA continued
to take money from state employees. 37
While they continued to collect the deducts, administration

36Ibid., July 11, 1939.
37Ibid., June 29, July 14, 21, 24, 1939.
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officials realized that the public mood demanded that their methods
of collecting the "deducts" had to be streamlined.

State employees

reported in early August, 1939, that "sources which experience has
taught them to respect" assured them that no more deductions would
be taken from their salaries in the immediate future.

One employee,

however, added "we have been told to save our money because, when
things quiet down, they will expect us to pay in a lump sum the equiv
alent of deductions not taken out of our pay." Governor Long announced
on August 9 that no further deductions would be taken from state em
ployees after July 31, but responded angrily to reports that employees
had been ordered to save their money.

"Anybody who says I told them

that is a damned liar," he declared. 38
The system LDA leaders devised to replace the straight deduct
was a "voluntary contribution" plan.

Workers at the Charity Hospital

in New Orleans were the first to report the new system.

They would

be "permitted to contribute" to Long's campaign, but hospital officials
had assured them that no one would lose their jobs if they refused to
do so.
tem:

Several workers reported a further refinement of the old sys

the "voluntary contributions" would be accepted from them after

they cashed their paychecks, not before, and in a building set aside
from the main hospital.

Even though Governor Long steadfastly main

tained that contributions "will never be collected on a fixed percent
while I am governor" and that if any state workers was unable or un
willing to contribute, or had suffered a recent family illness "he or
90

Bill Attel to "Gentlemen," August 7, 1939, Morrison Collection;
Times-Picayune, August 8-9, 1939.
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she won't be allowed to contribute," Charity Hospital workers in New
Orleans found special brown envelopes marked for their "voluntary con
tribution" included in their mid-November pay envelopes.

State police

and highway department workers in Baton Rouge also received strong
hints to make the "voluntary contributions." Employees of the State
Employment Service Perdido Street office in New Orleans received in
December a form letter addressed to Governor Long with which they were
to send their contribution "in recognition of your integrity and out
standing record of accomplishments and to aid you in some small mea
sure in your great fight to secure for Louisiana four more years of
39
the good government that you inaugurated when you became governor."
Reform elements in Louisiana were particularly incensed by the
state employee assessments to help pay for Long's campaign.

Tugwell,

Jones, Noe, and Morrison repeatedly referred to the practice when re
citing their litany of abuses practiced by the Long regime.

Their

attitude is best typified in two editorials which appeared in the New
Orleans States. The first portrayed a Long machine composed of poli
ticians who treated the poor with callous disregard "unless the poor
how down and worship them and give up in many instances part of their
pay by means of the nefarious deduct system." More directly, the
States reminded its readers that given the past record of the admini
stration, every state employee who received one of the "voluntary
39
Times-Picayune, November 15-16, 1939; States, November 10, 15, 17,
December 18, 1939; Item, November 15, 28, 1939; Stella O'Connor, "The
Charity Hospital at New Orleans: An Administrative and Financial
History, 1736-1941," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, January, 1948,
p. 90.
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contribution" envelopes and failed to respond "would soon be regarded
as inefficient, defiant or not possessing the requisite qualities to
hold a job."^
Tugwell created a permanent campaign issue with his investiga
tions into the deduct system.and next focused his attention on the
suspicious activities of the Louisiana Conservation Department.

He

first questioned the arrangement by which the Longwood Oil and Gas
Company received a permit to produce an extraordinarily high amount
of gas from two wells in the Cotton Valley oil and gas field in Web
ster parish.

The permit was ostensibly for the purpose of conducting

an experiment on recycling distillate gas in the field, but Tugwell
charged that the extra gas was not recycled once it was pumped from
the ground.

He compared the Longwood permit to one issued to the

Ohio Oil Company for a similar experiment in the same field.

The Ohio

permit was limited to a period of thirty days while the Longwood per
mit was issued for an unlimited period.^
Tugwell also discovered other irregularities in the Conservation
Department.

The department had received $350,000 from the previous

legislature to fund construction of a geology building on the campus
of Louisiana State University, but LSU records showed only $275,000
received.

Governor Long held a hasty conference with university

officials and Conservation Commission William 0. Rankin, and shortly
40

States, November 9, 17, 1939.

^Brady Michael Banta, "The Regulation and Conservation of Petroleum
Resources in Louisiana, 1901-1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University, 1981), pp. 458-459; Times-Picayune, July 12-13,
1939.
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afterwards LSU received the rest of its money.

Tugwell next charged

that many Louisiana companies dealing in oil well supplies and equip
ment were compelled to obtain merchandise through the Maxwell Supply
Company, which kept ten per cent of the total amount of the order
even though it provided no service other than writing the bill for
each order.

Other firms transported, stored, and delivered the

equipment.

Tugwell identified C. A. Morvant of Thibodaux as the

registered agent of the Maxwell Company in Louisiana.

Morvant also

happened to be chief attorney for the Department of Conservation.
Morvant admitted that he was the company's agent but maintained that
no one was compelled to order through the Maxwell firm.

42

Governor Long initially declined to make any personnel changes
in the Conservation Department, but he eventually removed Commissioner
Rankin as the political attacks mounted and appointed state senator
Ernest S. Clements as commissioner.

Clements knew little about the

oil business in Louisiana and freely admitted so but pledged to ob
tain the best advice possible from experts in the field.

Some Louisi

ana oil men looked hopefully to his pledge to run the department without political favors.43
Earl Long and other members of the Long ticket were not the only

^Times-Picayune, July 14, 19, 25, 28, 30, 1939.
43
Ibid., July 25, 1939; W. Scott Heywood to Mr. and Mrs. Gene Heywood,
August 2, 1939, Jennings-Heywood Collection; Banta, "The Regulation
and Conservation of Petroleum Resources in Louisiana," p. 459; Rankin
was eventually jailed for using Conservation Department funds to pur
chase the yacht for Governor Leche, then was sentenced to an additional
5 years for his participation in the Longwood deal.
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candidates involved in the campaign who were forced to defend them
selves against corruption charges in the conservation area.

Erstwhile

reformer James A. Noe also ran into criticism for his oil and gas
dealings.

On August 23, 1939, the Ouachita Parish grand jury returned

indictments against W. D. Dark and 1. J. Melton, respectively manager
and field agent of the Louisiana Conservation Department in northeast
Louisiana, charging them with bribery in connection with the flow of
gas wells in the area.

Dark and Melton admitted their guilt but main

tained that the principal beneficiaries of the deal were the people
who had bribed them.

The indictments stated that the men received

$2,250 from the J. and H. Gas Company to permit it to acidize twelve
well and thus increase their production.

James A. Noe was listed as

president and general manager of J. and H. and incorporation papers
for the company listed Noe and Harold Wood as joint stockholders.
Noe quickly explained that, ’’Since the beginning of the Dick LecheEarl Long administration, the independent oil and gas operators in
this area have had to pay tribute to the indicted representatives of
this vicious political machine,” and he added that the grand jury
had examined all the evidence and had not indicted him.

Governor

Long, however, lost no opportunity to turn the glare of investigation
away from the machine and onto Noe. He charged that "Noe used to run
the conservation department" in Monroe, and that if Noe had nothing
to hide, he should have reported the shakedowns instead of unlawfully
paying them.

L. J. Melton added that acidization of Noe's wells was

a direct violation of a 1936 agreement among oil men in the region
that they would refrain from using acid in their wells because
continued use of acid caused an intrusion of salt water into the field,
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thus ruining it for further production. Melton also stated that Noe
had not yet explained why he paid the two agents $666.66 in 1937 not
to report him for producing excess gas from two of his wells by not
having it properly metered.

The money Noe called a "shakedown"

to pay conservation department employees in order to operate his
business, the Long machine maintained, was in fact a "bribe" paid by
him to needy department
his wells illegally.

officials who in turn allowed him to operate

The Progress, the administration newspaper,

thereafter often pictured Noe in cartoons as the mother of two child
ren, plump, well-dressed "Shakedown" for whom Noe provided the best
care, and skinny, bedraggled "Bribe" whom Noe sought to disown.^
Administration officials correctly considered Noe and Sam Jones
to be their most formidable opponents in the campaign and concentrated
44
Times-Picayune, August 24-25, 1939; Item, September 17, 1939; Prog
ress, various issues, August 1939-January 1940; Banta, "The Regulation
and Conservation of Petroleum Resources in Louisiana," pp. 455-458.
Noe's side of the argument is lent some credence by the fact that Dark
and Melton were also indicted for accepting $1,000 from George D. Pipes
ostensibly in exchange for protecting Pipes and Barlow Inabet from
prosecution for violation of Louisiana conservation laws. They were
never tried on this charge, however. See Supreme Court of Louisiana
No. 35,665, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manu
scripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton
Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection); the Leche administra
tion conservation department certainly was not above shady deals. W.
Scott Heywood reported in 1939 that William Burton had appealed to
Leche about the field agents in the Jennings field and Leche subse
quently ordered Rankin to allow Burton to produce "around 5,000 bar
rels" of oil per day per well, more than the other wells in the field.
Heywood also maintained that Earl Long and Clements stopped that extra
allowable. See Heywood to Mr. and Mrs. Gene Heywood, August 2, 1939,
Heywood to Frank A. Smith, January 14, 1940, Jennings-Heywood Collec
tion. The Item commented with much accuracy about the semantics of
the episode that the logic in the "Bribery-Shakedown" incident "is
more lengthy than convincing." See Item, September 12, 1939.
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most of their attacks on them.

The anti-Noe campaign focused on con

vincing the public that he had not earned his considerable wealth
honestly and that he had somehow betrayed Huey Long when he broke with
the machine following the 1936 nomination.

Earl Long, for example, in

one speech told his audience, "This Jimmie Noe has made plenty of
money out of oil and gas when he was governor, taking it away from
the school children of this state. .
The anti-Jones phase of their campaign sought to portray Jones
as something of a "Bourbon" — a conservative corporation lawyer who
would turn back the clock by taking away all the state facilities and
services that Huey Long and his heirs provided for the people.

The

Progress exclaimed that "Stuck-up Sam Jones, the High Sassiety (sic)
Kid, of Lake Charles is to receive $100,000 for himself to run for
governor of Louisiana as the candidate of the corporate interests."
Long charged that Jones represented fifty corporations in his legal
practice, a number which the Progress reduced to forty-three.

The

governor warned Jones that "The people are not ready to turn this
government over to the corporate interests."46
Later during the heated campaign, Earl Long coined the famous
phrase "High Hat Sam Jones, the High Society Kid, the High-Kicking,
High and Mighty Snide Sam, the guy that (sic) pumps perfume under his
arms" that haunted Jones throughout his political life.

United States

Senator Allen J. Ellender, speaking in behalf of Earl Long, told his
45
Times-Picayune, September 5, 1939.
46

Ibid., September 21, 1939; Progress, September 15, October 7, 1939.
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audience that "the opposition" wanted to turn the state back over to
the "big hoys who haven't forgotten that the present regime made them
turn over $8,000,000 in severance taxes, $3,500,000 in year in corpor
ation franchise taxes, and $5,500,000 per year in income tax." Pre
sumably the "big boys" were now out for revenge.^
Jones, of course, did not allow these charges to appear unchal
lenged.

He repeatedly stressed his humble beginnings in rural Beaure

gard Parish in his stump speeches and reminded voters that even though
his law firm did handle corporation clients, he accepted only "honest"
cases, corporate or otherwise, and moreover, he had been a member of
the same law firm as former governor Alvin 0. King, whom Huey Long
had made governor in his fight with Paul Cyr.

If Huey had approved a

governor whose legal firm handled corporate clients, why could not he
(Jones) represent corporations?

In addition, Jones reminded his lis

teners that he had recently won a large judgement for some southwestern
Louisiana rice farmers who had sued a milling corporation. 48
In Gueydan, Jones warned his audience that the administration
would try to tell them he was against free school books, homestead ex
emptions, the free right to vote, and old-age pensions, but he cited
an article printed in the DeRidder Enterprise in 1920, in which Jones
himself had advocated these measures.

Speaking to a carpenter's

union, Jones advocated Labor's right to organize, strike, and picket.
47Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp. 434-435; Item, November 17, 1939.
^Times-Picayune, October 1, 3, 5, 26, 1939. For a list of King's
considerable corporate connections, see Sobel and Raimo, Biographical
Directory of the Governors of the United States Volume II, pp. 583584.
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His most pungent rebuttal to the "High Hat" charge, though, remained
his "My pappy was for Huey" phrase, repeated endlessly on the campaign
trail.

But Jones failed to mention his father’s eventual disillusion-

ment with Huey Long. 49
The charges and countercharges of both sides were briefly pushed
from the front pages of state newspapers during early September, 1939.
The European situation had steadily worsened since Adolph Hitler's
rise to power as German chancellor in 1933.

War finally erupted when

Hitler ordered his armored columns to invade Poland during the early
hours of September 1. England and France subsequently launched a fu
tile effort to save Poland, and World War II spread across the European
continent.

The mood across the Atlantic, both in the United States

and in Louisiana, was at first one of reluctance to envision any pos
sibility of American involvement in the spreading war."^
The outbreak of World War II immediately made the candidates’
World War I army records primary campaign topics as they sought to
prove their patriotism.
was Earl Long.

49

The only major candidate without a war record

Noe hastened to attack Long as a "slacker":

Times-Picayune, October 15-16, 1939.

Jerry Purvis Sanson, "North Louisiana Press Opinion and the Begin
ning of World War II," North Louisiana Historical Association Journal,
Fall, 1980, pp. 33-36; Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Louisiana Public Opinion
and the Beginning of World War II," paper presented to the Louisiana
Historical Association convention, March 26, 1983; James MacGregor
Burns, Roosevelt the Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945 (New York, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp..37, 41, 43; Robert Dallek, Franklin
D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945 (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1979), pp. 201, 228.
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I want to ask him where he was 21 years ago
today (Armistice Day) . There never has been
a greater slacker and draft dodger, i . Earl
K. Long was in Texas dodging the draft. When
the armistice was signed, a warrant was out for
Earl Long’s arrest as a draft dodger.5*
Noe also sought to parallel the Long machine in Louisiana with Nazi
Germany, characterizing the incumbent administration as "a political
machine as evil and debauched as Adolph Hitler, Europe’s madman."
James H. Morrison joined the fray when he charged that the Louisiana
administration even provided aid to Hitler by producing oil in excess
of the allowable under the Connolly "Hot Oil" Act and selling the "hot"
oil to Nazi Germany to be refined into airplane fuel.

Pressing the

same idea still further, Sam Jones declared that the Long machine had
attempted to "Hitlerize" the school children of the state by having
State Superintendent of Education T. H. Harris suggest to school prin
ciples that if they could only afford one newspaper for their school,
52
that paper should be the Progress.
Earl Long felt pressed to defend himself and his administration
against any charge of disloyalty. He explained that he was living in
Brownsville, Texas, during World War I, selling baking powder for $100
per month plus expenses.

With that money, he had helped to support

one sister in Colorado suffering from tuberculosis and another widowed
sister who was studying at the State Normal College at Natchitoches in
order to support her children as a teacher.

Long had sent the

^^Times-Picayune, November 12, 1939.
52
Times-Picayune, September 10, November 4, December 19, 1939; States,
December 19, 1939.
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Colorado sister $60 per month, the widowed sister $40 per month, and
lived on the expense account. After investigation, his local draft
board placed him in Class II.

Class II of the 1917 Selective Ser

vice Act.provided only temporary exemptions until the local board *s
supply of Class I registrants was exhausted.

Earl could be placed in

this classification only by a strained interpretation of its first pro
vision, which provided exemptions for registrants with both wife and
children, or who were the father of motherless children, where the
family was not solely dependent upon the registrant’s labor for sup
port because "reasonably certain sources of support " (Huey?) were
available.

Actually, Earl’s situation could have more easily placed

him in Class III, under Section A, providing exemption for a regis
trant who was the main support of children not his own issue, or Sec
tion C, a registrant with a helpless brother or sister, regardless of
age, mainly dependent on his labor for support.53 Huey eventually
offered to support their sisters, and Earl had reported promptly for
induction.

The draft board, however, told him that an armistice was

on the verge of being signed and that if he had a job, he need not
i. 54
enlist.
Long’s explanation did nothing to defuse the opposition attacks.
Noe remarked that he did not understand "how Earl Long . . . can stand
between the American flags and ask the people of Louisiana to elect
53
The Classification Process, Special Monograph No. 5, Volume I Selec
tive Service System (Washington, United States Government Printing Of
fice, 1950), pp. 22-23.
54
Times-Picayune, November 13, 1939.
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him governor," and that Long moved to Texas during the war not to pur
sue his career but to escape the Winn Parish draft board.

The States

taunted the governor with a series of editorial cartoons deriding his
supposed draft dodging, and then culminated its attack with a forceful
editorial:
Sam Jones wore the uniform of his country during
the World War. So did Jimmy Noe . . .
But Earl Long wasn't there. He managed to keep
himself out of khaki. He managed to keep a few
jumps ahead of the draft board’s ’greetings’
peddling shoe polish along the way. When the
draft board finally ran him down, he was at
Brownsville, Texas, just across the border from
Mexico. Earl Long did not fight for anything
in 1917-18, except for a few dollars in commis
sions.^
Long attempted to deflect criticism of his lack of army service
by belittling Sam Jones' army experience. Noe had served overseas in
the American Expeditionary Force, so he escaped this salvo, but Jones
spent his World War I army days at Camp Beauregard north of Alexandria,
Louisiana.

Jones was initially a clerk of the Beauregard draft board

because of his schooling at LSU and his familiarity with government
forms, but he took the job only with the understanding that he would
join the army reserves and be subject to call at any time.

He was soon

called into the army and applied for admission to the Army Artillery
Officers Training School, but the armistice became effective before
Jones received his appointment.

Though Jones was never closer to

Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany during the war than Alexandria, Louisiana,

^Item, October 9, 1939; New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribtme, November 12,
1939; States, February 9, 13, 17, 1940.
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still he had served in uniform for seventeen months (September 29, 1917
to February 28, 1919) during the conflict, eventually reaching the
rank of sergeant, and he often reminded his audiences of his service
to his country during the gubernatorial campaign.^
The Long forces made much of Jones' paltry war record, claiming
that his war duties consisted of tending livestock at Camp Beauregard.
The Progress later dubbed him "Mule Nurse Sam.Undaunted, Jones
throughout the 1939-40 campaign clung to the image of a fighting pro
tector of American liberty provided by his stateside service.
James A. Noe campaigned hardest for the support of World War I
veterans vote.

He attempted to convey the message that his overseas

service gave him a special rapport with them.

His campaign included

veterans’ organizations throughout the state, including the "Jackson
Brigade" charged with keeping the New Orleans vote count honest.

Fol

lowing his defeat in the first Democratic primary, he directed their
efforts toward protecting fellow veteran Sam Jones' interests in the
city.
Despite the sudden timeliness of the candidates' World War I army
records —

or in Long's case, the absence of one —

the dominant issue

of the campaign remained the corruption of the incumbent administra
tion.

Long attempted to dissociate himself from the Scandals, re

minding voters that federal investigators had not indicted him.

His

^Sam Jones to Denny Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection;
Maj. Gen. E. S- Adams to Allen J. Ellender, February 3, 1940, Ellender
Collection; Angers, "Sam Houston Jones Reform Governor,” pp. 6, 12;
States, January 15, 1945.
^Progress, February 16, 1940.
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opponents, however, charged that Long had either been a part of the
systematic looting (despite his denials), or that if he had not actu
ally known what was occurring, he was too stupid to be governor.
Jones stressed the "common honesty" theme of his campaign,
charging that even "If Earl Long was deaf, dumb, and blind . . . he
should have known that something was rotten in Louisiana," and stating
that, "Everybody in the state — even the big majority of the job
holders," now wanted to clean up Louisiana, and the organized re
formers had only to see that the public sentiment was accurately
counted at the polls.

In a particularly vitriolic radio speech

broadcast over WDSU, Jones said that, "The ancient Huns of the Old
World were not so barbarous in their treatment of their enemies as
these people have been in the treatment of those who elected and
58
trusted them."
Former Senator Joseph Ransdell, whom Huey had retired from poli
tics, endorsed Jones because "the state needs someone to lead it out
of immorality, degradation, and dishonor into which it has fallen."
The state’s major newspapers endorsed Jones, and angry citizens
joined groups with such names as the Fearless Democrats, the Citizens'
Voluntary Committee of Louisiana, the Louisiana Association For Clean
Government, and the People's League (chaired by young New Orleans at
torney T. Hale Boggs), all designed to elect a reform governor of
Louisiana.

The Catholic church establishment joined in the general

revulsion at the rampant corruption, but carefully avoided any appear
ance of factional alliance.

In February, 1940, Archbishop Francis

CQ

Item, September 21, October 5, 16, 20, 1939.
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Rummel called on citizens to correct and atone
for all the public scandal, ugly crimes,
flagrant injustices, slanders . . . dis
turbing agitators which have during the
past eight months poisoned our atmosphere,
shocked the sensibilities and wounded the
pride of honorable citizens, humiliating
our state before the nation, and threatening
to undermine its credit.59
The New Orleans Catholic newspaper added its hopes that "the shock of
the recent revelations of scandals instill(s)- a firm resolution in the
people to cherish the franchise of freedom before it is too late" and
defended Rummel*s foray into politics:

"Those of the priesthood should

counsel and encourage the people to the performance of their duty, to
an honest use of their American birthright, the Ballot (sic) . .
•v

A minor adaptation of the general appeal of reformism developed
in New Orleans, where Sam Jones and his supporters likened their cru
sade to that of the White Leaguers who had worked to end what many
New Orleanians considered the dictatorship of Reconstruction.

Jones

spoke at the Liberty Monument at the foot of Canal Street, and the
States editorially asked the people to "Vote as They (the White
Leaguers) Would Vote" —

for liberation and against tyranny.

James

Morrison charged that each of Earl Long’s rallies cost the state
$4,000 and maintained that a vote for Earl Long would be cast only
59
Times-Picayune, November 24, 1939; Shreveport Times, January 7, 1940;
Item, November 29, 1939, January 3, February 19, 1940; Howell, Louisi
ana Sugar Plantations, Mardi Gras, and Huey Long, p. 169.
^New Orleans The Catholic Herald, February 15, 1940.
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"by one who has no respect for America or LouisianaEarl Long and his allies countered this barrage of criticism with
the political means at their disposal, legal, illegal, and question
able.

The governor was an effective stump speaker, amply able to con

duct his own defense, but even he called upon the eloquent Gerald
L. K. Smith to join him on the stage to deliver a fervent appeal to
the voters not to let Huey down by repudiating the machine:

"If you

want to know who to be against, find out who the devil is for." Earl
also called upon Huey’s widow, Rose, to join in a few rallies and
simply ask the audience to vote for him.

Illegally, state trucks and

employees continued distributing the Progress. Questionably, Dr. E.
L. Sanderson, Superintendent of the Shreveport Charity Hospital sent
a form letter to the parents of student nurses studying at the facil
ity, asking them to support Long:

"If you have no special reason for

supporting someone else for governor, we shall consider it a great
help to this institution if you will help us to elect him.” State
workers also glued Earl Long posters to the Orleans civil court
building on Royal Street while city officials refused permission to
Jones and Morrison workers to place their political posters on public
P

buildings already bearing Long posters.

Civil Sheriff Louis Knopf re

fused to allow Noe workers to photocopy Orleans parish poll lists so
they could carefully check their accuracy. 62
^ Item, October 18, November 29, 1939.
62
. . .
Times-Picayune, January 4, February 8, 1940; Progress, February 16,
1940; Item, November 16, December 20, 1939; States, November 6, Decem
ber 4-5, 21, 1939; Earl Long circular, January 14, 1940, Ellender Col
lection .
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The effect of the Scandals and the continued anti-Long effort to
focus the campaign on them was revealed in December, 1939, when a new
campaign device burst upon the Louisiana political scene.

On December

17, Dr. George Gallup began releasing the results of a public opinion
poll his American Institute of Public Opinion had conducted in Louisi
ana earlier in the month.

A sample of 2,500 Louisianians revealed

that Long and Jones were running even in public support with thirtyfour percent of the straw vote, Noe was in second place with twenty
per cent, Morrison third with ten per cent, and Moseley fourth with
two per cent.

These findings indicated that voter support of the Long

machine had severely eroded since Leche’s rout of Cleveland Dear in
1936.

Even more ominous for the Longites were predictions that a

Jones-Long second primary would result in Jones receiving fifty-eight
per cent of the vote and Long forty-two per cent.

63

The pollsters also asked other questions which revealed the lack
of confidence in state government felt by Louisianians in 1939. When
asked, "Do you think elections in Louisiana in recent years have been
honestly conducted?" Louisiana voters responded:

Honest - twenty-

five per cent, Dishonest - sixty percent, No opinion - fifteen per cent.
Asked "Do you think that if the present state administration is re
turned to office next year it will ’clean house’ in the state govern
ment?", those polled responded:

Yes - thirty percent, No - fifty-one

percent, No opinion - nineteen per cent.

Asked "Do you think that

George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The Pulse of Democracy (New York,
Simon and Shuster, 1940), pp. 156-158; Sunday Item-Tribune, December
17, 1939; Times-Picayune, December 24, 1939.
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state courts are honest?" they responded: Yes - thirty-six per cent,
No - forty per cent, No opinion - twenty-four per cent.

Despite the

opinion revealed in these questions, a fourth question substantiated
the enduring legend of the man who had set the stage for the political
situation which many Louisianians had come to deplore.

Asked "Taking

everything into consideration, do you think that Huey P. Long was a
bad or good influence in Louisiana? Louisianians responded:

Good -

fifty-five per cent, Bad - twenty-two percent, Both - fourteen per
cent, No opinion - nine per cent. 64
Even beyond these numbers, however, the Gallup pollsters made a
chilling empirical assessment of Louisiana's political culture:

"The

Institute has never found, in any state, on any question, such wide
spread reluctance to speak and such guardedness in replies." The
pollsters found fear of expressing an opinion more common in the
poorer sections of the state, and more common in men than in women,
though some women interviewed alone commented that "My husband has
told me not to talk to anybody about state politics." Overall, one
person in five indicated their reluctance to talk for fear of politi
cal or personal reprisals.

Their fears were not unjustified.

When

told that some respondents thought Huey Long had been a bad influence
on the state, one man replied:
64Gallup and Rae, The Pulse of Democracy, pp. 156-158; Kane, Louisiana
Hayride, p. 440; Item, December 20, 22, 1939; Sindler, Huey Long's
Louisiana, pp. 115-116 includes a revealing further breakdown of the
statewide figures on the last question showing that Longism had made
heavy inroads into the middle class which should normally abhor a per
version of democracy. Sindler attributes this anomaly to the voters’
disgust with Louisiana's political system before Huey Long.
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I wish you’d show me the ones that says (sic)
he was a bad influence! I’ll report 'em (sic)
tomorrow and they’ll sure lose their jobs fast.
You are probably a Long man, and you'll prob
ably report them before I can, but I sure wish
you’d let me do it.^5
Reaction to the results of the.poll were understandably mixed.
Long thought the poll "ridiculous."

The Progress charged that the

Gallup organization came to Louisiana solely to rig the election, and
in an attempt to discredit the results made the racial slur that the
Gallup team included "a Harlem nigger (sic) in a double-breasted suit."
Noe and Moseley had no comment; Morrison instructed his listeners to
"pay no attention to this poll." Jones’ forces, however, used the re
sults to their advantage.

In a circular repeating the results, Jones

rhetorically told Long that "it may not be that you are beaten — but
you are at least found out."66
The political threat to the machine revealed in the Gallup poll
results led to the revival of a practice rarely used by Longites:
raising the race issue when forced into a political corner.
machine threaded racist attacks throughout the campaign.

The Long

When Dudley

LeBlanc withdrew as a candidate on October 23, 1939, all sides hoped
to inherit his sizeable Cajun support.

LeBlanc endorsed Jones on

October 25 and thus inspired a racist attack on the Jones camp.

The

Sunday Item-Tribune, December 17, 1939.
^Sam Jones Circular, December 20, 1939, Aswell Collection; F. Edward
Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans" The Life and Times of
Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center
for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1976),
p. 145.
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Progress printed a picture of two black children holding Jones signs
and literature.

In an attempt to blunt the impetus given Jones’

campaign by LeBlanc’s endorsement, the newspaper noted that black
support had come to Jones along with LeBlanc.^

Obviously, the Long

machine wished to persuade its white supporters where sympathy for
blacks lay, and that a vote for Longism was a vote against presumed
"nigger lovers" — Jones and his followers.
As the campaign neared the first Democratic primary, United
States Senator Allen J. Ellender made several speeches in an attempt
to help Earl Long win the election.

Speaking at the governor’s final

New Orleans rally, Ellender charged that federal prosecutor 0. John
Rogge came to Louisiana charged by the Justice Department with estab
lishing the right of properly qualified blacks to vote in the election
;and dared Rogge to perform his duty.
same charge.

Ellender soon expanded on the

The day after his initial comments, he declared from the

stump that, "If you people don’t watch out, in 10 or 15 years the fed
eral government will be in charge of all your elections and the
darkies will be voting." He held out hope, though, taking comfort in
the fact that there were "too many good white citizens in Louisiana
who remember the carpetbag days, when Negroes voted and held office,

^Progress, December 22, 1939; Item, October 26, 1939; Floyd Martin
Clay, Coozan Dudley LeBlanc From Huey Long to Hadacol (Gretna, Louisi
ana, Pelican Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 132-133; Trent Angers, "The
Three Faces of Dudley LeBlanc," Acadiana Profile, Second Quarter, 1977,
pp. 47-48, 58. Louisiana political folk wisdom held that LeBlanc
strongly controlled 5,000 to 6,000 "Cajun" votes, a sizeable number in
a close election. C. A. Shaw to David C. Pipes, October 2, 1940, Pipes
to R. H. Chadwick, September 26, 1940, David C. Pipes Papers, Division
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge.
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to permit any federal interference in state affairs." Earl Long did
not join in this blast.

During Ellender*s attack, he satisfied him

self with calling the opposition candidates "filth chunkers and browbeaters" and declaring that "I have been carrying on like Huey P. Long,
Oscar Allen, Jesus Christ, and God Almighty would have me do."
campaign stationery bore the motto:

(His

"Carrying On the Work of Huey and

O.K.").68
Despite the Long machine's efforts, Earl Long was not successful
in this campaign.

The Governor garnered more votes than any other

candidate in the first Democratic primary, 226,385 to Jones’ 154,936;
Noe's 116,564; Morrison's 48,243; or Moseley's 7,595, but he carried
only nine parishes and failed to win the nomination outright as he
had often boasted he would do. As the campaign wound into the second
primary, the Progress descended into a blatantly racist appeal for
votes.

In its last edition published before the second primary, the

newspaper reprinted facsimiles of the February 10, 1940, issues of the
Louisiana Weekly, which it called "the largest Negro newspaper in the
South," and the Sepia Socialite, so-called "No. 2 Negro newspaper in
New Orleans." The sole purpose of these reprints was to appeal to
the racism of white voters.

A passage quoted from the Louisiana

Weekly showed the Long machine as a staunch defender of white suprem
acy:
Feeble attempts were made during the day (the
gg

.....................................

Times-Picayune, January 14-15, 1940; Kane, Louisiana Hayride, pp.
446-447; Earl K. Long to W. Scott Heywood, December 11, 1939, JenningsHeywood Collection.
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first primary) at various polls throughout
the city (New Orleans), by courageous Negroes,
to call the bluff of the faomastic Mr. Ellender
. . . but to no avail. The Long machine
crashed their hopes. The Negro was told that
'this is a white man's primary.' Commissioners
for both Mr. Jones and Mr. Noe argued that the
Negro was entitled to vote, but the Old Regu
lars thought differently, and their thoughts
were conclusive.
Slyly attacking the opposition's war record, the Progress further
quoted that:
Another advantage that the Negro who fought in
World War No. 1 has is the comradeship of Mr.
Jones and Senator Noe. The sterling qualities
possessed by these gentlemen will permeate down
throughout the past system giving impetus to
. . . the birth of enfranchisement.
The Progress's editorial comment about the black newspapers’ endorse
ment of Jones went even further in racist rhetoric:
Sam sure is making gains with the coons. He
charms them with some kind of sex appeal. Look
what this nigger (sic) newspaper say about Sam.
This Negro 'society newspaper' attacks Governor
Long for not letting the Negroes vote in the
Democratic primaries and praises Sam Jones for
the battle he is making in behalf of the coons.
'We are against Earl Long because he takes the
stand that the Democratic primary is a white
man's election’ says this Sam Jones Negro news
paper. The Sepia Socialite says that 'Sam Jones
is the white hope of the black man.'69
Even though Jones and Noe ignored the attacks, many reform elements
69Progress, February 16, 1940; Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong,
Southern Primaries and Elections 1920-1949 (University, Alabama,
University of Alabama Press, 1950), p. 70.
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in Louisiana condemned the Long machine for this ugly phase of the
campaign.

The Item editorialized that "we can't recall in 35 years

any political faction that has departed so far from decency to raise
the race-issue (sic) among Democrats, or even so-called Democrats, in
this state," while the States commented that "The Maestri-Long-Leche
machine has stooped to foul means of any sorts (sic) in the effort to
win this election, but the most venal and contemptible plot it has
yet engineered was its clumsy attempt to promote race animosity and
class strife."^
The statement of James E. Wilkins, president of the New Orleans
branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, raised a pertinent question about the entire episode:

why

did the Long machine choose this time to raise the race issue?
The local branch of the NAACP resents the injec
tion of the Negro into the Democratic primary
campaign after every known scheme has been used
to prevent this minority group of American citi
zens from voting . . . In our present voiceless
state whoever emerges victorious on February 20,
1940 (the second Democratic primary) is of little
concern to us.
Louisiana voting rolls in 1939 reflected approximately four decades
of systematic disfranchisement.

After all, it was not until 1944

that the first blacks since disfranchisement in the early 1900s regis
tered to vote in Rapides parish, and Assistant Registrar of Voters in
Tangipahoa parish, Merle S. Weigel, wrote to her soldier-husband in

^Item, February 14, 1940; States, February 27, 1940.
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1944 that no blacks had registered yet in that p a r i s h . N o "black
threat" existed in Louisiana in 1939 comparable to that which existed
during the 1890s and before by which unscrupulous Democratic poli
ticians safely kept white voters in line.

The votes necessary to

create this "threat" simply did not exist in the black communities.
In 1940, only 886 black voters were registered in the entire state.
They constituted .1 per cent of.the total registration.

72

Neverthe

less, and in desperation, the Long machine had used the threat of a
fictitious black vote to capitalize on the ingrained fears and preju
dices of the white community.
A full account of the Louisiana Weekly and Sepia Socialite
articles reveals a trail of greed and misplaced zeal.

The Louisiana

Weekly editor, C. C. Dejoie, Jr., stated in an affidavit executed be
fore notary public T. Hale Boggs that the articles he published were
brought in to his office by James B. LaFourche, who paid for their
insertion.

He identified LaFourche as a black man who performed odd

jobs for the police department and also for "a lawyer known to support
the administration." LaFourche subsequently issued his own affidavit
in which he stated that he wrote and inserted articles in the two
newspapers in an effort to make money.

He had heard that the Long

^Item, February 16, 1940; Alexandria Daily Town Talk (hereinafter
cited as Town Talk), August 8 , 1944; Merle S. Weigel to H. S. Weigel,
August 11, 1944, H. S. Weigel and Family Papers, Division of Archives
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge.
72Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 422; Riley E. Baker,
"Negro Voter Registration in Louisiana, 1879-1964," Louisiana Studies,
Winter, 1965, pp. 335, 338. It was not until 1964 that every parish
in Louisiana had some blacks registered to vote.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

machine had sought to buy 450,000 copies of a black newspaper carrying
an article asking 0. John Rogge to help blacks get the vote and sug
gesting that Jones and Noe were willing to aid such a move.

Keeping

an eye on the main chance, LaFourche arranged with one of the papers
to receive two cents royalty on the sale of each copy above the normal
circulation.

The Long machine subsequently purchased extra copies of

the newspaper issues carrying LaFourche's articles, but when he heard
them misrepresented in a radio address, he went to Jones headquarters
and agreed not to write any more of them, commenting ". . .my only
idea was to agitate for civil rights of Negroes with an increased circulation of the papers out of which I would realize a profit."73 Even
though crass commercial greed lay behind the publication of the
articles, the Long machine bears sole responsibility for injecting the
race issue into the campaign.
The major event of the second Democratic primary occurred when
Noe endorsed Jones "1000 per cent" and actively campaigned for his
election.

Even though Jones' hopes for election brightened consider

ably as he finished.second in the first primary, he welcomed Noe's
support.

The Progress detected a political deal in the Jones-Noe

arrangement.

Articles in the newspaper charged that Noe received

$150,000 for his endorsement, and cartoons appearing in the paper
showed Noe clutching a money bag labeled "$150,000" and dressed in a
"Mark Hanna" suit covered with dollar signs.

In fact, Jones and Noe

had reached an agreement, but not exclusively for money.

Instead,

^Item, February 14, 16, 1940.
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their "deal" included the stipulation that the Jones organization
would pay Noe's campaign expenses and ironically, that fifty per cent
of the state patronage jobs would be reserved for Noe's supporters
after the election, even though Jones had promised to create an effec
tive Civil Service.

Morrison refused to endorse either Long or Jones

and announced that he was "going fishing" on election day, though
Jones claimed that thousands of Morrison supporters were flocking to
his campaign.

Moseley also did not participate in the second primary.

7

The second primary combination of Jones and Noe proved too power
ful for Earl Long to overcome.
not sway voters for Long.

Even the threat of massed troops could

On the eve of the second Democratic primary,

Governor Long ordered the Louisiana National Guard to be ready to move
in case of disorders at the polls.

In nineteen cities throughout the

state, 3,500 men were on call during election day.

To counter this

threat and also any attempted vote-stealing in the election, Noe en
listed more volunteers in his "Jackson Brigade."7'’
Earl Long lost the Democratic nomination for governor when the
voters in the second primary gave him 261,790 votes (48.2 per cent)
compared to Jones' 282,470 (51.8 per cent), but Long was not yet ready
to retire to his Winnfield farm.

The Governor attempted to continue

74
Progress, January 19, 1940; Times-Picayune, January 20, 25, 1940;
Deutsch, "New Orleans Politics," p. 329; Howell, Louisiana Sugar
Plantations, Mardi Gras and Huey P. Long, pp. 170-171; Kane, Louisiana
Hayride, pp. 443-444; Mrs. Louise Jones to Jerry Purvis Sanson, August
4, 1982, author's collection; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Ti
tans,", p. 149.
7^Times-Picayune, February 13, 20, 1940; Item, February 9, 1940;

States, February 9, 1940.
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in a lesser state office after the death of incumbent Secretary of
State E. A. Conway on February 18, 1940.

Conway had won renomination

over reform candidate James Gremillion, but died just before the
second primary.

Long appointed E. A. Conway, Jr. to fill the remainder

of his father's term. Meanwhile, several possible candidates emerged
for the four year term to be filled in the general election.

The

leading contenders for the post were Long and Conway, Jr.^
The Long-dominated Democratic State Central Committee elected in
1936 selected Long as the new Democratic nominee, but reform members
of the "new" Democratic State Central Committee elected in 1940 ob
jected to the selection and maintained that their committee should
select the nominee.

Sam Jones reached a settlement with Wade 0.

Martin, Sr., chairman of the "old" (1936) committee, in which Martin
agreed to call his committee into session again to replace Long with
a nominee more compatible with the governor-elect.

The 1936 committee

on March 2, 1940, rescinded its earlier nomination and nominated Gre
million, and the 1940 committee meeting the same day reaffirmed that
actxon. 77
Earl Long immediately appealed to East Baton Rouge District Court
Judge James D. Womack for a court order blocking Gremillion's certi
fication as the legal candidate in the general election, but Jones'

^Times-Picayune, February 23, 1940; Item, February 19, 1940; Heard
and Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections, p. 71.
^Times-Picayune, February 23, 25, 28, March 3, 1940; Baton Rouge
Morning Advocate, March 1, 1940.
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forces blocked this maneuver by filing a petition for application of
writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court asking that Womack be relieved
of all jurisdiction in the struggle.

The high court agreed that dis

trict courts did not have jurisdiction in such cases and later dis
missed Long's suit, stating that he had no legal basis for contesting
Gremillion's nomination. 78 The Supreme Court ruling was the end of
Long's dream of retaining office in 1940.
The campaign of 1939-1940 was at last over.

Jones still faced

token opposition in the general election from Republican William
Tuttle of New Orleans but did not bother to campaign against him.

The

miniscule Louisiana Republican party was split into two warring fac
tions, and the Democratic nomination was then tantamount to election.
The general election results were:

Jones 225,841 and Tuttle 1,367.

The April general election merely lent a final stamp of authority to
the vigorous reform movement now ready to do battle with the Long
machine at every turn.

That running battle lasted twenty-four years

until a brief reappearance of the race issue following civil rights
developments in the 1950s, and the unique homogenizing campaign of
John McKeithen for the governorship in 1964 obliterated the last
*
JQ
Times-Picayune, March 3, 1940; Ibid., March 8 , 1940; Ibid., March 9,
13, 1940. One casualty of Long's fight was Angola Warden Louie A.
Jones. Long discharged him because Jones gave his proxy to the oppo
sition side in the nominating struggle in the "old" committee. Jones
was subsequently appointed Angola farm superintendent by Angola gen
eral manager Theophile S. Landry who had also given his proxy to the
opponents, but was protected from Long's wrath because his job re
quired Senate confirmation. See Times-Picayune, March 14, 1940,
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 17, 1940.
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vestiges of the classic bifactionalism in Louisiana. 79
Reform-minded commentators throughout the state and nation hailed
Jones’ victory as a triumph also for the democratic principles of
government.

Jones, however, saw his election not as a final triumph,

but only as a beginning.

He commented in an interview after the

second Democratic primary that, "We have got to restore decent, demo
cratic government and enact legislation that will prevent the recur
rence of debauchery, corruption and dictatorship that has character
ized Louisiana in recent years," and he reminded the people of Louisi
ana in his inaugural address that, "Once again yours is the dictator
ship, the dictatorship of the whole people over the men who serve
them, the only kind of dictatorship that a Democracy can abide."80
Even though he acknowledged his debt to Noe and to the reformers
who had helped him from the beginning of the campaign, Jones also
79Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics
Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York, Basic
Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 166-167; Perry H. Howard, "Louisiana Resis
tance and Change," in The Changing Politics of the South, ed. by Wil
liam C. Havard (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1972),
pp. 561-566; Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, pp. 386-389;
States, January 31, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 24,
1940; Official Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of
Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session of the Legislature (Baton Rouge,
Thomas J. Moran’s Sons, 1940), pp. 10-11. Tuttle received no votes in
sixteen parishes and one vote in five parishes. His highest parish
total was 698 in Orleans, compared to Jones* 82,622 in Orleans.
80
Sam Jones inaugural address, Aswell Collection; Tom Dutton, "Sam
Houston Jones: Louisiana’s Liberator,” The Christian Science Monitor
Magazine, April 27, 1940; James C. Crown, "Louisiana’s David," New
York Times Magazine, March 3, 1940; Alva Johnston, "Louisiana Revolu
tion," The Saturday Evening Post, May 11, 1940; "The Whole People,"
Acadiana Profile, October/November 1971, p. 6 ; Times-Picayune, Febru
ary 22, 1940; Shreveport Times, February 12, 1940; Jones to Denny
Daughery, July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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acknowledged the importance of the help he had received from Louisi
ana’s women voters:

"It can safely be said that a good many thousands

of wives of state and city officials voted against their own husbands
who drew their pay from the political payrolls." With the secret bal
lot, of course, his estimate is unverifiable, but it does echo the
sentiments of organized reform women’s groups and of Mrs. James A.
Noe who took to the stump to urge women to vote for her husband in
the first primary and then Jones, in the second primary. 81
While the reformers exulted in their victory, the Longites con
soled each other and tried to put together what had gone wrong.

T.

H. Harris, defeated candidate for re-election as State Superintendent
of Education on the Long ticket, stated simply that the Long slate
lost because the votes of the candidates who had been eliminated in
the first primary went to their opponents in the second primary.
Jennings oil man w. Scott Heywood, who had campaigned for Long in the
first primary, concluded that Long lost because he was "double-crossed
by the school teachers, the bus drivers, and the truck owners;" and
because Jones had promised a $3 fee for automobile licenses, a fifty
per cent reduction in the fee for truck licenses, and twelve months
pay for school teachers, even though Long had maintained that the
state could not afford such favors. Long himself provided the most
fitting epitaph for his 1939-1940 troubles when he wrote eight years
later:

"They charged me with being politically and personally dis

honest, and there was no way on earth, at that time, for me to prove
-----------------

Jones to Daugherty, July 22, 1970; Jones interviewed by Daugherty,
May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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that their contemptible accusations were untrue."82
As Long's ally, United States Senator Allen Ellender surveyed the
political situation in the early spring of 1940, he took comfort in
the fact that "We put up a good fight, but the odds were against us."
Ellender looked forward to a friendlier political climate in the
future: "Right now sentiment is swinging the Jones way, but I predict
that the people will soon wake up and realize their mistake."83 The
Long machine and its allies lay in wait for Sam Jones.

Its articulate

spokesmen still sat in the national and state Houses of Representatives
and Senate, and in parish courthouses and city halls throughout the
state.

Jones began his administration in a state filled with expec

tation.

The reformers expected a vigorous assault on the abuses of

the previous administrations, the Longites expected Jones to turn back
the clock to a pre-Huey Long time, obliterate state services and thus
lose his thin margin of support.
Sam Jones' victory in the 1939-1940 gubernatorial campaign, while
important because it established effective bifactionalism in Louisi
ana, was incomplete.

He had no sweeping mandate from the voters.

In

deed, even with the help given his campaign by the revelation of the
Scandals, he received only fifty-two per cent of the second primary

82W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Heywood, February 27, 1940, JenningsHeywood Collection; Earl K. Long to John B. Fournet, Fournet Collec
tion; T. H. Harris, The Memoirs of T. H. Harris State Superintendent
of Public Education in Louisiana 1908—1940 (Baton Rouge, Bureau of
Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, Louisiana
State University, 1963), p. 191.

83
Allen J. Ellender to Donald A. Draughon, March 5, 1940, Ellender
Collection.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

vote compared to Earl Long’s forty-eight per cent.

ft/

Brief analysis of the 1940 second Democratic primary..results, the
election which most clearly revealed the Long/anti—Long cleavage in
that year, reveals that Longism remained strong in its traditional
home base in the north Louisiana hills.

Earl Long carried fourteen

of the twenty—seven north Louisiana parishes.

Moreover, eleven of

those parishes gave him at least 53.3 per cent of their vote.

South

west Louisiana, Sam Jones’ home territory, also voted heavily Longite.
Allen parish gave Long 57.4 per cent of its vote, compared to 42.6
per cent for Jones; Cameron parish went 55.7 per cent for Long and
44.3 per cent for Jones.

In addition, Jones' native Beauregard parish

split almost evenly (50.9 per cent Long, 49.1 per cent Jones).

Only

in his adopted Calcasieu parish (55.9 percent to 44.1 per cent) and
neighboring Jefferson Davis (60.3 per cent to 39.7 per cent) did Jones
do well in his native area.
The reformers found much more support in south Louisiana.

Jones

swept the twenty-four south Louisiana parishes with the exception of
four.

Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes voted for Long as

a result of alliances between the Longites and Old Regulars in Orleans
and Leander Perez in St. Bernard and Plaquemines.

Long carried the

fourth "Longite" south Louisiana parish, St. James, by only five votes.
In addition, south Louisiana contained six of the sixteen parishes
statewide giving Long the lowest percentage of their vote.
84
.
Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 264.
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The Florida parishes remained a center of anti-Longism in this
election- with Long carrying only Washington parish.

The two bastions

of reform sentiment in this region were East Feliciana, which voted
for Jones 61.1 per cent to 38.9 per cent, and East Baton Rouge, 65.9
per cent for Jones, 34.1 per cent for Long.
A survey of the 1940 Longite vote also reveals that the faction
continued to obtain stronger support in the rural areas of the state
than in the urban area.

Louisiana then contained six parishes which

either were urban or contained one of the state’s largest cities.
Earl Long carried only one of these:

boss-controlled Orleans, by

55.3 per cent to Jones' 44.7 per cent.

Jones carried the other five:

East Baton Rouge and Calcasieu by the totals noted above; Rapides by
57.6 per cent to 42.4 per cent; Ouachita by 62.5 per cent to 37.5 per
cent; and Caddo by. 66.9 per cent to 33.1 per cent.

Moreover, Jones

also carried the nascent "bedroom suburbs" of Jefferson parish (56.8
per cent to 43.2 per cent) and St. Tammany (53.0 per cent to 47.0 per
cent).
Despite the large number of parishes he carried, however, Jones
still won only a narrow victory, carrying eight of his forty-one
parishes by a five per cent or less margin of victory.

Moreover, he

failed to carry all the members of his ticket into state office:

re

formers won in the races for Attorney General, Superintendent of Pub
lic Education, and Secretary of State, while independent reformer A.
P. Tugwell retained the State Treasurer’s office, and Longite hold
overs remained as Registrar of State Lands and Commissioner of Agri
culture.
More importantly, Jones’ supporters did not win a majority of
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seats in the legislature.

One estimate divided the House of Represen

tatives into sixty-one or sixty-two "independent" members to thirtyeight or thirty-nine Longites, and divided the Senate into twentyfour Jones supporters compared to fifteen for Long.
appears to have been generous.

85

This estimate

Other observers found much less

Jones support in the legislature, as few as seven Senators and fourteen Representatives prominently aligned with him. 86

Jones later

claimed at most thirty-five supporters in the House and fifteen in
the Senate. 87
Jones, therefore, was not able to act independently and tear the
Long machine "leaf from twig" as he had promised during the campaign.
Because of his partial victory, he was forced to compromise on some
of his measures in order to establish any of his reform program.

His

compromises disillusioned some of his followers who expected a pris
tine reform unsullied by any hint of "politics as usual," but Jones
cannot be realistically faulted for agreeing to compromise.

His bed

rock supporters, ardent but politically inexperienced, were not numer
ous enough to pass his legislation by themselves.

Jones counted his

political ability as the prime reason he was able to hold together and
enlarge his legislative following enough to pass his program. 88 His

Morning Advocate, February 22, 1940.
QfL

States, May 13, 1940.
87Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6 , 1940, Daugherty Collection.
88

Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 177-178; W. V. Holloway, "The
Crash of the Long Machine and Its Aftermath," Journal of Politics,
August, 1941, pp. 348-362.
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appraisal should be considered accurate.

He had no reliable legisla

tive majority for his proposals, and the residual strength of the
Longite organization, discredited but not destroyed, became apparent
during the 1940 and 1942 legislative sessions and in a series of law
suits challenging Jones' program when passed.

His election indicated

a temporary popularity of reformism in Louisiana, but in its narrow
ness it bore the seeds of an uneasy tenure in office.
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CHAPTER III
SAM JONES AND THE BEGINNING OF REFORM (1940-1941)
Following his victory in the February second Democratic primary,
Sam Jones left for Tucson, Arizona, and a vacation at the home of his
wife’s parents.*

During his lame duck period between the February

primary and Jones’ inauguration in May, however, Earl Long sought to
maintain Longite influence in state government.

In one move, Wade J.

Gamier of Amite resigned from the Louisiana Milk Commission in April
rather than continue serving until August when his term would expire
(thus giving Jones an appointment).

Long then appointed State Repre

sentative R. C. Hathorn to replace Garnier for the four remaining
months and appointed Garnier to fill a new six-year term.

He also ap

pointed L. H. Bowden to fill a vacant term expiring in 1942.

Henry

Vernon, the other commissioner, had served only two years of his
original eight-year appointment and thus had six years remaining on
2
the board.
Long also attempted to help five New Orleans men convicted of
attacking Jones supporters at the polls during the recent primaries.
The five men were all political henchmen of Longite leader Philip
"Nina’’ Patorno, who lived next door to the polling place of Orleans
Parish’s Ward 5, Precinct 1 on Dumaine Street.

Judge Frank T.

Echezabal sentenced each of the five to a six-month term in prison.

*New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 29, March 4, 29, 1940.
2

Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 19, 1940 (hereinafter cited as
Town Talk).
96
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Long granted each man a reprieve so he could ask for clemency before a
special meeting of the State Board of Pardons-

Long’s maneuver proved

ineffective when the pardon board denied all five requests.

3

Even though Long still sat in the governor’s chair and occasion
ally used his official power to the machine's advantage, the state’s
attention focused on the incoming Jones administration.

Jones an

nounced that his inauguration would be held in Louisiana State Univer
sity's horseshoe-shaped football stadium.

His planning committee

hoped to seat 60,000 people in the stands and crowd the rest of the
expected 125,000 people in the end zones and on the field.

They also

planned a huge barbeque of at least 800 cattle and 250,000 hams
be washed down with 300 barrels of lemonade.

to

In an attempt to dis

credit the "High Hat" label put on him during the campaign by Earl
Long, Jones announced that the inauguration would be run "in the most
democratic way possible” and promised, "We'll find room for as many
as appear.” ’ Jones also sought to dispel the corporation lawyer image
Long had attached to him by making his first speech as governor-elect
to the Louisiana State Federation of Labor convention in Shreveport.
In this speech Jones promised to appoint a "real labor man" as labor
commissioner; recommended that labor leaders continue their work to
improve the economic condition of their members ("I have no respect
for any organization that does not"); but also warned that labor’s
“3
Times-Picayune, April 26, May 4, 1940. Patomo eluded justice by
committing suicide May 8 , 1940, the day of his delayed sentencing.
Times-Picayune, May 9, 1940.
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legitimate work could best be continued outside politics.

4

Inauguration day, May 14, 1940,- was a busy time for Jones.

The

festivities began at 9:00 in the morning with a parade from his
Heidelberg Hotel headquarters in downtown Baton Rouge to the LSU cam
pus, followed by a song festival in the LSU stadium at 11:30 (which
included old favorites such as "Hail, Hail, The Gang’s All Here,"
"Home on the Range," and "God Bless America," as well as a new compo
sition entitled "How Do You Do Sam Jones?").

The swearing-in ceremony

began at 12:00 noon as Louisiana Chief Justice Charles P. O’Neill ad
ministered the oath of office.

In his inaugural address, Jones paid

homage to the investigators who uncovered the Louisiana Scandals
(". . . I take my high hat off to the unflagging courage of our press
. . .”); cautioned his followers not to expect a free disbursement of
public jobs ("do not make my administration," he said, " . . . an ob
scene scramble for places at the public trough"); promised that the
state police would no longer be used as political instruments of the
state administration (they "will cease, to be a political gestapo,
modeled on Hitler's best efforts"); promised to destroy completely
all vestiges of the Long machine and repair its damage to political
democracy in Louisiana; and compared the hopelessness of the European
situation with the hopeful developments in Louisiana ("With the lights
out in Europe, with democracy dead and dying . . . it is as inspiring
a task as we could set ourselves — the restoration of thriving, un
shakable democracy here in one great state of this Union.").
—4

The new

.....

New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, March 31, 1940; Town
Talk, April 4, 1940.
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governor's audience interrupted his speech with cheers and applause,
and as he concluded with "God Bless Louisiana," they gave h-i-m a
standing ovation."*
Afternoon inaugural festivities included the barbeque at 1:00
and block dances before the LSU Memorial Tower, on the old and new
capitol grounds, and in Victory Park, at which visitors could buy
souvenir top hats and perfume bottles.

The final official events of

the day were informal dances held at the LSU Gymnasium and Field House
and at the American Legion Community Club.

The new governor and Mrs.

Jones retired to the executive mansion on North Boulevard to host a
buffet supper for close friends and relatives in the mansion's east
room. 6
Sam Jones became Louisiana's chief executive at a threatening time
in European affairs.

On the day of his inauguration, the German armies

broke through the French lines at Sedan, while the Netherlands sur
rendered to the Germans later the same evening.

In Washington, Presi

dent Franklin D. Roosevelt worked with his aides on a message to
Congress requesting extraordinary defense funds which reliable sources
estimated could reach $500,000,000-

Antwerp, Belgium, fell to the
X

^Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, May 14-15, 1940; New Orleans States,
May 14, 1940; Sam Jones Inaugural Address, May 14, 1940, James B.
Aswell, Jr. and Family Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
(hereinafter cited as Aswell Collection).
^Morning Advocate, May 15, 1940. Outgoing-governor Earl Long declined
to attend Jones’ inauguration. His first public appearance after leav
ing office occurred May 16 when he appeared at a Bossier City cattle
auction dressed in khaki pants, red checkered shirt, and white panama
hat. He was there, he said, to sell some cattle from his Winnfield
farm.
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German onslaught on May 17 and on May 20 residents of the English
coast at Dover first reported hearing the sounds of airplanes coming
toward the English Channel.
on May 30.

The Allied debacle at Dunkirk occurred

Italy entered the war against France and England on June

9, and Paris fell on June 13.^
The events of the unfolding war in Europe caused some concern in
Louisiana, but most attention continued to focus on events in Baton
Rouge.

Sam Jones began his first day in office by driving himself to

the capitol in his personal car.

His first visitor was Vance Plauche,
g

head of the State Civil Service Commission.

Other prominent poli

ticians followed, including James A. Noe, who came to the governor’s
office for the first time since leaving it at the end of his short
term in 1936.

Jones spent the rest of the day politicking: he shook

hands with ordinary citizens who wanted to congratulate him, held his
first gubernatorial press conference, appointed F. Edward Hebert as
his personal representative in Washington, D.C., and Steve Alford as
the new superintendent of state police.

He signed Executive Order No.

1 which forbade state department heads from collecting "deducts" from

employees’ salaries and ordered any employee approached for a deduct
to report the incident promptly.

This order was important in fact,

^Times-Picayune, May 14-15, 20, 30, 1940; States, May 14, 1940;
Morning Advocate, May 14-15, 1940; Town Talk, May 14, 17, 20, 30,
June 9, 13, 1940.
g

This Civil Service Commission was a sham created by Huey Long in the
Second Extraordinary Session of the Legislature in 1934, which, in
reality, provided no Civil Service protection, but instead helped the
Longite machine seize control of local personnel. L..Vaughn Howard,
"Civil Service Development in Louisiana," Tulane Studies in Political
Science (New Orleans, Tulane University, 1956), p. 46.
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for it specifically forbade a particularly glaring political abuse
perpetuated by the Longite machine, but it was also important as a
symbolic act — the reformer sweeping aside the vestiges of corrup
tion.

Finally, Governor Jones began laying the foundation for a

successful legislative session by hosting an afternoon reception at
the mansion for legislators and then worked past midnight with his
g
followers outlining administration bills.
Jones' attempt to establish a solid relationship with the in
coming legislature was well advised.

Because he had achieved election

with only fifty-two per cent of the vote, Jones had no overwhelming
mandate with which to persuade legislators, while a sizeable bloc of
the legislature was elected on the Long slate.
Despite his lack of overwhelming support, Jones was successful
in securing the important legislative leadership posts for his
9
Morning Advocate, May 14, 1940; Times-Picayune, May 16, 1940; F.
Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of the Titans” The Life and
Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisi
ana, Center for Louisiana Studies, The University of Southwestern
Louisiana, 1976), p. 153; Roman Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law; Louisi
ana State Police (Topeka, Kansas, Josten's Publications, 1980), pp. 5051. Jones thought that the Louisiana Congressional delegation would
not adequately represent his interest because it was anti—Jones. More
over, the Louisiana governor's office already maintained a representa
tive in Washington, Earle Christenberry, Huey Long's former secretary,
whom Hebert briefly replaced in the $10,000 per year job before he ran
foT Congress. Alford, meanwhile, immediately began purging the state
police of Longite supporters. On May 15 he fired 17 troopers including
Joe Messina, Huey Long's former bodyguard.
^Morning Advocate, February 22, 1940; States, May 13, 1940; Sam Jones
interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970, tape recording, Dennis
M. Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection).
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followers or his allies.

Norman S. Bauer of St. Mary parish, elected

on the Jones ticket and the governor's choice for Speaker of the
House, was chosen for the position following a briefly confused situ
ation which led to several candidates announcing for the post after
Jones announced that he would take no direct part in organizing the
legislature because he was hesitant to appear to be following in
Huey’s dictatorial footsteps.

Frank T. Ellis of Covington, also elec

ted on the Jones ticket, became President-Pro-Tempore of the Senate.
Similarly, Jones carried the day in selection of committee chairmen:
Joe T. Cawthorn, a Noe associate, became chairman of the Senate Fi
nance Committee; pro-Jones Senators James Bailey, W. D. Cotton, and
Grove Stafford became Senate Judiciary Committee chairmen; and Lionel
Ott, a Jones man from New Orleans, secured the chairmanship of the
Affairs of New Orleans Committee.
ships also went to Jones men:

In the House, important chairman

Rules (A. C. Petitjean), Ways and Means

(H. H. Huckabay), Judiciary (Arthur C. Watson and Lester Bordelon;
Old Regular Frank Stitch received the third Judiciary chairmanship).^
The new governor in his first address to the legislature called
on members to help him carry out his pledges to reform Louisiana.
Jones won two early tests of strength on his anti-corruption pledges,

*^Times-Picayune, February 29, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States,
April 7, 1940; Morning Advocate, April 30, 1940; Town Talk, April 8,
30, 1940; Denny Daugherty, "From Log Cabin to Governor's Mansion The
Story of Sam Houston Jones” (senior thesis, Louisiana.State University,
1970), pp. 48-49. Jones later maintained that the governor had the
right to help select the president-pro-tempore and the speaker of the
house, but that any further action on his part would result in execu
tive domination of the legislature. Jones interviewed by Daugherty,
May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection.
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though one victory came through default.

On May 21, 1940, Representa

tive DeLesseps S. Morrison of New Orleans introduced a resolution de
claring vacant the seat of Representative Chester Wooten of Plaque
mines Parish because Wooten had served as Plaquemines registrar of
voters until September 22, 1939, and the constitution clearly stated
that no parish registrar could be elected or appointed to any office
until twelve months after vacating the registrar’s office.

"It is

purely a constitutional question," Morrison said, "The question is
merely abstract and not personal.

I am speaking for the principle

alone." Wooten, however, represented the baliwick of the pro-Long
political boss Leander H. Perez.

The Wooten expulsion resolution

deadlocked the Committee on Elections with a 3-3 vote,
resigned rather than face possible expulsion.
gained his objective.

but Wooten

Jones thus indirectly

He was more clearly successful in ousting State

Bank Examiner Jasper S- Brock, who also kept the payroll records of
the infamous Louisiana Debt Moratorium Commission which the Longites
had used to reward friendly legislators.

The final vote to oust

Brock passed 79-17 in the house and 31-6 in the senate.

The New Or

leans delegation provided fourteen of the house votes and five of the
Senate votes against ouster.

12

Jones’ success in these early victories and in his subsequent
passage of bills implementing a large part of his campaign platform
has been credited to several factors.

Allan Sindler traces much of

To

:
Times-Picayune, May 21-23, 28-29, 1940. Jones’ new bank examiner
found that legislators had collected $296,987 in debt moratorium com
mission salaries during the past four years.
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Jones' success to a working arrangement reached by Jones and Robert
Maestri shortly after the second Democratic primary.

Maestri recog

nized that New Orleans needed continued state fiscal assistance, and
that in large part his domination of New Orleans resulted from state
legislation which could be undone in Baton Rouge.

In return for favors

from the state government, the Old Regular delegation agreed to sup
port many of Jones' key reform bills.

Ever the political realists,

the Old Regulars recognized the direction of the political wind and
accomodated themselves to it, pledging to support the governor "in
every constructive move he made for the benefit and welfare of our be
loved state and its people." As noted above, however, the Old Regulars remained unreliable allies at best. 13
Jones later maintained that he had been successful in the 1940
legislative session because the general public's anti-Long, anti
corruption sentiment was so strong that few legislators chose to vote
against it.

More perceptively, he also maintained that some of the

Longites voted with him in hopes of placating him and obtaining some
of the patronage jobs for their followers. 14
In reality, all three of these considerations influenced decision
making in the 1940 legislative session.

Robert Maestri and Sam Jones

T3
Allan Sindler,-Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics, 1920-1952
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 162-163; New Orleans
Item, May 10, 1940.
14
Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection;
Sam H. Jones interviewed by James M. Godfrey, February, 1977,.type
script copy, LSU Oral History Collection, Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Times-Picayune', August 8, 1940.
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were shrewd, politicians who realized that both would benefit from a
political compromise, and designed a temporary truce that both could
accept.

Old Regular representatives met with Jones representatives

in Baton Rouge just before the 1940 regular session opened.

Norman

Bauer assured the Old Regulars that "nobody will be punished for the
way he voted in the election" and that they would receive a fair
share of committee memberships.

Following this meeting, twenty-one of

the twenty-eight member New Orleans legislative delegation met in
formally at the Choctaw Club headquarters and voted to support the
Jones program "as far as may be possible." Jones, however, always
maintained that there was a limit to how far he could compromise:
"The important thing,"

he said later, "is getting your program

through without sacrificing your principles.Moreover, the impor
tance of the anti-corruption sentiment resulting from the Louisiana
Scandals cannot be underestimated.

No other single reason adequately

explains the presence of such anti-Jones stalwarts as Representative
William J. Dodd on the Jones side of several of the reform measures.
American legislative bodies seldom hold tidy, smooth-running ses
sions.

Their function is not only to enact bills into law, but also

to hear alternatives, consider complaints, and forge compromises of
issues they choose to consider.

The 1940 Louisiana legislative ses

sion was no exception to this rule.

Sam Jones had pledged himself to

a thoroughgoing reformation of Louisiana and was eager to embark on
his task.

He had to deal, however, with a legislature in which many

Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6, 1970, Daugherty Collection;
New Orleans Item, May 8, 10, 1940.
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of his slim cadre of supporters were, like Jones himself, political
neophytes equally eager to do a good job of reforming the state, but
who were also inexperienced in the procedure and unfamiliar with the
political log-rolling necessary to accomplish their objectives.

In

addition, Jones was bound by his idealism and his campaign statements
to leave the legislature unbossed.

The result of this situation was

the introduction of 1,430 bills, only 481 of which became law,^ be
cause of the inexperience and excessive optimism of administration
leaders in both branches of government.
Nevertheless, Jones managed at the outset of his administration
to piece together a partial fulfillment of his platform.

The heart

of Jones’ effort consisted of his pledges to dismantle the centrali
zation of power and resulting opportunities for corruption in the
state government left from the previous administration, and to re
organize the state government into a more business-like, manageable
system.

His record of accomplishment in these areas is mixed.

Some

of his reforms were successful, while others proved temporary and
ineffective.
Much of Sam Jones' lasting success lay in his fight to repeal
numerous laws, some dating back to Huey Long's administration, which
allowed the state government to dominate parish and local units.
These centralization measures hampered the effective operation of
local governments, and both the Louisiana Police Jury Association and

^Tom Dutton, "Sam Houston Jones: Louisiana's Liberator," Christian
Science Monitor, April 27, 1940; James Bugea, Carlos Lazarus, and
William T. Pegues, "The Louisiana Legislation of 1940," Louisiana
Law Review, November, 1940, p. 98.
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the Louisiana Municipal Association eagerly sought their repeal.
Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell noted at the 1940 LMA convention that
the absence of home rule in municipal governments led to morale and
control problems.

If an employee knew that his job was a state ap

pointment, Caldwell asked, how were municipal officials to influence
him not to neglect his work?^
The major legislation concerning local revenue passed at the 1940
regular session was Act 70, which repealed Act 10 of the 1934 Extra
ordinary Session and restored full authority to municipalities and
parishes to impose taxes, license fees and taxes without seeking
legislative approval.

Jones had little trouble with repeal, which

originated in the Senate where it passed with a 30-6 vote.

The

measure passed the House unanimously. 18

"Rights Restored to Police Juries," Louisiana Policy Jury Review,
April, 1941, p. 27; S. S. Caldwell, "Address," Louisiana Municipal
Review, May-June, 1940, p. 7.
18
Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the
Regular Session (1940) (Baton Rouge, published by authority of the
State, 1940), p. 383 (hereinafter cited as Acts Passed by the Legisla
ture, 1940); Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Rep
resentatives of the State of Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session
(Baton Rouge, published by authority, 1940), p. 1631 (hereinafter cited
as Proceedings of the House, 1940); Calendar of the House of Represen
tatives of the State of Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session of the
Legislature Under the Constitution of 1921 (Baton Rouge, published by
authority, 1940), p. 507 (hereinafter cited as House Calendar, 1940);
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of
Louisiana at the Tenth Regular Session of the Legislature Under the
Adoption of the Constitution of 1921 (Baton Rouge, published by
authority, 1940), p. 493 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings of the Sen
ate, 1940); Senate Calendar 1940 of the State of Louisiana Tenth Regu
lar Session of the Legislature Under the Constitution of 1921 (Baton
Rouge, published by authority, 1940), p. 65 (hereinafter cited as
Senate Calendar, 1940).
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Local municipalities of 12,500 or more persons also received
authorization to install and operate parking meters on their streets,
provided that they called an election after a three-month trial period
to decide whether the meters should remain permanently.

Alexandria,

which was soon swamped by vehicles from nearby army camps, was one of
the first major Louisiana cities to experiment with parking meters,
not so much for revenue as for some effort to control traffic itself
in the increasingly congested downtown area.

The legislature also

authorized local governing bodies in Louisiana to participate in the
federal government's national defense program by authorizing them to
donate or other wise transfer land to the United States for national
defense purposes, especially for the maintenance or construction of
waterways. 19
Jones also sought legislative authorization to pursue wrongdoers
who had stolen the state's property or money through creation of a
State Crime Commission to consist of the governor, the executive
counsel to the governor, and the attorney general.
set to remain in

The agency was

existence for fouryears with a $1 ,000,000

ation for its operation.

appropri

With this $1,000,000, Jones hoped to recover

$4,000,000 which had been illegally taken from the state.

His bill

was introduced in the House on June 3, and after an unsuccessful at
tempt by Representative James E. Bolin to reduce its appropriations
to $250,000, and opposition from Representative Lloyd Hendrick who
preferred a legislative investigating commission, the bill passed the

T9Acts Passed by

the Legislature (1940), pp. 392, 441; Town
August 16, 1941, January 22, 1942.
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House on June 19 on an 87—7 vote, with most of the nay votes cast by
rural north Louisiana Longites.
by a 32-4 vote,

The bill passed the Senate on July 4,

with opposition from a combination of north and south

Louisiana Senators.

20

Jones thus obtained in Act 13 his Crime Commis

sion with wide-ranging authority "to investigate and inquire into the
affairs of the State, to investigate the functions, transactions, con
tracts, purchases, sales and expenditures of the State to the extent
it may deem necessary or desirable," and the authority to institute
civil proceedings to recover "any money, property or thing of value"
it found fraudulently acquired from the state. 21
Despite the ease with which former legislatures had granted ex
traordinary powers to the governor during the years of Longite con
trol, some Longite legislators feared that the Crime Commission (the
"Hitleristic, dictatorial, tyrannical crime commission" as Senator
Boucher called it) gave too much power to the governor.
hand, the reformers applauded the new authority.

On the other

The Longites, how

ever, chose not to criticize the purpose of the Crime Commission, but
instead attacked the legality of its appropriations.

22

The Longites challenged the constitutionality of the Crime Com
mission's appropriations in the case Harold G. Falkenstein, Et. Als.
20
Proceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 1055-1057; House Calendar, 1940,
p. 251; Proceedings of the Senate, 1940, pp. 403-404; Senate Calendar,
1940, pp. 1779-1780; Times-Picayune, June 3, 13, 1940; States, June 3,
1940.
21

Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 73.

22

Morning Advocate, September 9, 1940.
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v. Sam Houston Jones, Governor, Member of Commission Created by Act
13 of 1940, filed in the 19th Judicial District Court presided over
by Judge James D. Womack in Baton Rouge.

In this and other cases

brought before him, Judge Womack proved to be a thoroughgoing Longite,
whose court district in East Baton Rouge Parish normally heard cases
which questioned the constitutionality of state government actions.
Womack issued a preliminary injunction against the Crime Commission
on June 21, 1941, in which he prohibited it from expending any funds
made available to it because be found that the Commission had no legal
source of funds.

The original legislation provided appropriations to

it from state funds not otherwise appropriated, at a time when all
23
funds were in fact earmarked.
Womack then began hearings into the
legality of the funding plan.
These hearings led to a heated conflict between Jones and Womack
over the limits of executive privilege of the Louisiana governor.
Womack wanted to call Jones into his courtroom to testify about the
Crime Commission bill and issued a subpoena to require . his attendance.
Jones, in turn, asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to issue a writ
prohibiting Womack from forcing the governor's appearance in his
courtroom, surrounded himself with 30 state troopers, and announced
that he did not intend to be taken from his duties by "frivolous ef
forts of a few demagogues and enemies of good government."

In his

23
"Louisiana Crime Commission Report to the Legislature," May 11, 1942;
Harold G. Falkenstein, Et. Als. v. Sam Houston Jones, Governor, Member
of Commission Created by Act 13 of 1940, Supreme Court of Louisiana,
No. 36,416 (hereinafter cited as Falkenstein v. Jones); John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (herein
after cited as Foumet Collection).
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opposition to Jones’ plea to the Supreme Court, Womack sarcastically
remarked that "this court had hoped that the governor would refrain
from his speechmaking activities and . . . come into court and testi
fy in the case and thus . . . assist respondent judge in arriving at
an intelligent decision . . . "

Histrionics aside, the Supreme Court

five days later declined to dissolve Womack's restraining order
which paralyzed the Crime Commission and also denied Jones' request
that he not be forced to appear in Womack’s court.
Jones, however, had no intention of honoring the subpoena.

He

cited as precedent Thomas Jefferson’s refusal to appear before a
court during his years as President of the United States.

If he were

to appear in every political suit brought against the state, Jones
maintained, he would have no time to attend to his duties as governor.
Besides, he added, the Attorney General had issued an opinion that "I
am not amenable to subpoenas." Womack, however, was neither ready to
recognize Jones' claim nor to establish the precedent of executive
immunity in Louisiana and declined to reissue a subpoena for Jones,
thus never forcing the issue to a conclusion.

Judge Womack did, how

ever, issue a ringing statement in which he reiterated his belief in
judicial supremacy over the executive:
I grant that he has defied my authority and I
have tolerated it, but he has not by any means
intimidated this court and I want to say at
this time that in the event I signed an order
compelling his attendance and it became . . .
my personal duty to serve that order, I would
24
Morning Advocate, July 3, 8 , 1941.
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bring him into court regardless of the
consequences.25
Womack closed his Crime Commission hearings on July 10, and on
July 14 ruled that the appropriation plan was defective and issued an
injunction to replace his temporary restraining order paralyzing the
Commission.

The Louisiana Supreme Court lent its final stamp of

authority to the case when it upheld Womack’s ruling in an appeal by
the state, and in addition, in its later

rulin g

on the Elmer Stewart,

Et. Al. v. Eugene Stanley, Attorney General, Et. Al. case, held that
the Commission’s right to institute suits was also unconstitutional.26
As a result of these court decisions, Sam Jones’ Crime Commission
perished.
Jones similarly lost his bid to reorganize the bewildering con
glomeration of 179 state departments into a more manageable 20 depart
ments.

He began studying the problem of government reorganization be

fore his inauguration, and on April 31, 1940, announced that he had
hired the "nationally known firm of Griffenhagen & Associates of
Washington, Chicago, New York, Boston, and Milwaukee" to survey
Louisiana’s state government and design a more efficient arrangement.
25

Ibid., July 11, 1941; Sam Jones to J. D. Womack, June 28, 1941,
William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones,
Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane
University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
26

Morning Advocate, July 11, 15, August 3, 1941; Item, December 1,
1941; "Louisiana Crime Commission Report to the Legislature," May 11,
1941; Faleknstein v. Jones. The Stewart v. Stanley suit was insti
gated by Leander.Perez, the political boss of Plaquemines parish. See
Glen Jeansonne, Leander Perez, Boss of the Delta (Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana State University Press, 1977), pp. 124-127.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

The resulting "Griffenhagen Report" produced a reorganization plan
modeled on arrangements already in effect in Virginia, Illinois, New
York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Minnesota.

The report and the subse

quent reorganization bill in the legislature called for consolidation
of the state government into 20 departments:

Revenue, Treasury, Fi

nance, State, Education, Occupational Standards, State Lands, Agricul
ture, Labor, Banking, Public Service, Public Welfare, Institutions,
Public Safety, Highways, Public Works, Conservation, Minerals, Military Affairs, and Independent Establishments.

27

The plan also created

an executive cabinet (consisting of the department heads, the governor,
and his executive counsel and special assistants) which was to meet
each week to coordinate governmental affairs.

The key to the reorgani

zation plan was to be the new Finance Department, divided into bureaus
for the budget, accounts and control, purchases and property control,
buildings, local governments, and administrative services.

In addi

tion, a new fiscal code proposed in a separate bill further buttressed
the Finance Department's enhanced importance.

The fiscal code provided

that the Finance Department would construct preliminary budgets for
all other state departments, supervise all expenditures, and make all
purchases, while the Treasurer continued as custodian of all state
funds, the disbursing officer and supervisor of state investments.
The State Auditor examined all state accounts and reported any
27
Morning Advocate, May 1, June 2, 1940; Proceedings of the House, 1940,
pp. 1245-1251; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 220; Charles
S. Hyneman, "Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legisla
ture," Louisiana Law Review, November, 1940, p. 147; Mortimer Barr,
"The Louisiana Public Service Commission" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1941), pp. 102-103.
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unauthorized or illegal transactions to the legislature.

In addition,

the fiscal code provided a new Board of Finance consisting of three
members appointed by the governor for overlapping 9-year terms to
represent the public, approve all rules in the Finance Department,
approve depositories of state monies, approve the borrowing of funds,
and make any investigations deemed necessary. 28
Introduction of the companion reorganization and fiscal code
bills engendered a storm of protest from the Longites.

Representative

Wilbur T. McCain of Grant Parish complained that the bills were too
long (the reorganization bill alone ran to more than 100 pages), and
legislators were asked to vote without sufficient time to consider
them.

Representative C. 0. Webb of Red River Parish added that "I

have read [these bills] twice and all I could get was a headache.

I

defy any member of this House to say truthfully that he knows what
these bills mean."

Other legislators, however, thought that they

knew exactly what the bills meant — Teutonic dictatorship on the Nazi
model.

Senator Ernest Clements asserted on the Senate floor that "it

is not necessary to go all the way to Chicago and bring the firm of
Griffenhagen to Louisiana to tell us how to write our laws and how we
»
shall live.” Griffenhagen, he said, was "an emissary of Adolph Hit
ler." Moreover, Griffenhagen had devised "an attempt in a most dicta
torial manner through the governor to take charge of our state."
Clements emerged as the most vituperative critic of the reorganization
plan.

In floor debate on a bill to appropriate $100,000 to fund

28
Morning Advocate, June 2, 1940; Proceedings of the House, 1940, pp.
1242-1245; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 288.
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preliminary investigation of state departments, he charged again that
the proposed law was the "most high-handed and dictatorial ever known
in the state," and again in an absurd statement drew the Griffenhagen/
Hitler parallel:
Why should Griffenhagen want to reorganize
the government of Louisiana? Hitler trampled
down the bloodstained poppies of Flanders
Field and overran the hallowed soil of France.
In the cafe the other day, I saw one of
Griffenhagen’s associates and he had the map
of Germany written all over his face.
If the reorganization passed, Clements worried, "We will have a combi
nation of Fascism, Naziism and Bolshevism that will be known as the
29
Jones Four Year Plan."
Senator Frank Ellis defended the reorganization plan by reminding
Clements that "It is as necessary for the government to adjust itself
to progress and social change as for individuals to become adjusted,"
and pointedly asked the Senators "Are you statesmen or are you poli
ticians?"

Jones in a radio address also defended reorganization

("the heart and core of reformation in Louisiana") and attempted to
allay any fears of dictatorship by reminding the voters that "the
administration is not 30 days old yet, but we have seen the restoration of democracy and abolition of dictatorship." 30
Despite vocal opposition, the reorganization bill (Act 47) passed
the House with an 89-2 vote and the Senate with a 35-3 vote (Clements
29
Times-Picayune, June 11, 24, 28, 1940.
30
States, June 13, 18, 1940.
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persuaded two others to vote with him)- The companion fiscal code
bill (Act 48) passed by similar margins:

87-1 in the House and 36-1

(Clements voted nay) in the Senate. 31
The reorganization bill passed the legislature as a constitutional
amendment and thus required ratification in the November, 1940, general
election.

Earl Long and other Longites waged a strenuous campaign

against the amendment, but the voters approved it 140,543 to 113,876.
Jones proceeded to establish the new governmental order in Louisiana,
but his efforts ultimately came to nothing.

The reorganization and

fiscal code acts faced the same gauntlet as the Crime Commission:
the 19th judicial district courtroom of Judge J. D. Womack.

32

A group of six Louisiana taxpayers filed suit in Womack’s court
in late December, 1940 (Earl R. Graham, Et. Als., v. Sam H. Jones,
Et. Als., later amended to Earl R. Graham, Et. Als. v. A. P. Tugwell,
Et. Als.). Graham and the other plaintiffs in the case contended that
the Reorganization Act was unconstitutional on three grounds:

1.

it

violated the fundamental principles of the republican form of govern
ment guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, "because it
is arbitrary, undemocratic, and denies and limits petitioners’ voice
in the election of public officials directly responsible to the elec
torate and places unlimited; centralized power in the Governor of

~^Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 220-228; Proceedings of
the House, 1940, pp. 1242-1251; House Calendar, 1940, pp. 248, 258259; Proceedings of the Senate, 1940, pp. 1604-1605; Senate Calendar,
pp. 400, 410; Times-Picayune, July 3, 1940.
32Times-Picayune, August 16, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 3, 14,
1940.
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Louisiana without due process of law"; 2. the legislature had failed to
designate the specific election at which the amendment was to be sub
mitted to the voters as required in Article 21, Section 1 of the state
constitution; 3. the statute as presented to the voters also violated
the requirement in Article 21, Section 1 of the state constitution
which provided that "when more than one amendment has been submitted
at the same election, they shall be so submitted as to enable the
electors to vote on each amendment separately."
Judge Womack in his decision and the Louisiana Supreme Court in
its subsequent review of his decision both dismissed the plaintiffs'
first contention, the Supreme Court noting that American legal prece
dent had established that enforcement of the constitutional guarantee
of a republican form of government was a political question over which
the courts have no jurisdiction.

Both courts agreed, however, that

the statute was invalid because of sloppy procedure.

The legislature

had failed to specify the date of the election when the voters were
to vote on the amendment as provided by the amending procedure of the
1921 Constitution.
too broad:

Womack also ruled that the reorganization act was

it amended laws covering various functions of the state

government which were too divergent to be covered with one amendment,
thereby failing to fulfill the constitutional requirement that voters
be allowed to vote on each amendment separately.
presented to the voters provided only one choice:
the entire state government.

The amendment as
reorganization of

The plaintiffs contended that a voter

may want to approve the reorganization of one department of state
government but not approve reorganization of another department, and
could not do so under the amendment as it appeared on the ballot.
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Womack on March 18, 1941, therefore, ruled the entire reorganization
amendment unconstitutional. 33
The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed Womack’s decision on appeal
by the state, and by a 5-2 vote upheld his ruling.

The complex

supreme court decision left Jones in an odd situation:

his state

government now had no clear lines of authority or organization.

The

court invalidated the enactment of the amendment on two points — the
legislature failed to specify the date the amendment was to be sub
mitted to the voters, and the act should have been submitted as at
least two separate amendments (a practice dating from the 1879 Consti
tution and its stipulation that acts of the legislature must deal with
one subject only).

In the murky majority opinion written by Justice

Wynne G. Rogers, the high court appeared to rule that while the enact
ment of the reorganization was completed improperly and was thus uncon
stitutional, the enabling acts relating to the reorganization and the
fiscal codes were not unconstitutional. 34 The original suit had not
attacked any possibly dangerous centralization of power, and the
supreme court apparently saw none.
State attorneys argued that loss of the reorganization amendment
would not cause the collapse of the entire new governmental structure;
that the reorganization and the attendant fiscal code would be intact
except in those areas where it specifically conflicted with the 1921
33James D. Womack, The Griffenhagen-Jones Reorganization Amendment:
The Decision Rendered by a Competent, Honest and Courageous Judge
Holding the Scheme Flagrantly Unconstitutional (n.p., n.d., 1941?)
pp. 2-23; Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941; States, July 1, 1941.
34
Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941; States, July 1, 1941.
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Constitution, which contained a vague authorization for consolidation
of departments.

Opposition attorneys maintained, however, that loss

of the amendment resulted in loss of the entire reorganization.

Gov

ernor Jones questioned the court's authority to declare an amendment
unconstitutional:

"Its effect is to declare the constitution uncon

stitutional . . . The decision says that [the people] don't have [the]
right to change their own constitution." He also admitted that the
state had no alternative plan for the reorganization, but reaffirmed
his determination to bring it about.

The Supreme Court anticipated

Jones’ question, and in its opinion cited the American and English
Enclyclopedia of Law: "The courts have full power to declare that an
amendment to the constitution has not been properly adopted, even
though it has been so declared by the political department of the
state," and the Miller v. Johnson decision cited in the Lawyers’ Re
ports Annotated, which declared that "the question of lawful adoption
of an amendment to the constitution is a judicial question."35
Jones began a strenuous public campaign to restore state reorgan
ization.

He portrayed the decision as an assumption of judicial power

unprecedented in Louisiana:

"Never . . . have the people of Louisiana

been denied the right to say what their constitution may contain . . .
every amendment adopted since 1921 can be declared null and void."
Earl Long and Ernest Clements announced that they would follow Jones
everywhere he spoke and counter his arguments.

The state asked the

Supreme Court to rehear the case, or, failing that, to issue a clari
fication of its incomprehensible ruling.

Otherwise, state officials

35
Morning Advocate, July 1, 1941.
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will be confronted with a presumptively valid
administrative organization under a presump
tively valid act of the legislature, but under
which no operations may possibly be had be
cause of the impossibility of determination
^g
of exactly what the court means by its decree.
As the state awaited the outcome of its request, House Speaker
Norman Bauer hinted that if the court denied the rehearing, Jones
might call the legislature back into a special session either to re
pass the reorganization or to call a constitutional convention to
write the reorganization into the organic law of the state.
end, neither happened.

In the

In 1942 the supreme court also invalidated

the reorganization acts themselves in the case of 0. Dolan Ricks v.
Martin Close, on the basis "of inseparability of those provisions de
pending on constitutional change from the other provisions." Jones
salvaged some of his reorganization plan when the 1942 legislature
by statute reinstituted the Departments of Public Works, Finance, and
Occupational Standards, but generally the state government reverted
to its inefficient pre-1940 organization.

Careless drafting of legis

lation on the part of the reformers thus made their attempts to reorganize the state administration vulnerable to nullification. 37
*

Jones was more successful in his efforts to establish a Classified
State Civil Service System to replace the old order in which state
employees had been subject to dismissal at the whim of their super-

36 Ibid., July 16-17, 1941.

37

Ibid., July 1-2, 4, 16-17, 23, 30, 1941; Report of the Committee to
Consider Changes in the Powers, Duties, and Responsibilities of the
Governor, May 11, 1966, p. E-12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121

visors, and had been compelled to provide "deducts" from their pay
checks to finance Longite machine campaigns.

To eliminate these

abuses and protect state employees, Jones appointed prominent New
Orleans attorney Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., who had worked for institu
tion of the merit system since Governor John M. Parker’s administra
tion in 1920, to head a committee to draft proposed Civil Service
bills for the state and for the city of New Orleans.

Dunbar's com

mittee responded with two separate bills modeled after the Civil Service laws of the federal government and other states. 38
The two bills were introduced in 1940 as administration bills
with Jones’ full backing.

The proposed Civil Service laws were

further strengthened by a proposed constitutional amendment which
provided that they could not be amended or repealed by any subsequent
legislature except by a two-thirds vote of both houses.

Therefore,

while the Civil Service bills did not face the November hurdle of
popular ratification, their protecting amendment did.

The bills orig

inated in the House, where they passed by wide margins following sur
prisingly mild debate and passed the Senate after the defeat of
several proposed diluting amendments, thus becoming Act 171 (New
Orleans) and Act 172 (state) of the 1940 regular session of the
legislature. 39
OO
Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 75-76.
39Hyneman, "Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legisla
ture," pp. 15-16; Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana,"
pp. 75-76; Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 687-729; Pro
ceedings of the House, 1940, pp. 833-834, 2071-2072; House Calendar,
1940, pp. 220-223; Times-Picayune, June 12, 15, July 5, 1940; States,
June 14, 1940.
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The Louisiana Civil Service bill provided for a State Civil
Service Commission consisting of five members appointed by the gover
nor for staggered 6 year terms from lists provided by the presidents
of five Louisiana colleges: LSU (public), Tulane University (indepen
dent private), Loyola University (Catholic), Centenary College (Metho
dist) , and Louisiana College (Baptist)- Dunbar and his associates
assumed that future governors could be hostile to Civil Service and
therefore designed several safeguards into their system.

If the

governor failed to appoint a member to a vacancy on the Commission
within six months of its occurance, for example, the person whose name
appeared first on the list prepared by the college president who had
recommended the member whose seat became vacant automatically became
a full member of the Commission.

The bill also provided for a state

director of personnel whom the Commission was to appoint from a list
prepared by a special examining committee consisting of three persons
skilled in personnel management.

The act brought into the classified

Civil Service most of the employees of all the executive departments
and agencies except the offices of the governor, the attorney general,
and the Crime Commission.

Entrance into the Civil Service was to be

by "truly competitive" examinations.

The Louisiana Civil Service law

faced the problem of how to start the system.

It rejected the proce

dures used in other states which called for state employees to take
competitive examinations along with prospective employees in order to
keep their jobs, or freezing all state employees on their job without
any test at all.

Instead, current Louisiana employees had to pass

special "noncompetitive” examinations proving their minimum competence
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to hold their job, after which they were "blanketed in" under Civil
Service protection.

The act forbade the use of political pressure

for employment or promotion and also forbade employees to pay "any
assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political organi
zation or purpose . . ."a direct response to the Long machine*s
"deducts" and forced Progress subscriptions.

The law was not to be

come effective until July 1, 1942 (the legislature later delayed the
effective date to January 1, 1943), thus allowing time for the Commis
sion and the personnel director to be appointed and the tests designed.
The other administration-sponsored Civil Service bill applied only
to cities with a population in excess of 100,000, i.e., New Orleans.
That measure differed from the state law only in establishing a sepa
rate commission and providing that all current city employees would
be blanketed in on July 1, 1942, without any examinations at all, a
concession to Mayor Maestri and members of the New Orleans legislative
delegation who threatened to oppose Civil Service if the test require
ment was not dropped.

The reformers thought that Civil Service could

not be enacted without their support and so agreed to this major
concession, which, in effect, made meaningful implementation of Civil
Service in New Orleans a matter of employee attrition. 41
40
Acts of the Legislature (1940), p. 687; Hyneman, "Political and Ad
ministrative Reform in the 1940 Legislature," pp. 16-22; Howard, "Civil
Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 77-79; Willard E. Parker, Report
Department of State Civil Service 1943-1944 (Baton Rouge, 1945), pp.
18-20. Of the 9,531 state employees judged eligible to take the origi
nal non-competitive exam, only 86 failed to qualify.
41
Howard, "Civil Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 79-80, 92;
Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 157; Edward F. Haas, "New
Orleans on the Half-Shell: The Maestri Era, 1936-1846," Louisiana
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The voters approved the Civil Service protection amendment by
more than 9,000 votes in the November, 1940, election, and six days
later Jones appointed his Civil Service Commission, which began its
search for a personnel director.

Jones’ Commission survived a tax

payer suit brought against it when District Judge Charles A. Holcombe
in December, 1941, ruled that plaintiff 0. Dolan Ricks (a Longite
former deputy fire marshal) was not directly affected by the pro
visions of the act and could therefore properly contest only the
constitutionality of the act and not the expenditure of general revenue funds to pay for its operation.

42

But Civil Service in Louisiana, as enacted by the Jones admini
stration, proved to be short lived.

Newly-elected governor Earl Long

mustered a two-thirds vote in the 1948 regular legislative session to
emasculate Civil Service and then mustered a two-thirds vote in the
1948 extraordinary session which destroyed Civil Service except for
employees of the social security agencies (where the federal government
History, Summer, 1972, p. 298; Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison
and the Image of Reform New Orleans Politics, 1946-1961 (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p. 21; Joseph B. Parker, The
Morrison Era Reform Politics in New Orleans (Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican
Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 59-60.
42
Item, November 8 , 1940; Morning Advocate, November 14, 1940; TimesPicayune, December 9, 1941; States, March 30, 1942; 0. Dolan Hicks V.
Department of State Civil Service, Et. Als., Supreme Court of Louisi
ana No. 36,529, Foumet Collection. A third Civil Service act passed
in the 1940 legislature provided protection to municipal firemen and
policemen in cities with populations in excess of 16,000 persons. This
bill did not have administrative backing, and Jones vetoed it when it
reached his desk. He created a minor legal flap when he later recon
sidered and signed it into law. The court ruling in State v. Junkin
(1907), he said, provided that as long as the bill remained in the
governor’s possession, it was subject to consideration, and he had
never filed his veto with the Secretary of.State. His action was sub
sequently not questioned. See Howard, ’’Civil Service Development in
Louisiana," pp. 81-83 and Bugea, Et. Als., "The Louisiana Legislation
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required it).

Permanent, fully protected Civil Service did not arrive

in Louisiana until Governor Robert Kennon's administration wrote Civil
Service into the constitution at the beginning of his administration
in 1952.43
Governor Jones’ efforts to reform Louisiana’s electoral proce
dures survived judicial and political challenges.

The legislature

passed administration bills prohibitng any state office from "padding
the payrolls" of any department by increasing the number of employees
in the six months preceeding a gubernatorial election; prohibiting
any person from allowing his or her name to be carried on a state,
parish, or municipal payroll for services not actually rendered; pro
hibiting political advertisements on public property; prohibiting any
employee of the state or any of its political subdivisions making
$200 or less per month to contribute to political campaigns for pri

mary or general elections, either directly or indirectly; providing
that illiterate voters could obtain help from poll commissioners only
if they produced an affidavit certifying their inability to read; and
providing that parish registrars of voters -must have their poll records available for public inspection for part of each day. 44
of 1940," p. 99.
43
Howard, "Civil-Service Development in Louisiana," pp. 108-109;
Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 243; Michael Kirtz, "Government By
the Civics Books: The Administration of Robert F. Kennon, 1952-1956,"
North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Spring/Summer, 1981,
p. 56.
44
Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), pp. 14, 377, 832, 1141, 1197;
Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, pp. 155-156; States, May 30, June 4,
1940; Times-Picayune, May 17, June 12, 14, 19, 28, July 10, 1940;
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 7, 1940.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126

Another electoral reform that caused a great legal and political
storm was Act 84 which authorized the use of voting machines in pri
mary and general elections- and made their use mandatory in all muni
cipalities with populations in excess of 150,000 (New Orleans).

Even

though the measure passed the legislature with little difficulty, it
faced both judicial challenges in new "taxpayer suits" and official
resistance on the part of New Orleans officials reluctant to implement
the reform, which would make manipulation of the city vote more diffi
cult.

Nevertheless, Jones pushed ahead with his reform.

In June,

1941, the state let a contract by which the Shoup Voting Machine Cor
poration of Philadelphia was to supply 435 machines at a cost of
$1,136 each, or a total of $464,160 with a two per cent discount for
paying cash.

The state paid the total bill and the city of New Orleans

was to reimburse the state treasury $25,000 immediately, $100,000 the
next fiscal year, and the rest of its one-half share of the machines’
cost over the next several years.

The funding scheme was quickly

challenged in a suit instituted by 0. Dolan Ricks (the same 0. Dolan
Ricks who challenged the Civil Service act), represented by attorney
Charles Rivet of New Orleans, special assistant attorney general and
revenue department attorney in former Longite administrations.

In his

suit, Ricks alleged that the legislatively-created board in charge of
the voting machine purchase had no power to bind the state to pay the
$464,160 debt and asked that the purchase be prevented.

Judge J. D.

Womack again struck down an administration measure when he agreed that
the voting machine purchase board had indeed far exceeded its authority
in contracting the debt, and issued a temporary order restraining the
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state treasurer from spending any money on the purchase of the machines.
In addition, the voting machine act faced other suits.

In August, 1941,

Adam J. Falkenstein '(brother of Harold G. Falkenstein who had chal
lenged the state Crime Commission) filed a separate suit seeking to
restrain State Treasurer Andrew P. Tugwell from withholding funds for
purchasing the machines from money due New Orleans for homestead
exemptions.

The homestead exemption provided that homes up to a cer

tain value were exempt from property taxes.

Falkenstein's suit was

dismissed, however, because he had received his full homestead exemp
tion on his New Orleans property in 1941 and had thus paid no taxes.
The third suit brought against the voting machine act was filed by
Lafayette policeman Alphonse Peck, who challenged the law because it
required the state to pay one-half the cost of New Orleans voting
machines but did not provide state help for any other municipality
choosing to use them.

Judge Womack again struck at the reformers by

deciding that the entire Act 84 was invalid, "a striking and glaring
example of loosely written, hastily prepared and ill-considered legis
lation," and prohibiting the state and the city from buying, leasing,
or renting the machines.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, over

ruled Womack in the Peck case and found Act 84 to be legal and correct
in all sections, neither too broad nor dealing with more than one
..
45
subject.
Local resistance to the implementation of the voting machine law
45
Acts Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 406; States, May 21, 1940;
Morning Advocate, June 11, 22, July 9, August 14, 1941; Times-Picayune,
June 13, 1940; August 15, September 26, December 2, 23, 1941; Town
Talk, September 23, 1941; Item, December 1, 1941.
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surfaced in the New Orleans Commission Council headed by Mayor Robert
Maestri, who informed the governor that it would be impossible for New
Orleans to pay its share of the cost because the money had not been
provided in the city's 1941 budget.

Jones, however, noted that the

Commission Council had amended city budgets before to pay for unfore
seen expenses.

Meanwhile, a groundswell of reform opinion in favor

of installing the machines swept the city.

The Citizens' Voluntary

Committee of Louisiana offered to arrange a loan to the city to pro
vide its half of the voting machine money although city attorney
Francis P. Burns quickly ruled this move illegal.

Five organizations

— the Optimist Club, the Woman Citizen's Union, the People's League,
the Citizens' Voluntary Committee, and the Louisiana League of War
Veterans — joined the New Orleans Junior Chamber of Commerce’s offer
to support a subscription drive to raise the money.

In addition, the

Woman Citizen’s Union formed a picket line in front of City Hall to
remind the administration that the citizens demanded voting machines.
(Mayor Maestri warily eyed the pickets as he- passed by on his way to
his office, but said only "Keep up the good work.")

At last the Com

mission Council in September voted to set aside money in the 1942
budget (to be adopted in December 1941) to pay for the voting
machines.^
Other measures passed by the 1940 legislature dealt with the more
mundane aspects of governing the state:

taxes, education, and housing.

46
Times-Picayune, August 15, 20, 21, 28, September 3, 4, 6 , October 4,
11, 1941; Town Talk, August 21, 25, 28, 1941; Haas, "New Orleans on the
Half-Shell," p. 302; Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison, p. 21.
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Jones had campaigned in 1939-40 on a platform including a pledge to
repeal the Louisiana sales tax, a revenue device of Longite Governor
Richard Leche.

In fulfillment of that promise, Representatives De-

Lesseps S. Morrison and Welbom Jack introduced in the House a sales
tax bill which specified no termination date for the tax because the
authors expected the Ways and Means Committee to fit the repeal into
a general tax reorganization and not leave the state without sufficient
revenue to meet its expenses.

Senator Joe Cawthom simultaneously

introduced a Senate bill for repeal, but his bill provided a specific
termination date of October 1, 1940, after which the sales tax would
no longer be collected.

The Ways and Means Committee decided on

December 31, 1940, as the termination date to be inserted in the
House bill.^
Jones' entire new tax package, introduced to the legislature in
early June, included increases in the tax rates on liquor and tobacco
products, income, gasoline, extension of the severance tax, and imposi
tion of a distribution tax on natural gas.

The new liquor taxes pro

vided for.increases ranging from 10 cents per gallon (on still wines
of 15 per cent or less alcohol) to 50 cents per gallon (still wines of
25. per cent or more alcohol), while the tax on liquor and sparkling
wines was increased a flat 50 cents per gallon.
ward revision completely.)

(Beer escaped the up

In addition, the cost of selling liquor

also increased; a sliding scale of $200 for saloon permits and $100
47!

States, May 15, June 17, 1940; Times-Picayune, May 16, 1940; Acts
Passed by the Legislature (1940), p. 402; Edward J. Gay, Jr., "Louisi
ana Housing Legislation Urban and Rural," Louisiana Municipal Review,
January/February, 1941, pp. 9-11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

for package house permits in cities of 5,000 or more and $100 for
saloon permits and $50 for package house permits, in cities with less
than 5,000 replaced the old standard $5 permit fee for all dealers in
alcoholic beverages.
less of location.

Wine-only package house permits cost $50 regard

Jones* tobacco tax raised the rate from $10 to $20

per thousand cheap cigars (15 cents to 20 cents) and from $13 to $27
per thousand on more expensive cigars (21 cents-up), while the cigar
ette tax increased from one-fifth to one-fourth cent per cigarette.
One-third of the increase in tobacco tax revenue was earmarked for
the General Fund while two-thirds went to the Public School Fund. 48
Readjustments to the severance tax included extension to tax
pulpwood at the rate of 6 cents per standard cord and to tax distil
late, casing head gasoline, and natural gasoline at the rate of 11
cents per barrel, while tax rates on previously-taxed oil increased.
The tax package also included a one-half cent per thousand cubic feet
tax on the gathering of natural gas, a temporary measure, the admini
stration said, to help liquidate the huge public debt left by Longite
spendthrift programs, meet the state's emergency financial needs
caused by the repeal of other taxes, and carry on state public assistance programs. 49
Surprisingly for an administration which its enemies attempted to
48Morning Advocate, June 3, 1940; Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; M. G.
Dakin, "Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940," Louisiana Law Review,
November, 1940, pp. 74—76.
49Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; Dakin, ’Louisiana Tax Legislation of
1940,” pp. 74-76; W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Hejwood, June 3, 1940,
Jennings-Heywood Collection.
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portray as a friend of the rich and the corporations, Jones’ tax
package also raised income taxes and tightened loopholes in the gift
tax.

The new rates taxed incomes at the rate of two per cent on the

first $4,000 of income in excess of credits, four per cent on the next
$4,000, and six per cent on all income above $8,000.

The old Longite

rates had been two per cent on the first $1,000; four per cent on the
next $40,000; and six per cent on all above $50,000.

In addition, the

tax on corporate incomes increased from four per cent to six per cent
and applied to all taxable net income without the $3,000 exemption
allowed by the Longites.

Also, individuals and corporations faced a

five per cent surtax on net income in excess of $5,000 resulting from
sales of unimproved land, sale of mineral rights or oil royalties, or
lease of land for oil exploration.

The gift tax provision closed the

loophole by which an individual could save taxes by spreading large
cash gifts over several years.

Under the new tax, the amount paid

would be the same whether the gift was made in one year or in several
years.

50

While the governor's sales tax repeal successfully passed the
legislature, the income tax increases, which had to be framed as a
constitutional amendment because prevailing rates were written into
that document, failed to gain approval in the November election.

This

failure left Jonfes a dire problem with which he wrestled until 1942:
how to fund a $154,002,641.58 biennial budget without a major source

^^Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940; Dakin, "Louisiana Tax Legislation of
1940,” pp. 55-60.
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of revenue he had expected to receive.^
Education bills passed by the 1940 legislature provided improved
benefits for the state’s teachers and public school funding at unpre
cedented levels.

Teachers received ten days per school year leave of

absence for illness or other emergency without loss of pay, sabbatical
leaves in all parishes, and the establishment of a Teacher’s Retire
ment System.

The legislature, with Jones' urging, dedicated the

severance tax to public education to provide a maximum $20 per educable child, and also reserved a portion of the tobacco tax revenue
for education.

Teachers also received slight pay increases:

the

average white teacher’s salary rose to $1,331.88, while the average
black teacher's salary was less than half that -- $558.81.

The state

also tightened its requirements for certification, and for the first
time required a minimum bachelor's degree rather than the sketchy
college training course required before.

The main criticism of the

1940 education legislation was that it did not go far enough.

Repre

sentative William J. Dodd, an Allen parish teacher and president of
the Louisiana Teacher’s Association, pointed out that even with the
pay raise, the average Louisiana teacher received $83 per month after
taxes and also publicly

scored Jones and Superintendent of Education

John E. Coxe because they failed to back a bill to extend Louisiana's

^^Times-Picayune, June 18, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 3, 1940.
The sales tax repeal also brought another problem:' what to do with
the left-over sales tax tokens the government had produced in the mil
lions (6,806,400 one-mill pieces and 1,599,750 five-mill pieces re
mained in storage and another 53,709,860 one-mill and 7,812,564 fivemill pieces remained in circulation). Louisiana tried to sell them to
Mississippi, which had a shortage because of curtailed war production,
but state law prevented Mississippi from accepting another state's
tokens in payment of its tax.
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school requirements from eleven to twelve years for high school gradu.. 52
ation.
On the whole, Jones was well pleased with his first legislative
session.

It was, he said, a legislature that ’’cannot be bought, bull

dozed or browbeaten." He reported to the people that he had worked
with the legislature, but pointedly reminded them that he "never ap
peared on the floor of either House and . . . never appeared before
any committee." Perhaps if he had, more of his legislation 'might have
fared better.

He strove to dispel the old Longite image of him as an

unfeeling corporation lawyer.

In addition, he said, the people had

been freed from political dictatorship. 53 The subsequent taxpayer
suits, of course, dampened his optimism.
Not all members of the legislature shared Jones’ positive opinion
of the session.

While Senator Joe Cawthorn remarked that "I. am happy

that the vicious deduct system, dual jobholding and graft, that was
fought so hard by my close personal friend, former Governor James A.
Noe, have been successfully eliminated from the political system of

Times-Picayune, June 26-27, 1940; "Legislation of 1940," Louisiana
Schools, September, 1940, pp. 22-23; "Address by President W. J. Dodd,"
Louisiana Schools, November, 1941, p. 4; Charles E. Sutton, Charles L.
Foxworth, Robert E. Hearn, Louisiana’s Story of Public Education (Ruston, Louisiana, Bureau of Educational Research and Publications, Col
lege of Education, Louisiana Tech University, 1971), pp. 10-11; Minns
Sledge Robertson, Public Education in Louisiana After 1898 (Baton Rouge,
Bureau of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education,
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College,
1952), pp. 149-153, 157; Charles E. Weimer, "John Easterly Coxe, Louisi
ana Educator" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1974),
p. 23.
53
Times-Picayune, June 13, July 12, 1940.
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this state," Representative Charlie Webb of Red River parish, a "self
admitted Earl Long member of the House," called the legislative ses
sion "a disappointment," and further remarked that "The [employment]
of Yankees from Chicago to throw aside a form of government we have
been using for 100 years and substituting a plan that no one under
stands is an unnecessary experiment.

The crime commission will prob

ably be used to persecute and intimidate those connected with the past
administration . . . "

54

Following the legislative session, Jones faced the problem of
maintaining much of his reform program as the entrenched remnants of
Longism filed taxpayer suits against it. He and his followers also
had to grasp and learn to manipulate better the levers of power in the
state government.

Jones found that even the best good government in

tentions did not protect him from problems with patronage.
cases, he appointed businessmen to government positions:

In many
sugar planter

W. Prescott Foster of St. Mary parish became chairman of the Highway
Commission, while Alexandria produce merchant Martin L. Close, and
Franklin parish planter and businessman W. E. Gilbert became members
of the same body.

New Orleans engineer Frank Grevemberg became busi

ness manager of executive buildings; independent oil operator B. A.
Hardy of Shreveport became Conservation Commissioner; while another
Shreveport oil man, Charlton H. Lyons, became president of the board

^States, July 11, 1940..
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of supervisors of elections for Caddo parish-^

Jones had relatively

little trouble with these appointments, but the agreement by which
Jones’ camp agreed to share state patronage 50-50 with James A. Noe's
supporters slowly came unraveled, and as it did, Jones gained a foe
as implacably anti-Jones as he had been anti-Long.

Moreover, he took

many of his vocal supporters into the anti-Jones camp.
Governor Jones shrewdly did not begin a serious turnover of state
jobs until the legislative session neared adjournment.

He therefore

retained the leverage provided by a promise or even a hint of a state
job for a legislator's favored supporter.

He and Noe, however, held

several preliminary meetings in Baton Rouge in which they discussed
patronage.

Noe denied rumors that he and Jones had failed to reach

an early agreement:

"I'm 100 per cent behind whomever Governor Jones

wants to appoint.
After the legislative session, however, the serious competition
for state jobs began as rumors raced across the state that "Long men"
were to be purged from state payrolls and replaced by men loyal to
Sam Jones.

Hundreds of people — hopeful Jones supporters, legisla

tors, and James A. Noe — converged on the state capitol and the
executive mansion during late July, 1940, for a series of patronage

~*~*Town Talk, May 4, 1940; "Major Hardey Looks Ahead At the 'Golden Age
of Louisiana,"' Louisiana Conservation Review, Spring, 1940, p. 7; Sam
Jones to Charlton H. Lyons, Sr., October 16, 1942, Charlton Havard
Lyons, Sr. Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H.
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
^Morning Advocate, May 17-18, 1940.
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meetings.

57

Jones’ eventual plan for the distribution of state patronage was
typical of him — business-like and multi-layered.

All job changes

under his original plan were to be made under recommendation of parish
political units of the Jones administration.

He also planned for a

"district representative" in each Congressional district to smooth over
problems which arose.

The district representatives, in turn, were to

forward recommendations for jobs to the department with the opening.
In his public announcement, Jones reiterated his plan that the men
appointed must be qualified to fill their posts and perform their job.
He planned a major turnover in state jobs to begin August 1, when the
state composed its new payrolls.

Several legislators complained that

the plan had no place for them except for having a final veto over
job offers in their districts.

That meant, they said, that when some

one received a job he or she would feel indebted to the Jones organi
zation, but when someone failed to receive a job he or she would damn
the legislator. 58
Jockeying for control of patronage brought strange bedfellows
together:

Old Regular Assessor James E. Comisky and Property Commis

sioner Joseph P. Skelley met in Baton Rouge with Jones and Noe to ar
range for Old Regular input into selection of state workers in New
Orleans, in exchange for Old Regular support for Jones-Noe candidates
in city elections.

Remnants of the Leche-Long administration, mean-

^ Times-Picayune, July 26, 1940^Times-Picayune, July 26-27, 1940; Item, July 17, 1940.
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while, announced formation of the American Democratic Association led
by George W. Flynn, who had worked in Earl Long's campaign headquar
ters in the recent gubernatorial election, to seek votes from voters
who lost jobs, failed to get jobs, or generally opposed the JonesNoe-Old Regular alliance. 59
Despite his careful planning, Jones' guidelines to distribute
patronage through the district representative system failed as Noe’s
forces protested their lack of influence in the selection process.
Noe, however, remained loyal ("everything is lovely"), and Jones'
forces formulated a new plan which allowed Noe to establish his own
parish committees to be consulted on the patronage distribution at
the local level.

Jones also announced a new "high command" composed

of Vance Plauche of Lake Charles, Francis Whitehead of Port Allen
(both former members of his campaign team) and Charles E. McKenzie
of Monroe, Noe's first Democratic primary campaign manager, to handle
__
_
60
all requests for patronage.
Jones’ hope, however, was not fulfilled.

Three months after

their organizations promulgated the second patronage plan, Jones and
Noe met again, and neither was satisfied with the outcome of their
conference.

Noe remarked in a restrained understatement that "We

haven’t been so very well pleased with what we've been getting," but
added that "we hope things will get better.” He adamantly rejected a
suggestion to solve the problem by merging their two organizations:
59
.............
Times-Picayune, July 30-31, 1940; Times-Picayune New Orleans States
July 28, 1940.
^Times-Picayune, July 31—August 2, 1940.
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"As long as Jimmy Noe is able and Mrs. Noe is by his side . . .we'll
never leave our organization."

Jones ruefully remarked, "I guess this

will be going on up to 1944." Following this meeting, Jones leaders
unveiled yet a third patronage plan to replace the old system.

Now,

Jones and Noe would each appoint three members to a special patronage
committee.

A Jones member and a Noe member from the committee would

then contact state department heads and discusss patronage with them.
The new arrangement also failed to satisfy Noe.

61

Ill tempers

flared again at patronage conferences in the spring of 1941, and the
conflict fueled rumors of an impending Jones-Noe split.

Noe termed

their April 7, 1941, meeting "highly unsatisfactory." Noe's organi
zation then began to crack apart.

Five New Orleans ward leaders an

nounced that they did not attend a meeting of his city organization
because they felt that total amalgamation of the Noe and Jones organi
zations was the essential requirement for full participation in the
patronage.

They also wondered if perhaps Noe's determination to hold

his organization together showed his dedication to political ideals,
or his "ambitions for personal political advancement," a pointed
reference to his publicly

announced intention to run for the United

States Senate seat held by Allen J. Ellbnder.

Noe delayed for two days

before replying that he would continue to fight for the complete inde
pendence of the Noe organization as the best guarantee of good govern
ment in Louisiana, but that he still continued to back "every

^Morning Advocate, December 17, 22, 1940.
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constructive move" Jones made.62
On April 17, however, Noe left Baton Rouge, saying that the
governor had been too busy to hear his request to meet with New Or
leans Noe leaders to reassure them about patronage.

That same day

Noe's organization continued to deteriorate as three Noe leaders in
New Orleans became co-leaders of their wards in the Jones organization.
Noe hurriedly sought and received Jones' assurances that the defecting
leaders would have no effect on the Noe followers who had received
state jobs, yet remained loyal to Noe.

He reiterated, though, that

"we haven’t been treated right, either in the country or the city,"
and threatened to devise his own plan to divide the jobs.

63

Noe rapidly became disillusioned with his perceived slights in
the patronage controversy, and angrily charged that even though he
favored Civil Service, he wondered whether the Jones camp was attemp
ting to install its followers in all the state jobs to blanket them in
when the Civil Service became effective.

The final break between the

erstwhile allies occurred after Noe charged on May 14, 1941 that Jones
was merely erecting a new dictatorship in Louisiana.

Jones planted

spies in the Noe organization meetings, Noe charged, and then fired
from state jobs Noe supporters who would not join his organization,
or who spoke against him.

"This is nothing more than dictatorship

dressed up in silk stockings and under a new name . . . " Noe

62Ibid., April 8-9, 1941.
63Ibid., April 17-18, 1941.
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fumed.^
The alliance of convenience forged between Jones and Noe seemed
almost destined to disintegrate.

They were, after all, unlikely

allies, one the idealistic reformer, the other a consummate politician
schooled by the master, Huey Long.

Jones* need for Noe’s help was

most acute during the second primary campaign in 1940, and thus he
may have agreed to provide more patronage than reality later allowed
him to supply to Noe's supporters.
Not all Jones' time during his first two gubernatorial years was
occupied by formulating or defending his reform plans or in attempting
to pacify James A. Noe.

The unfolding European war caused a boom in

defense industries throughout the United States, and Jones traveled to
Washington, D.C., to plead with President Roosevelt "for anything and
everything that will help Louisiana." New defense stations, he said,
64
Morning Advocate, May 15, 1941. Even though the bitter split with
Noe cost Jones some of the support with which he established his re
form program at the beginning of his administration, it was not as
costly as it may appear at first glance betcause Noe's days as an
asset were numbered. In late 1940 he was indicted by a federal grand
jury for alleged income tax evasion committed in 1935 by the Win or
Lose Oil Corporation, in which Noe (who served as president), Seymour
Weiss, Oscar K. Allen, and Huey Long (Allen and Long secretly) shared
the profits. Noe was acquitted on all counts following a tearful
court appearance, but his statewide political influence was on the
wane. He threatened on several later occasions to run for either
governor or United States Senator, but his only campaign for an im
portant state post, his ill-fated 1959-1960 gubernatorial candidacy
in Earl Long’s bizarre attempt to retain political power, ended in a
crushing defeat. See (for Noe's trial) Morning Advocate, June 12,
August 17, 1941, April 12, 1942; Times-Picayune New Orleans States,
April 12, 1942; (for Noe’s subsequent career) Glen S. Jeansonne, Race,
Religion and Politics The Louisiana Gubernatorial Elections of 195960 (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of
Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), pp. 31-32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141

expansion of present army, navy, and marine organizations, opening of
airplane factories, anything that would bring money into Louisiana
would be considered:

"If there are any federal funds to be got, I am

going to do my damdest to get them."65
Shortly after his trip to Washington, Jones attended the Southern
Governor's Conference and proposed a study of all states to determine
what each had to contribute to the national defense and preparedness
program, and called for a Southern Defense Council, composed of one
representative appointed by each southern governor.

He was not ready,

however, to gear Louisiana's economy solely on defense.

He announced

that Louisiana would join in the "Balanced Prosperity" program, a tenyear effort to bring a more balanced economy to the south, sponsored
by the Southern Governor's Conference, and warned a Lake Charles
audience that Louisiana would enjoy only a "false prosperity" based
only on defense spending.

"There will be better times, much better

times," he said, but "there will be a repercussion when that [defense]
spending stops.
As Jones worked tirelessly to attract United States dollars to
Louisiana, he also established himself as a staunch advocate of im
proved United States relations with Latin America, a pet project of
President Franklin Roosevelt.

Jones’ efforts in improving these re

lations, however, resulted from his pragmatic attempts to reestablish
New Orleans as the premier portconnecting

the UpperMississippi

^Times-Picayune, June 3, 1940.
^ Times-Picayune, June 3, 4, 11, 19;September
cate, February 16, May 9, 1941.

24,1940;

Morning Advo
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Valley and outside world, especially Latin America.

He also en

visioned New Orleans as the new "air hub of America" connecting the
great Mississippi valley and South America, and pledged his admini
stration to fostering better understandings and relations among all
the Americas.

Jones proposed increased study of Spanish and Portu

guese at LSU to ease communication problems.

He also proposed an ex

change student program, and encouraged nationals of all American
countries to visit other countries so that nonrepresentative nationals
in a foreign land would not discredit the entire citizenship of their
country.

He set an example himself by vacationing in several Caribbean

countries to unwind after his grueling campaign to win approval of
his constitutional amendments in the fall, 1940 general election.

He

chaired the five-member committee formed by the Southern Governor’s
Conference to promote trade, defense preparedness, and friendship
with Latin American countries.^
Perhaps Jones’ most flamboyant effort toward establishing his
personal diplomacy toward Latin America occurred during the summer of
1941 when the "Greater Louisiana Special Train" brought a group of
prominent Louisianians to Mexico City for a good will visit from July
12 until July 24 to promote Louisiana-Mexico trade.

Jones planned to

lead the "special," but legal challenges to his reform plan kept him

Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 4, 1940; Times-Picyaune,
August 7, 1940; Monroe Morning World, September 17, 1904; Morning
Advocate, November 23, 1940; Town Talk, December 11, 1940; A. E.
Pradillo, "Louisiana's Governor ’Sells’ Middle West," New Orleans Port
Record, October, 1943, pp. 9-10; Willard Range, Franklin D. Roose
velt's World Order (Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press,
1959), pp. 52-66; Gary Arnold Bolding, "Efforts to Develop New Orleans
as a World Trade Center, 1910-1960" (M-A. thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1966), pp. 62-64.
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in Baton Rouge to help plan strategy.

In his stead, Mrs. Jones and

Agriculture Commissioner Harry D. Wilson led the delegation. 68
Victory, joy, challenge, frustration, defeat — Governor Sam
Jones experienced all these emotions during his first two years in
office.

He established his reform laws for Louisiana but saw some of

his efforts washed away in court battles.

Little did he know, as he

struggled to save his reformation and bring more industry to Louisiana,
that even greater challenges lay ahead. His break with Noe and his
lack of a strong political base in the legislature, however, led to
even further defeat in the 1942 regular session.

68

Morning Advocate, July 10, 1941; Greater Louisiana Special Train
(n.p., n.d.); Justin E. Wilson to W. Scott Heywood, June 28, 1941,
Heywood to Harry D. Wilson, June 30, 1941, Heywood to Sam Jones, June
30, 1941, Jones to Heywood, July 2, 1941, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONTINUING BATTLE FOR REFORM (1942-1944)
Louisiana politics in 1942 began with the Democratic primary for
the New Orleans mayor’s race.

Early speculation suggested freshman

United States Representative F. Edward Hebert as a possible reform
candidate.

Hebert, however, had no interest in the office, so some

reformers initially chose as their candidate former Old Regular Con
gressman Paul H. Maloney, whom T. Hale Boggs had defeated in 1940.
Governor Sam Jones briefly considered lending his support to Maloney,
but purists among the Governor’s supporters dissuaded him from doing
so.

The Old Regulars, meanwhile, promised to support Maloney for

Congress again in the 1942 fall election in exchange for his with
drawal from the January mayoral primary, a deal which Maloneyaccepted.
The reformers then turned to 38-year-old .attorney Herve Racivitch, a
veteran politician from the Jones campaign.

The Old Regulars backed

incumbent Mayor Robert Sidney Maestri in his election bid.

Two minor

candidates, Shirley G. Wimberly and John T. Knoop, entered the race
as independent Democrats who attacked Maestri as the close ally of
thet "thieving" Long machine and Racivitch as the candidate of a new
reform machine.^

^"Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the Image of Reform New
Orleans Politics, 1946-1961 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
Press, 1974), pp. 14-15, 21-22; Joseph B. Parker, The Morrison Era
Reform Politics in New Orleans (Gretna, Louisiana, Pelican Publishing
Company, 1974), p. 60; F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "Last of
the Titans" The Life and Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of
Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, Univer
sity of Southwestern Louisiana, '1976), pp. 164-165; New Orleans TimesPicayune, September 16, 18-19, October 2, 11, December 16, 18, 1941;
New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, November 16, 1941; New
144
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Maestri and the Old Regulars campaigned as a "complete the work"
ticket, citing improvements in New Orleans finances made since 1936.
Sam Jones did not enthusiastically support Racivitch, evidently because
Jones hope to continue the working relationship with Maestri which had
allowed at least some of his legislative proposals to pass the 1940
legislature.

Governor Jones did, however, accompany Racivitch to a

New Orleans dinner commemorating the transfer of Louisiana from France
to the United States, and in his speech that night remarked that during
the war in which the United States found itself currently embroiled,
"Derelictions and backgrounds which in times of peace might be over
looked are now reason enough for instantaneous repudiation of any man
in high office," a direct allusion to Maestri.

Again in New Orleans

for services commemorating the 127th anniversary of peace between the
United States and Great Britain following the Battle of New Orleans,
he reminded voters that any appeals to the old "don’t-change-horsesin-the-middle-of-the-stream" slogan, "[are] now as ludicrous as [they
were] always fallacious . . . if your horse can no longer make progress
under its own power because of riding so long on a machine —

then

Orleans Item, July 31, 1941; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, August 1-2,
1941; New Orleans States, December 18, 1941. Maestri had become
mayor in the aftermath of Huey Long's political war with New Orleans
which led to mayor T. Semms Walmsley's resignation in 1936. Governorelect Richard Leche, Conservation Commissioner Maestri, and New Orleans
Dock Board president Seymour Weiss agreed that Maestri should be ap
pointed to replace Walmsley. Maestri's one opponent in the primary
election called in 1936 to fill Walmsley’s unexpired term withdrew
from the campaign and the Republicans did not enter a candidate in the
general election. Maestri thus became mayor without facing the voters.
The Longites then pushed through the legislature a constitutional
amendment which cancelled the regular 1938 mayoralty race. Therefore,
in 1942 Maestri had been mayor for 6 years, but was conducting his
first campaign for the office.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146

you'd better change horses . . . "

2

Jones' former ally, James A. Noe, felt no reluctance at cam
paigning in the New Orleans election.

Noe had already announced his

intention to run for either Allen J. Ellender's United States Senate
seat in 1942, or for thegovernorship in 1944, and planned to use the
1942 mayor's race to forge politicalalliances for use in his
campaigns.

later

Noe the reformer thus mended his political fences with

the machine and endorsed

Maestri andthe Old Regular ticket:

"[they]

have my blessings and my

best wishes . .." Maestri replied that he
3
was "happy" to accept the endorsement.
Noe, however, unwittingly created a split within his New Orleans
organization.

A small group of twelve ward leaders who had originally

backed Noe in the 1940 gubernatorial primary sought to oppose the
Maestri endorsement.

Their spokesman, Harry Cabral, one of Noe's

earliest supporters in the city, asserted that they stood by the origi
nal intent of the Noe organization "to bring an end to the MaestriLeche-Long dictatorship . . . "

James D. McNeill, chairman of the Noe

city caucus sought to discredit the dissidents by charging that they
had accepted state jobs in exchange for their disavowal of the Noe .
organization.

The Jones-Noe failure to fulfill their patronage agree

ment in 1941 thus surfaced to harry Jones' reform effort.
ever, retained control of his organization.

Noe, how

"I am still Kingfish of

2
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 21, 1941; Times-Picayune,
September 22, 1941, January 9, 30, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, October 5, 1940, July 16, 1941, January 17, 1942;
Times-Picayune, January 3, 1942.
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the Noe lodge . . . " and announced that "we are 100 per cent with Bob
4

Maestri in this fight."

The reformers’ campaign centered on Maestri's ties to the Long
machine and its attendant corruption, while the Old Regular-Noe alli
ance attacked Jones for his efforts to help Racivitch.

Rumors of a

renewal of the infamous deduct system to finance Maestri’s campaign
caused a brief flurry of excitement and a quick response from the
mayor: "I have given no orders to make any ’deducts.’" Reformers
thought they had uncovered a new sophistication of the deduct scheme
when they discovered that city employees were buying tickets to a
"lotto party" to benefit Maestri's campaign, but the sponsoring Old
Regular ward leaders innocently explained that instead, the proceeds
"are to be used for baskets for poor families and for no other pur
pose." Telephone calls made on the night of the supposed party to the
address shown on the tickets, however, failed to ascertain whether the
lotto games were in progress.^
Charges of corruption, past or present, failed to bring the re
formers victory in New Orleans.

Maestri received 76,008 votes to

Racivitch’s 49,762, Wimberley’s 11,029, and Knoop's 788.

Sam Jones

attempted to put the best possible face on the returns, noting that
the Old Regulars carried 3,000 less votes for Maestri than they
carried for Earl Long in the governor's race two years previously, but
the reformers could take little comfort in the election returns as
^Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 4, 1942; Morning Advocate,
January 17, 1942; Times-Picayune, January 6, 8, 16, 21, 23, 28-29, 1942.
^Times-Picayune, September 20-21, October 10, 12, 1942.
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Maestri remained safely in power.

The governor on March 30 cancelled

the general election as state law required if the Democratic candi
dates had been unopposed and the deadline for qualifying had passed
with no other party candidates in contention. 6
The 1942 mayoralty campaign proved to be only the preliminary
bout to the major political battles of the year:
sequent extraordinary sessions of the legislature.

the regular and sub
Governor Jones'

primary problem stemmed in part from the voters' failure to approve
the constitutional amendment providing for increased income taxes de
signed to replace some of the revenue lost with the sales tax repeal
in the 1940 legislative session.

Jones dealt with the problem immedi

ately after the income tax amendment failed, receiving authority from
the State Board of Liquidation to poll the legislature for permission
to borrow up to $5,000,000 in case of a possible shortfall to tide the
state over until Jones could call a special legislative session to deal
with the situation.

Prompt action became necessary because State

Treasurer A. P. Tugwell announced on November 29, 1940, that as a re
sult of the new tax structure, the state could run out of money by
March or April, 1941, and by then also have an $8,000,000 deficit.
Jones subsequently polled the legislature and received permission to
make the loan.

Despite Jones' attempts at establishing more efficient

public administration, by the end of 1940 the state faced a biennial

^Ibid., January 28-29, February 1, March 31, 1942; Morning Advocate,
May 16, 1942. Maestri thus served as New Orleans mayor for 10 years
(1936-1946) and placed his record on the line only twice, this success
ful 1942 campaign and the 1946 contest which he lost to the young war
hero-reformer DeLesseps Morrison. After the 1942 election, Jones com
pensated Racivitch by appointing him attorney to collect delinquent
taxes in Orleans parish.
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deficit of $14,000,000, chiefly caused by public largesse distributed
by the 1940 legislature, continued state borrowing, and Jones' in
ability to implement his administrative and fiscal controls because
the Longites had successfully challenged him.

Also, the Governor’s

split with Noe caused Noe’s fiery young protege, State Senator Joe T.
Cawthorn of DeSoto parish, to become one of Jones' most ardent and
vocal critics.

The state's dire fiscal condition became apparent

in early 1941, when the New Orleans Charity Hospital closed its two
uppermost floors, thus eliminating 497 patient beds, a move that pre
saged later developments.^
During early 1942, Jones attempted to impress upon his department
heads the gravity of the situation and also to persuade them to save
as much money as possible by issuing guidelines to adapt the state
government to the war effort.

These guidelines included returning to

the state treasury as much of their current appropriations "as humanly
possible," not replacing personnel taken for military service, elimi
nating desirable but non-essential services, and cultivating all
available state land for food and fuel requirements of state agencies.
Jones* attempted economies, however, were not sufficient to obliterate
the deficit.

State financial officers in 1942 estimated that the 1940

legislature had increased state expenditures for schools, hospitals,
and relief by about $8,000,000 per year, while state income had

^Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics, 1920-1952
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 169-170; Morning
Advocate, November 20, 30, December 8, 12, 1940, February 20, March 3,
13, May 26-27, June 7, 12, 28, August 11, 1941; Alexandria Daily Town
Talk, December 20, 1940, August 27, 1941 (hereinafter cited as Town
Talk).
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increased by only about $5,000,000.

The state would require at least

$3,000,000 to relieve the existing deficit; an additional $4,000,000
for each of the next two years to prevent a recurring deficit; and
about $3,000,000 more to fund built-in increases in salaries, materi
als, and other expenses.

Jones blamed the failure of the 1940 income

tax amendment and the state’s bonded indebtedness leftover from the
Long-Allen-Leche administrations for the state's fiscal problems,
but Senator Cawthom, Jones' most persistent critic, charged instead
that "waste and inefficiency" since 1940 had led to the current situ
ation:

"The governor was not satisfied with the help and advice he

could get from the elected officials . . . He had to go up to Chicago
g

and get a Mr. Griffenhagen . . . "
Problems concerning both Louisiana's role in the war and the
state's fiscal condition dominated the 1942 regular session which
opened in May.

Reform elements in the state hoped that the legisla

ture would "[avoid] all kinds of petty legislation introduced in the
name of the war effort which has no real purpose . . . " and propose
only measures to "provide for the orderly conduct of state business."
Their hopeful attitude found some basis in the Old Regular announcement
that they would not oppose Norman Bauer'for re-election as Speaker of
the House.

The reformer’s hopes, however, were short lived.

The

first skirmish of the new session occurred in the vote to replace the
late J. Martin Hamley as Secretary of the Senate.

The administration

first supported William Gladney of New Orleans for the post but, in an
—

Shreveport Tiroes, January 10, February 11, 1942; States, March 21,
1942; Morning Advocate, April 9, 29, 1942; Item, May 14, 1942.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

effort to find a more popular candidate, switched to Robert A. Gilbert
of Napoleonville, brother of the late Senator Philip Gilbert, formerly
aligned with Huey Long’s regime.

The staunch anti-Jones group of

senators headed by Cawthorn nominated former Acadia parish representa
tive N. Smith Hoffpauir, but when they realized that the administration
commanded enough votes to block Hoffpauir’s selection, they agreed to
a compromise of Gilbert for secretary andHoffpauir for assistant
secretary.

The potential deadlock created by the virtually equal sup

port of each side in the Senate was revealed when Lieutenant-Governor
Marc Mouton ruled that the two appointments were separate and had to
be considered separately. Cawthorn retorted that the Senate could make
its own rules, and a 20—19 vote sustained him.
Gilbert and Hoffpauir by the same 20-19 vote.

The Senate then elected
The Senate secretary

vote also revealed an additional problem Jones faced.

His ally from

the 1940 session, President-Pro-Tempore Frank B. Ellis, voted against
the administration.

Ellis maintained that he had not broken with the

administration, but instead merely exercised his right to make indepen
dent decisions.

Jones’ enemies, however, had counted Ellis as one of

their own, or at least expected him to vote with them more than against
9
them. (Jones later maintained that Ellis had "sold out to Maestri.")
Governor Jones, in his opening address to the legislature, called
for enactment of measures to provide for Louisiana’s role in the war
effort, to solve problems created by invalidation of some of his 1940

~9

States, May 7, 11, 1942; Morning Advocate, May 8, 10, 12, 1942; Item,
May 12, 1942; Sam Jones interviewed by Dennis Daugherty, May 6, 1970,
Dennis Daugherty Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana.
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reforms, and to finance necessary and desirable governmental activities
for the next biennium.

His proposed war measures included mundane pro

posals regulating blackouts, penalizing anyone trespassing in or at
tempting to sabotage a war industry, as well as election reforms
guaranteeing the right of servicemen to register and vote absentee,
providing leaves of absence to servicemen in state employ, and per
mitting servicemen to run for public office absentee by a simple noti
fication procedure instead of the regular formalities and fees required
by law.

His principal proposals to solve the reorganization problem

included legislative recognition of the departments of state govern
ment not invalidated by the adverse decision on the constitutional
amendments, especially certain provisions of the fiscal code.

Admini

stration fiscal proposals strangely provided no detailed plan to raise
necessary additional revenue.

Jones had already stated that it was the

Legislature’s role to provide the money necessary to fund the state
government, and thus confined himself to general platitudes about re
duction of appropriations and unnamed additional revenue sources needed
to balance the budget.^
Reactions to Jones’ speech were mixed, understandably along fac
tional lines.

Cawthorn accused him of "attempting to hide the failure

of his administration behind the war."
trop stated that

Senator Brooks Oliver of Bas

"I think it was a bunch of hooey.

All of us be

lieve in defense and co-operation," and asked pointedly, "Why didn't
he cooperate with us during the past two years?"

Earl Long, however,

^ Morning Advocate, May 13, 1942; States, May 13, 1942; Shreveport
Journal, May 13, 1942.
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probably best typified a widespread feeling in Longite ranks.

He

attended the opening of the legislative session, and when asked his
opinion of Jones’ speech, he replied, "I didn't hear it.

I wouldn’t

waste time that way." Nine Longite Senators apparently agreed with
Long’s assessment when they followed Senator Ernest Clements' lead in
voting not to recess the Senate to hear Jones' address.
voted 29-10 in favor of recess.)

(The Senate

They did, however, attend the joint

legislative session which Jones addressed.

Jones' supporters described

the speech as "excellent and most timely," and "wonderful."**
Jones' troubles with the legislature, however, had only begun.
Robert Maestri rented Longite Registrar of State Lands Lucille May
Grace’s house in Baton Rouge to serve as a convenient political and
entertainment headquarters for Longite members of the legislature.
Jones' allies failed in attempts both to pass resolutions asking
Maestri to leave the city and quit

attempting to influence legisla

tors, and also to pass bills stripping the New Orleans mayor's office
of extraordinary powers granted to it at the expense of the city council during Leche's administration. 12
Governor Jones and the reform forces were most successful in
passing the measures he called for in his opening speech to facilitate
Louisiana's participation in the war effort.

The legislature provided

authorization (Act 6) for "forces of Louisiana" other than the National
Guard to serve outside the boundaries of the state, to pursue enemies

**Morning Advocate, May 13, 1942; Item, May 13, May 22, 1942; States,
May 13-14, 1942.
12

Morning Advocate, May 15, 19-20, 1942; Item, May 19-20, June 2, 16,
1942; States, May 19-20, 1942.
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of the state into other states with reciprocity agreements, and also
authorized other states' military forces to pursue their enemies into
Louisiana.

They also authorized the Governor (Act 7) to provide pro

tection from air raids by ordering practice blackouts, radio silences,
and other precautionary measures.

In order to protect vital war in

dustries located in the state, the legislature made trespassing il
legal on any premises engaged in defense activities (Act 22); estab
lished the crime of sabotage and provided prison terms of one to ten
years at hard labor for those convicted of tampering with or inten
tionally damaging public or private property engaged in war production,
or intentionally producing faulty articles destined for war or defense
of the United States (Acts 24, 25, 26).

To protect harbors, ships,

and navigable waters, Act 117 provided that anyone on any of them or
on land within 200 feet of a navigable stream must have a valid
identification and approval by the Coast Guard.

Moreover, Act 242 made

it unlawful to encourage violence, sabotage, or disloyalty to the
United States or Louisiana, or to give information on military se
crets, operations, or plans of defense, and Act 290 prohibited employ
ment of known enemy aliens or conscientious objectors.

The Louisiana

Commission of Labor received extraordinary authorization to dispense
with lessor labor laws for six month periods for businesses producing
goods under army or navy contracts (Act 41), while the Director of
Highways could close, partially close, or restrict the civilian use of
any public or private highway or street used in the American war ef
fort, or in troop movements.

To help conserve gasoline and tires,

the legislature decreed (Act 228) that service stations be closed be
tween midnight Saturday and midnight Sunday, except for five per cent
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of the stations (chosen by lot every three months), which would remain
open as emergency stations.

The legislators authorized the Governor

to grant leaves of absence (Act 33) to appointed officials and No
taries Public (Act 9) who joined or were drafted into the armed ser
vices.

To allow full participation in the United States Government’s

War Bond Program, the legislature allowed (Act 12) businesses char
tered under state law to act as issuing agents for United States
Government obligations.

The legislature also authorized the state

(Act 28), Police Juries (Act 29), School Boards (Act 30), and munici
palities (Acts 39 and 150) to invest surplus funds in "E," "F," and
”G" war bonds, and allowed state and parish employees to dedicate a
portion of their paycheck to the purchase of series "E" bonds. 13
Despite occasional agreement on the necessity of war measures,
not all of them enjoyed bifactional support.

Sam Jones' plan for a

"state guard," composed of volunteers between 18 and 64 years of age,
for example, drew heavy Longite fire.

Representative DeLesseps Morri

son introduced the bill in the House, and the original draft included
provisions for drafting men into the guard if not enough volunteers
emerged to fill the ranks.

Representative William J. Dodd of Allen

"l3
Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana At the
Regular Session 1942 (hereinafter cited as Acts of the Legislature,
1942 Regular Session), pp. 52, 59, 61, 64, 71, 106, 11-112, 117-119,
121, 123, 129, 133, 378, 516-517, 801, 824, 968. The new easements of
labor laws reflected some of the requests of United States Secretary
of Labor Frances Perkins that the exemptions be limited to war indus
tries and retention of certain aspects of labor laws passed to protect
women workers. Frances Perkins to Sam Jones, June 13, 1942, William
Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special
Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer
sity, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection).
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Parish rose to announce that while he was in favor of creating the
guard, he was against creating a "buzzard roost" of deadheads on the
state payroll.

Why not, he asked, rely strictly on volunteers?

The

governor considered the bill to be in such grave danger that he made
a rare appearance before a legislative committee along with Adjutant
General Raymond H. Fleming of the Louisiana National Guard, testifying
14
in behalf of the guard bill.
Most war measures passed the legislature easily.

The bill allow

ing pursuit of "enemies of the state," for example, passed the House
of Representatives with an 83-6 vote.

Three of the "nays" saw fit to

include a rare "Explanation of Vote" in the House Journal. Beatrice
Moore, W. 0. Noble, and T. C. Brister opposed the bill, not because it
was an administration bill, they said, but instead because they felt
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies
could better handle interstate troubles.

The state guard bill also

passed by a wide margin, 85-5, but Noble again gave an explanation of
his "nay":

he believed the draft clause "an insult to the patriotism

of the male citizens of Louisiana."

(Representative Dodd did not

14
Item, May 21, June 4-5, 19, 1942; States, June 2, 1942; Morning
Advocate, June 5, 1942; Town Talk, July 18, 1942; W. Scott Heywood to
Neal Whisenhunt, July 6, 1942, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records,
Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited
as Jennings-Heywood Collection). General Fleming understandably felt
some initial reluctance to help establish the State Guard because he
feared that it might infringe on his own National Guard. After passage
of the law, however, he helped to supply arms and uniforms to the
State Guard and helped to establish standards for examining officer
candidates. Major General Raymond H. Fleming to Sam Jones, September
15, 18, 22, 25, 1942, Jones Collection.
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overcome his objections, and also voted against the bill.)^
The governor was also successful in his attempts to push through
the legislature new laws to salvage part of his state government re
organization struck down by the state Supreme Court in a ruling issued
May 25, 1942, while the legislature was in session.

The Jones admini

stration quickly created a new package of bills, each of which created
and provided for the continued operation of one state department
(Public Welfare, Occupational Standards, Labor, Public Safety, Insti
tutions, Highway, and Finance), each headed by a director appointed
by the governor.

While all of the reorganization package faced oppo

sition, the proposed fiscal code drew the strongest Longite ire.

The

fiscal code passed the Senate by a slim 20-18 vote, with Senator
Cawthorn in strong opposition.^
While the reorganization faced stiff challenges, but eventually
succeeded,-Longite and reformers reached a stalemate on Jones' Civil
Service program.

Representative Moseman Simoneaux of New Orleans,

a Maestri ally, on May 31 introduced a resolution providing for the
suspension of New Orleans Civil Service until after the 1944 regular
session of the legislature (at which time the Longites hoped to

^ Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives
of the State of Louisiana at the Eleventh Regular Session of the Legis
lature Under the Adoption of the constitution of 1921, pp. 495-496.
Unfortunately, the Senate Journal for this session is virtually inac
cessible because the complete Senate Calendar was never published. The
fragmentary Calendar only covers the first four weeks of the session
and is incomplete even for that short period. Some House bills which
the Senate considered then are not listed in the fragment.
^States, May 25, June 3, July 13, 1942; Item, June 3, 1942; Morning
Advocate, June 13, 1942. Jones later vetoed the bills creating the
Public Welfare and Labor departments, claiming that they were suffi
ciently established by laws already on the books.
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control the governorship again). Meanwhile, a coalition of rural
legislators (Horace Wilkinson of West Baton Rouge, C. 0. Webb of Red
River, and A. D. Flowers of LaSalle) introduced a similar resolution
to delay implementation of the state Civil Service-

The Longites

sought to achieve the desired delay by resolution in an attempt to
circumvent the governor's veto power.^
Reformers again rallied to the Civil Service banner.
interpreted the move to delay the acts as pure politics:

They
"[The

Longites] want political jobs they can pass out, and they want office
holders under their control . . . "

The New Orleans Ministerial Union

tied Civil Service to the war effort:

If we are going to ask soldiers

to give their lives and our people to give their money for national
survival, they asked, "why does this community tolerate the defiance
of law and the diversion of millions of dollars from constructive use
into the coffers of greedy, immoral ghouls?"18
While reformers in the House beat back an attempt by Representa
tive Flowers to cramp Civil Service by reducing its appropriation
about $83,000 in its first year, and $71,000 in its second year, the
Civil Service League and the governor eventually agreed to delay
implementation of New Orleans Civil Service — ostensibly because the
administrative apparatus was not yet in place — and also agreed to
postpone implementation of state Civil Service in order to avoid
further factional animosity and suspicion.

The delay, however,

*^Morning Advocate, June 1, 1942; States, June 5, 1942.
18Morning Advocate, June 4, 1942; Item, June 9, 1942.
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was not as long as the Longites originally desired.

Civil Service

implementation was now delayed from July 1, 1942 (original implemen
tation date) to January 1, 1943, instead of July 1, 1944, as the
Longites wished. 19
The primary battle (and the most important stalemate) between
the two factions occurred over Jones* budget and tax proposals.

He

submitted two budget bills for legislative consideration, an "A"
budget maintaining approximately the current spending levels, and a
"B" budget with reduced appropriations.

The "A" budget called for the

state spending $152,654,467.15 over the next biennium (fiscal 1942-43
and 1943-44) with a state sales tax enacted to generate $8,500,000,
and a natural gas gathering tax enacted to generate $1,600,000 in
needed additional revenue.

The "B" budget provided for spending

$133,178,365.29 over the biennium without the sales tax.

But as

Budget Director James I. Smith explained to the legislature, the reduc
tion in funding would require the removal of approximately 4,000
patients from state hospitals, dropping approximately 2,400 students
from state colleges and 700 from trade schools, removing approximately
19,000 recipients from the welfare rolls, closing an unspecified num
ber of health units, and losing countless dollars in federal matching
funds.

The governor reiterated his belief that it was the legisla

ture’s proper task to determine budget appropriations but warned that
19
Morning Advocate, June 7, 1942; States, June 25, July 1, 1942; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 172- Sam Jones maintained that after
the regular session adjourned, emissaries from Leander Perez offered
him a deal by which the Longites would drop their opposition to the
sales tax in a special session if Jones would agree to dismantle the
Civil Service. Maestri and Perez both hotly denied offering such a
deal. See Morning Advocate, July 15, 1942; States, July 15, 1942.
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he felt duty-bound to veto all appropriations for which sufficient

„

revenue was not provided. 20
Moreover, the governor warned the legislature of impending major
deficits in state expenditures:
43 fiscal year,
year,

$9,647,462.86 by the end of the 1942-

and $9,989,831.27 by the close of the 1943-44 fiscal

unless the provided additional funding for "the present ser

vices of our state agencies which have been authorized by you." The
House and then the Senate, however, approved a budget of $175,000,000
for the biennium.^
While the eventual legislative budget was approximately
$25,000,000 above Jones' most optimistic proposals, the legislature
would have seemed less irresponsible had it provided sufficient reve
nue to fund its appropriation.

Early in the session, however, leaders

of the "country group" of Longites announced their opposition to in
creased taxation.

Nevertheless, Representative Paul F. Stinson of

Jackson parish, a Jones ally, introduced a two per cent state sales
tax bill on wholesalers expected to generate $11,000,000 to
$15,000,000.

Opposition to Stinson's bill surfaced immediately from

Longites, reformers, and business groups. The States called the whole
sale tax only a "camouflaged sales tax" and called on the administra
tion to present its case of need, ask for a statewide sales tax, "and
try to fool no one."
sales tax.

State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell endorsed a general

A sizeable delegation of merchants under the leadership of

20

Times-Picayune, May 19, 1942; Item, May 19, 1942; States, May 21,
1942.

^ States, May 26, June 22, 29, 1942.
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the New Orleans Association of Commerce and Young Man's Business Club
(friendly to Jones since 1939), called the proposal "unfair, imprac
ticable, and unworkable," primarily because the bill provided no
mandatory clause that retailers pass along the increased cost of the
tax to their customers-

The businessmen thus thought that the federal

wartime agency, the Office of Price Administration, would object to
increased retail prices resulting from the wholesale tax.

Subsequent

to this storm of protest, the House Ways and Means Committee dropped
the wholesale sales tax in favor of a retail sales tax to be reported
in the form of an amendment to a bill which had been introduced by
title only by Representative H. H. Huckabay of Caddo parish.

The new

bill provided a one per cent sales tax on all retail purchases from
thirteen cents to sixty-two cents and two per cent on sales above
sixty-two cents, but exempted gasoline and natural gas purchases, as
well as taxes under other laws, and purchases of water flowing through
pipes in its natural state.

The Ways and Means Committee attempted to

make the increased tax rate more acceptable by titling the sales tax
a "War Emergency Tax" to provide additional funds made necessary by
the war effort, limiting its term to two years, and expressly forbidding a return to the tokens of the Long sales tax program. 22
Battle lines between the two factions appeared almost immediately.
James A. Noe, James H. Morrison, and Senators Cawthorn and Clements
all appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee, and each re
called that Jones had promised that the state would have no sales tax

^States, May 12, 28, June 5-6, 9, 1942; Item, June 1, 4-5, 9, 1942.
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during his term of office.

Jones, in a public response to a request

for advice from24 legislators, replied that even though he was not an
advocate of sales taxes, in this case it had become a necessary evil:
"I would rather defend my support of the sales tax than explain closed
hospitals and hungry old people, and bankrupt local governments, and
unbalanced budgets, and underpaid teachers, and impassable roads . . .
[and] I am confronted, with these alternatives."

Superintendent of

Education John E. Coxe sent letters to school board members, parish
superintendents and supervisors, and school principals asking their
support for the sales tax and its proposed $2,135,000 increase in
school funds.

As a result, 40 parish superintendents endorsed the

„
tax.23
House floor debate on the sales tax lasted a stormy four hours.
Representative Theo Cangelosi (East Baton Rouge) warned that the
people were in favor of retrenchment, not excessive taxation.

Repre

sentative James E. Bolin of Webster parish appeared in his army
lieutenant’s uniform to plead for defeat of the tax, telling fellow
legislators that they should "leave as much money with the people as
we can to pay federal war taxes and to buy war bonds and stamps."
*
Speaker Norman Bauer and other pro-Jones representatives repeatedly
referred to benefits of the tax:

$20 per educable child for public

schools, regular equalization fund payments, regular contributions to
the teacher retirement fund, additional old-age pension funds, and
added revenue for hospitals.

The House at last passed the Jones sales

23
Morning Advocate, June 12, 16, 1942; States, June 13, 16, 1942;
Item, June 17, 1942.
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tax on June 17, 1942, by a vote of 51 yeas and 43 nays. 2 4
The thin margin by which the sales tax passed the House, where it
had a friendly presiding officer, did not augur well for the bill in
the Senate.

Jones attempted to lobby the Senators as he had the

Representatives:

". . . if I were a member of the Senate, I should

most assuredly vote for the proposed sales tax.
sity.

It is a grim neces

The war has tak[en] huge slices of our tax revenues; oil and

gas products, which supply us with sixty per cent of our revenues,
will yield smaller and smaller sums as the rubber shortage grows more
severe . . . "

Despite Jones’ pleas, the Senate voted on June 24 to

kill the sales tax in a complex bit of parliamentary maneuvering.

The

Senate first voted 21-17 to indefinitely postpone (and thus kill) the
bill.

Senator Grove Stafford, a Jones floor leader from Rapides

Parish who voted against the indefinite postponement, then announced
that he wished to switch his vote to the prevailing side so he could
give notice of reconsideration and bring the bill back before the
Senate the next day.

Senator Cawthorn maintained that Stafford was

out of order, but Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton ruled that a Senator
could indeed change his vote and give notice of reconsideration.
Cawthorn and Senator Dudley LeBlanc objected to Mouton's ruling, and
Cawthorn moved a suspension of the rules to revert to the bill in
order to move that it be laid on the table (again effectively killing
it).

Mouton denied Cawthorn's suspension of the rules motion, but

Cawthorn asked for a Senate vote and carried his motion by 20 yeas to
24

States, June 17-18, 1942; Item, June 18, 1942; Morning Advocate,
June 18, 1942.
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18 nays-

With the rules thus suspended, Cawthorn made his final

motion to table the entire bill and carried it, thereby killing the
sales tax for the 1942 regular session. 25
Jones’ supporters were outraged by the Senate action.

Senator

Lloyd Hendrick of Shreveport called the Byzantine maneuvering "one
of the most cowardly, contemptible, most reprehensible things I have
ever heard of." Much of the reformers’ rage was directed toward
Robert Maestri, whom they saw as the mastermind who "sits down on the
highland road (sic) and sends his delegation up here" to thwart the
will of the people.

Jones blamed "three millionaires" — Maestri,

oilman William Helis, and political boss of Plaquemines and St. Ber
nard parishes Leander Perez —

for defeat of his tax proposal.

The

Alexandria Daily Town Talk warned its readers•to expect a barrage from
the "Jones smearing crew" whom it expected to appear shortly in north
and central Louisiana to attack the governor.
newspaper predicted, that "we told you so.

They will say, the

We knew Sam Jones would

not help the poor people, the lame, the halt, and the blind.

Where

is all the money he was going to use to help feed you, and send your
sons to school, give medical attention to your sick and aid for your
old and feeble?
Rhetoric aside, Louisiana still faced the problem of its looming
deficits.

The House passed new revenue bills adjusting income tax

rates, and the Senate talked of reviving the wholesale sales tax, but
25
Morning Advocate, June 21, 1942; States, June 24, 1942.
26
States, June 24, 1942; Item, June 24, 1942; Morning Advocate, June
28, 1942; Town Talk, July 1, 1942.
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the only major piece of revenue legislation passed by both houses
was the gas-gathering tax, estimated to raise about $1,500,000 per
year.

Jones announced that he had made one last appeal to the Regular

Democratic Organization for fiscal sanity but had failed to win their
support, so his war-time tax program was indeed dead.
did not totally despair, however.
unpleasant, option:

The governor

He still had one possible, though

"The only thing left for me to do is to veto

sufficient items to balance the budget." An independent citizen’s
committee investigating state finances reported that the 1942 legis
lature had appropriated $8,000,000 to $11,000,000 in excess of esti
mated revenue for 1942-43, and between $7,000,000 and $9,000,000 excess for 1943-44.

27

The governor clearly had a difficult task.

The performance of the rebellious 1942 legislature reveals the
fiscal irresponsibility of Jones’ opponents.

They assumed the mantle

of "fiscal integrity" and reiterated their compassion for the "com
mon man" by defeating the tax increases proposed by the reformers.
At the same time, however, they expected their own lavish programs
to be financed, apparently out of thin air.

When the legislature

adjourned, therefore, it left the governor as the scapegoat who had
to reduce state expenditures to balance state income by eliminating
desirable programs.
Jones' Longite opponents were pleased as the legislature adjourned
27Acts Passed by the Legislature, 1942 Regular Session, p. 80; States,
June 26, July 3, 6, August 7, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 6, 1942;
Town Talk, July 8, 1942.
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"sine die" on July 9, 1942.

They had not completely obliterated

Civil Service, but they had beaten back attempts to curb their leader,
Robert Maestri’s, power, had forced Sam Jones to endorse a distasteful
sales tax in violation of his campaign pledge, and had then brought
him to his knees by failing to pass it, and had custom-tailored a
campaign issue to use against the reformers in 1944 (Where is your
health care? Where are you schools?).

The Longites, however, had

underestimated the governor's resilience and his willingness to take
a political gamble to obtain his balanced budget.

28

Jones' gamble involved vetoing enough necessary or popular pro
grams to at once balance the budget and also create enough public
pressure on legislators that they would vote to provide the revenue
needed to continue state services with a balanced budget.

(The Louisi

ana governor had no power to reduce appropriations made by the legis
lature.

He could only approve or veto them.)

Jones' vetoes resulted

in approximately 11,000 families leaving the relief rolls; a $342,000
reduction in LSD’s appropriations; loss of a $2,000,000 appropriation
to aid unemployables not covered by federal programs; loss of
$1,000,000 for the teachers' retirement system, among others.

Jones'

biggest gamble, however, was his veto of the $6,500,000 biennial main29
tenance appropriation for the New Orleans Charity Hospital.
The governor attempted to place blame for the Charity Hospital's
problems squarely on the Old Regulars.

"Your political party [sic]

28

Glen Jeansonne, Leander Perez Boss of the Delta (Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana State University Press, 1977), p. 124.
^Morning Advocate, July 11, 13, 1942; States, July 11, 1942.
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is primarily responsible . . ." he wrote to Old Regular caucus chair
man George Montgomery.

"When the sick are turned away from your

hospitals, it will be your fault." Montgomery shot back that, "As an
organization we feel that it would be undemocratic to attempt to dic
tate to [the New Orleans delegation] as to how they must vote." Mrs.
Helen N. Farris in an open letter to Jones and the legislature placed
the blame on both factions for their shortsightedness:

" . . . what

are you thinking about," she asked, "when you close the door of health
of thousands of people?"- The premier Longite, former governor Earl
Long, blamed Sam Jones solely for the hospital's problems.

"I don't

understand why it is that Gov. Jones had to pick on the hospitals and
welfare when in the same appropriation bill was an appropriation of
over a million dollars for a civil service bureau that is not necessary. ,.30
The New Orleans Charity Hospital had fallen on lean times even
before it was caught in the bifactional conflict.

By June 23, 1942,

it had lost eighty resident physicians, ninety-three nurses, thirtyeight junior interns, and forty-nine members of the visiting staff to
the armed services.

Hospital officials feared that in case of an air

raid or other serious emergency, the remaining staff would be unable
to provide adequate medical service.

31

The Longites resorted to their familiar tactic of filing a law
suit to overturn Jones' veto.

In

In this case, New Orleans attorney

States, July 1-2, 8 , 1942; Morning Advocate, July 18, 1942.

^States, June 23, 27, 1942.
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Alfred 0. Danziger, represented by attorneys Leander Perez, George M.
Wallace, and Wade 0. Martin, Jr., filed suit in Judge J. D. Womack’s
court seeking to block Jones' veto on the grounds that it prevented
payment on the state’s $800,000 bonded indebtedness for the hospital,
of which Danziger himself held two bonds.

The administration filed

writs in the Louisiana Supreme Court asking that the suit be dismissed
because Womack's court lacked jurisdiction in the case.
Court declined to issue the writ.
stitutional on two grounds:

The Supreme

Womack declared Jones' veto uncon

it cancelled the obligation of contract

(the state, he reasoned, had entered into a contract with its bond
holders and was obligated to complete payment), and he also declared
that Jones should have returned the veto to the legislature for action
prior to adjournment.

The state then filed a.suspensive appeal with

the State Supreme Court seeking to overturn Womack's injunction
ordering the state to meet the Charity Hospital obligations.

Danziger,

through Perez, maintained that if the court granted the suspensive
appeal, he would be denied protection of the law and divested of his
rights without due process of law.

The Supreme Court, however,

granted the state's suspensive appeal and made it returnable on Sep
tember 4, when both sides were to submit briefs and a date was to be
set for hearing the injunction.

This action effectively nullified

Womack's decision, because the court on the same day announced its
summer recess, meaning that the case could not be heard until October,
weeks after the September closing date set for the Charity Hospital
unless it received more money.

32

^ Morning Advocate, July 28, 1942; States, July 31, August 1, 6 , 10,
12, 14-15, 1942; Item, August 15, 1942.
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The obvious answer to the state’s fiscal problem appeared to lie
in a special legislative session.

Rumors of a special session surfaced

after the Senate voted down the sales tax during the regular session.
The governor, however, was reluctant to cause the state additional
expense unless he obtained reasonable assurance of success:

"It would

be a waste of the state’s money to have a special session that would
result in a cat and dog fight." Requests for a special session, how
ever, came from various sources.

Sixteen Senators on July 26 urged

Jones to call a special session empowered to raise money for all the
curtailed state services.

The vacillating Senator Ellis called for a

session to provide funds for the Charity Hospital but remained opposed
to the sales tax, and proposed a transfer scheme by which a surplus
in the Confederate pension fund could be used as the foundation of a
bond issue to pay for programs for the aged and needy, thus freeing
money set aside for them in the general fund which could then be used
for the hospital.

The Young Men’s Business Club of New Orleans ap-

pealed to the governor for relief for the hospital. 33
The governor continued to seek assurances that a special session
would be worth the money it cost.

During mid-August, he informed

Mayor Maestri that he was contemplating issuing a call for an extra
ordinary session and asked Maestri to meet with him to discuss ways
of raising enough revenue to keep Charity Hospital open and other
state services functioning.

Maestri, xchen asked by newspaper reporters,

testily denied receiving Jones’ telegraphed invitation, declaring that
33
States, July 7, 27, August 10, 14, 1942; Item, August 13, 1942.
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he did "not propose to be dictated to by his excellency" and main
taining that he had no more to do with the legislature than did any
other mayor-

(He also noted, however, that "several of my friends"

had confided that they would vote for any tax necessary to raise reve
nue except a sales tax).^
■While Maestri maintained his refusal to meet with Jones, Old
Regular floor leaders Representative Frank Stitch and Senator J.
Aubry Gaiennie met with the governor and announced that they opposed
"anything in the form of a sales tax" but would consider other taxes.
The participants in this meeting declined to announce the exact pro
posals discussed, but political observers reported that the primary
topic of discussion was a one and one-half per cent sales tax and an
alternate one per cent sales tax with increased additional taxes.
Stitch and Gaiennie favored the latter proposal-

The Longites, how

ever, continued to question the need for a special session before the
September Congressional primaries-

Ex-govemor Earl Long declared

that Jones only wanted to use the session to. help his "stoogey” Con
gressional candidates.

MaestriTs representatives reportedly offered

support for a sales tax in exchange for a delayed session.

The extra

ordinary session, however, met August 20, 1942, in response to the
governor's call, which did not limit it to consider a sales tax only
but instead authorized consideration of various revenue measures that
the legislators wished to propose. 35
34
States, August 16, 18, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 17, 1942; Item,
August 18, 1942.
35
States, August 18-20, 1942; Item, August 18-20, 1942; Morning Advo
cate, August 20, 1942.
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The legislators responded to Jones' wide authorization by intro
ducing a number of proposals.

Senator Ernest Clements, for example,

urged a widening of the call to include revision of the appropriations,
in order to eliminate funds for state Civil Service, "the greatest
army of high-salaried, super-colossal, streamline 18-karat deadheads"
the state had even known.

The governor, however, recommended the one

and one-half per cent retail sales tax, and Representatives Bonnie Baker
of East Baton Rouge Parish and H. H. Huckabay of Caddo Parish intro
duced the bill in the House.

The major Longite alternative to the

sales tax was framed in bills introduced by Representative W. 0.
Noble of Richland parish and Senator Joe Cawthorn.. These bills would
have funded the Charity Hospital completely by cutting all other state
expenditures by thirty per cent.

Administration leaders, of course,

immediately saw this move as the political ploy it was intended to be:
though the Charity Hospital would remain open, Longites could campaign
over the rest of the state against Sam Jones, telling audiences that
he had mishandled the state's funds so badly that it had to reduce its
benefits to them."^
The House passed the one and one-half per cent sales tax by 5133 vote, and then only after adding an amendment providing that if
the people approved a proposed increased income tax amendment in the
November election, the sales tax would expire.

In addition, the House

Ways and Means Committee also ruled unfavorably on six revenue bills
(1 cent soft drink tax, increased common

carrier tax, increased gas

Morning Advocate, August 21, 24, 1942; States, August 21-22, 24,
1942.
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gathering tax, among others) introduced by anti-Jones members as substitutes for the sales tax. 37
■While House debate on the unpopular tax proceeded normally, de
bate in the Senate broke into open warfare.

The melee began when

Senator Dudley LeBlanc took the floor and roundly attacked the gover
nor.

Representative Fred J. Heintz of St. Tammany parish, who was

standing nearby, began exchanging words with LeBlanc and invited him
outside the Senate chamber to continue the exchange.

Instead, LeBlanc

removed his glasses, and both men began swinging their fists.
Senators immediatley joined the fracas.

Other

Representatives present in

the chamber vaulted the low railing onto the floor.

Calls arose to

"call the police" and Lieutenant-Governor Mouton repeatedly pled for
order:

"This is just a trivial matter.

Please return to your seats,

gentlemen." Mouton’s gentle admonition went unheeded as one legisla
tor grabbed a brass cuspidor and bandied it about before he was dis
armed.

The members eventually returned to order.

Even though anger

continued to seethe within the chamber, the adjournment was generally
peaceful, with only fistfights between spectators, but not legislators.
Senator Cawthorn and Louisiana State Police Superintendent Steve Alford
began a fight in the corridor just outside the governor's office, but
their friends quickly separated them.

Earlier on the day of the

melee, however, former governor James A. Noe signaled a break in
Longite opposition to the sales tax when he testified to the Senate
37
States, August 24-26, 1942; Morning Advocate, August 25, 1942; Acts
Passed by the Legislature of the State of Louisiana at the Extraordi
nary Session 1942, p. 6 , 28.
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Finance Committee that he favored the tax only as a last resort to
keep the hospitals open and to provide state services to the poor,
sick, blind, and insane.

(Noe also told the Senators that he would

remove the sales tax after he was elected governor in 1944.) 38
Despite Maestri's protests earlier that he had no extraordinary
influence in the legislature, final negotiations to break the sales
tax deadlock occurred in his Heidelberg Hotel room at a meeting of Old
Regulars, the New Orleans legislative delegation, and non-city Longites.

One last-minute hitch developed on the Senate floor when Sena

tor Grove Stafford of Rapides parish objected to dedicating $1,750,000
of the proposed revenue to parish police juries.

Nevertheless, the

Senate passed an amended version of the House sales tax (the Senate
voted a one per cent levy) on a close 20-15 vote following a complex
session filled with legal and parliamentary points of order.

The

House the next day concurred in the Senate amendment, thus giving
Jones a source of revenue expected to yield about $6,000,000 per
biennium.^
Predictably, neither Jones nor Maestri could resist attempting
38
Morning Advocate, August 26, 1942; States, August 26, 1942. The
States commented that many of the legislators were "young enough to
hurl bombs at Hitler and Hirohito" and added that if their performance
in the fight was any indication "many of them should make good com
mandos."
39

States, August 27-29, 1942; Item, August 27-28, 1942; Official Jour
nal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of
Louisiana at the Seventeenth Extraordinary Session of the Legislature
Under the Adoption of the Constitution of 1921, pp. 40-41; House Cal
endar Seventeenth Extraordinary Session, 1942, pp. 1—2; Official Jour
nal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the States of Louisiana at the
Seventeenth Extra Session of the Legislature Under the Adoption of
the Constitution of 1921, pp. 116-130.
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to make political mileage out of the results of the special session.
Jones exulted that the opposition "has taken a political shellacking
and they know it," and hoped that after the Congressional primary "we
can all settle down and give the people a breathing spell from parti
san politics." Maestri, on the other hand, reminded the people that
Jones had originally proposed a two per cent sales tax "which he
claimed was absolutely necessary . . . " but "the resistance of the
city delegation and their country friends resulted in reducing this
tax to 1 per cent . . . " with a proportionate saving to the voters. 40
Even though the new sales tax began generating revenue at mid
night, August 31 (the legislature gave its final approval only on
August 29), Charity Hospital's troubles did not suddenly end.

Hospi

tal Superintendent Dr. Oliver P. Daly, announced that while the in
fusion of revenue would allow an expansion of the hospital's capacity
from 1,600 to 2,200 or 2,300 patients and would reopen the seventh
floor, it would not be possible to use all 3,300 beds until after the
war because of the shortage of doctors, nurses, and other staff
members.^
The records of the 1942 legislative sessions reveal that despite
national and state calls for setting politics aside for the duration
of the war, combative bifactionalism continued in Louisiana.

If Sam

Jones was correct in his later assessment that in 1940 the Longites
were convinced that they had the votes to do as they pleased, but
40Morning Advocate, August 30, 1942.
^States, August 31, 1942; Item, August 31, 1942.
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decided to cooperate with him in hopes of a share of the patronage,
then by 1942 that hope was gone.

Moreover, the "country Longite"

group held out even longer against rapprochement with Jones than did
the Old Regulars.

Senator Clements of Allen parish, for example, was

one of the fifteen Senators who voted against the resuscitated sales
tax in the extraordinary session, even after Senator Cawthorn had
abandoned his opposition to the tax.

Clements also held true to his

principles and cast the lone dissenting vote against creating the War
Emergency Revenue Fund, which channeled the sales tax receipts into
the hospital, welfare, and school funds.

Both sides went through the

motions of appealing for unity, but neither was willing to set aside
their differences.

Each looked forward hopefully to the 1944 state

campaign and attempted to establish a strong foundation for its appeal
to the voters.
Even with Louisiana's fiscal problems solved more or less to his
satisfaction, Sam Jones still faced one more major challenge to his
control of the state — the infamous "little war of 1943." This chal
lenge surfaced when Plaquemines Parish Sheriff L. D. Dauterive died on
June 1, 1943.

Jones and Attorney General Eugene Stanley contended

that the constitution provided that in such instances in which the
late official had less than one year left to serve, the governor could
appoint a successor to fill the office until the next regular election.
The next election following June 1, 1943, was the state-wide general
election to be held April 18, 1944, thirty days after which (May 19,
1944) the governor could issue a commission to the newly-elected
official.

Therefore, Jones and Stanley automatically assumed that the

governor should appoint Dauterive's successor.

Plaquemines District
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Attorney Leander Perez, a Longite since Huey's day, staunch antiJones man, and undisputed boss of the parish, thought otherwise.
Dauterive, he held, had not filed his oath of office until June 14,
1940, so his term lasted until June 14, 1944, clearly more than one
year past his death.

Therefore, he concluded, the constitution did

not authorize Jones to appoint Dauterive's successor but instead pro
vided that he call a special election to fill the parish vacancy.

In

fact, Perez's convoluted interpretation sprang from his fear that
Jones planned to appoint an anti-Perez sheriff.

(It was also in direct

contradiction of the terms of Perez's original appointment to public
office as district judge in 1919 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
had established the legality of the less-than-a-year appointment
procedure.)

4?

Each side held firm to its convictions.

Perez had Plaquemines

Coroner Dr. Benjamin R. Slater sworn in as acting sheriff on June 2.
According to the state constitution, however, Slater could only assume
an incapacitated sheriff’s tax collection duties.

Jones, after a

frantic search for an anti-Perez man willing to challenge the boss,
appointed Walter Blaize as sheriff.

Blaize, a Buras automobile repair

shop owner, former police juror, and chairman of the Grand Prairie
levee board, was a recognized staunch anti—Perez man who possessed the
courage to run repeatedly on an anti-Perez platform and to suffer
42Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 127-128; James Conaway, Judge The
Life and Times of Leander Perez (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),
p. 66; Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South Stars of
the New Confederacy (New York, Grossman Publishers, 1968), pp. 15-16;
Harnett T. Kane, Deep Delta Country (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce,
1944), p. 210; Morning Adovcate, June 12, 1942.
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defeat after defeat.

Dr. Slater refused to relinquish the office to

Blaize, and Perez installed approximately twenty parish deputies in
the sheriff's office and barricaded the court house at Point a la
s % 43
Hache.
Jones, meanwhile, gathered a force of State Guardsmen in Baton
Rouge, evidently hoping to frighten Perez into submission with an im
plied threat of invasion, but dismissed the State Guard after only a
roll call and a brief drill on the grounds of the Old State Capitol.
Instead of being frightened, however, the pugnacious Perez gathered
his own army.

Using one of the wartime measures passed by the legis

lature which authorized local officials to call upon local citizens
to quell a public emergency, he created the Plaquemines Wartime Emer
gency Patrol, ostensibly to guard the parish's coast from German
submarine attack, but in reality to keep Walter Blaize and the State
Guard away from the courthouse. 44
Confrontation seemed likely as the protagonists drew their armies
around them, but the first clash occurred in court.

The "little war"

caused a number of court cases filed in various state and federal
courts.

Jones initially filed a friendly suit against the supervisor

of public funds and the collector of revenue, claiming that they
43Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 128-129; Conaway, Judge, p. 66;
Morning Advocate, June 12, 1943; Times-Picayune, June 12, 1943.
44Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 130; Conaway, Judge, pp. 66-67; TimesPicayune , 9-11, 1943- Perez had opposed the legislature's passage of
the State Guard bill, fearing that Jones would use it against local
governments, but Longites were not concerned. Senator Cawthorn com
mented that "Jones doesn’t know how to use power so he won't abuse
power. That fellow Jones could go into a Boy Scout camp with a can
non and come out without his pants." See Item, June 19, 1942.
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refused to yield their roles as temporary Plaquemines tax collectors
to Blaize.

This move allowed the administration to establish the

legality of the governor's action in a district court other than the
Plaquemines-St. Bernard district court which Perez dominated.

Despite

Perez's.argument that the Plaquemines deputy tax collector (his nephew,
Wilson Dauterive) had never surrendered the tax records to the state
officials, the Baton Rouge district court on June 18 ruled that
Blaize's appointment was indeed valid.

In order to lend a further

stamp of authority to the decision, the defendants appealed the dis
trict court decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court which on July 13
upheld the lower court’s ruling. 45
Blaize's legal right to the Plaquemines sheriff’s office proved
to be easier to obtain than physical possession of the office.

His

initial foray to Pointe a la Hache ended at the northern parish line
where he saw a group of deputies stopping cars at Braithwaite and
checking the occupants' identification before allowing them to enter
the parish.

Perez had the Pointe a la Hache highway blocked in front

of his house and traffic diverted through his yard where he stationed
his guards to detain undesirables.

Blaize announced that he would

not attempt to force his possession of the sheriff's office.

"We're

45
Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 131-132; Morning Advocate, July 15,
17, 1943; Walter J. Blaize v. Jerome A. Hayes, Supervisor of Public
Funds, Et. Al., Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37190, John B. Foumet
Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Jones'
hand was strengthened in the East Baton Rouge district court when
Judge Womack lost a 1942 re-election bid.
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working on something else," he said.^
Blaize and Jones eventually had to resort to outright invasion
to place the new sheriff in office.

On October 8 , 1943, the State

Supreme Court reiterated their decision that Blaize legally possessed
the office by refusing Perez's application for a rehearing of their
June 13 decision upholding the appointment.

On October 9, Jones de

clared martial law in Plaquemines parish and ordered State Guard com
mander Brigadier General Thomas F. Porter to install Blaize in office.
Perez obtained a restraining order from "his" District Judge Albert
Estopinal, Jr., stopping the State Guard from attempting to install
Blaize in office, but it proved useless.

The State Guard gathered at

Camp Pontchartrain in Orleans Parish, and Perez made his last minute
preparations for invasion.

One Plaquemines deputy reported that the

courthouse was "bristling with machine guns" but also added signifi
cantly that "we don't have the men to shoot them if the going gets
tough.
The State Guard rolled into Plaquemines parish early on the
morning of October 9, 1943, on 31 trucks, with two command cars and
an ambulance.

They met resistance only three times:

three deputies

met them at Braithwaite and attempted to serve Estopinal's court order,
but they were arrested and the court order torn up; the main highway
before Perez's home was blocked by oil field equipment which had to
be removed; and burning oyster shells blocked the highway at the
46Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 133-134; Morning Advocate, June 12,
July 15, 1943.
47Jeansonne, Leander Perez, p. 134; Morning Advocate, October 8-9,
1943; Times-Picayune, October 8-9, 1943.
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outskirts of Pointe a la Hache.

As the State Guard approached the

parish seat, Perez and his followers abandoned their stand inside the
courthouse after looting the sheriff’s office, and fled on the Pointe
a la Hache ferry to the middle of the Mississippi River.

Slater re

fused to leave his office and had to be carried from the building be
fore Blaize could be installed in the wrecked room.

One Slater deputy

remarked that the lack of office equipment really did not matter be
cause "I give Blaize two weeks in office.

Then he will have to call

the State Guard again."48
Threats of continued violence proved groundless.

Blaize, the

State Guard, and newspaper reporters who accompanied them had to cope
with harassment from local citizens who spoke, whistled, sang into,
or turned the crank of their old-fashioned telephones, thus disrupting
contact with the outside world.

Also, a mysterious blackout left the

courthouse without electricity while nearby residential customers con
tinued receiving power.

The only physical combat, however, was aimed

against the swarms of delta mosquitoes. 49
The quietness of the situation led Jones and Porter to remove all
but one hundred of the State Guardsmen within three days.

The con-

r

tingent was soon reduced to about seventeen, then to a symbolic two
men and one officer.

Even though a surface quiet prevailed, Blaize

was still not the effective sheriff of the parish.

He soon located

48Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 135-136; Conaway, Judge, pp. 72-76;
Morning Advocate, October 10, 1943; Times-Picayune Mew Orleans States,
October 10, 1943.
49Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 137-138; Morning Advocate, October 1112, 16, 1943.
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missing tax records left behind in a locked courthouse safe, but
desultory efforts to collect taxes met with failure.

Meanwhile,

Perez continued his propaganda and legal battle against the state ad
ministration, filing as many as fifteen lawsuits at one time.

The

administration, in turn, fought back with lawsuits of its own, filing
impeachment proceedings against Perez and Estopinal and filing a
murder conspiracy suit against Perez, among others.^
Louisiana’s "little war" occurred against the backdrop of the
1943 statewide primary election campaign.

In Plaquemines parish, both

Dr. Slater and Blaize qualified to run for sheriff, but not surpris
ingly, Slater with Perez’s help defeated Blaize by an approximately
four to one margin.
troversy-

Slater's election, however, did not end the con

In April, 1944, Judge R. R. Reeves of the Catahoula-Con-

cordia parishes district, who had been installed to replace Estopinal
until the impeachment charges against him could be heard, ruled that
Jones had acted illegally when he declared martial law in Plaquemines
Parish.

Jones maintained that he was merely enforcing the judgment of

the Supreme Court-

Almost a year after the fact, the Supreme Court on

October 4, 1944, laid to rest the last of the Plaquemines cases before
it, dismissing charges of conspiracy to commit murder brought against

^Jeansonne, Leander Perez, pp. 137-140; Morning Advocate, October 16,
November 6 , 18, 1943; Benjamin R. Slater v. Walter J. Blaize, Et. A1-,
Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37,237; Benjamin R. Slater v. Walter
J. Blaize, Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 37,341, Fournet Collection.
Perez's propaganda barrage included a speech entitled "The Truth About
the Plaquemines Situation" which detailed his side of the conflict.
He delivered the speech on WNOE, and Representative F. Edward Hebert
also inserted the text into the Congressional Record. See Congres
sional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 78th Congress First Ses
sion Appendix, Volume 89 Part 12 (Washington, D.C^, United States
Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. A4598-A4600.
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Jones and Stanley, fraud charges against Stanley, and the impeachment
proceedings against Perez and Estopinal.

Most of these charges were'

dropped because of lack of evidence or because the points of law they
were based on were by then moot, because Jones, Stanley, and Blaize
were out of office.
however.

This ruling did not end litigation in the case,

On October 9, 1944, former Plaquemines deputy sheriff

Joseph Cappielo sued Jones, Stanley, and eight others for injuries he
allegedly suffered at the hands of the State Guard during the invasion.
The final decision in the "little war" cases occurred on February 7,
1945, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans upheld
Federal District Court Judge Adrian J. Caillouet's dismissal of the
damage suit for lack of jurisdiction.^
The Plaquemines "little war" can be seen as merely a reprehensible
waste of precious fuel and manpower during wartime, but it should also
be seen in the context of its part in the larger theme of continued
bifactionalism, another opportunity for Longites to harry Sam Jones
and ridicule his reforms.

(Perez did not split with Earl Long until

the race issue surfaced in the 1950s.)

The thread of continued bitter

bifactionalism ran through Jones' administration, especially from 1942
until the end.

The unnamed "oppositionist" Senator who said during

the 1942 regular session that, "We don't expect to get bills we really
want . . -We're just concentrating on keeping Jones from getting what
he wants," accurately summarized the situation.

The reluctance of the

1942 regular session to pass the sales tax while increasing state

^Morning Advocate, October 10, 1944, February 8 , 1945.
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expenditures stemmed in part from Longite desire to put Jones in an
uncomfortable position, as well as from their philosophical

opposition

to a regressive sales tax (many of them, however, had approved Leche's
sales tax in 1936).

The bitter last-ditch stand by "country" Longites

against the sales tax in the 1942 extraordinary session likewise re
vealed a continued bifactionalism even though Jones cagily split the
opposition by retaining appropriations for state charity hospitals out
side New Orleans in part because much of his support came from these
areas, while establishing much political pressure on the New Orleans
legislative delegation by withholding the funds for the city charity
hospital.

The Morning Advocate editorially saw the "little war" as

only a continuation of the Jones opposition and sadly commented that
"folks —

especially in Louisiana — have to accept such shenanigans

as more or less to be expected . . . "

Expected or not, however, the

little war exploded across the news reports of the state as a major
challenge to Sam Jones, a challenge in which he ultimately failed.
He won the battle; he installed Walter Blaize as sheriff; but he lost
the war.

Leander Perez reestablished an iron control over Plaquemines

parish that was never again successfully challenged until his death
in 1969.

52

9

As his administration drew to a close in late 1943 and early
1944, Sam Jones judged that his efforts had met with a great deal of.
success.

He had fulfilled, he said, 43 of 45 campaign promises made

52

Item, June 26, 1942; Morning Advocate, October 16, 1943; Jeansonne,
Leander Perez, p. 141; Kane, Deep Delta Country, p. 213; Sherrill,
Gothic Politics in the Deep South, p. 17.
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in 1939, and his failure to eliminate the sale tax and provide old
age pensions at the level he anticipated were due to Longite obstruc
tionism, not to failures on his part.

In fact, however, Jones left a

mixed legacy to both his supporters and his critics.

As Allan Sindler

observes, many of the pure reformers, expecting a renewal of John M.
Parker's holy war against machine politics, stood by aghast as Jones
made the necessary deals with Noe and Maestri to implement his admini
stration's reform program.

Jones simultaneously disappointed Longites

by not mindlessly attempting to reduce Longism's social services, as
they had expected he would, thus demonstrating that Jones was no poli
tical naif.

Comparison of Jones’ and Earl Long’s 1939 platforms re

veals, indeed, striking similarities:

they both had promised in

creased aid to education, free school books, a school lunch program,
increased old age assistance, and homestead exemptions. 53
Jones, in fact, fully realized by 1940 that it was no longer
possible in Louisiana politics for an anti-Long gubernatorial candi
date to campaign openly and sincerely against public services (as
did Old Regular candidate Hewitt Bouanchaud in 1928) and still seri
ously expect to be elected.

This practical realization marked a new

maturity and political realism in anti-Long ranks.

"My pappy was for

Huey," Jones reminded the voters, but it was not until Jones' admini
stration that the anti-Long, anti-machine reform group had a chance
to prove the state's ability to provide many of Huey's services
53

Shreveport Times, December 11, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 11,
14, 1943; Sam Jones Report to the People, December, 1943; Barney
Krebs to "Mr. Healy," n.d. (1948?), DeLesseps Story Morrison Papers,
Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane
University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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without the concurrent corruption and semi-dictatorial political
apparatus.
Perhaps it took the shock of Huey Long to focus conservative
Louisiana's attention on poor people's problems, but Jones aptly
demonstrated that by 1940-1944, conservative Louisiana had learned
its lesson.

No longer would it retreat so far into fiscal conserva

tism that it would rip apart Long’s social program.' Even so, the re
formers were still not as comfortable as the Longites in spending
large sums on many of Long's favorite programs.
Sam Jones, the amateur politician, learned much about political
reality during his four years in the governor's office — the neces
sity of forming alliances with people not normally considered as
allies, the demands for patronage, the frustration of being unable to
save a legislative program from defeat in the legislature or in the
courts, and the desertion of friends.
inauguration day:

Jones remakred on Jimmie Davis'

"One thing I found out in my four years as governor

is that all of the saints were not in my political faction, and all
of the sinners were not in the opposing faction." Despite his prob
lems, however, Jones provided not the hidebound conservatism of the
past past but a "progressive conservatism" which Sindler accurately
maintains "became impressed upon large numbers of voters . . . as a
.54
reasonable alternative to the bucaneering liberalism of the Longs."
Louisiana’s Constitutions since 1898 forbade the governor from
succeeding himself for a second term.

Therefore, as Jones prepared

54Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 177-180; Shreveport Times, May
10, 1944.
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to leave office and return to his Lake Charles law practice, the 194344 gubernatorial campaign, while quieter than the 1939-40 contest,
brought politics back into focus as the reformers sought a candidate
to take up the reform banner, while the Longites regrouped for a
strong attempt to regain control of all state offices.^

This departure was not the end of Jones’ public career. He ran for
governor again in 1948 and suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of
Earl Long. During the 1960s, Governor John McKeithen appointed Jones
to head a committee studying reorganization of the state government.
Jones died on February 8 , 1978, two years after his son, Robert, re
ceived his own drubbing in a campaign for the governorship against
Edwin W. Edwards.
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CHAPTER V
THE EMERGENCE OF JIMMIE DAVIS (1943-1944)
The Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of 1943-44 commanded much
attention, even though many people continued to be preoccupied with
war news.

Speculation centered on two questions:

Would the reformers

be able to retain the state government offices they had won in 1940,
or would the Longites sweep back into full control?

Would the United

States involvement in World War II have any effect on the campaign?
These questions were answered as the campaign unfolded.
Governor Sam Jones, curiously, did not openly endorse a potential
successor to carry on his reform efforts in the state government.

In

stead he broadcast a series of ten radio addresses in December, 1943,
the scripts of which were collected into a pamphlet and distributed
throughout the state.

In this pamphlet, Jones underscored the bene

fits provided by his own reform administration.

Even though he wanted

a reformer to follow him into office, Jones felt constrained by his
political principles not to use his power as governor to help sway the
election.

He thought that such activity would contribute to the

appearance of his building a state administration political machine,
an image that he, archfoe of Huey Long's political machine, did not
want to project.*
Even though Jones did not publicly involve himself in the cam

*Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 10, 1944; Sam H. Jones to Denny
Daugherty, July 22, 1970, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of
Atchives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Daugherty
Collection); Sam Jones Report to the People, 1943.
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paign, it was an open secret throughout Louisiana that he desired
Public Service Commissioner James Houston (Jimmie) Davis of Shreveport
to follow him into office, even though Jones had doubts about Davis'
ability to govern the state.

He was "not a good candidate" Jones

later recalled of Davis, "but he was a good campaigner."2
The reform faction had to locate a new candidate because the 1921
Louisiana Constitution prohibited governors from succeeding themselves,
thus eliminating any possibility of Jones running for re-election.
Jones sent two emissaries, Prescott Foster and Louisiana Highway De
partment Director D. Y. Smith, to Shreveport to discuss a possible
candidacy with Davis, but Davis refused to see them because he was not
yet interested in aspiring to higher office.

Soon afterward, however,

Davis attended a Public Service Commission meeting in Baton Rouge.
While he was in the city, Lee Laycock, Clerk of the Louisiana House of
Representatives, persuaded Davis to meet with the governor.

Davis'

agreement led to an informal meeting between him and Jones along the
shore of Lake Bruin, near the small town of St. Joseph in Tensas parish,
where Jones was visiting.

Jones told Davis that some of the reformers

had mentioned him as a possible gubernatorial candidate and that he
favored Davis’ candidacy.

Davis, however, remained reluctant to run

for governor, fearing the potential for scandal associated with the
oil business in Louisiana and the unpopularity of superceding local
officials to prosecute gamblers in the state.

He feared that he had

—2

Sam Jones interviewed by James Godfrey, February, 1977, LSU Oral
History Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H.
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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too little experience with the oil business to understand its com
plexities and could thus enmesh himself unwittingly in improper agree
ments.

He also realized the popularity of gambling, especially in

the southern part of the state, and did not wish to appear dictatorial
in enforcing the state’s anti-gambling laws.

Jones reassured Davis

that the Mineral Board insulated the governor from the oil business,
and as for gambling, "I guess the best thing on that subject is just
to let [the local officials] handle their own business."
The reason behind Jones' lack of public support for Davis re
mains unclear.

Gus Weill maintains (based on Davis' recollections)

that Davis told the reformers at a meeting at the governor’s mansion
that he would not accept their offers to campaign for him because "I
don't believe the people will go for the show of a lot of power."^
Jones, however, maintained that he refrained from campaigning because
he had no plans to construct a state machine.The important specter
overhanging both interpretations is that of the Longite machine and
its Louisiana Scandals of 1939.

The deep impression made by the

Scandals on Louisiana politics is amply illustrated by the attempts by
both Jones and Davis to disavow any hint of connection to a powerful
*

_

Gus Weill, You Are My Sunshine The Jimmie Davis Story (Waco, Texas,
Word Books, 1977), pp. 61—63. Weill’s book is useful because he re
cords Davis’ thoughts and memories in sometimes quite lengthy state
ments. Interpretations included in the book, though, must be care
fully scrutinized. It is, after all, a self-proclaimed "affectionate"
(uncritical) biography.
A

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

~*Ibid., p. 64; Morning Advocate, March 10, 1944; Jones to Daugherty,
July 22, 1970, Daugherty Collection.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190

political organization.

The anti-Longites, of course, had long been

opponents of political machines — their own lack of an effective
organization had prevented their winning elections prior to 1939 —
but the Scandals made it imperative that the reformers avoid machine
tactics in the 1943-44 contest.

In addition, Jones’ failure to en

dorse Davis, as Allan Sindler maintained, allowed Davis to attract
a cross-factional support that may not have been possible had he
publicly enjoyed strong support from Jones.^
In Jimmie Davis, the reformers selected the most popular candi
date willing to carry the reform banner in the election.

Davis was

bo m in an autumn, sometime around the beginning of the twentieth
century, one of the eleven children of Sam Jones Davis and Sara Eliza
beth Works Davis.^ The elder Davis worked as a tenant on the farm of
W. R. Guess located in the tiny Beech Springs community near the small
town of Quitman in rural Jackson parish.

Jackson parish and its

neighbor immediately to the south, Winn parish, shared many traits.
They were both populated by a heavily Anglo-Saxon Protestant popula
tion wresting a living from the poor, hill soil.

"We were the same

kind of people as those at Winnfield," Davis later wrote, "My Dad

^Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana State Politics, 1920-1952
(Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 182-183.
^Davis’ precise birthday is unknown. Robert Sobel and John Raimo in
Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States Volume
II (Iowa-Missouri) (Meckler Books, Westport, Connecticut, 1978), p.
588, list September 11, 1902 as the date, but they also have Davis’
father's name wrong. Davis' birth was not recorded, a practice which
continued well into the twentieth century in rural Louisiana, so his
exact birthday is impossible to determine.
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farmed — cotton. . . peanuts, corn, hay, and watermelons.”

Jimmie Davis began his education at the small elementary school
at Beech Springs, graduated from Beech Springs High School in 1920,
and entered Louisiana College, a small Baptist college in Pineville,
in the freshman class of 1920.

There he worked in the college kitchen

and found additional odd jobs to help finance his education.

He gradu

ated from Louisiana College in 1924, then returned to Beech Springs
High as a teacher and coach.

He remained there two years before

entering Louisiana State University from which he received a Master
of Education degree in 1927. 9
Following his LSU graduation, Davis taught social studies at Dodd
College, a Baptist girl's college in Shreveport, and also began his
professional music career, writing "country" songs and performing on
radio station KWKH in Shreveport.

Davis came from a musical family.

He.wrote in 1969 that "Grandma Davis . . . was the only one in the
family who never tried to hit a note, or play a guitar, or anything,"
and the few recreational opportunities in rural Beech Springs — the
g

Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 8-10; Jimmie Davis, "Country Music
is Part of the People," Louisiana Heritage, Summer, 1969, p. 17.
9
Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 35-36; Shreveport Times, May 9, 1944;
Morgan Peoples, "The Sunshine Governor From Jackson Parish," paper pre
sented to the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March
25, 1983; The Pine Knot 1924, Keatchie-Mt. Lebanon Collection, Richard
W. Norton Memorial Library, Louisiana College, Pineville, Louisiana;
Jimmie Davis interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, April 9,
1984. Davis in his very brief master's thesis observed that "among
the negroes [sic] themselves there are certain individuals who are
capable of taking on that type of training which will qualify them for
leadership in the betterment of their race," and advocated early recog
nition of those individuals by a test battery so that "the most intel
ligent negro [sic] children" would receive "the advantage of better
training," but also concluded that black intelligence is raised in pro
portion to the amount of Caucasian inheritance of an individual.
James Houston Davis, "Comparative Intelligence of Whites, Blacks, and
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Baptist church and Saturday night or Sunday afternoon sing-alongs —
provided ample practice.

The future governor had supplemented his

college income by singing on the streetcorners of Alexandria and later
Baton Rouge, but his first regular check from his singing was the $5
per week he received from KWKH.

His regional success led to recording

contracts with nationally-known labels.

Davis' early hits included

"Nobody's Darling But Mine," recorded in 1934, but his biggest hit was
unquestionably "You Are My Sunshine," recorded in 1939, which became
his campaign theme song.^
In addition to his teaching and singing careers, Davis entered
politics in 1929, when he became clerk of the Shreveport city court.
In 1938 he defeated two opponents (one backed by Richard Leche and
the Long machine) to become Shreveport Public Safety Commissioner.
Davis in this local campaign learned the effectiveness of using his
band to attract a crowd to his rallies, a tactic he used to good ad
vantage in the.1943-44 governor's race.

Davis also used his singing

Mulattoes" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1927), p. 14.
^Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 47-49; Davis, "Country Music is Part
of the People," pp. 16-17; Peoples, "The Sunshine Governor From Jack
son Parish;" S. A. Wilkins, "Dodd College: A Brief History," North
Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Summer, 1980, pp. 29-30;
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, May 22, 1983 (hereinafter cited as Town
Talk); Jimmie Davis interviewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, April
16, 1984. "You Are My Sunshine" was eventually recorded by more than
350 artists. A 1983 survey found that it is the third most widelyknown song in the English language (preceded by "Happy Birthday" and
"White Christmas"). Davis mused in 1983 that "You can go anywhere in
the world and they’ll sing it with you." I argue no brief in the cur
rent disagreement in country music history circles about whether Davis
actually wrote "You Are My Sunshine." His recording of and association
with the song (he holds the copyright) made him famous, and that fame
helped propel him into statewide politics.
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ability to "sell" Shreveport on public safety: his talks on traffic
safety to school children, for example, included his rendition of
several ballads.^
The years between 1938 and 1942 brought Davis both increased
fame as an entertainer and growing political ambition.

In 1942, he

began a movie career in the musical "Strictly in the Groove," which
led to other roles, usually as the leading man’s best friend and side
kick.

Also in 1942, he defeated Longite John S. Patton for Louisi

ana's Public Service Commission Third District seat.

By 1943, there

fore, when the reformers cast about for.a gubernatorial candidate,
they found that Jimmie Davis was widely known through his entertaining,
was electable (moreover, he had defeated two Longites), and that his
pleasant personality and soothing campaign style had left him with few
political scars.^

*^Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 49, 54-55; Morning Advocate, Septem
ber 12, 1943; Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1941, p. 61.
12

Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 57-60; Times-Picayune, April 8, 1943;
Morning Advocate, December 28, 1943. "Strictly in the Groove," also
featured Ozzie Nelson and Shemp Howard, among others. According to
advertisements, the story centered on "a group of jumpin' [sic],
jivin’ [sic], jitterbugs, who, by some mistake, provide the right
answers to their college exams and graduate." Davis' other films were
almost exclusively westerns. Hollywood columnist Hedda Hopper, for
example, reported that he held up shooting a scene of "Cyclone Prairie
Rangers" while he answered a long-distance telephone call from friends
in Louisiana asking him to run for governor. Shreveport Times, July
30, 1943. Davis' singing career introduced him to Louisianians in
non-traditional ways. Merle Weigel asked her soldier-husband "What do
you think about Jimmie Davis for our Governor?" and added, "The first
time I ever heard him was on a 'Juke Box* at Felders." Merle Weigel
to H. S. Weigel, March 3, 1944, H. S. Weigel Family Papers, Department
of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge.
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Davis received numerous delegations of reformers asking him to
enter the race, but he postponed an official announcement of his
gubernatorial candidacy until September 11, 1943- He delayed, he
said, until he was sure that
the people of our state were interested in a
candidate who they believe can amalgamate the
forces of our state so that after the war, we
will be able to give our returning soldiers
and sailors the opportunity of making a de
cent living and returning to a normal civilian
life with the least friction and resistance.
Davis* prepared statement reveals that he planned to run a harmonizing,
soothing campaign.

He called for retention of

all constructive legislation of all past ad
ministrations, including an adequate system
of old age pensions and social welfare, free
school books, the civil service system . . .
homestead exemptions, adequate funds [for
road construction], hospital privileges, and
proper accounting in state financing.^3
Davis efforts to be non-controversial and his pleasant personal
ity, however, should not be confused with, neutrality.

He recalled in

1983 that the strength of Huey Long’s dictatorship and the Louisiana
Scandals convinced him that Sam Jones’ reforms required four more
years to cleanse the state.
tion:

Davis, however, hoped to transcend fac

"We had a'lot of dissension," he said in 1983, "I wanted to get

those people together.

I said I didn’t care if they were Long or anti-

13Morning Advocate, August 29, September 12, 1943; Times—Picayune New
Orleans States, September 12, 1943; Shreveport _Times, September 12,
1943.
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Long . . . I wanted them to be a Davis man," or, as he said in 1943,
"I shall do all in my power to bury the hates and distrusts of the
past and raise the curtain that will let in the sunshine of Louisi
ana’s future greatness.
While Jimmie Davis hoped to bring all Democratic factions in
Louisiana together under his banner, the Longites experienced an un
precedented disunity.

The Longites easily agreed that the primary

goal of the campaign was to defeat the reformers, but they were un
able to agree on a candidate to lead their fight.

James A. Noe an

nounced in January, 1943, that he planned to run for governor, but
his campaign failed to attract adequate support.

Noe subsequently

withdrew from the race "as a first step toward uniting Louisiana and
promoting harmony and eliminating political disunity . . ." ^
The major split within Longite ranks, however, occurred between
the New Orleans Old Regulars and the "country" Longites from North
Louisiana.

To combat the Old Regular political organization, the

upcountry Longites created the Louisiana Democratic Organization at a
conference held at the Hotel Bentley in Alexandria during February,
1943.

The LDO was also strongly anti-Sam Jones.

Longite state Sena-

*

tor A. A. Fredericks of Natchitoches remarked in the statewide radio
speech launching the LDO campaign that "the strategy of the Jones ad
ministration should be well understood.

It is like the one used by

^Morning Advocate, September 12, 1943; Town Talk, May 22, 1983.
^ Morning Advocate, January 14, September 19, 1943; Town Talk, Septem
ber 18, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 19, 1943.
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[Adolph] Hitler."

16

The LDO, however, appears to have been primarily

a political front for Earl Long's quest for the gubernatorial nomina
tion.
Even though the 1921 constitutional prohibition against two suc
cessive gubernatorial terms prevented a direct Sam Jones-Earl Long
confrontation, Long was eager to unseat the reform faction which had
turned him out of office in 1940.

He spoke at LDO meetings throughout

the state, and LDO leaders negotiated with Robert Maestri and the Old
Regulars about the gubernatorial nomination.

LDO leader A. L. Kil

patrick of Monroe reported on July 29, 1943, following such a meeting,
that neither the LDO nor the Old Regulars had selected a candidate
yet, but "It was unanimously decided that we continue our efforts as
strictly opposing the Sam Jones administration or any candidate that
he might suggest or offer."

The LDO, however, maintained that the

Longite candidate should come from outside New Orleans.

Alexandria

businessman, J. A. "Brother" Blackman, LDO chairman for the Eighth
Congressional District, remarked on August 22, that the organization
had to find a way to choose, as the Longite gubernatorial candidate,
either James A. Noe, Earl Long, or Senator Ernest Clements.
All three candidates, however, failed to develop a strong enough
base of support to claim the nomination.

Long enjoyed support from

old-line Longite state administration employees thrown out of office
TZ
Morning Advocate, April 6 , 1943; Shreveport Times, July 29, 1943;
Town Talk, August 23, 1943.
*^Morning Advocate, June 14, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 29, 1943;
Town Talk, August 23, 1943. It was not until the 1948 gubernatorial
campaign that Earl Long obtained his revenge in his stunning defeat
of Sam Jones which ended Jones' elective political career.
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by tbe reformers, and from the rural areas of the state.
mained the choice of labor leaders of Louiisiana.

Clements re

Maestri and the Old

Regulars thus held a key bloc of Longite support which each contender
hoped to add to his following. 18
Maestri, however, kept his own counsel as delegation after dele
gation of up-country Longites visited him seeking some sign of Old
Regular preference in the struggle.

Earl Long, meanwhile, in early

September, received the LDO endorsement to run for governor after
agreeing to support the organization’s anti-Jones platform, which
included planks calling for abolishing all unnecessary state depart
ments (especially the Finance Department), a twelve-month pay plan for
schoolteachers, a retirement system for teachers after thirty years’
service, an increase in old-age pensions to $30 per month, lowering
the voting age in state elections to eighteen years and calling a con
stitutional convention "to remedy ills and defects in our present
system of laws." Many of these planks, including the education and
voting age reforms, are remarkably similar to planks in the platform
Earl Long promulgated when he announced his candidacy six months be
fore in March, 1943.*^
Long gratefully accepted the LDO endorsement in his opening
statewide radio address originating from WDSU in New Orleans.

Long,

in his speech, sought to reassure the businessman who might be tempted
to vote for the reformers, noting that his experience as a lawyer,
To

Town Talk, August 24, 1943.
19
Morning Advocate, March 28, 1943; Town Talk, August 24, September 6 ,
1943.
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farmer, and livestock producer qualified him to understand the busi
nessman's point of view.

He also sought to quell immediately any

doubts about his honesty still lingering in the minds of the voters:
"I stand before you tonight as one man in our state at least who has
been investigated from top to bottom, from morning until night, from
cradle to the present time and I have yet to find any man who could
point the finger of suspicion at me for breach of the public trust."
He also dismissed Sam Jones' administration as "one of the saddest
failures in the history of Louisiana . . . [a failure] no longer
necessary to discuss," but also branded Jimmie Davis as "The Sam
Jones candidate for governor," who would "turn this state government
back to Sam Jones and his henchmen for the next four years," and
called Davis a "banjo-picking song and dance man."

20

20
Morning Advocate, September 15, 1943; Times-Picayune, September 15,
1943; States, September 15, 1943. Earl Long's most damning comment
about Jimmie Davis occurred after the campaign: "Jimmie Davis," he
said, "loves money like a hog loves slop."
The statewide radio broadcast was a standard fixture of Louisiana
politics during the 1940s, and the evidence suggests that a politician
utilizing it could reach a large audience. One survey of Louisiana’s
radio use in 1940 revealed that 307,883 of the 577,965 households in
the state (53.3 per cent) contained a radio. The study also revealed,
however, that 72.6 per cent of Louisiana urban dwellings were fur
nished with a radio. Moreover, 70.1 per cent of radio owners reported
the radio as their primary news source, while only 18.1 per cent of
them relied on newspapers as their primary news source. A politician
making a radio speech, therefore, could expect to reach many potential
voters. Edgar A. Schuler, Survey of Radio Listeners in Louisiana
(Baton Rouge, General Extension Division, Louisiana State University,
1943), pp. 9, 62, 67. Reaching those voters and convincing them to
vote for a particular candidate, however, were not always the same.
Frank T. Lewis, Jr. found no correlation between the amount of radio
time used and the number of votes received by the candidates in the
1948 gubernatorial campaign. Frank T. Lewis, Jr., "The Political Use
of Radio in the Louisiana Gubernatorial Campaign of 1947-1948" (M.A.
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1952), pp. 73-76.
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Longite ranks became further confused when United States Senator
Allen J. Ellender announced on September 15, 1943, that he was
"seriously considering" running for governor at the behest of individu
als and groups who considered him to be the only candidate capable of
uniting all factions within the Longite camp.

Ellender's consider

ations, however, included two unalterable conditions:

all other

Longite candidates would have to withdraw from the race so he could
conduct a strictly anti-Jones campaign, and he would not trade his
Senate seat for support from the Jones faction.

21

The Old Regulars welcomed a possible Ellender candidacy.

Rumors

circulating in New Orleans held that the Ring had decided to support
Ellender for governor and Ernest Clements for lieutenant governor.
But the Ellender candidacy encountered trouble on two fronts:

the

other Longites refused to withdraw from the race, and, more seriously,
William L. Donnels, editor of the Federationist, the state labor news
paper, announced at a New Orleans labor rally that organized labor was
"unalterably opposed" to Ellender.

"If the Old Regulars endorse Ellen

der," he said, "we will work for his defeat.
we’ll snow him under . . . "

If he runs for governor,

Donnels also presented labor's opposition

to Ellender at an Old Regular caucus

("labor here and now expresses

its unqualified opposition to Senator Ellender's gubernatorial aspir
ations"), and, in addition, presented a resolution passed at a New
Orleans labor rally calling on Ellender to "stay in Washington and
carry out the campaign pledges he made."

Ellender's estrangement from

21

Morning Advocate, September 16, 22, 1943; States, September 21, 1943;
Times-Picayune, September 21, 1943; Town Talk, September 21, 1943.
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organized labor apparently stemmed from his personal dislike of Con
gress of Industrial Organizations president John L. Lewis in particu
lar and other labor union heads he considered dictatorial. Moreover,
in June, 1943, Ellender also voted for the Smith-Connally (War Labor
Disputes) Act, which authorized presidential seizure of war plants on
strike, and thus further incurred the wrath of labor unions. 22
The collapse of the Ellender boomlet left Earl Long as the
strongest Longite candidate in the field.

The Old Regulars had not

dismissed Long, but negotiations among Old Regular leaders, Long and

LDO president, state Representative
left unresolved differences.

T. C. Brister of Pineville, had

Moreover, in 1943, Earl Long was not

the proven commodity he later became in Louisiana politics.

He was,

in fact, a two-time loser — once for lieutenant governor and once for
governor —

and the Old Regulars were "anxious to be with a winner,"

as one Ring leader remarked.

23

Despite their lack of confidence in him, Earl Long was too strong
for the Old Regulars to ignore completely.

On September 20, rumors

22

States, September 29, October 1, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 1,
1943; Thomas Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp. 24-27.
23

States, September 16, 21, 1943; Morning Advocate, September 21, 1943.
As George Briwar wrote to James H. Morrison: ”. . . looks like Earl
Long wants to make another try, but the City Hall boys don’t think he
can make it. [T]hey seem to think the name ’Long’ will hurt . . . "
George Briwar to James H. Morrison, April 3, 1943, James H. Morrison
Papers, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University,
Hammond, Louisiana.
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in New Orleans hinted that a newly-concluded political agreement be
tween them created a virtual "co-governorship."

The terms of the

agreement included provisions that Long would abandon his gubernatorial
candidacy in exchange for Old Regular endorsement for lieutenantgovernor on a ticket headed by Lewis Morgan of St. Tammany parish,
and in return receive control of all state jobs and state government
activities in Louisiana north of Alexandria.^
The final Longite ticket for the campaign was not completed until
October 25: Morgan for Governor, Long for Lieutenant Governor, Wade
0. Martin, Jr. for Secretary of State, Joe T. Cawthorn for Attorney
General, E. J. Bourg (treasurer of the Louisiana Federation of Labor)
for State Auditor, John B. Daigle for State Treasurer, Lucille May
Grace for Registrar of State Lands, and Harry D. Wilson for Commis
sioner of Agriculture.

The Old Regulars endorsed this ticket on

October 27, and added Lether Frazar for Superintendent of Education. 25
The new nominal leader of the Longites, Lewis Morgan, was a
sixty-seven year old St. Tammany parish native who had graduated from
Tulane University in 1901, served on the St. Tammany Parish School
Board from 1904 to 1908, served briefly in the Louisiana House of
Representatives in 1908 before resigning to accept a post as district
attorney for the 22nd District (St. Tammany and Washington parishes),
where he remained until 1912.

He served as Louisiana’s Sixth District

United States Representative from 1912 until 1917, when he retired to
24

States, September 21, 1943.

25

States, October 23, 1943; Morning Advocate, October 26, 28, 1943;
Times-Picayune, October 28, 1943.
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private law practice.

He returned to state government in 1929 as

Counsel for the Highway Commission and was also one of the attorneys
representing LSU during the 1939 Scandals investigation.

Morgan

originally announced that he would run for Attorney General in the
1943-44 campaign, but political observers speculated as early as
August, 1943, that he would make a strong gubernatorial candidate. 26
Despite the apparent unity in October, 1943, when the Longite
ticket was formed, the intra-factional dissension continued throughout
the campaign.

Morgan's age and health problems (heart trouble)

branded him as a weak, ineffective leader in the eyes of many potential
Longites.

In addition, some of Earl Long's up-country Longites voted

for their hero for lieutenant governor, but deserted Morgan in the
governor's race.

Long later maintained that the Longite ticket would

have been successful at the polls if only he had been tapped to run
for governor instead of the second spot.
While Morgan and Davis were the major candidates in the guberna
torial campaign, other candidates joined the fray.

James H. Morrison,

by then Louisiana's Sixth District United States Representative, an
nounced his candidacy in August, 1943.
colorful as his 1939-40 effort.

This campaign was not as

There was no "Convict Parade" this

time, but Morrison offered in its place "Jimmy Morrison's Victory
Parade," a pale copy that lacked the vitality and timeliness of the
original, and also included in his entourage a band similar to that
26
Town Talk, August 27, 1943; Morning Advocate, August 28, October 17,
26, 1943; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, October 17, 1943; States,
October 23-24, 1943; Times-Picayune, October 28, 1943.
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of Jimmie Davis.

Morrison’s rhetoric, however, was as sharp as ever:

Just as the American people have shown that they
will not obey or bow to the will of any dictator,
the people of Louisiana feel likewise. No man
[who seeks] to be crammed down their throats by
Tojo, Mussolini, Hitler, Sam Jones, or any other
dictator, foreign or domestic, can expect any
thing but defeat.
Louisianians, Morrison thought, wanted no part of either a continu
ation of Jones’ brand of reform or a return to Longite control, but
instead wanted "new blood, youth, aggressiveness, and ability to get
the job done." Morrison campaigned against both the Jones and Longite
factions, but after his elimination in the first primary, he endorsed
Morgan in the second primary. 27
Shreveport Mayor Sam S. Caldwell also ran for governor in the
1943-44 campaign.

Caldwell, a fifty-year-old native of Mooringsport

then serving his third term as Shreveport mayor, centered his campaign
on his promises to "return home rule to every parish and to every city
in the state," freeing them "from domination from Baton Rouge," just
as "our state must be freed from fundamental control from Washington."
Caldwell also maintained that he wanted to bring all political fac
tions together, even though Earl Long called him a "trial balloon for
Sam Jones."

(Caldwell’s reply:

"I have no time to waste on dead

politicians nor ammunition to waste on chattering sparrows.")

Cald

well eventually formed a ticket with state Senator Frank B. Ellis, who
27
Morning Advocate, April 29, August 15, December 7, 1943; TimesPicayune New Orleans States, October 22, 1943; James H. Morrison
interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, May 18, 1982.
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had originally announced to run for governor, but withdrew to join
Caldwell's ticket as the candidate for lieutenant governor.

28

In addition to Morgan, Davis, Morrison, and Caldwell, four other
gubernatorial candidates appeared on the ballot in the first Demo
cratic primary in January, 1944:

state Senators Ernest Clements and

Dudley LeBlanc, Opelousas lawyer Vincent Moseley, and editor of the
Amite News Digest, Lee Lanier.

The minor candidates spent most of

their time attempting to convince the Louisiana electorate that they
were serious candidates.

Lanier, LeBlanc, and Moseley campaigned

against both Davis and Morgan as independent reformers.

As Moseley

asked in a speech to the women of Louisiana, "Must you swoon to a
'Sinatra' hillbilly [singer], or, in the alternative, be taken over by
the 'Wheelchair' Morgan crowd?" Moseley promised an administration
"that will end factionalism and vindictiveness . . . " but his most
novel political idea in this campaign was endorsement of Lewis Morgan
and Davis' candidate for lieutenant governor, J. Emile Verret in the
second primary.

Moseley encouraged voters to "split the two machine
29
tickets wide open and let Earl Long die a natural political death."
The actual campaigning for governor did not begin until October,
23

Shreveport Times, July 29, August 1, October 26, 1943; Morning
Advocate, July 29-30, August 1, 1943; States, October 25, 194329
Times-Picayune, September 23, October 22, December 16, 1943, Janu
ary 5, 1944; Shreveport Times, September 23, 1943, January 16, 1944;
Morning Advocate, October 30, December 22, 1943, January 16, 1944.
Rev. John L. Williams, a Methodist clergyman and superintendent of
the Louisiana Child Finding and Home Society, J. C. Feldman, president
of the Louisiana Cooperative Poultry Association, and State Treasurer
A. P. Tugwell announced their gubernatorial candidacies, but withdrew
from the race before the first primary.
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1943.

Sam Caldwell began his campaign on September 30 with a speech

in which he promised a strong state system of public health, state
aid to farmers, state aid to provide education and employment to re
turning servicemen, conservation of Louisiana's water resources, and
twelve-month pay for the state's public school teachers.

30

Jimmie Davis opened his campaign two weeks later, October 13,
with a state-wide radio address in which he said that "Until the
[world] war is won, there can be no other vital issue," but he also
outlined his plans for the future of Louisiana.

Davis proposed a new

state project to bring Louisiana's marginal farmland into food produc
tion but also called for increased industrialization to ease Louisi
ana's economic dependence on agriculture.
the war-built industries.
alone.

"We must," he said, "hold

But we must not be content with these

We must stop the flow of our raw materials and learn to con

vert them to the finished product here at home." Davis also in this
speech reiterated his independence ("I am running on the ticket of
Jimmie Davis strictly and Jimmie Davis alone . .

promised to

conduct a "positive" campaign without saying anything derogatory
about his opponents, and closed his speech with a rendition of "You
Are My Sunshine," a practice which became a standard feature of Davis'
campaign appearances. 31
Davis also broadened the appeal of his campaign during October
when he and Sam Jones persuaded Iberia parish insurance agent J. Emile
30
Morning Advocate, October 1, 1943.
^ Town Talk, October 15, 1943; Shreveport Times, October 15, 1943;
Morning Advocate, October 15, 1943.
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Verret to join his ticket as the candidate for lieutenant governor.
Davis, recognizing the weakness of his appeal as an unabashed North
Louisiana Protestant in Catholic South Louisiana, sought a running
mate from South Louisiana. 32 Verret undoubtedly increased Davis’
South Louisiana popularity.

He was born on a farm at Loreauville,

fifteen miles north of New Iberia on September 13, 1886, and graduated
from Southwestern Louisiana Institute (now the University of South
western Louisiana) in 1905.

He worked as an assistant overseer and

store clerk on Morbihan Plantation, invested in sugar cane land and a
sugar mill, and in 1927 entered the insurance business.

He gained

his political experience on the Iberia Parish School Board to which
he was elected in 1912.

He became president of the parish school board

in 1914 and held the post until 1944.

In addition, he was president

of the Louisiana School Boards Association in 1942, and thus had a
network of political contacts throughout the state.

33

32"Speech Delivered by Governor James H. Davis, Rotary Banquet Held
June 6 , 1945," transcript; "Address" (n.d., 1943), transcript copy;
"Biography of J. Emile Verret, Candidate for Lieutenant-Governor on
the Sam Jones Ticket," (n.d., 1948), J. Emile Verret Papers, Archives
and Manuscripts Collection, Dupre Library, University of Southwestern
Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Verret Collec
tion) . Davis in this instance followed the example of Governor Sam
Jones. Even though Jones was a native of Beauregard parish, which is
geographically but not culturally in South Louisiana, he chose Lafay
ette physician Marc Mouton as his running mate in 1939 to bolster his
campaign in the French areas of the state, then retained Verret in
the same role in his unsuccessful 1948 campaign.
33"Biography of J. Emile Verret, Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana,
1944-1948," typescript copy, Verret Collection; Shreveport Times,
October 30, 1943; Times-Picayune, January 26, 1944.
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Following the completion of his bob-tailed ticket in late October,34 Davis spent November spreading his "You Are My Sunshine" phil
osophy in a campaign that was part political rally and part North
Louisiana tent revival.

He called for less state government inter

ference with local governments and pledged a comprehensive program to
conserve the state's exhaustible natural resources (especially natural
gas). This program was a favorite of Sam Jones, who envisioned a
vast industrial boom in post-war Louisiana, fueled by cheap natural
gas. Davis also promised to provide college programs or trade school
training to returning war veterans, wholeheartedly endorsed Civil
Service (it "should not be tampered with"), and adopted Sam Jones'
calls to develop Louisiana as the "air terminal of the two Americas."

35

In his role as peacemaker, Davis acknowledged that Louisianians
appreciated improvements in the state, whether they were in the form
of clean government or of increased benefits from the state govern
ment, no matter whose administration had instituted the benefits.

He

therefore incorporated some of the old Longite measures into his cam
paign: more adequate old age pensions, increased services for the
poor and dependent, and construction of a preventive medicine program.
He couched the last suggestion in terms'of saving the state money.

It

cost the state less, he said, to keep a poor person well than to treat

3^The four original members of Davis’ ticket were Davis,Verret, Fred
LeBlanc of Baton Rouge for Attorney General, and James Gremillion of
Crowley for Secretary of State. In the second primary campaign, Davis
added incumbents John E. Coxe for Superintendent of Education, and A.
P. Tugwell for State Treasurer.
Times-Picayune, November 3, 15, 18, 1943; Morning Advocate, November
16, 18, 28, 1943; Town Talk, November 17, 1943.
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an illness.

Even as he promised state benefits, however, he acknowl

edged that scarcity of goods and manpower caused by the war neces
sarily limited the services he expected his administration to provide.
I could "promise you the moon with a fence around it," he told a
Sunset audience, but "I wouldn’t do that . . . because my policy on

36
promises has always been ’if you can’t fulfill them, don’t make them.’"
Davis also cast his campaign as a crusade.

He wanted, he said,

to make the governor and the citizens of the state into "good friends."
When asked why his band appeared with him on the political stage,
Davis replied; "We always found [at Beech Springs] that people who
liked to gather around the organ or music box and sing [were good
friends] and that’s what the people of Louisiana want to be with their
governor —

good friends."

are friendly and happy.

He repeated many times that "Our meetings

We are trying to spread sunshine and good

will as we go along . . . "

Davis reached the height of the religious

overtones in his campaign in a speech at St. Martinville:
I think we should have more music and song and
less fighting. When people are singing they
are not fighting. X take this attitude about
my so-called 'corn fed’ music — down this life's
pathway, which way I'll go but once — if some
where down the road we can make someone’s burden
a little lighter and scatter some sunshine along
the way, I’m only glad I've had the opportunity
to do s o . 3 7

36
Town Talk, November 17, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 19, 29,
1943.
37Morning Advocate, November 20, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 10,
1943.
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While Jimmie Davis administered his soothing homilies to the
voters, Lewis Morgan spent November combatting rumors about his ill
health and attempting to heal the bitterness caused by the bruising
fight for the Longite nomination.

He opened the Longite campaign on

November 3 with a Baton Rouge speech in which he promised a "sane and
economical" administration, no use of state power to harass individu
als, and freedom of parishes from state control.

Morgan was almost

immediately removed from active campaigning, however, by serious in
juries incurred when a gas heater exploded in his Covington home.
In his stead, the Longite ticket embarked on a campaign tour of the

„ . 38
state.
At early rallies on this tour, Earl Long tackled the question
uppermost in the minds of many Longites: why had he abandoned his
quest for the governorship?

Long answered that he agreed to run on

the Morgan ticket in the interest of "harmony and unity" and added,
"I would run for dog catcher on any ticket that would end the regime
of Sam Jones and his crowd."39
James A. Noe's appearance at Longite campaign rallies in Monroe
and West Monroe sparked a revival of reform interest in the Scandal
era.

The New Orleans States editorially recounted the charges and

countercharges hurled between Earl Long and Noe during the 1939-40
campaign, and asked, "If Earl Long is what Jimmy Noe said he was, why
does Mr. Noe support him?

If Mr. Noe is the kind of character Earl

Og

Morning Advocate, November 4, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 8 , 1943.
39Times-Picayune, November 8 , 1943.
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said he was, why does he accept his support?" An even more relevant
question, the States mused, is "Why Mr. Morgan as head of the Maestri
ticket accepts the support of either of them."40
United States Senator John Overton partially answered this last
question early in 1944 when he charged that he had been "stabbed in
the back" by his Longite friends.

According to Overton, Noe had

abandoned his 1943-44 gubernatorial candidacy and agreed to support
the Morgan-Long ticket in exchange for his protege, Joe Cawthom's,
place on the ticket and promises by Long and the Old Regulars to un
seat Overton and support Noe in the fall, 1944, United States Senate
race.

The breach between Overton and the other Longites was healed

before the second Democratic primary and caused only a minor stir in
the campaign, but it revealed the most probable cause for Noe's withdrawal of his candidacy.

41

Rumor about Lewis Morgan's ill health caused concern among some
Longites, and Morgan sought to allay those fears.

He returned to

active campaigning on November 11, declaring that his health was good,
that he was able to serve "every single moment of a four year term,"
and that he was not merely a "stalking horse" for Earl Long:

he had

no intention of resigning the governorship and turning the office
over to anyone else.

Any attempt to do so, he said, would be

40
States, November 9, 1943.
^ Morning Advocate, January 6 , February 16, 1944. The Shreveport
Times (January 6 , 1944) commented that "If greater infamy could be
added to such stabbing in the back, it would be added by the further
fact that the Win or Lose Oil Company Jimmie Noe was to be the bene
ficiary."
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"infamous." “ He reiterated his theme in a speech broadcast on both
WNOE and WDSU radio stations:
Knowledge, experience, and sound judgment
are qualities which can be acquired only
through the passing of years.
■Where youth brings to a cause fire and en
thusiasm, maturity brings wisdom and courage . . .
Two days later, he asked in another radio speech, "Since when must a
man defend his ability to continue to serve the people of his state
because he is in his sixties? When, before, has maturity . . . been
a matter which one must attempt to excuse, to vindicate, to live
down?"^

Morgan unveiled his platform on November 27 in a New Orleans
speech.

He made an obligatory attack on Sam Jones:

"Sound economy

means that no state administration . . . should neglect roads, schools
or hospitals to glorify a surplus . . . " and revealed an ambitious,
typically Longite platform of public services.

Morgan's program in

cluded (for health care) well-equipped trailers to provide free
dental care, free ambulance service in each parish, traveling tubercu
losis X-ray clinics, and an improved system of charity hospitals;
(for education) additional work scholarships for students, a trade
school in every parish, and increased pay for school bus drivers and
teachers; (for roads) rebuilding of farm to market roads, and widening
existing main highways; (and in general) hiring Louisiana people for
42
43

Shreveport Times, November 12, 1943; States, November 12, 1943.
States, November 26, 1943; Morning Advocate, November 28, 1943.
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state jobs, lending every effort toward winning the war, reclaiming
waste land, replenishing streams regularly with fish, teaching re
forestation in high schools and colleges, "favoring" Civil Service,
and providing $30 monthly old age pension checks. 44
Sam Caldwell opened his campaign in his Shreveport stronghold and
called for adoption of a "Louisiana Charter," based loosely on the
Atlantic Charter.

The Louisiana Charter, he said, would include

"Freedom from graft and corruption, political bosses, from those who
could exploit our state for selfish gain, from inefficiency, waste,
extravagance, punitive and vindictive legislation, bigotry, intoler
ance, bureaucrats, and dictators or control from whatever souce it
may come.”45

Caldwell also received several important endorsements

during November:

the Shreveport Times and both Monroe newspapers, the

Monroe Morning World and the Monroe News-Star, endorsed him, as did
the American Democratic Association (despite its name, it was a state
organization), which rescinded its original endorsement of Jimmie
Davis because of his supposed involvement with Prescott Foster.
James H. Morrison's early campaign focused on two themes:

46
estab

lishing himself as the only true "Huey Long man" in the race, and
protecting himself from charges that he misused his Congressional
office in his campaign for governor. Morrison declared that Lewis
44Times-Picayune, November 28, 1943.
^ Shreveport Times, November 5, .1943; States, November 5, 1943; TimesPicayune , November 5, 1943.
^ Shreveport Times, November 7, 28, 1943; Times-Picayune, November 11,
1943; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 183-184.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2 13

Morgan was really seventy-one years old instead of sixty—seven, as
Morgan and the Old Regulars claimed, and that "I [Morrison] used to
help him on all his harder court cases.

Whenever he made a 15 minute

speech, he had to go home and go to bed the next day." Morrison told
an Abbeville audience that "You can't fight the Sam Jones faction with
Davis [because of his ties to it], or with Morgan [because he is too
infirm], but you can do it if you elect me." Morrison continued to
draw the Morrison/Long parallel:

"The only way you can get something

for the people is to fight for it, just like Huey Long fought to get
you roads, free school books, school busses, homestead exemption, and
free hospitals."

Elect me, he said, because "It is my hope to fight

the battle for the people, just as Huey did . . . "

47

Morrison had to fight charges of his own political impropriety
because of a series of letters he inserted in the Congressional
Record, then mailed to Louisiana voters using his Congressional frank.
The series included two general letters, one concerning, the military
situation ("I have supported President Roosevelt and the armed forces
on every war measure"), the other recounting the "thousands" of mis
takes in family allotment checks received from servicemen, mistakes
he helped to correct and also cases in which he tried to help worried
family members locate a missing or wounded serviceman.

He also in

serted letters directed to "Dear Pellow Elected Officials," and "Dear
School Bus Driver," as well as his response to a letter of inquiry
(obviously contrived) from Alfred Bateman, Manager of the Ascension

^ Morning Advocate, November 20, 1943; States, November 22, 1943;
Shreveport Times, November 28, 1943.
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Farmers’ Cooperative Association, in which Morrison detailed forty
ways in which he had helped his district or the state.48 United
States Postal officials investigated whether Morrison’s action could
be considered improper and announced before the first primary that he
was entirely within his rights as a Congressman to insert material in
the Congressional Record and then frank it to his state.

Morrison,

they added, used his own funds to pay the duplication costs for the
copies mailed to Louisiana.

49

Even though he was cleared of any im

proper behavior in the episode, the investigation provided an aura of
questionable ethics which Morrison’s opponents exploited.
State Senator Ernest S. Clements was the only other candidate to
draw statewide attention in the opening phase of the campaign.

Clem

ents attempted to establish himself as the only truly independent
candidate in the race.
picked" candidates.

Morgan and Davis, he said, were both "hand

"Elect me governor of Louisiana," he told a home

town Oberlin audience, "and show the Maestri and Jones gangs in New
Orleans that the people in the country don't want them to hand-pick
48
Congressional Record, 78 Congress 2 Session Appendix, Volume 90 Part
10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1944),
pp. A3267, A3348-A3349, A3598; Times-Picayune, November 18, 1943.
Morrison did help a number of servicemen's dependents who had trouble
either receiving their allotment check or hearing from their loved
one. His papers still contain copies of hundreds, if not thousands,
of letters he wrote to federal government agencies on behalf of his
constituents who experienced these problems during the war years.
Just prior to the first Democratic primary, Morrison admitted using
his frank to mail the letters and commented that instead of condemning
him, the federal investiators congratulated him on keeping "the folks
back home" informed on current events. Times-Picayune, January 18,
1944.
49
States, December 31, 1943; James H. Morrison interviewed by Jerry
Purvis Sanson, May 13, 1982.
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candidates and cram them down your throats."

Clements also reminded

Louisianians that he had stood alone in his fight against the Crime
Commission, Reorganization Act, and the sales tax.

He unveiled a

decidedly rural Longite platform calling for extensions of mail and
school bus routes, restocking lakes and woods with wildlife, protec
tion of trappers and fishermen, as well as old age pensions and
"rehabilitation" of needy World War II veterans.^
The candidates continued their campaigns during December, 1943.
Sam Caldwell and Frank Ellis spent the month attempting to convince
voters that they were the only independent candidates in the race.

On

December 1, Caldwell's most influential backer, the Shreveport Times,
blasted both the Prescott Foster-Jimmie Davis and Maestri-Morgan-Earl
Long political machines for a recent "whispering campaign" which held
that "Sam Caldwell is the best candidate in the governor's race, but
he can't be elected without a machine."

Instead, the Shreveport Times

maintained, Caldwell will be elected because he has no political
machine behind him.^*
Caldwell repeatedly returned to this theme during the month.
"The day of the political bosses in Louisiana is at an end," he said
on December 3, "whether the machine that supports a candidate be in
New Orleans or Baton Rouge, the voters of the state . . . resent this
organized attempt to force a candidate down their throats." Or, as
he said more simply in a later speech stressing his own independence:

^States, November 15, 25, 1943; Tnmes-Picayune, November 15, 1943.
Shreveport Times, December 1, 1943.
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"I have no strings tied to me."52
Caldwell also charged that Prescott Foster had first attempted
to run State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell for governor.

The Tugwell

candidacy, however, disintegrated when Tugwell’s questionable associ
ation with businessman William T. Burton was revealed at Burton's
tax evasion trial.

Foster then endorsed Davis, Caldwell said, "whom

he had guffawed at before."53
In a series of North Louisiana speeches during the first half of
December, Caldwell also attacked Jimmie Davis because Davis' singing
career added nothing to. his political experience:

"Do the people of

Louisiana want to become the laughing stock of other states?" he
asked a Lake Providence audience.

"If so, all they must do is to

elect a crooner of sweet nothings to the highest and most dignified
office within their gift." Or, as he said more pointedly in an Oak
Ridge speech, "If we must have an entertainer to lead us in these
[perilous times], then let's send to Hollywood and get a good one. I
52
Ibid., December 9, 11-12, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 4, 1943.
53Shreveport Times, December 12, 1943. Tugwell testified during
Burton's trial that Burton had given him $5,000 in 1936 to speed up
payment due Burton for shells, dredging, towing, barge rentals, and
other services he provided the Louisiana Highway Commission because
Burton was afraid that incoming governor Richard Leche thought that
a recent $15,000 business payment from Burton to James A. Noe was a
political contribution and would therefore withhold or delay the
$84,000 payment in retaliation. While Tugwell’s acceptance of the
$5,000 payment may not have been technically illegal (he provided,
after all, only his normal service in paying the legitimate $84,000
debt), it was unethical, and it ended his brief boomlet for governor
in 1943. Shreveport Times, July 21, 1943.
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believe Mickey Rooney is available."54
Jimmie Davis began December pleasantly with the endorsement of
the Times-Picayune-New Orleans States in an editorial that recounted
the fight for reform four years earlier, as a result of which "we have
had clean, efficient, scandal-free government," and urged Davis’ elec
tion "because we are convinced he will give Louisiana the honorable,
constructive administration every good citizen wants . . through the
four years ahead.
Davis maintained his relaxed campaign style developed during the
previous month.

An appearance in his hometown of Shreveport, for

example, included his brief recapitulation of his life, general sug
gestions for various improvements needed in the state, a comment that
if the constantly warring peoples of Europe would "gather ’round (sic)
the organ, take the old fiddle down from the fireplace and sing a
while, there would be less trouble in the world," followed by a music
program during which Davis interspersed political comment between
songs.

He sang "Live and Let Live" ("Live and let live.

Don't break

may heart . . .") and remarked that the attitude suggested by the
lyrics "would be a good policy for any governor.
Jimmie Davis and Emile Verret also further defined the reform

^Shreveport Times, December 9, 1943; Morning Advocate, December 11,
1943.
~*~*Times-Picyaune New Orleans States, December 5, 1943. The other
major New Orleans newspapers also endorsed Davis, the States on Decem
ber 24, 1943 in an action separate from the Times-Picayune New Orleans
States endorsement, and the Item on January 8, 1944.
^Shreveport Times, December 15, 1943.
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platform during December.

Davis in a speech at Clarks publicly

endorsed a $30 minimum old-age pension, vocational education, and in
creased services for the poor.

Verret, meanwhile, reiterated the

general provisions of the platform:

ridding the state of bifactional

hate and preserving the positive achievements of past administrations.
Both candidates promised continued economic development in Louisiana
after the war.

Davis told an Alexandria audience that servicemen

from all forty-eight states had received military training in Louisi
ana, and he hoped that many would return after the war to become
permanent residents.

Verret noted that "with our reserve of resources,

we can attain as great a prosperity in time of peace.,as we attained
during the war . . . built upon firm, enduring foundations not subject
to curtailment of any Armistice day." Davis in a Mangham speech
stressed his belief that Louisiana should reduce its exports of natural
gas in order to conserve its natural resources for an attempt to be
come one of the great industrial centers of the south following the
war.

57
Davis’ campaign received a small boost during the last days of

December when Theodore Hotard, president of the Orleans parish school
board, and Samuel J. Boylan, tax assessor for the fifth municipal dis
trict (Algiers), both members of the Old Regular faction, bolted from
the Morgan-Long ticket ("a set of candidates who were repudiated at
the polls four years ago," they termed the Longites) in order to

^ Morning Advocate, December 17, 1943; Times—Picayune New Orleans
States, December 19, 1943; Times-Picayune, December 23, 1943; Verret
Address (n.d., 1943?), Verret Address (December 3, 1943), Verret
Collection.
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support Davis.

The Times-Picayune editorially applauded Hotard and

Boylan for their farsightedness.

The newspaper also took full advan

tage of the opportunity to remind the voters of the Scandals and
called the Old Regular endorsement of Morgan and Long "a flat defi—
ance of the public will and the public interest."58
Jimmie Davis also suffered sharp criticism during December.

The

Shreveport Times attacked "Absentee Ace" Davis for his excessive ab
sence from Shreveport city commission council meetings when he was
Commissioner of Public Safety:

". . . he didn’t have much time at

home those days," the newspaper noted, "what with going east to make
juke box records, eyeing Hollywood, and keeping the old hill-billy
band tuned up for ’come election time.’"59
The sharpest criticism of Davis, however, came from Sam Caldwell,
who charged that the speeches attributed to Davis in newspapers were
"but figments of the imagination of his roving press agent."

Caldwell

commented that one of his friends attended a Davis rally during which
Davis acted as master of ceremonies, sang, and mumbled a few "inaud
ible" words.

Caldwell's friend was surprised to read in the next

day's newspapers that Davis had "discussed reforestation and the lum-

* 60
ber industry in the manner of an expert."
Caldwell’s ally, the Shreveport Times, immediately took up his
theme.

The newspaper on December 17 editorially charged that Davis'

Times-Picayune Hew Orleans States, December 26, 1943; Times-Picayune.
December 27, 1943.
59 Shreveport Times, December 8, 1943.
^Morning Advocate, December 10, 1943.
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press agents filed reports that Davis made wide-ranging erudite
speeches on various subjects, when, in fact, he had not done so.

The

Shreveport Times also revealed that the situation had arisen because
of the wartime shortages of gasoline, tires, and manpower. Major news
papers which normally assigned a reporter to travel with each major
candidate in a gubernatorial campaign and file reports did not do so
this time because of the shortages, but instead relied on reports
wired in from each candidate.

Later in the month, the Shreveport Times

reported that because of its revelation of the fraudulent speeches,
the Associated Press would no longer quote Davis directly in its dis
patches, but instead only noted that his press agent quoted him as
saying something.^
In fact, the charges that Davis or his agents reported more com
plete and meaty speeches than he actually made appears to have been
more than mere campaign rhetoric.

During the 1947-48 gubernatorial

campaign, for example, Dave McGuire reported to candidate Sam Jones
that the Times-Picayune refused to take road quotes from candidates
"because they were badly burned by phony reporting during the 1944
T
,
*
Davis

*
campaign
...

«6 2

The Lewis Morgan/Earl Long ticket exhibited a rare unity during
December.

Morgan in a speech at 011a on December 1 pledged to rebuild

the state highway system, provide $30 per month old age pensions to

^ Shreveport Times, December 17, 29, 1943.
62

Dave McGuire to Sam Jones, October 22, 1947, DeLesseps Story Morrison
Papers, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library,
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as D.
Morrison Collection).
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every needy person above sixty years of age, and admission to chari
table health institutions by presenting a certificate of medical need
from a practicing physician.

Then on December 6 , he also pledged full
go
support to both New Orleans and state Civil Service systems.
Morgan also attacked the reformers by attacking Sam Jones.

In a

speech at Columbia, he attacked the surplus generated by the sales
tax but not used—

". . . no administration . . .should neglect our

roads, our schools, our hospitals to glorify a surplus and to cast
upon the succeeding administration the burden not only of its current
expenses but the additional burden of repairing and replacing the
normal wear and tear which occurred during the proceeding four years."
Morgan and his running mate also charged that the reformers were using
the state governmental apparatus to coerce voters by ordering state
officials to "put Davis over if you want to hold your jobs."^
Earl Long appeared with Morgan at various political rallies
throughout the month and joined his attacks on the reformers:

he

asked the voters to defeat the "Jones-Davis do-nothing ticket" and
return liberal government to the state; he charged that Davis in fact
had a contract which provided that he would appear in Hollywood
several months of each year and called on Davis to tell the people if
they would have a full-time or a part-time governor if they voted him
into office; he joined in the charges that Davis did not deliver the
speeches attributed to him and added that, moreover, Sam Jones’

Morning Advocate, December 2, 7, 12, 194364

Ibid., December 11, 1943; Shreveport Times, December 12, 1943.
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publicity agents wrote Davis’ speeches.^
New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri joined the Longite campaign
against Davis by speaking at Morgan-Long rallies in New Orleans and
Algiers, where he commanded some political support and would not stir
up resentment from angry rural voters.

Maestri reminded his audiences

that some of the legislation the reformers claimed was in fact passed
with the help of legislators supported and elected by the Old Regu-

,

lars. 66
The other candidates and their allies, meanwhile, struck at Mor
gan.

Jimmie Morrison stressed that Morgan, "a fine old gentleman,"

was nevertheless ”71 years old with a weak heart and in bad health."
The Shreveport Times charged that Morgan’s pledge to build a vocation
al school in every parish was merely a ploy to provide building con
tracts to his friends.

The Times-Picayune, however, struck hardest

at Morgan in an editorial intimating that even though "so far as we
know, he was not personally involved" in the Louisiana Scandals, Morgan
had served in the Longite administrations guilty of looting the state,
and was thus guilty by association:

"he continued to occupy a luxuri

ous rumble seat on the state machine until Louisiana voters junked
it . . ."67
^ Morning Advocate, December 2, 5, 11, 12, 1943; Shreveport Times,
December 12, 22, 1943.
66

Item, December 13, 1943; States, December 23, 1943. Even though he
confined his campaign appearances to his New Orleans base, Maestri had
to defend himself against charges that he was attempting to establish
himself as dictator by endorsing Morgan. See Times-Picayune, January
13, 1944.
^Shreveport Times, December 15, 17, 1943; Times-Picayune, December 18,
1943.
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The candidates continued their campaigns until the date of the
first Democratic primary, in January of 1944, on the same issues.
Jimmie Davis maintained his "sunshine" campaign:

"we must elect to

office men who have no hatred in their hearts and whose records prove
that they have the interests of the masses of the people at heart,"
and stressed his independence ("the man doesn't live who will tell me
what to do in politics").

Earl Long, however, harbored no doubts

about Davis' supposed independence.

As he told an audience at Rayne,

"Any one with a thimble full of sense would know that Jimmie Davis
has the full blessing of the Jones group . . . "

Long also attempted

to throw Huey’s mantle over the Morgan-Long ticket:

"Don't lose all

the benefits that my brother Huey worked his life out to give you."68
The lack of substantive issues in the 1943-44 gubernatorial cam
paign is revealed in a minor smear attempt which developed after
Shirley Wimberly, president of the American,Democratic Association in
New Orleans, called on Jimmie Davis to defend himself against whis
pered rumors that he had written and recorded songs with serial
numbers 60836AB and 60837AB on the Decca Records label, namely "Bed
Bug Blues" and "High Geared Mama."

"To say that these songs are

suggestive, indecent, and vile," Wimberly judged, "would be a decided
understatement.

They were obviously designed for the entertainment of

the denizens of the lowest dives and dens of inequity." The East
Baton Rouge Morgan Committee added that not only had Davis recorded
those two songs, he had also written and performed other equally

Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 2, 1944.
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questionable tunes entitled "High Geared Daddy," Honkey-Tonk Blues,"
"Mama's Getting Hot," "Papa's Getting Cold," and "Shirt Tail Blues."
A political advertisement the committee placed in the Morning Advocate
maintained that the words to these songs were "unprintable, but suf
fice it to say that they glorify the 'Bottom' or red light district
in Shreveport which ran wide open while Jimmie Davis was Commissioner
of Public Safety.
Jimmie Morrison joined in the attack on Davis, who, he said, "has
no political record that can be seen [but does have] several obscene
records that no decent people would like to hear." Both Morrison
and the Longites, however, found it difficult to label as "obscene"
a man who had so successfully cultivated the image of "sunshine, peace,
and harmony" as had Jimmie Davis.

When they attempted to stigmatize

Davis as crude and indecent, Morrison and Long were themselves force
fully rebuffed.

When Morrison, for example, played "Red Nightgown

Blues," another of Davis' risque records, at a Shreveport rally, the
audience began dancing!

Morrison became enraged, broke the record,

and exclaimed "Elect him if you want him." Earl Long, faring no
better, played "Bed Bug Blues" for a group of ministers, expecting to
hear comments of shock and outrage, but instead, heard a thankful ex
pression that even though Davis "used to be on the wrong side of the
fence . . . now he's seen the light!

Thank the Lord!"

70

^Morning Advocate, January 16, 1944; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp.
68-69; Gary Mills and Grady McWhiney, "Jimmie Davis As A Figure of
Continuity in Country Music," paper presented to the Louisiana Histori
cal Association Annual Convention, March 25, 1983.
^Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp. 68-69.
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Despite these charges, the Jones administration swung more openly
behind Davis' candidacy during the week before the first Democratic
primary.

On January 11, Lieutenant-Governor Marc Mouton announced

from his sickbed that he realized that he was fighting a losing battle
for his life and that he therefore had nothing to lose by speaking out
on the race.

He recalled the "days of political plunder and shame and

disgrace," and pled with voters to elect Jimmie Davis in order to keep
Louisiana from returning to those bad days.^*
Sam Jones, in his election-eve broadcast, still declined to en
dorse Davis by name, but he also reminded his audience of Louisiana's
sordid political past:
It is easy to forget some of the things of the
past. It is easy to forget the fraud, the cor
ruption, the abuses, the crimes, and the suicides.
The wholesale thievery and the rest are easily
forgotten, but let me remind you that a man you
once honored as governor of this state paid his
visit to the Atlanta penitentiary.
Despite Jones' refusal to endorse Davis, his remarks clearly indicated
that he preferred a reformer to follow him:

". . . every single gain

you the people have made over these years can be wiped out in a period
of five months after the next governor takes office,” he advised his
audience, "and I tell you that at least some of the candidates for the
72
office would like to do that very thing."

^*Times-Picayune, January 12, 1944; Morning Advocate, January 12, 1944.
Mouton died on August 21, 1944.
7?

"Times-Picayune, January 18, 1944; Shreveport Times, January 18, 1944.
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Perry H. Howard maintains that the 1943-44 election was the first
of a "new competitive Louisiana politics" in which first Democratic
primaries became "sorting out contests as increasingly more candidates . . . vied for a position in the runoff."73 While Howard’s
observation is accurate, the 1943-44 election, even though it marked
a new evolution of Louisiana politics, also remained firmly in the
bifactional tradition of recent Louisiana politics.

The two leading

candidates in the first primary were Jimmie Davis (34.9 per cent of
the vote), and Lewis Morgan (27.5 per cent).

The Longites and the

established reformers left both the independent Longites and the in
dependent reformers in the dust.

Davis received 167,343 votes and

scored a plurality in 34 parishes, while Morgan received 131,682
votes and achieved a plurality in 11 parishes. 74
Even though the

reformers took comfort in Davis' lead over Mor

gan, the first primary returns revealed that they also had cause for
concern.

The combined "Longite" votes (Morgan+Morrison+Clements+

LeBlanc) was 56.1 per cent of the total, while the combined "reform"
vote (Davis+Caldwell+Lanier+Moseley) was only 43.9 per cent of the
total.

Moreover, reformers had trailed badly in several of the races

for lesser state offices.

Verret trailed Long in the lieutenant-

governor's race by 128,232 votes to Long's 194,155; Gremillion trailed
Martin in the secretary of state race; LeBlanc trailed Cawthom in
the attorney general

race; Coxe trailed Frazar in thesuperintendent

73
Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed., 1971), p. 269.
74

Ibid., p. 270; Item, January 26, 1944.
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of education race; and Registrar of State Lands Lucille May Grace and
Commissioner of Agriculture Harry D. Wilson won re-election to their
offices.^

These results showed that the taxpayer suits and legisla

tive opposition to Sam Jones’ program had not been the dying gasp of
a beaten faction.

Instead, Longism, discredited and battered four

years before, had bounded back marvelously.

Reform forces still

faced a stiff battle to preserve their control of the government.
The two candidates remaining in the gubernatorial race after the
first primary immediately began collecting endorsements for their
second primary efforts.

Ernest Clements endorsed Lewis Morgan on

January 20, as did Lee Lanier on January 25, Vincent Moseley on Jan
uary 30 (Moseley announced his endorsemment of a split ticket of
Morgan and Emile Verret for lieutenant-governor), and Jimmie Morrison
on February 18. 76

Sam Caldwell congratulated both Morgan and Davis

for their success in the first Democratic primary but announced his
neutrality in the second primary, as did the Ewing newspapers in
North Louisiana (the Shreveport Times, the Monroe Morning World, and
Monroe News-Star), which had formed his bedrock support.^

Jimmie

Davis received the endorsement only of Dudley LeBlanc among the unsuccessful gubernatorial aspirants. 78

^Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 270; Item, January 26,
1944.
^ Times-Picayune, January 21, 26, 31, 1944; Item, February 19, 1944;
Morning Advocate, February 19, 1944.
^Shreveport Times, January 22, 1944; Morning Advocate, January 22,
1944.
78Item, January 29, 1944; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January
30, 1944.
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In addition to the scramble for support from unsuccessful guber
natorial candidates, Morgan and Davis also sought help from candi
dates for lesser state offices.

On January 26, James A. Gremillion,

the incumbent secretary of state for whom the reformers had fought
so hard against Earl Long's backdoor attempt to stay in public office
in 1940, withdrew from his second primary re-election campaign,
leaving his Longite opponent, Wade 0. Martin, Jr., as the Democratic
nominee. 79 Attorney General candidate Joe Cawthorn reaffirmed his
steadfast support for the entire Morgan-Long ticket, and the Long
machine promised its continued support of him. SO

Jimmie Davis, mean

while, received endorsements from incumbent Superintendent of Edu
cation John E. Coxe, and incumbent Treasurer Andrew P. Tugwell, and
added them to his ticket. 81
No new issues emerged in the second primary campaign. Morgan
continued to attack the reform administration of Sam Jones:

"Never

will you find Lewis Morgan using the power of his office to oppress
people by threatening to close the largest state hospital in Louisiana
as a means of gaining political legislation, such as was done by the
present administration in 1942." Morgan also charged that Jones was
70

Times-Picayune, January 27, 1944; Item, January 27, 1944. In re
sponse to Gremillion's defection, Davis’ campaign manager, W. H.
Talbot, referred vaguely to "a huge slush fund” the Longites were ex
ploiting to regain control of the state and its natural resources.
80Morning Advocate, January 29, 1944; Henry D. Larcade, Jr. to Joseph
T. Cawthorn, December 27, 1943, John B. Foumet Papers, Department of
Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).
81Morning Advocate, January 29, 1944; Times-Picayune, February 4, 1944.
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attempting to coerce Civil Service employees into supporting Davis. 82
In addition to his offensive, Morgan also attempted to draw Huey's
mantle even more tightly around himself:

"[I]f you want the kind of

government originated by Huey Long in 1928," he told a Coushatta audi
ence, "then go to the polls and vote for Lewis Morgan." The next day
at Homer, he called Huey "That sandy-haired boy who came from Winn
parish in 1928," and declared that "he was the most affectionate and
beloved friend I ever had."83
The reform faction continued its drumbeat of denunciation of
Longite corruption.

The Times-Picayune New Orleans States commented

that " . . . very few will vote deliberately for Louisiana’s betrayal
and forced retreat to the scandalous deals that stained Louisiana's
good name and wasted her funds and resources during the previous
Maestri-Leche-Long dictatorship." Davis, in a state-wide radio speech
(we know he delivered this one!), asked whether the voters thought
that "the city ring [can] bring harmony to you?

So long as one part

of the state tries to dominate the other, this can never be.

All the

great fights in Louisiana politics came about because of this attemp8A

ted domination."

Even though Davis’ speech reveals an incomplete

understanding of Louisiana politics, the sentiment is clear.

It was

a surprisingly strident presentation for Davis.
Easily the most explosive event of the second primary was the
go

Morning Advocate, January 30, February 17, 25, 1944.

83Ibid., February 17-18, 1944.

^ Times-Picayune New Orleans States, January 23, 1944; Morning Advo
cate, February 18, 1944.
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threatened disintegration of the Longite faction.

The trouble stemmed

from a quirky provision of the 1921 Constitution which provided that
if there was no second primary for governor, either because a candi
date was nominated in the first primary or because one of the candi
dates selected for the second primary withdrew from that race, then
there would be no second primary for any other state office, and the
candidate with the highest number of votes in each of the lesser state
wide races would automatically be declared the Democratic nominee.
Immediately after the results of the first primary became apparent
the Longites realized that if Lewis Morgan withdrew from the second
primary they would obviously lose the governorship again but would
gain control of powerful, though lesser, state offices.

Despite this

realization, the Old Regulars on January 20 announced that they would
continue the fight through the second primary. 85
Other Longites, however, apparently harbored reservations about
the wisdom of continuing the contest.

Lewis Morgan announced on Janu

ary 21 that he intended to stay in the race, even though current
rumors suggested that he would withdraw.

Scarcely a week later, how

ever, Morgan announced that "a political friend” was negotiating with
Jimmie Davis forces to bring the campaign to a quick end.

On February

1, after a speech in Lafayette, Morgan replied "Yes, that's right"
when asked whether Earl Long was the "political friend" negotiating
n - 86
with Davis.

OC

Shreveport Times, January 21, 1944.
86

Times-Picayune, January 22, February 1-2, 1944; Morning Advocate,
February 2, 1944.
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Morgan’s announcement split Longite ranks.

Lucille May Grace

and Wade 0. Martin, Jr. announced that they would "stick by Lewis
Morgan" through his "darkest hour" filled with "terrific sabotage."
Earl Long, however, denied any knowledge of Morgan's charge:

"You

can tell 'em (sic) I expressed utter surprise," he told a TimesPicayune reporter.

W. H. Talbot announced that he knew of no contacts

between the Davis and Long forces.

Maestri declined to comment on

the charge.^
Former Judge James D. Womack dropped a bombshell into Longite
ranks during an address broadcast over WNOE and WDSU radio on February
4, in which he revealed the alleged details of the Davis-Long deal.
Womack claimed that he had attended a Longite conference at the Monteleone Hotel in New Orleans on January 25 at which Earl Long announced
that John Fred Odom, E. A. Stephens, and Wade Gamier of the reform
camp, had requested a meeting with him.

Long obtained Maestri*s per

mission for the meeting, and then heard the reformers' proposition:
Morgan would be "prevented" from contesting the second primary, thus
electing Davis and the high man in each of the other races.

In ex

change for Longite derailment of Morgan's campaign, Davis would leave
*
the state six months following his inauguration to make movies in
Hollywood, leaving Earl Long in charge as acting governor.

Davis

would also resign his office eight months before the 1948 primary,
thus giving Long the additional perquisites of the incumbancy to use
in his campaign for the governorship.
g7

In addition, Womack said, Long

*

Times-Picayune, February 2-3, 1944.
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reported that both Davis and Sam Jones promised to support his 1948
bid for the governorship. 88
The principals named in Womack's speech immediately issued hot
denials.

Davis —

"I have never had a political conference with Earl

Long in my life;" Stephens —

"unqualifiedly untrue;" Odom —

posterous and untrue;" Long —

"nonsense."

"pre

(Long also paid Davis an

uncharacteristic compliment during the episode.

Davis, he said, told

"the absolute truth" when he denied the alleged negotiations.)

89

The accuracy of Womack’s fantastic charges cannot be determined.
The absurdity ("giddiest absurdity” the Item characterized it) 90 of
the political shenanigans he outlined, however, undermines his credi
bility.

It is difficult to imagine the reformers willingly yielding

control of the state to Earl Long six months after Davis' inauguration.
It is virtually impossible to imagine Sam Jones agreeing to support
Earl Long for governor in 1948.

It is possible, however, that Womack's

charge did stem from knowledge of a meeting that had taken place.
Earl Long admitted that he had, in fact, met with a group of men whom
he "presumed to represent Davis," but that they only sought to estab
lish the basis for a smooth adminisration in case he and Davis were
elected to office. 91
go

Times-Picayune, February 5, 1944; Item, February 5, 1944; Morning
Advocate, February 6 , 1944. When he repeated these charges during a
speech broadcast over WJBO in Baton Rouge the night following his New
Orleans broadcast, Womack changed the site of the political meeting
he attended on January 25 from the Monteleone to the Roosevelt Hotel.
89Times-Picayune, February 5, 1944; Item, February 7, 1944.
90

Item, February 7, 1944.

^Morning Advocate, February 7, 1944; Town Talk, February 7, 1944.
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Even though the breach in Longite ranks was healed by the Old
Regular announcement that they would endorse the same ticket in the
second primary that they had backed in the first primary (i.e.,
Morgan-Long with no exceptions), the rifts were only papered over.
Morgan in a Winnsboro speech on February 19, asked his audience to
vote for "every solitary man" on his ticket —

the first time he had

asked for support for the entire ticket since the disagreement with
Long.

Joe Cawthorn in Gonzales on February 20 announced that "we've

all joined hands . . . There is no more confusion in our ranks.
never split again."

We’ll

But Morgan and Long did not appear together until

their closing New Orleans rally at Municipal Auditorium. 92
The results of the second primary revealed that even though the
Longites had shown a surprising strength in the campaign, they were
not strong enough to overcome the reformers. .Jimmie Davis was elected
governor with 251,228 votes (54 per cent, of the total) to Morgan's
217,915.

Moreover, reform candidates swept into all the contested

state offices:

Verret for lieutenant governor, LeBlanc for attorney

general, Tugwell for treasurer, and Coxe for superintendent of education. 93
^Morning Advocate, February 20-21, 28, 1944.
93Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 271; Morning Advocate,
March 8 , 1944. Davis carried 44 parishes and 7 of Louisiana's 8 Con
gressional Districts, losing only the First District, which consisted
of lower Orleans parish, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes. Davis
remembered this loss, and during an appearance at Port Sulphur in
Plaquemines parish in 1945, dedicated a song to its residents, then
burst into a chorus of "It Makes No Difference Now." Item, August 1,
1945. The race issue which became important in Louisiana politics
during the late 1950s and early 1960s caused several new and strange
(by previous standards) alliances within the state, one of which was
Leander Perez and Jimmie Davis. See Glen Jeansonne, Race, Religion,
and Politics The Louisiana Gubernatorial Election of 1959-60
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Observation of the 1944 second Democratic primary results shows
that while Davis added to the number of parishes voting anti-Long in
north Louisiana compared to the 1940 results, he lost some of the
southern and Florida parishes Sam Jones had carried.

Davis' native

Jackson parish, East and West Carroll, Franklin, and Concordia
parishes joined the ranks of the reformers in 1944, while Grant and
Caldwell left the reformers and voted for Lewis Morgan.

Beauregard

joined Calcasieu and Jefferson Davis parishes in southwest Louisiana
in voting for Davis, but Allen and Cameron parishes remained Longite.
Acadia and St. Martin parishes in south Louisiana voted for Morgan by
comfortable margins, 52.6 per cent to 47.4 per cent in Acadia and 55.6
per cent to 44.4 per cent in St. Martin, but Davis carried St. Bernard,
which had voted for Earl Long in 1940. Morgan's lifelong association
with the Florida parishes allowed him to erode anti-Long strength in
this region.

St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Livingston parishes all

voted for the Longite in 1944.
Nevertheless, with the continued exception of Orleans, Davis held
on to the urban areas of the state.

East Baton Rouge parish preferred

him 66.8 per cent to 33.2 per cent for Morgan; Calcasieu by 52.8 per
cent to 47.2 per cent; Rapides by 58.3 per cent to 41.7 per cent;
Ouachita by 64.1 per cent to 35.9 per cent; and Caddo by 75.4 per
cent to 24.6 per cent.
9

The reformers, of course, were well pleased with the second
primary results.

Sam Jones remarked that Davis' election demonstrated

(Lafayette, Louisiana, Center for Louisiana Studies, University of
Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), p. 112; and Jeansonne, Leander Perez,
pp. 257-260.
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that his own election four years before had not been merely a "flash
in the pan." The 1940 campaign, he said, "was won by the flame of
spontaneous revolt against shocking scandal." The 1944 reform vic
tory, in contrast, "was brought about by the unspectacular but deliber
ate determination of the people to continue clean, independent govern
ment." Former reform United States Representative T. Hale Boggs
wrote to Emile Verret congratulating him on his victory over Earl Long:
"In defeating him you have earned the everlasting gratitude of the
people of Louisiana."

State Representative DeLesseps Morrison, a

thoroughgoing reformer then on army duty overseas, wrote to his mother
that "[It] looks like . . . a prolonged era of good government is in
for Louisiana . . . Thank God, we are through with Joe Cawthom, Earl
Long, and the like.

Here’s hoping [the reformers] don't start making

deals with the Old Regulars . . . as long as you play with dogs,
you're bound to catch fleas."

94

The Longites, meanwhile, were gracious in their defeat.

Robert

Maestri said that "Because I have always been of the democratic opin
ion that the rule of the majority prevails, [!] I congratulate Mr.
Davis on his election . . ." Lewis Morgan extended his "sincere and
hearty" congratulations to Davis, and hoped "that his administration
will be one to which the people may point with some satisfaction at
its close . . .
94
Morning Advocate, March 1, April 29, 1944; DeLesseps S. Morrison to
Anita 0. Morrison, March 12, 1944, D. Morrison Collection; Hale Boggs
to Emile Verret, March 6 , 1944, Verret Collection.
95Morning Advocate, March 2, 1944.
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In contrast to the 1939-AO campaign, the 1943-44 contest had been
tame.

Even the war, which dominated so much of American life, failed

to dominate Louisiana's political agenda.

Gas rationing caused the can

didates some minor transportation problems, even though the Office of
Price Administration in Washington, D.C., empowered local ration boards
in Louisiana to issue special gasoline rations to the candidates. 96
The war issue entered the campaign only in two minor themes.
First, calls came from various sources to conduct a serious campaign
without the ballyhoo, innuendo, distortion, and lies usually present
in Louisiana campaigns (admonitions that went unheeded).

The second

war theme which entered the campaign was the pledges made by both
Jimmie Davis and Lewis Morgan to provide "rehabilitation" and jobs
for the returning servicemen

and servicewomen. 97 Neither of these

war-related issues achieved major importance in the campaign.
Jimmie Davis' election to Louisiana's highest office in 1944
allowed reform elements in Louisiana another four years in which to
96
Times-Picayune, September 16, 1943; Weill, You Are My Sunshine,~p.
66; W. Scott Heywood to Prentiss M. Brown, October 4, 1943, JenningsHeywood Collection. J. E. Brumfield, district director of the OPA
said in Shreveport that all properly qualified candidates would re
ceive enough gas coupons to carry on their campaign, but would not re
ceive coupons for transportation of bands, sound trucks, or campaign
workers.
97
Morning Advocate, August 19, 21, 1943; "Address," (n.d., 1943),
Verret Collection. The concerns about providing "rehabilitation" to
returning combat servicemen after the end of the war were shared by
people throughout the United States who wanted their loved ones back
from the battlefields, but realized that the veteran would not be the
same person as the recruit they had sent away to war. As the war wound
to its conclusion, a real concern developed that battle-hardened and
—scarred veterans might wreak havoc in the country, either because of
psychological disorders or by turning their military training to crim
inal uses. See Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years 1945-1950 (New York,
Antheneum, 1976), pp. 37-51, the chapter entitled "Preparing for
Ulysses."
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govern the state.

Relations between the outgoing and incoming admini

strations remained cordial.

Governor and Mrs. Jones invited the

Davises to move into the governor's mansion with them on May 1, to
allow them to become accustomed to their new quarters and also to
simplify some of the confusion of inauguration day.

Jimmie Davis,

however, served notice to the reformers that even though he would
preserve those aspects of their program he considered useful, he was
not Sam Jones.

When asked whether he endorsed all of Jones' reform

program, Davis replied, "I never take stock in anybody's politics except my own."98
Even though some of the reformers never fully accepted a profes
sional country singer as the champion of good government in Louisiana, 99 Jimmie Davis in 1944 began establishing his own very different
leadership of the state.
Shortly after winning the second Democratic primary in February,
1944, which ensured his election as Louisiana's sixty-eighth governor,
Davis made two announcements.

He believed he would be too busy to

make more films or record any songs for a while, and also rejected an
offer to star in a special movie, "The Singing Governor," based
loosely on his life, planned by Columbia Studios in Hollywood.
98
Morning Advocate, April 16, 25, 1944.
99Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, pp. 198-199.
^ ^Morning Advocate, March 5, 17, 1944; Weill, You Are My Sunshine, pp.
79-80. The eventual movie based on Davis' life, "Louisiana," was not
made until 1947 by Monogram Pictures. Davis' prediction that he would
neglect his entertainment career was wrong. He spent 44 days out of
state in fiscal 1944-45, and 68 days in fiscal 1945-46. See Sindler,
Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 19.0. Davis later excused his action by main
taining that many of these days were on week-ends when he flew to re
cording sessions in Nashville or New York. Nevertheless, he twice ex
hausted the contingency fund which pays the lieutenant governor the
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Davis was officially elected governor of Louisiana in the general
election on April 18, 1944.

He was unopposed and the voter turnout

was typically low.
Davis’ inauguration was much simpler than Sam Jones’ extravaganza
held four years before.

Gasoline and tire rationing reduced the crowd

to an estimated 10,000 people, compared to the approximately 100,000
who had crowded into Baton Rouge to witness Jones* inauguration.
The simple inaugural ceremony was held on the capitol steps, rather
than in the Louisiana State University football stadium, and there
were no inaugural balls.

Following the inaugural speech, Governor and

Mrs. Davis held an open house at the governor’s mansion.
Jimmie Davis worked even before his inauguration to translate
his "peace and harmony" campaign style into administrative reality.
He endorsed incumbent House Speaker Norman Bauer of St. Mary parish
for re-election to that post, and reformer Grove Stafford of Rapides
parish as President-Pro-Tempore of the Senate.

He also announced,

however, that in issuing these endorsements, he was not attempting to
downgrade the qualifications of any other candidates for the posts.
Davis also met with legislators from around the state, including those
from the First and Second Congressional districts (in and around New
Orleans) who possessed slightly more than one—fifth of the votes in
the legislature.* He revealed in the meeting with the Orleans delegagovernor’s salary when the subordinate official must substitute for
the chief executive.
^ ^ Morning Advocate, April 19, May 7, 10, 1944; Item, May 9, 1944;
Shreveport Times, May 10, 1944. The inaugural crowd included Davis’
mother, but his father was too ill to attend the ceremony and died on
February 6 , 1945.
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tion that he had no "must" legislation, but that he expected wide
spread support for his "non-political" program which included renewal
of the sales tax, re-enactment of the gas-gathering tax, and separa
tion of the Conservation Department into two agencies — one for wild
life and one for minerals.

The initial success of his effort to estab

lish "peace and harmony" was revealed in a public letter from Longite
Secretary of State Wade 0. Martin, Jr. to Davis pledging "my . . .
active support, co-operation, and assistance in every matter which
shall have for its purpose the advancement and improvement of the
state of Louisiana."102
The dove of peace had apparently settled over the legislature
by the time it convened on May 8 , 1944.

Old Regular leaders told

the members of their delegation to the legislature that they would
"play ball" with Davis, and entered no candidates in the races for
House Speaker or Senate President-Pro-Tempore. Some reform elements
in the state hoped that the new legislative mood signaled an improved
political climate in Louisiana:

the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate

commented, "Politically speaking, there is today more unity and good
will among the people of Louisiana than has been seen in a long while
. . . [We] believe that, in a manner of'speaking, the sun will shine
in Louisiana for the next four years."

103

The legislature met in joint session on May 15 to hear the new
governor's plans for the state.
102

Davis, however, revealed no specific

Morning Advocate, May 2, 6 , 1944; States, May 4, 1944; Item, May

6 , 1944.

103
Morning Advocate, May 8 , 1944; Item, May 8 , 1944.
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recommendations in his address.

He spoke in general terms about the

need for improved flood control, highways, hospitals, and penal in
stitutions, but reminded the legislators that "Many of these improve
ments involve construction and the use of materials and supplies.
These needs must continue to yield to the greater needs of war."
Davis called the legislators to endure a period of austerity until
"the greater needs of war [are] lessened" and the victory won.

". . .

it behooves all of us here," he said, "to do everything that is humanly
possible to accomplish this one common desire that is felt in the
heart of every real American.
Despite his pleas for austerity and careful husbanding of the
state's resources, Davis presented the legislators with a budget
calling for expenditures of §197,768,787.26 for the 1944-45 biennium
(§15,540,292.55 above Sam Jones' 1942-43 budget).

State fiscal offi

cers anticipated income for the biennium covered by the new budget to
be approximately §42,000,000 less than the proposed expenditures.
The original estimates of the deficit, however, did not include ap
proximately §16,000,000 in revenue to be realized if the legislature
re-enacted the sales tax, and approximately §3,500,000 additional
revenue from Davis' proposed re-enactment of the gas-gathering tax.
It also did not include the possibility of reducing the deficit by
using part of the §12,500,000 surplus left in the state treasury by
104
Address by Governor Jimmie H. Davis Before the Joint Session of the
Legislature — May 15, 1944 (Baton Rouge, House of Representatives,
1944), pp. 2, 6 ; Shreveport Times, May 16, 1944.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

242

Governor Jones

Davis described the executive budget (actually pre

pared by the executive department before he took office) "considerably
out of balance" and called upon legislators to cut appropriations
"where necessary to provide an economical and balanced budget . . . "
The state’s expenditures, he said, "must be kept within the means of
the state to pay."^^
In addition, Davis favored renewal of the two taxes which could
generate enough income to lessen the deficit considerably, the gasgathering tax and the sales tax.

Renewal of the sales tax met with

less opposition than did renewal of the gas-gathering tax.

Davis ap

peared before a House caucus on May 29 and pleaded for renewal of
the one-cent sales tax.

"It was not a campaign pledge,” he said, "but

after study from every angle, I believe it is necessary." The House
then approved the measure on a 94-0 vote with no debate.

The Senate

similarly passed the sales tax, and Davis signed it into law.^^^
Renewal of the gas-gathering tax, however, roused the ire of
both large and small natural gas producers throughout the state.
They maintained that they had accepted the original gas gathering tax
in 1940 and agreed not to subject it to litigation only because Sam

^ ^ Item, May 16, 1944; Morning Advocate, May 16, 1944; Sindler, Huey
Long’s Louisiana, p. 191. Sindler maintains that "The administra
tion’s budgetary miscalculations were so gross as to warrant a judg
ment of intentional deceit . . . "
^ ^Item, May 23, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 5, 1944.
^ ^Moming Advocate, May 30, June 13, 1944; Item, May 30, 1944; Shreve
port Times, May 31, 1944; Acts Passed by the Legislature of the State
of Louisiana at the Regular Session 1944, p. 138 (hereinafter cited
as Acts Passed by the Legislature 1944).
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Jones assured them that it would be in effect for only two years, and
that he desperately needed it to pay the state debt left behind by
the Longites.

Then in 1942, the producers maintained, they agreed to

a two-year extension of the tax in order to help ease the state's
financial crunch, and, in exchange, received a distinct pledge from
the Jones administration that the tax would positively not extend
beyond 1944.

Davis' spokesmen, however, maintained that he could not

be held responsible for a pledge made by the previous administration,
and that it was just as important for him to achieve a balanced budget as it had been for Sam Jones. 108 Despite the protests from the
natural gas spokesmen, the legislature renewed the gas-gathering
tax. 109
The "peace and harmony" facade of the legislative session dis
appeared on June 12.

The first bill to create division was the ad

ministration proposal to remove the Education Department from poli
tics by providing for an appointed rather than an elected Superinten
dent of Education.

The bill caused a sharp debate between legisla

tors who thought it a reasonable reform and those who saw it as a
dangerous concentration of power in the governor's hands.
group drew enough support to dispose of the measure.

The latter

Davis also lost

when he endorsed a proposal to "freeze" $10,000,000 of the $12,000,000
treasury surplus by investing it in war bonds.

($2 ,000,000 of the

surplus was earmarked for salary increases for teachers but was

^ Item, May 16, 1944.
109Acts Passed by the Legislature 1944, p. 354-360.
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entangled in a lawsuit against the Board of Liquidation of the State
Debt and was not included in the "freeze" proposal.)

The legisla

tors, however, preferred to keep the surplus liquid, even though the
war-time scarcity of construction materials limited its use.
Davis received his sharpest rebuff from the legislature when he
attempted to institute an additional one cent state retail sales tax.
Davis and the other major supporters of the proposal — Executive
Counsel to the Governor, James I. Smith; State Treasurer A. P. Tugwell; Highway Director D. Y. Smith; and Public Works Adminstrator
DeWitt Pybum — urged the legislature to pass the additional tax to
help veterans after the war.

They recognized the pent-up need for

state projects including construction or repair of roads, hospitals,
and mental institutions, as well as other state projects which would
demand large amounts of money as soon as the end of the war made con
struction materials plentiful.

At just that time, the supporters

reasoned, the Louisiana economy would also enter a slump because of
the sharp reductions in military and industrial spending expected at
the end of the war.

James I. Smith explained to the legislators that

the state could raise money it needed for post-war projects (which
would incidentally create jobs for returning servicemen) in either of
two ways:

it could wait until the end of the war and issue state

bonds, or it could impose the additional one cent sales tax in 1944,
while the Louisiana economy was booming and save the revenue generated

* ^ Item, June 13, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, p. 191.
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by the tax for postwar projects.
Despite Davis' assertion that " . . . since it is for the soldiers,
1 think we can all agree to be for it," the additional sales tax drew

a storm of protest.

E. H. "Lige" Williams, president of the Louisiana

Federation of Labor, called the appeal to patriotism in remarks sup
porting the tax, a "transparent mockery." The New Orleans legislative
delegation opposed the measure because they thought that residents of
the city already paid a high sales tax (two cents city tax and one
cent state tax) and the additional one cent would push sales taxes in
the city to an unacceptable level.

Opposition also arose from re

formers, some of whom thought the additional levy unnecessary because
of the large surplus generated by the state sales tax instituted in
1.942.112
Despite the strong opposition, the additional sales tax passed
the House Ways and Means Committee, but only on a close 8-6 vote.
Floor debate on the proposal was sharp.

Speaker Norman Bauer pled

for passage, but the opposition to the tax overwhelmed him.

Repre

sentative J. Duff Smith of Union parish charged that Tugwell had
threatened that if Smith did not vote for the bill, "I couldn't get
the things we need in Union parish." Representative Sidney Sylvester
of St. Landry parish warned darkly that the additional tax would
created a "slush*fund to perpetuate a political machine." 113

^ ^ Item, June 15, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 192.
11o

Item, June 15, 22, 1944; States, June 26, 1944.

^^Item, June 15, 28, 1944.
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After a prolonged debate before packed galleries, the House voted
against the additional sales tax 48-47.

Governor Davis announced that

he was disappointed that the state would not be collecting the addi
tional revenue from the money then circulating in Louisiana but,
typically, also announced that he was not bitter about the defeat.
He had thought that the proposal was useful and necessary, but a
majority of the House members had thought differently, "and that was
their priviledge."^^ ..
As the legislative session unfolded, the reformers found that
Jimmie Davis was indeed not another Sam Jones.

While Jones’ belief

in an "unbossed" legislature led him to refrain from appearing in be
half of administration bills, sometimes to the detriment of his pro
gram, he worked behind the scenes to build coalitions in support of
his program.

Davis, however, provided little legislative leadership,

overt or otherwise.

Ttfithout direction from the governor, the legis

lative sessions quickly disintegrated into a welter of confused ef
forts and cross purposes within the reform faction.
The administration's position on many issues became so unclear
that Davis held a series of caucuses with legislators to emphasize
which bills had administration support.' But these sessions did not
stop the flow of criticism directed at the governor.

Representative

R. Brownell of Morgan City, a staunch reform supporter, on a point
of personal privilege, remarked that there was a vast difference
between an independent legislature and a disorganized legislature.
Tl4

Ibid., June 28, 1944; Shreveport Times, June 29, 1944; Morning
Advocate, June 29, 1944.
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Legislators not invited to the early caucuses became incensed at
being omitted.

As Representative A. R. deNux remarked, bis constitu

ents in Avoyelles parish felt that "You’re not representing us if
you’re not called in to decide on what’s going to be done in the legis
lature.”* ^
Criticism of Davis' lackadaisical legislative leadership spilled
over into other reform elements in the state.

The Item entitled its

June 19, 1944, editorial "The Lack . . Leadership," and remarked that
When legislators go about in circles saying they
don't know what measures are favored or opposed
by the Governor . . . the situation has got to a
sad pass.
. . . the idea of bringing the Governor into
'secret caucusses' to inform [the Legislature]
of his views is bizarre. The only right way to
do that is to have the Governor express himself
to the Assembly in messages or personal addresses
. . . The leadership and incentive have to come
from the Governor and none other.
In addition, veteran New Orleans political journalist Hermann B.
Deutsch analyzed the legislature and reached an equally dismal con
clusion:
In the House of Representatives, there is no one
to call signals, and when anyone gets hold of
the ball, he carries it as his individual fancy
dictates . . . [and] apparently no one is author
ized to make decisions. All the players are in
dependent, and quite proud of that fact, as well

**~*States, June 9, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 16, 19-20, 1944;
Shreveport Times, June 20, 1944; Item, June 20, 1944.
**^Item, June 19, 1944.
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they might be. But they are not merely in
dependent, they are unorganized. And between
those two terms yawns a tremendous difference.
The States noted as the legislative session ended, that the
"State Pays Price for Peace, Harmony." The "price" cited in this
editorial included broken pledges, a dissipated $10,000,000 surplus,
no postwar legislation of any consequence, and no "great constructive
legislation . . . for the benefit of the people or the returning sol..
,,118
diers.
Whatever their cost, peace and harmony prevailed at the closing
meeting of the legislature.

Governor Davis attended the House ses

sion, harmonized with the representatives on several songs, and ren
dered a solo performance of "It Makes No Difference Now." Represen
tative Leonard Santos of Orleans parish released two pigeons labeled
"Peace" and "Harmony" in the House chamber. 119
The legislature left the governor a seriously imbalanced budget,
but Davis vetoed $15,000,000 of appropriations, thus bringing expendi
ture into line.

His two major vetoes eliminated $5,000,000 each for

state drainage programs and for highway construction to be paid from
the general appropriations fund.
amounts:

His other vetoes were for lesser

$1,280,000 payment to police juries for parish roadwork;

$75,000 for construction of an agricultural experiment station in
117-.,
Ibid.
118

States, July 6 , 1944.

119Ibid.; Morning Advocate, July 7, 1944; Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisi
ana, pp. 196-197.
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Washington Parish and $100,000 for a similar project in Red River
Parish among others-

By July 12, State Treasurer Tugwell announced

that with Davis’ vetoes, he projected a $1,000,000 budget surplus for
the next biennium.
Projections of a budget surplus kept Davis from calling a special
legislative session to reconsider imposition of the additional one
cent state retail sales tax that the regular session had failed to
pass.

Speculation about the extraordinary session began when the

regular session rejected the additional sales tax, and as the legis
lators considered the idea after the regular session, some of them
decided that the administration proposal to "stockpile” revenue with
the additional tax had merit, after all.

Representative Drayton

Boucher of Spring Hill announced that he had found that "my people
and the other members of the Legislature from my district are in
favor of the bill."

By early September, however, the administration

had abandoned all thoughts of the special session.

A "high unnamed

administration source" gave no official reason for abandoning the
idea, but the Item pointed out that during the first two months of
the new fiscal year (July and August, 1944), Treasurer Tugwell's rec
ords showed that the state received $12,021,761.98 total revenue,
compared to $10,375,318.71 during the same two months of the previous
fiscal year, and that the previous year had produced the $12,000,000

^ ^Morning Advocate, July 8 , 11-12, 1944.
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-surplus.

121

*

Administration leaders thus felt great reluctance at the

prospect: of attempting to "sell’’ increased taxes when the state expec
ted:a healthy surplus .from available revenues. Davis on February 14,
1945, announced.that he would call no special session "until the end
■

122

of the European war was in sight."

■' ■

During the months between the end of the first regular session of
the legislature in July, 1944, and the end of World War II in Septem
ber, 1945, Davis remained involved with governing the state and par
ticipating in the war:effort.

Hemet with President Franklin Roose

velt, and following Roosevelt’s death, with President Harry Truman,
"talking politics" and also asking them to retain Louisiana’s war
production plants and military training camps during the post-war
years.. He attempted to halt "floggings or other, mistreatment" of
prisoners at. the state; penitentiary by executive order.

Sam Jones

had issued a similar order,;but prison officials had ignored it Davis’ order met a similar fate and flogging of state prisoners con
tinued into the 1950s.

He and his band made public appearances at

war bond sales rallies, and made an eight-state "postwar business
tour" of the south attempting to persuade businessmen to build
commercial establishments in Louisiana after the war.
did not forget his entertainment career.
121

■ ■

Davis also

He and cowboy singer Tex

■

States, August 17, 1944; Item, September 7, 1944. Louisiana re
mained in a healthy economic condition for the remainder of Davis’
term. The 1945 special session appropriated $16,500,000 for highway
and drainage construction, and yet the budget surplus in 1946 was
still $19,000,000. See Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana, p. 192.
122

States, February 7, 15, 1945.
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Ritter completed the score for a musical comedy entitled "Start
Cheering.

•

Following the 1944 regular session, the legislature met only once
more to deal with war issues — in the postwar extraordinary session
Davis promised to call immediately after the end of the war.

This

short session quickly passed bills providing for expenditure of
$16,500,000 — $7,500,000 to match federal funds for construction of
highways and bridges, $4,000,000 to the State Department of Highways
for the construction or improvement of roads and bridges not included
in the state highway system and not included in the federal aid sys
tem, and $5,000,000 to the Department of Public Works for draining
and reclaiming undrained or partially drained marsh, swamp, and over—
flow lands.
The war years proved to be the most peaceful and harmonious of
Davis' administration.

He became embroiled in the attempts to re

strict organized labor’s powers in the 1946 regular session when he
vetoed the "right to work" bill the legislature passed outlawing the
union shop, calling it "an interference with the right of collective
bargaining.” In 1946 and again in 1947, Davis' (and Sam Jones')
"conservationist" policy of restricting exports of natural gas from
Louisiana came Under heavy fire from legislators ready to exploit the
123
' 1 v7- ’
Morning Advocate, September 7, December 2,.1944, May 12, June 1,
1945; States, May 16, 1945; Weill,: You Are My Sunshine, pp. 73-74;
Mark T. Carleton, Politics and Punishment -The History of the Louisi
ana State Penal System (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press,
1971), p. 144.
124 ■
'
■•■■ ■
.Morning Advocate, October 12-13, 1945; Acts Passed By the Legisla
ture of the State of Louisiana at the Extraordinary Session, 1945,
.pp. 5-7.
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state's resources for short-term gain.
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:Despite these -setbacks, Jimmie Davis' administration, as Allan
Sindler correctly maintains, was more than the "do-nothing" void in
Louisiana politics that the Longites (on purpose) and Sam Jones (unwittingly) branded it.

Davis was partially successful in his ef

forts to establish ;"peace and harmony" in Louisiana, hut bifactional
ism did not disappear.

Davis’ lack of legislative leadership allowed

new coalitions of Longites and reformers to form around specific
proposals.

Moreover, the facade of harmonious relations was also

nurtured by the plentiful supply of money in the state treasury.

This

surplus, along with the dearth of construction materials caused by
the war,' necessarily limited the conflict over state funding for the
legislators’ pet projects.

In addition, the two most visible fac

tional symbols in the state, Sam Jones and Earl Long, either of whom
could enrage the opposing faction merely by the mention of his name,
were both out of office during Davis’ administration.

Their reappear

ance in the 1948 gubernatorial election caused a rerun of the 1939-40
contest, a bitter struggle that ended in Long's sweeping victory.
Davis’ administration, therefore, was only a continuation of the
reform interlude in Louisiana politics between the era of unbroken
Longite control (1928-1940) and the renewed success of the Long
machine under Earl Long's leadership in the late 1940s and 1950s.
Davis’ initial retirement from politics lasted from 1948 until 1960,
125

:

"

’

’

Sincler, Huey Long’s Louisiana., pp. 195-196; Weill, You Are My Sun
shine, pp. 75-77.
126
'
Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana, pp. 196—199.
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when he was elected to a second gubernatorial term. .Bis third try for
the governorship ended' in failure in 1972; and he retired permanently
to his entertainment interests , by then consisting almost exclusively
of performing and recording gospel music — and he was deservedly
elected to the Country Music Hall of Fame.
While Davis’ second gubernatorial term would he marred by discord
and violence arising from court-ordered school desegregation, and by
two costly projects of questionable^worth, his ^first term generated no
equally disruptive controversy.

Instead, the first Davis administra

tion provided, a friendly atmosphere for continued reform, even though
Davis himself was not an ardent or aggressive reformer.

As Allan

Sindler correctly maintains, Davis’ reputation suffered from Sam
Jones’ campaign tactics-in the 1948 gubernatorial campaign, when Jones
focused on the 1939 Scandals and his.own gubernatorial term, and thus
acquiesced in Earl Long’s contention that Davis had presided over a
127
’’do-nothing” administration.

"Good government" has always been

the underdog in Louisiana politics, and the surprise in the state’s
political history during the 1940s was not that Earl Long devastated
reformism’s white knight, Sam Jones, in 1948,. but rather that Jimmie
Davis had been able to defeat a Longite resurgence in 1944.

127Ibid., pp. 190-191.
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CHAPTER V I

LOUISIANA AND NATIONAL POLITICS, 1940-1944
Louisiana’s participation in national politics, together with
voter behavior in federal elections, reflected the state's ongoing bi
factionalism during World War II.

"Longite" and "reform" candidates

contested for seats in Congress as well as for local and state offi
ces.

Political unity in Louisiana came nearer to realization in the

two wartime presidential elections, but even then President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's successful quest in 1940 for an unprecedented third
term, combined with his choice of the unpopular Henry A. Wallace for
vice president, met with opposition and caused some defections from
state Democratic ranks.

While Louisiana did not abandon the party in

either 1940 or 1944, the two wartime presidential campaigns revealed
increasing discontent with Roosevelt's "Grand Coalition" which in
cluded organized labor, intellectuals, and blacks —

a discontent

Louisiana shared with the rest of the South — and which blossomed
into full rebellion in the first post-war presidential election in
1948.1
An essay written by Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture Tom
Linder, to Louisiana Commissioner of Agriculture Harry D. Wilson, re
vealed emerging southern restiveness.

Linder wrote that the historic

Democratic party was no more, and that "the nefarious practices begun
by Abraham Lincoln are now being carried to completion by Roosevelt

^"Robert A. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Section
alism, 1941-1948 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1974),
pp. 1-30.
254
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and the New Deal party.” Linder even suggested that the South boycott
the national Democratic convention and nominate its own presidential
candidate, who would then hold the balance of power between the "New
2
Deal and the Republicans."
Beyond Southern concern with "liberal" tendencies within the
national Democratic party, two other issues dominated the 1940 presi
dential election:

should Franklin Roosevelt be granted a third term

as president, and how realistic were the President's plans to defend
3
the country in a world at war?
The third-term issue split the
national Democratic party as Vice President John Nance Gamer, Post
master General (and Democratic national chairman) James A. Farley,
and conservative United States Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland
attempted to wrest the Democratic presidential nomination from Roose
velt, who nevertheless won an easy renomination on the first ballot at
4
the Democratic national convention at Chicago.
2

Tom Linder to Harry D. Wilson (n.d., 1940), William Walter Jones Col
lection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special Collection Divi
sion, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans,
Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Jones Collection).
3Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, p. 13;
Robert E. Burke, "Election of 1940," in The Coming to Power Critical
Presidential Elections in American History, ed. by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York, Chelsea House Publishers, 1972), pp. 360-363.
4

Bruke, "Election of 1940," pp. 369-373; Geoffrey Perret, Days of Sad
ness, Years of Triumph (New York, Coward, McCann and Geoghagan, 1973),
pp. 48-50. This was the convention in which the famous "voice from
the sewer," Chicago's Superintendent of Sewers Tom Garry, chanted over
the public address system in the convention hall that "Illinois,"
"America," and "the world" wanted Roosevelt as the Democratic nominee.
The contrived demonstration he led following Senator Alben Barkley's
speech announcing Roosevelt's professed reluctance to run again for
president last more than one hour. The continued demonstration al
lowed Roosevelt to note coyly in his acceptance speech that even though
he did not want to run for a third term, the overseas war emergency
made it imperative that he "not reject the call of the party to run"
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Roosevelt \s muted pursuit of a third nomination upset some Louisi
anians, just as it did many other Americans.

Anti-third-term senti

ment in Louisiana was best expressed in a front-page editorial pub
lished in the New Orleans Item in July, 1940, just before the Demo
cratic convention opened.

The Item recounted its support of Roosevelt

in both the 1932 and 1936 elections.

The newspaper alsoclaimed that

it hadsupported "most of his [Congressional] measures."

Itfurther

promised to "[continue] to support him in all steps for the national
welfare, so long as he remains President." But the newspaper also
stated that "The Item believes that a President who has served two
terms should retire."

The Item, a strong reform voice in Sam Jones'

recent victory over the Longites in the 1939-1940 gubernatorial cam
paign, feared the potential danger in establishing the precedent of a
three-term president:
In our state we have had a terrible example
of the abuse of democratic government by
officeholders for officeholders, and for their
associated plunderers. We have no feeling
that there is any such intent as this in the
'draft Roosevelt’ movement. But our interpre
tation of democracy in our own country makes
us believe that the two-term tradition in the
presidency, established by Washington and per
petuated by Jefferson and Jackson, is a safe
anchor to which to tie in this time of world
wide storm.^
That Louisiana would in fact support Roosevelt in the 1940
and if elected, "the call of the country to serve." Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 Volume, War — And Aid to
Democracies (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 293-303.
”*New Orleans Item, July 9, 1940.
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presidential election was not clearly evident earlier in the year.

In

April, Governor Jones met with Postmaster General Farley at Shreveport,
as Farley awaited a train connection to Jackson,.Mississippi.
however, disclaimed any endorsement of Farley:

Jones,

"I am absolutely un

committed to any candidate for presidential nomination.

It is not the

province of the governor to dictate to the people whom to nominate for
president.
The intrusion of Louisiana's bifactional division into national
politics was clearly revealed during the Louisiana State Democratic
Convention held in the Louisiana State University Gymnasium to choose
Louisiana's delegates to the Democratic National Convention.

The

state meeting became uncontrollable when United States Senator Allen
J. Ellender walked to the podium to move that Louisiana's delegates
to the national convention be instructed to vote for a third nomina
tion for Franklin Roosevelt.

The state convention delegates, domi

nated by the reform faction, had booed Ellender as he entered the
building, and as he attempted to address the convention, a chorus of
boos again greeted him.^
"I thought Louisiana had returned to a democracy," Ellender com
mented as the rising volume of noise made it evident that he would
not be heard.

"It has," several delegates rejoined from the floor.

Despite his reception, Ellender gamely attempted to deliver his pro
posal.

He described his visit to the White House the day before to

^New Orleans Times-Picayune, April 5, 1940.
^Ibid., June 5, 1940; New Orleans States, June 5, 1940.
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inform Roosevelt that he planned to submit a resolution to the state
convention calling for Roosevelt’s renomination.
from the delegates.

More boos rang out

"The president asked me to deliver to you his

sincere wishes for a successful convention," Ellender said.
don't you sit down?" a delegate shouted back.

"Then why

In an apparent attempt

to placate the delegates with small talk, Ellender said, "The presi
dent expressed his sincere desire to come back to Louisiana and par
take of our fishing and perhaps duck shooting." Ellender must have
instantly regretted his choice of words.

Upon his mention of the

word "duck," a delegate shouted "de-duct!", and the crowd began
chanting, "What about the de-ducts?" Ellender became livid and asked
convention chairman Vance Plauche to restore order, but the crowd
would not be silent.

Plauche and then James A. Noe asked for quiet

so that Ellender could be heard, but cries of "No! No!" drove Ellender
from the stage.

8

While the delegates were eager to vent their resentment at the
Long machine by humiliating its most visible public spokesman, they
did not want the President to believe that their repudiation of Ellen
der was also a repudiation of Roosevelt.

After Ellender resumed his

seat on the floor of the convention as a delegate from Terrebonne
parish, Hewitt Bouanchaud, a delegate of Pointe Coupee Parish,
offered a resolution that the convention action not be construed in
any way as a reflection upon Roosevelt.

Bouanchaud’s resolution

Times-Picayune, June 5, 1940.
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passed unanimously.

9

It must be remembered that the rank and file of the Louisiana
Democratic party had no opportunity to express its feelings during
the years of Longite control.

The 1940 meeting was the first state

Democratic party convention since 1924.

It must also be remembered

that Ellender had played an integral part in the recent 1939-40 guber
natorial campaign, raising the race issue in his futile attempt to
help Earl Long defeat Sam Jones, and that a majority of state conven
tion delegates were Jones partisans.
The delegates declined to instruct Louisiana’s delegates to the
national convention to vote for Roosevelt.

Instead, they left the

delegation uninstructed except for an admonition to keep the state’s
votes together as a unit.^

That none of the state's delegates to

the 1936 national convention were selected to attend the 1940 conven
tion clearly revealed reform domination of the official state party

,

apparatus.11
Ellender maintained later that the humiliating incident at the
state convention was an attack on him and not on Roosevelt.

He sus

pected beforehand that he would not be allowed to speak, he said,
because the "powers that be," whom he identified as "a few disgruntled
sugar planters, cotton exchange brokers, and bond dealers," had de-

^Ibid.; "Resolution," June 4, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen
J. Ellender Archives, Allen J. Ellender Memorial Library, Nicholls
State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana (hereinafter cited as Ellender
Collection).

^ Times-Picayune, June 5, 1940; States, June 5, 1940.
^^Shreveport Journal, July 3, 1940.
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cided that he should not speak. 12
When asked how he would cast his vote for the presidential nomi
nation at the Democratic national convention, Governor Jones replied
"I don't know." Asked who his favorite was among the Democratic con
tenders for the nomination, Jones facetiously replied, "0. John Rogge."
Jones also reiterated that he would not dictate the Louisiana delegation's vote on the nomination. 13
The Louisiana delegation to the Chicago convention, however,
caucused and agreed to support Rogge on the first ballot for the pres
idential nomination with a tacit understanding that they would switch
to Roosevelt on later ballots.

The proposal to vote for Rogge re

sulted partially from the reformers* wish to honor the man who had
successfully exposed the corruption of their political opponents, and
partially from- the delegates’ efforts to apply a bit of political
pressure to Roosevelt to accept a Louisiana-proposed plank in the
Democratic platform calling for strong protection of the American
sugar industry.

Rogge immediately dispatched a telegram asking the

delegation not to support him any longer.

He notified them that he

"cleaned up the state through a desire for justice" and not for

12Joseph P. McCormick to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 6 , 1940; Allen
J. Ellender to T. E. Bird, June 25, 1940, Ellender Collection.
Roosevelt had been careful to avoid any entanglement in the infighting
in the Louisiana Democratic party. When asked, "Is there anything in
the Louisiana situation that you would like to comment on?" Roosevelt
carefully replied, "I don't know a thing about it except that they
have a runoff primary. That is all I know." Complete Press Confer
ences of Franklin D. Roosevelt Volume 15 1940 (New York, DaCapo
Press, 1972), p. 103.
13
Times-Picayune, July 15, 1940; Item, July 15, 1940.
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political acclaim.^
The support for Rogge, however, at least partially achieved the
delegates' objective — consideration of Louisiana's goal of protec
tion for American (i.e., Louisiana) sugar producers.

Roosevelt’s

emissaries, including Harry Hopkins, well-known in New Orleans be
cause of his flood relief work there with the Red Cross following
World War I, met with Louisiana's delegates and produced a compromise
agricultural plank which induced the Louisiana delegates to abandon
Rogge and vote as a unit for Roosevelt’s nomination on the first
ballot.15
The Louisiana delegation was concerned about reform of American
sugar policy because of unrest felt among Louisiana sugar planters who
were displeased with New Deal agricultural policies which limited
their crop and thus limited their income.

The New Deal sugar policy

was embodied in the Sugar Act of 1934 (the Jones-Costigan Act) and
the subsequent Sugar Act of 1937.

The Sugar Act of 1934 established

a sugar quota system guaranteeing to each producing area a portion of
the estimated United States sugar requirements during a calendar year.
The act thus regulated mainland production and limited imports.

In

addition, mainland producers received Federal payments for compliance
with various requirements of the act, including limitation of crop acre
age, payment of minimum wages to sugar workers, and soil conservation
practices.

Money to pay for the provisions of this act came from a

processing tax of one-half cent per pound of raw sugar placed on the

^States, July 15, 17., 1940.
15New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.
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manufacture and importation of sugar.

The Sugar Act of 1937 primarily

retained the same objective of sugar acreage reduction but adopted
funding methods which circumvented the United States Supreme Court’s
1936 ruling which invalidated the processing taxes and contractual
method of controlling production.

The year 1937 also saw completion

of a new international sugar agreement in which the sugar exporting
countries of the world won a concession from the importing countries
which also produced part of their domestic demand (including the
United States) by which the exporters could continue their substantial
output.Therefore, Louisiana sugar producers felt that their pro
duction at home was being curtailed and that they had little hope of
expanding their market overseas.
While Franklin Roosevelt neatly sidestepped the ire of the sugar
interests in his bid for a third nomination, his handpicked vice presi
dential candidate was not so fortunate.

Great disappointment settled

over the 1940 Democratic convention when Roosevelt announced soon af
ter his own nomination for president that he was endorsing Secretary
of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace as his vice presidential running mate.
Wallace had few friends on the convention floor, and had only recently
converted from his original Republicanism to the Democratic party.

^Earl B. Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls 1941-1947 Volume I
(New York, Statistical Press, Inc., n.d.), pp. 8-9; Murry R. Benedict,
Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950 A Study of their Origin
and Development (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), p. 399.
Louisiana sugar farmers considered the 1937 act an improvement over
the 1934 act, because it increased the number of tons of sugar cane
they could produce, but still chafed at any restrictions. See Thomas
Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment Louisiana, 18871976 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), p. 73.
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Wallace won the vice presidential nomination on the first ballot,
but only by the close vote of 628 to 459 ballots cast for various
other rivals for the nomination.^
Roosevelt, in choosing Wallace, chose the bete noir of Louisiana
sugar interests.

J. Y. Sanders, Jr., a member of the Louisiana dele

gation and a member of the resolutions committee, tried to persuade
the committee to adopt a strong plank for the party platform in favor
of domestic sugar production.

Sanders’ proposed resolution included

assertions that American farmers were entitled to priority and pref
erences in the home market; that farmers producing a non-surplus crop
should be encouraged to increase production; that essential foods
should be produced within the United States as part of the defense
program; that continental producers,

who supplied less than 30 per

cent of United States consumption of sugar, should be permitted to in
crease their production to their physical limits in order to safeguard
against shortages; and that the sugar policy of the United States
should be based on adequate tariffs and quotas against foreign countries to allow expansion of the domestic sugar industry.

18

Sanders

understandably marshalled support for his resolution among delegates
from sugar beet producing states and Florida, but ran into opposition
from Wallace and his supporters.

The Wallace partisans pointed out in

committee hearings that Sanders’ proposals, if adopted, would threaten

*^Burke, "Election of 1940," pp. 369-375; Bernard F. Donohoe, Private
Plans and Public Dangers: The Story of F D R ’s Third Nomination
(Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 174177.
^Itera, July 16, 1940.
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the agreements that the United States had signed with other countries
setting the level of sugar production.

Wallace himself told Sanders

that the proposed plank might "upset our foreign policy regarding
Cuba, and seriously affect the economic life of Hawaii, the Philip
pines, and Puerto Rico."

Sanders cared little about the international

implications of United States sugar policy in peacetime.

Instead, he

replied to his critics that one-third of Louisiana was directly af
fected by the sugar policy ("It's more important for us not to upset
the domestic economy of the United States"), and moreover, that normal
peacetime agreements may no longer be valid in a world at war.

Now

is the time, Sanders told the committee, to produce all necessary food
in increased volume.

19

Despite Sanders' valiant efforts, the Demo

cratic platform contained only a weak, general agricultural plank with
no specific mention of sugar.

The Democratic party pledged "To safe

guard the farmer’s foreign market and expand his domestic market for
all domestic crops."20

While this generously-worded plank pledged

nothing specifically-for protection of sugar farmers, its protection
ist cast allowed-some o'f them to support Roosevelt in good faith.
Wallace’s opposition to Sanders' sugar plank led the Louisiana
delegation to endorse Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson for the
vice presidential nomination.

Johnson had been a University of Vir

ginia classmate of Prescott Foster, and an American Legion friend of
Sam Jones.
19

Governor Jones, in fact, led the opposition to Wallace

States, July 18, 1940; Sunday Item-Tribune, July 21, 1940.

^Item, July 18, 1940.
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within the Louisiana delegation.

He informed Roosevelt's convention

leaders Harry Hopkins and Senators James F. Byrnes of South Carolina
and Pat Harrison of Mississippi, that Wallace’s

nom i n ation

would

"split the party wide open in the state." The Louisiana delegation
agreed to stay with Johnson as long as he remained in the race, and
if he withdrew, switch to Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas or Speaker
of the House William B. Bankhead of Alabama. 21
Louisiana’s Democratic delegation headed home from Chicago dis
pleased with Wallace’s first ballot nomination.

Governor Jones an

nounced that he was against Wallace "1000 per cent."

One irate Louisi

ana delegate, storming out of the convention, demanded of Washington
columnist George Allen, "Name me one, just one, man [who wanted Wal
lace]." Allen replied, "Brother, that I can do —

and that one man

22

was Roosevelt."

Some Louisiana delegates reported after they returned to Louisi
ana that they had been displeased with more than the Wallace nomina
tion.

John Caffery, a south Louisiana sugar planter, revealed that

he had planned to speak in favor of an anti-third term plank, but when
delegates debated the plank, convention chairman Alben Barkley refused
to recognize those delegates wishing to support it.

Caffery maintained

that anti-third term sentiment remained strong in the Louisiana dele
gation until it became apparent that Roosevelt commanded enough
support to ensure his nomination. They climbed on the Roosevelt band-

^ States, July 18, 1940.
22

Alexandria Daily Town Talk, July 18, 1940 (hereinafter cited as Town
Talk); Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, pp. 177-178.
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wagon "in the best interests of Louisiana." While most of the Louisi
ana delegates believed that the state would close ranks, soft-pedal
the third-term issue, and support the president, Caffery announced
that he planned to support Republican candidate Wendell Willkie, and
predicted the largest Republican vote in Louisiana’s Third Congres
sional District (heart of the sugar-growing area) since Reconstruction. 23
Caffery was correct in his predictions of a drift away from
Roosevelt and toward Willkie in south Louisiana.

Charles A. Farwell,

chairman of the education committee of the American Sugar Cane League
in New Orleans, called Wallace "the worst enemy Louisiana sugar ever
had," and announced that "I’m voting for Willkie." Farwell recited
a litany of complaints the sugar interest had against the Democrats:
Roosevelt in 1932 promised not to lower United States tariff rates
when a reduction would hurt a domestic crop, and then lowered the
tariff on Cuban sugar from two dollars to ninety cents per ton; in
1936, the administration promised production of all the sugar the mar
ket could absorb plus creation of a reserve supply, then in 1937,
promulgated the new sugar act with continued sugar quotas; Wallace,
while he was Secretary of Agriculture, had made a speech during 1934
in Ruston, Louisiana, in which he called sugar "an inefficient indus
try," and commented that "I would not kill it outright . . . But I

^

Item, July 19, 1940; States, July 19, 1940.
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would expose it gradually."2^
Prescott Foster announced upon his return from Chicago that he
would wait a while before deciding for whom to vote in the presiden
tial election, but that "I imagine the sugar planters will get together . - - and confer on the whole question."25

The sugar planters

did indeed "confer on the whole question," and some of them reached
the conclusion that they must support the Republicans.

Allen Ramsey

Wurtele, a New Roads sugar planter and businessman, announced his
plans to run as a Republican for Louisiana's Sixth District House
seat.

"Democracy is escaping from the United States under the Roose

velt dictatorship," Wurtele said, "Unless the Republicans take over
this country immediately, democracy is ended for us."26
Louisiana Republicans welcomed the defecting Democrats.

Louisi

ana's delegation to the Republican national convention that summer in
Philadelphia had not originally voted as a unit, preferring instead
for each, delegate to vote individually, and they had split into two
groups:

those who supported New York District Attorney Thomas E.

Dewey, and those who supported Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft.

The ama

teur attempt to nominate utilities president Wendell Willkie of New
York and Indiana stampeded the Philadelpia convention, however.
Louisiana delegates supported Taft after Dewey withdrew following the
24
States, July 20, 1940. Farwell also recalled that John E. Dalton,
United States Department of Agriculture Sugar Administrator, told
them after passage of the 1937 Sugar Act that "Unless you do as you're
told, we will throw the doors open and let the gales of tropical com
petition blast you from the face of the earth."
25Item, July 20, 1940
26

Ibid., July 22, 1940.

Republicans also entered the First, Second,
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fourth ballot, and climbed on the Willkie bandwagon when Ohio governor
John W. Bricker called for a unanimous nomination after Willkie had
won a majority of the delegates.

27

Nevertheless, Louisiana Republi

cans were comfortable with Willkie and worked for his election.
New Orleans attorney John E. Jackson joined Willkie's advisory
council in Washington, D.C., and local Republicans created political
associations to attract disgruntled Democrats to Wendell Willkie.
These organizations, called the Jeffersonian Democratic Clubs, were
part of Willkie’s effort throughout the South to attract Democratic
support without demanding that life-long Democrats abandon the preju
dices of their youth and join a Republican organization.

They party

also created the Louisiana Young Republican Club, a New Orleans-based
organization courting the "dyed in the wool Republicans and dis
gruntled Democrats."

The Republicans had to attract Democrats if

Willkie was to have any hope of success in Louisiana.
October, 1940, recorded a total of 702,545 voters —

The state in
700,727 Demo-

crats, 1,573 Republicans, 242 Independents, and 3 Socailists.

28

and Third District races. Only David Pipes in the Third District re
mained in the campaign. John P. Conway withdrew from the First Dis
trict race, Joseph 0. Schwartz withdrew from the Second District race,
and Wurtele withdrew from the Sixth District race.
27Times-Picayune, June 25, 1940; States, July 8 , 1940; Warren Moscow,
Roosevelt and Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1968), p. 104.
28
Item, July 10, 31, 1940; States, August 2, 1940; Donald Bruce John
son, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Drbana, Illinois, Uni
versity of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 134; Alden L. Powell, "Your De
mocracy Is In Your Hands," Louisiana Municipal Review, September-October, 1941, p. 146. Jeffersonian Democratic clubs sprang up in Tennes
see, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, North
Carolina, and South Carolina, in addition to Louisiana. Jackson rep
resented the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia on Willkie’s advisory committee.
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Many prominent Louisiana Democrats, even those opposed to Wallace,
however, did not join in the Willkie boom in the state.
announced on August 4, that "I am a Democrat.

Governor Jones

We fight out our fights

in the family," and gave the Roosevelt-Wallace ticket his "complete
endorsement." Louisiana Democratic Central Committee Chairman, Frank
J. Looney of Shreveport, announced that any Democrat who bolted the
party to join the Jeffersonian Democratic clubs and boost Willkie's
candidacy would forfeit the right to vote in all future Democratic
primaries.29
The Roosevelt administration assisted loyal Democrats in Louisi
ana by supplying statistics to refute the sugar interest’s claim that
New Deal farm policy had hurt the domestic sugar industry.

Undersecre

tary of Agriculture Paul Appleby wrote to Sam Jones that Secretary
Wallace had, in fact, helped to increase mainland sugar area base
quotas in the 1937 Sugar Act from 160,000 tons to 420,000 tons, and
had also helped to free conditional payments to Louisiana farmers who
violated the child employment provisions of the 1937 act.

In addi

tion, Appleby said that Wallace had never ordered Louisiana sugar
farmers to plow up any of their crop, as had been done in other New

States, August 5, 1940; Town Talk, August 13, 1940. Asking for
votes for a Republican candidate in the South in 1940 was a ticklish
job. While it is true that it was the twilight of the Solid (Demo
cratic) South, many southerners still "voted the way they (or their
father, or their grandfather) shot" in the Civil War. Looney on
another occasion urged Louisiana Democrats to "Be faithful to the
traditions of the tried and true; of [Robert E.] Lee, of [P. T. G.]
Beauregard, of [Francis T.] Nicholls."
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Deal crop reduction programs. 30
Governor Jones again endorsed Roosevelt’s candidacy in a speech
which attacked the Republicans in terms strangely reminiscent of the
Longite attacks on him:

"If the Republicans get into power, you'll

see more destitution, hunger, and starvation than you’ve ever seen in
■
..31
your lives.
Jones’ later assessment of the 1940 presidential campaign, how
ever, reveals that he may have been less than sincere in his endorse
ment of Roosevelt.

Instead of being won over because of New Deal

agricultural policy, or vague promises of increased opportunities for
agriculture, Jones thought that Roosevelt’s experience would help him
guide the country successfully through the perilous war-torn years
which lay ahead.
By the time of the American political conventions during the
summer of 1940, Hitler's armies had swept through the Low Countries
and into Paris — a dark and scary time for Western democracies.

The

1940 presidential election in the United States turned more on the
"experience" issue than on any other.

Indeed, Roosevelt expressed

his wish to the Democratic convention to retire to his home at Hyde
Park, New York, but held open the possibility that if the delegates
wanted a candidate with his experience, he would be amenable to a
30Paul Appleby to Sam Jones, September 19, 1940, Jones Collection.
Appelby’s information was incorrect. The USDA ordered Louisiana
sugar farmers to plow up portions of the 1939 crop. See Becnel,
Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, p. 74.
31
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 19, 1940.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271

draft.

Willkie, a political novice, had no comparable record in

foreign policy.

Or as Jones phrased it, "If your house catches on

32
fire, you want a fireman who knows what he’s doing."
Jones reiterated this same theme in another speech he delivered
defending Roosevelt from Republican charges that Roosevelt was trying
to establish a dictatorship with the third term:
The issue, which might carry weight in an
election conducted down the sunny lanes of
peace and world security, shrinks to mere
obstructionism, to a strained quibbling and
peevish yapping now that the earth has become
over much of its surface, a cockpit of
fighting ships and men and planes.
Now that each day's fearful developments
brings us teetering nearer and nearer the
act of seizing the sword to defend all that
we have in this hemisphere, I cannot worry
too much about whether Mr. Roosevelt will
serve eight years or twelve.33
In spite of his public pronouncements favoring Roosevelt in 1940,
Jones also later recalled that the Democrat’s victory in Louisiana
was not automatic:

"With three speeches, Willkie could have carried

32

Sam Jones interviewed by Denny Daugherty, May 6 , 1970, tape re
cording, Dennis Daugherty Collection, Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Daugherty Collection).
33Sam Jones, "Address," (n.d., 1940), James B- Aswell, Jr., and Family
Papers, Divisions of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as
Aswell Collection).
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34
the state."
The considerable disaffection among Democratic sugar
planters in south Louisiana was not the only criticism Roosevelt
suffered.

His liberal experiments in New Deal social programs and

his strengthening alliance with urban and labor groups at the ex
pense of agricultural interests had left many southern Democrats disillusioned. 35 W. Scott Heywood wrote to his son in 1940 that Willkie
was "just as good a democrat and probably more of a democrat than
Roosevelt."

In addition, Heywood objected to Roosevelt's support of

"Ma Perkins" (Frances Perkins) as Secretary of Labor.

Furthermore,

Heywood objected to Roosevelt "allowing his wife [Eleanor] to be
popping off the way she has been doing . . . " 36
The Willkie boomlet in Louisiana proved to have less support
than the sugar planters and the traditional Republicans hoped.

A

Gallup poll published on November 4, 1940, revealed that Roosevelt
still commanded much support in Louisiana — 82 per cent for Roosevelt,
34
Jones interviewed by Daugherty, May 6 , 1970, Daugherty Collection.
Jones himself followed a political path from the old-line Democracy to
Republicanism. He told Daugherty that he started voting against the
Regular Democrats after Roosevelt's third term. He voted for Dixiecrat Strom Thrumond in 1948, and then left that halfway house and
voted for Republican presidential candidates. Like many other Louisi
anians, however, he remained a registered Democrat.
35Hubert H. Humphrey, The Political Philosophy of the New Deal (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 23-29; Robert A.
Rutland, The Democrats From Jefferson to Carter (Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana State University Press, 1979), p. 197. Humphrey catalogs the dis
parate elements that constituted the support of the New Deal. Rutland
adds that during the New Deal, "the city-dwelling organized laborer in
a sense had replaced the farmer as the yeoman Democrat.”
36
W. Scott Heywood to Gene B. Heywood, August 14, 1940, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, Department of Archives and Manuscripts.,
Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
(hereinafter cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection).
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18 per cent for Willkie.

Roosevelt's support in Louisiana was less

than that found in Mississippi, equal to his support in Arkansas, and
more than his support in Texas.

In Mississippi, Roosevelt had 94 per

cent support compared to Willkie's 6 per cent; in Arkansas, the presi
dent commanded the support of 82 per cent of the respondents to Willkie’s 18 per cent; and Texas respondents supported the president by
seventy-nine per cent to Willkie's twenty-one per cent.

37

The sugar

planters, the Republicans, the businessmen in Louisiana may have been
disillusioned with Roosevelt, but the president still commanded the
allegiance of the people.
Roosevelt's supporters also turned out to vote on election day.
The president carried Louisiana by a margin of 267,510 votes, re38
ceiving 319,751 ballots compared to Wendell Willkie's 52,241. Obvi
ously, if Willkie could have carried Louisiana "with three speeches,"
as Sam Jones later maintained, then those speeches would have had to
have been blockbusters.
Roosevelt.

Even the sugar areas of Louisiana voted for

The South Louisiana Bayou voter type voted 84 per cent for

Roosevelt, while the South Louisiana Planter vote type voted 83 per
cent for the president. 39
37
Item, November 4, 1940.
38Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, p. 189. Moscow also notes that Roose
velt did well in the south because the regional economy was then still
based on cotton exports to Europe, and thus southerners felt at ease
with Roosevelt's internationalist foreign policy.
39Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, rev. ed., 1971), p. 299. The two
voter types include Louisiana’s major sugar parishes. Many sugar
growers returned to Roosevelt after the Democratic Senate in 1940 sus
pended domestic sugar quotas with Senate Joint Resolution 225, which
provided that a grower could harvest all of his domestic quota plus
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The Congressional elections held in Louisiana during the fall of
1940,. in conjunction with the presidential election, maintained Louisi
ana's reputation for spirited politics, except for the Seventh Dis
trict race.

(In that district, Sam Jones' friend Vance Plauche ran

unopposed.)

Governor Jones hoped that his reform forces could ride

the crest of his success in the spring gubernatorial election and
turn all the incumbent Longite Congressmen out of office in the fall
elections.

The Longites, he thought, no longer represented the will

of the people of Louisiana.

40

Subsequently, Jones endorsed reform

candidates in most Congressional races and campaigned for his "reform
slate" of candidates.

In a radio speech broadcast in late August,

he attempted to persuade Louisiana voters to complete the sweep of
Longites out of office they had begun in February:
Every vote you cast for this discredited group
is a vote against good government. It is a
vote to revive hopes in the hardened hearts of
the corruptionists, the grafters, the crooks,
and the despoilers of democratic institutions.
After many years of administration of rotten
ness and corruption, the task of restoring
democracy and public confidence is herculean.
Remember, this is a task that cannot be accomp
lished without the continued support and
twenty-five additional acres without losing benefit payments. See
Becnel, Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, pp. 74-75. The
President’s popularity in Louisiana was not seriously threatened by
the sugar planters' disillusionment. The comment of Harold H. Young,
the political strategist who headed Roosevelt’s campaign in the DallasFt. Worth, Texas area, "Nobody's for FDR except small voices — the
people," was also true in Louisiana. Quoted in Robert A. Caro, The
Years of Lyndon Johnson The Path to Power (New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1982), p. 581.,
40
Town Talk, July 2, 1940.
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enthusiasm of the people of Louisiana.
The reform effort to unseat all incumbent Congressman, however,
was not successful.

Representatives Overton Brooks (Fourth District),

Newt Mills (Fifth District), and A. Leonard Allen (Eighth District
congressman and brother of former governor Oscar Allen) were all re* 42
elected.
The most bitter campaigns for Louisiana’s Congressional seats
during 1940 occurred in the First and Second Districts (in and around
New Orleans). The campaign opened when First District Representative
Joachim 0. Fernandez and Second District Representative Paul H.
Maloney, both Longite allies, qualified to run for re-election.
formers in the city quickly fielded their own candidates:

Re

New Orleans

attorneys Herve Racivitch in the First District and T. Hale Boggs in
43
the Second District. Both Racivitch and Boggs had been active in
Jones' gubernatorial campaign.

The clearest bifactional competition

emerged in the Second District race where Boggs flatly stated that
The incumbent Congressman represented a vicious
dictatorship foreign to everything in America
rather than the people of Louisiana. That dic
tatorship has now been thoroughly repudiated.
And its representatives can be of no service

^ Ibid., August 28, 1940.
42
Ibid., September 1,, 1940; Morning Advocate, September 14-15, Octo
ber 16, 1940.
43
Times-Picayune, July 12, 15, 1940.
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to our people. 44
The clear bifactionalism in the First District race was clouded
by New Orleans States city editor, F. Edward Hebert, who entered the
campaign on July 15. Hebert’s friend James A. Noe attempted to per
suade him to run for mayor of New Orleans in 1942, an office which
Hebert did not want, so Hebert attempted to placate Noe by agreeing
to run for Congress in 1940. 45
Hebert built a strong coalition of support through his associ
ation with Noe.

Jones, Noe, and Old Regular leader George Montgomery

reached an agreement which divided the-offices in the New Orleans
area:

the Jones-Noe reform forces agreed not to oppose incumbent

judges seeking re-election in the area, and not to interfere directly
in the 1942 New Orleans mayor's race, and in exchange, the Old Regu
lars agreed to support Jones-Noe candidates in the 1940 First and
Second Congressional Districts, the First and Second Public Service
Commission Districts, the Orleans Parish School Board, and Orleans
Parish Juvenile Court.

46

This agreement, however, did not take into

44

Ibid., July 15, 1940. Boggs had organized the People's League to
support Jones' gubernatorial candidacy, and had served on Jones' cam
paign Speakers, Legal, and Finance Committees45
F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, "last of the Titans” The Life
and Times of Congressman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette,
Louisiana,. Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern
Louisiana, 1976), pp. 152-153. Hebert also realized that even if he
served only one term in the House, the lifetime access to the House
floor accorded former Congressmen would provide him a priceless news
source when he returned to journalism.
46
Times-Picayune, July 16, 18, 1940; Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the
Titans”, pp. 153-154. Hebert adds that Maestri agreed to support
Jones-Noe candidates in hope that his new alliance with the reformers
would blunt the ongoing federal investigation of his political faction.
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in
consideration the ambition of the incumbent Congressman.
Nevertheless, the Old Regulars and the reformers continued their
loose alliance through the campaign.

New Orleans Mayor Robert Maestri

announced to an Old Regular caucus on August 22 that "we are all Jones
boys now,” and instructed Old Regular leaders to "get out in [your]
wards and work hard" for the Jones-Noe candidates.

In return, several

reform candidates for the Civil District Court withdrew from their
campaigns.

Harry A. Cabral withdrew from the Division B race "at the

request of both Senator Noe and Governor Jones," ostensibly to devote
full time to the reformers' efforts to "instruct the electorate on the
value of passage of the [constitutional] amendments" which embodied
much of Jones’ reform program.^
Jones' association with Maestri, however, did not please all the
reformers.

George Piazza, an independent candidate in the District A

Civil District Court race, refused to withdraw.

"You cannot have

honest courts," he announced, "when you allow political organizations
to name your judges . . . A judge who is elected by a political machine
becomes part and parcel of that political machine . . . He becomes a
politician like the ward leader or the precinct captain."48
Despite its unpopularity among some reformers, Jones' agreement
with Maestri ensured F. Edward Hebert's election in the First District
race.

Any candidate with support from Jones, Noe, and Maestri had

little to fear, even from an incumbent Congressman.

Fernandez received

47*
Times-Picayune, August 13, 1940.
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support from organized labor groups,but the principal endorsements
in New Orleans went to his opponent.
Both Hebert and Fernandez virtually ignored Racivitch and cam
paigned primarily against each other.

Hebert called for an American

two-ocean navy, an adequate army, a "first-rate air force," federal
aid for Louisiana to stimulate industry, and new outlet from New Or
leans to the Gulf of Mexico to facilitate movement of wartime supplies
and commerce.
machine:

Hebert also tied Fernandez inextricably to the Longite

"I believe that the incumbent . . . represents that which

has been repudiated by the people of Louisiana . . . "
occasion commented that "[Fernandez is one of]
understand the writing on the wall.

And on another

the diehards who can’t

They can't believe that after

twelve years of plunderbund they have been counted out by the free and
independent people of the state.
Fernandez, in return, characterized Hebert as an enemy of labor,
and called Hebert’s platform "pure, simple, unadulterated political
fakery." He also read aloud letters of support from United States
House Speaker William B. Bankhead and House Democratic Leader Sam
Rayburn, and cited his memberships on the important House Appropria
tions Committee and its Naval Appropriations Subcommittee as reasons

■>UIbid., p. 158; New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August
4, 1940.
^^Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 159; Times-Picayune,
August 13, 1940.
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why Louisiana needed to return him to Congress.52
While the Jones-Noe-Maestri understanding aligned the city's dom
inant powers behind the reform candidate who then stood toe-to-toe
with the incumbent, who was stripped of his power base, it threw the
Second District race somewhat into disarray.

Political stances in the

Second District had been unclear from the beginning of the campaign.
Some reformers, remembering that incumbent Congressman Paul H. Maloney
had occasionally supported reform movements in the past, originally
wanted to maintain Maloney in Congress in order to improve their relations with the Old Regulars.

53

The wishes of the reformers, however,

ran into the political ambitions of New Orleans attorney T. Hale Boggs.
While the administration hoped that Boggs would run for the Public
Service Commission, Boggs preferred to run for Congress, and George
52
Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," pp. 157-161; TimesPicayune , August 15, 1940; Congressional Record 76th Congress Third
Session Appendix Volume 86 Part 17 (Washington, D.C., United States
Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 5526.
53
Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans," p. 154. Maloney's entire
political career was marked by the indecisiveness he exhibited during
the 1940 campaign. He began his political life as an Old Regular mem
ber of the New Orleans Commission Council, on which he served from
1920 until 1925. He bolted from the Old Regulars in 1925, ran for
mayor against Martin Behrman, and was defeated. In 1928, he again
opposed the Old Regulars when he supported Oramel Simpson for governor
instead of Riley Wilson, the Old Regular candidate. Maloney announced
his support of Huey Long in the second primary before Wilson withdrew,
and as a reward, was elected to Congress in 1930 with Huey Long's help.
Thereafter, he remained identified with the Longites. It is therefore
not surprising that the Old Regulars were willing to dump Maloney in
1940. See Times-Picayune, August 9, 1940, and Martin Behrman of New
Orleans Memoirs of a City Boss,- ed. by John R. Kemp (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, 1977), pp. 335-341. During their
1925 mayoralty campaign, Behrman called Maloney "a champion of medi
ocrity."
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Montgomery's indication of Old Regular willingness to drop Maloney
opened the way for a Boggs candidacy in 1940, even though some re
formers remained reluctant to endorse him.*^
Maloney, after he realized the strength of his opposition, de
clared that he would withdraw from the Second District race.

Any loss

of Old Regular support, he said, "would in effect strip my candidacy
. . . of election machinery," and bitterly added that
The imperfections and uncertainties of politics
under the guise of political expediency deny the
people of my district the advantages that would
unquestionably be forthcoming from the position
of prominence and influence that I have reached
in the United States Congress after almost 10
years of honorable, efficient, and attentive
service.^
Almost immediately after he made his announcement, however, Ma
loney announced that he had decided to remain in the race.

An organi

zation named the "Friends of Honest, Efficient Government," in a news
paper advertisement called upon Second District voters to "send back
to Congress an efficient and experienced Congressman . . . We believe
we are not asking too much when we seek to elect our Congressional
representative without interference from any political machine.
*
Even though the United States Senate quickly confirmed Maloney as
54
Hebert and McMillan, "Last of the Titans,", pp. 153-154; Lindy Boggs
to Jerry Purvis Sanson, February 28, 1984.
^ Times-Picayune, July 20, 1940.
56Times-Picayune New Orleans States, July 21, 1940; Times-Picayune,
July 25, 1940.
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Collector of Internal Revenue for the New Orleans District when Presi
dent Roosevelt nominated him on August 8 (a tempting offer provided by
Senators John Overton and Allen Ellender who recommended Maloney to
Roosevelt), Maloney chose to remain in the Second District race:
If the voters of this district return me to office
in spite of the coalition of the reform administra
tion with the very ones they promised to strip
'branch from stem and leaf from twig' I shall be
the proudest man in L o u i s i a n a . "57
Hale Boggs, however, registered the last word on Maloney's vacillation:
"No man can be a serious candidate if he cannot make up his mind
whether or not he is in the race."58
Boggs firmly aligned himself with the new tide of reform sweeping
through Louisiana, and Maloney retained support from many Longites in
the city.
machine.

Boggs attacked Maloney for his past ties to the Longite
In one campaign address, he noted the dangerous world situ

ation in which the United States found itself, and asked his audience,
"Isn't it a dangerous thing to have representing us as our Congressman
a man who has expressed so much sympathy, tolerance, and understanding
of Dictatorship?"

In an address following Governor Jones' endorsement

of him, Boggs commented that "If your governor, whom you elected . . .
over a scandal-ridden machine of which Paul Maloney was part and par—
cal, has faith and confidence in Hale Boggs, I believe you . . . can

^^Times-Picayune, August 9, 13-15, 1940.
^Ibid., August 17, 1940.
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well follow his recommendation."59
Maloney struck back with a scurrilous attack on Boggs for alleged
leftist activities during Boggs’ days as a student at Tulane Univer
sity.

"T. Hale Boggs Exposed!" screamed one Maloney leaflet which

contained the charge that Boggs had joined the American Student Union
in 1937 while studying at Tulane.

The American Student Union, ac

cording to the leaflet, promoted the pacifist "Oxford Pledge" by
which Union members promised not to fight for the United States
either in a defensive or an offensive war.
Think of an organization that tells red-blooded
American men that you shall not fight in de
fense of the United States of America — de
manding that if this country should be invaded
by brutal forces of a cruel and consciousless
dictator that you must stand cowardly by while
your wives, mothers, sweethearts, and sisters
fall helpless prey to the wild desires of human
beasts.
Another Maloney leaflet was more to the point:

"Shall It Be Ameri

canism and Maloney or Communism and Boggs?" This leaflet added the
"information" that the Dies Committee (The House Unamerican Activities
Committee) had labeled the American Student Union "one of the eleven
Border Patrols of the Communist Party," and called Boggs "a disciple

Ibid., July 21, 1940; T. Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), T.
Hale Boggs Papers, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial
Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereinafter cited
as Boggs Collection).
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of the bristle-moustached Stalin."^
Boggs fought off Maloney’s charges by outright denial:
I have never been a member of the American
Student Union; [but] I was chairman of the
student union building committee at the
University . . . I have ever been ready and
willing and am now ready and willing to take
^
up arms to defend the United States of America.
Boggs also issued statements by Rufus Harris, president of Tulane,
and Paul Brosman, dean of the Tulane Law School, affirming that he
had never been involved in any "subversive movements while at Tulane."

62

Both candidates sought to buttress their appeals to the voters
by supporting strong national defense. Maloney issued statements
from members of Congress urging his re-election.

The statement of

Representative Pat Boland of Pennsylvania was typical:

"We are going

through a period of important history-making, and these are most im
portant times in the nation's capital . . . This is the time that we
need the sound counsel that comes from experience."

63

"T. Hale Boggs Exposed!" (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection; "Shall It Be
Americanism and Maloney or Communism and Boggs?" (n.d., 1940), Ellender
Collection. It must be remembered that the 1940 election occurred
while Russian Premier Joseph Stalin was in alliance with Adolph Hitler
by the terms of the Russo-German Pact signed in August, 1939. Stalin
was thus "bristle-moustached." His rehabilitation into a vaguely af
fable "Uncle Joe" Stalin did not occur in the United States press un
til after Hitler turned on Russia with a vengeance in June, 1941.
61
Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.
62
Rufus Harris Statement, (n.d., 1940), Paul Brosman Statement, (n.d.,
1940), Boggs Collection.

63"What National Leaders in Congress Say About Paul H. Maloney,"
(n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

284

Boggs, meanwhile, also capitalized on the national defense emer
gency issue in his campaign.

After the fall of France to the Nazi

onslaught in June, 1940, which sent a sudden chill through the United
States, Boggs delivered a speech in which he belittled Maloney's claim
to governmental experience:

"For years France left her destiny in the

hands of old men who were re-elected year after year, and where is
France today but under the dictator's yoke." Again in a later speech,
Boggs noted that the United States had failed to fortify the Gulf of
Mexico coastline, an oversight which "will be remedied when Hale Boggs
goes to Washington as your Congressman."64
Boggs also did not fail to reiterate that coastal protection
would incidentally provide jobs as well:

"money and pay rolls to

Jefferson parish and New Orleans," he remarked in one speech.

In

other speeches, he urged New Orleanians to make a strong bid for their
fair share of the money spent on the United States rearmament program.^
Boggs, with his combined reform/Old Regular support, swept into
office in the Democratic primary in September, 1940.

He received

33,636 votes to Maloney's 25,590.
The spirited contest for the Third District seat occurred not in
the Democratic primary, but in the general election.

James Domen-

geaux, who had Governor Jones' endorsement, defeated incumbent Con
gressman Robert L. Mouton in the Democratic primary in September, but
faced David W. Pipes, a Democrat-turned-Republican because of Henry A.

^Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection.
65Hale Boggs, "Address," (n.d., 1940), Boggs Collection; Times-Picayune,
August 13, 1940
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Wallace, in the general election.^

The Third District, a wedge-

shaped area surrounding Lafayette in south central Louisiana, con
tained much sugar country, and some sugar planters had not forgotten
their antipathy to Wallace after his nomination on the Democratic
ticket.

James Domengeaux, in fact, found himself in legal trouble

after he publicly

admitted slapping Dudley LeBlanc’s face following

a radio address in which LeBlanc compared Domengeaux to Wallace:
"Henry A. Wallace . . . is not a friend of the farmer and Jimmy
Domengeaux is not a friend of the farmer and the poor people." Domen
geaux paid a $25 fine, but stated that he was willing to pay the cost
of the satisfaction he received from physically assaulting a man who
compared him to Wallace.

68

Pipes had telegraphed Prescott Foster at the Chicago Democratic
convention asking that Foster exert all possible efforts to secure

Domengeaux had been Sam Jones' campaign manager in the Third District
during the recent gubernatorial election. Pipes was a sugar planter
who had gained something of a national reputation during the 1920s.
The Mosiac disease struck Louisiana's sugar cane during that decade
and caused serious reductions in the sugar crop. Pipes obtained seed
stalks of disease-resistant P. 0. J. cane from the Dutch East Java Ex
periment Station and grew enough of thisvariety to supply the American
Sugar Cane League with seed stalks for distribution to other areas.
Times-Picayune, August 2, 1940; Stuart 0. Landry to Dr. Rufus C.
Harris, May 20, 1940, David W. Pipes Papers, Department of Archives
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana StateUniversity,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Pipes Collection).
68

Town Talk, July 22, 1940; Shreveport Journal, July 23, 1940. The
Democrats could not safely count on the Third District voting Demo
cratic. In 1914, for example, the voters elected Progressive W. P.
Martin of Thibodaux to Congress over his Democratic opponent because
of their displeasure with President Woodrow Wilson’s sugar policy.
Martin subsequently served in Congress until April 6 , 1929when he
died after his election to an eighth term.
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administration support for the sugar industry:

"Your support of this

request is the only action which will discourage entry of Republican
candidates [in the Third District race] with formidible support from
sugar industry and in addition from many loyal Jones supportersPipes’ supporters included people with sugar interests who were
disillusioned not only with Henry A. Wallace in particular, but who
were also disillusioned with the leftward drift of the Democratic
party.

U. S- G. Pettycrew wrote to Pipes that "I saw in the news that

you was (sic) a real Democrat and not a New Dealer."

Jules Godchaux

wrote more perceptively that " . . . I think it is in the best interest
of the sugar industry that we show the Democratic party our dissatis
faction of the way they have been treating us, a vote for the Republi
can candidates is the most effective way to register our protest."7^
Pipes indicated the depth of his protest when he switched his politi
cal allegiance from Democrat to Republican on July 17 and announced
his intention to run for the Third District seat.7^
Pipes waged his Congressional campaign more against Henry A.
Wallace than against James Domengeaux.

He opened his campaign on

September 15 with the following remarks:

»
I say to you here and now that the Louisiana
sugar industry has withstood and conquered
plagues of plant disease and insects, the

David W. Pipes to Prescott Foster, July 13, 1940; Pipes to C. J.
Bourg, September 26, 1940; C. J. Martin to Pipes, n.d., 1940, Pipes
Collection.
70U. S. G. Pettycrew to David W. Pipes, October 3, 1940; Jules Godchaux

to Pierre Chastant, August 2, 1940, Pipes Collection.
7 ^Times—Picayune, July 30, 1940.
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ravages of frost and flood and drouth, [hut]
can better face all these than the prospect
of four more years of Henry Wallace . . .
[The] curtailment of production means idle
people and empty main streets in South
Louisiana — and this is the treatment ac
corded us by the New Deal Democratic party
and Henry Wallace. This is the Democratic
party's appreciation of the 'Solid South.'^2
Again, six days later, Pipes reiterated that "Up till (sic) now, the
Democrats took us for granted and the Republicans did nothing for us
because we were Democrats." He also struck.directly at Wallace:

"I

believe . . . that as long as Henry A. Wallace has a position of im
portance in the councils of government, agriculture will be in a
straitjacket of ruin."73
Domengeaux and his supporters struck back at Pipes, not with a
defenseof Wallace, but instead with appeals to the ThirdDistrict
voters to remain loyal to the Democratic party in spite of Wallace.
Sam Jones in a speech delivered at Abbeville in support of Domengeaux,
urged voters to "Do as I'm going to do on November 5 -— stamp the
74
[Democratic] rooster from tip of beak to end of claws."
The large
French population in the Third District led to a bilingual campaign
for Domengeaux. Lieutenant-governor Marc Mouton urged Third District
voters "allons faire le vieux coq crier" ("Let's make the old rooster
72Morning Advocate, September 16, 1940.
^Ibid., September 22, 1940.
^The rooster, not the donkey, is the symbol of the Louisiana Demo
cratic party.
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crow ). 75
Domengeaux attacked Pipes as merely a spokesman for the sugar
establishment, an associate of "big shots," and charged that Pipes
worked laborers on his sugar lands long hours at the low wages of
eighty cents a day.

Domengeaux also promised that he would "never

vote for a declaration of war which would mean sending American boys
overseas"^ —

a reflection of the public wish to remain out of the

European war, just as Domengeaux's eventual vote for the declaration
of war reflected the profound change in public opinion by December 8 ,
1941.
Pipes waged a spirited campaign and attracted attention from both
the national Republican party and the national press, but he failed to
defeat Domengeaux.^

Third District voters instead chose the Democrat

to represent them in Congress. 78
Compared to the spirited contests for the First, Second, and
Third District seats, the campaigns in the Fourth and Fifth Districts
were relatively tame.

The Fourth District race drew five contestants

^ Morning Advocate, October 31, 1940; Town Talk, November 4, 1940.
^Morning Advocate, October 31, 1940.
^Dudley A. White to David Pipes, September 16, 1940; Washington, D.C.
Sunday Star, New York Herald Tribune, Chicago Sunday Tribune, New York
Times, Washington Times Herald, Baltimore The Sun, all July 21, 1940,
clippings in Pipes Collection.
78Now that we are used to political campaigns for inconsequential of
fices costing many thousands of dollars, it is striking to note that
Pipes reported spending only $2,955.02 on his Congressional campaign.
"Statement of Income and Expenses From Pipes Campaign to be Filed In
the House of Representatives," November 5, 1940, Pipes Collection.
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incumbent T. Overton Brooks, Shreveport insurance agent Henry O'Neal,
Caddo Parish District Attorney James U. Galloway, former Webster
Parish Registrar of Voters and State Representative J. Frank Colbert,
and Shreveport attorney and Caddo Parish State Representative Wellborn
Jack.

79

O’Neal, Galloway, and Jack had all supported Sam Jones’

gubernatorial candidacy, and the Governor remained neutral in the first
Democratic primary but endorsed O’Neal in his second Democratic pri
mary battle with Brooks, citing O’Neal’s "ability, honor, and integ
rity," as well as his personal friendship with the new Speaker of the
United States House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn, who had replaced
William Bankhead upon Bankhead's death. 80
In the face of his challenge from four opponents, Overton Brooks
stressed the importance of his Congressional experience and the im
portance of national defense during the deteriorating world situation.
While he did not advocate active American involvement in the shooting
war, Brooks' stance accurately reflected public opinion in northwest
Louisiana, which was somewhat stronger than opinion in the rest of the
state in accepting possible American intervention in the war. 81
"79

Shreveport Journal, May 31, June 5, 24, August 6 , 16, 1940; Shreve
port Times, August 6 , 1940.
8°
"Morning Advocate, September 8 , October 3, 1940.

Rayburn became
Speaker on September 16, 1940, after Speaker Bankhead died of a stomach
hemorrhage. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson The Path to Power, pp.
593-594 chronicles this transfer of power.
81Brooks inserted into the Congressional Record statements from both
individual constituents and various civic organization in northwest
Louisiana stressing the need for strong American defense, and even one
resolution which proposed United States defense of the entire Western
Hemisphere. Congressional Record 76 Congress 3d Session Appendix
Volume 86 Part 16 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing
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Brooks repeatedly allied himself with northwest Louisiana's con
servative attitude.

He scored the Roosevelt administration for its

failure to prepare the nation's defense for any eventuality during the
past eight years:

"stuffing money into our national defense system

will not revitalize it overnight."

In his formal statement of his

candidacy, Brooks pledged continued support for the nation's prepared
ness program, support for the "Dies Americanism Committee," adequate
federal old-age pensions, and assistance "for the farmers and working
men of Louisiana." Brooks' campaign slogan was "Defense to the Ut
most," and a letter to his constituents reflected his concern in the
following sentence with confused syntax, but clear meaning:

"If you

endorse the program of national defense to the utmost, 100 per cent
Americanism, and to rid the country of all spies, traitors, and 'fifth
columnists,' I claim your active support."82
Fourth District voters apparently agreed with Brooks’ supporters
who pled with them to return a man of experience to Congress.

(Fred

Wilson of Coushatta wrote that experienced men "should not be swapped
in the middle of this ocean of hell.")

Brooks' campaign advertisements

stressed that Brooks was "At His Post of Duty," and pleaded "Don.’t
swap in a crisis."83 Despite the reformers' efforts to elect Henry
Office, 1940), pp. 4062, 4211-4212, 4622-4623.
82Shreveport Journal, July 18, 1940; Shreveport Times, August 6 , 1940;
Congressional Record 76 Congress 3d Session Appendix Volume 86 Part
II (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941),
p. 5378; Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume
87 Part 12 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1941), pp. A2550-A2551.
83Congressional Record 76 Congress 3 Session Appendix Volume 86
Part 16, p. 4483; The Mansfield Enterprise, September 5, 1940.
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O’Neal in his stead, Fourth District voters returned Brooks to
Congress.^
While the Fourth District campaign stirred little emotion (’’De
fense to the Utmost" is not, after all, a stirring call to arms), the
Fifth District race stirred even less.

Even though his five opponents

included Lincoln Parish District Attorney Truett L. Scarborough, and
State Senators Edward Gladney and D. Y. Smith, incumbent Congressman
Newt V. Mills received more votes than any other single candidate in
the first primary, and then defeated Gladney in the second primary.

85

The campaign for Louisiana's Sixth District seat in 1940 centered
not on national defense but on Sam Jones and the reformers’ efforts
to overhaul the state.

The Sixth District race originally drew four

candidates, incumbent Dr. John K. Griffith; attorney Jared Young
Sanders, Jr., son of former Governor Sanders; former Louisiana State
University football player Sidney Bowman from Hammond; and New Roads
sugar businessman Allen Ramsey Wurtele, a Republican. 86

Sanders,

Morning Advocate, October 16, 1940. Brooks’ friends evidently could
not resist a bit of highjinks following his victory. On the morning
after their victory parade in downtown Shreveport, groundskeepers at
the Caddo parish courthouse found a stuffed effigy bearing the name
"Sam Jones" hanging from a tree on the courthouse square. Overton
Brooks remained in Congress until his death in 1961, when his seat was
filled by Joe D. Waggonner in a special election. Congressional Direc
tory 88th Congress 1st Session (Washington, D.C., United States Gov
ernment Printing*Office, 1963), p. 65.
85Times-Picayune, July 23, 1940; Monroe Morning World, September 11,
15, October 16, 1940.
86
Morning Advocate, August 20, 1940; Congressional Directory 77th
Congress 1st Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government
Printing Office, 1941), p. 43. Wurtele is an interesting character.
In addition to his New Roads sugar interests, he owned a factory in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, had invented a process to turn white sugar
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scion of a family whose anti-Longism had included the elder Sanders’
celebrated fisticuffs with Huey Long in the lobby of the Roosevelt
Hotel in New Orleans during late 1927, had campaigned for Sam Jones
in the 1939-40 gubernatorial campaign, and allied himself firmly with
Jones and the reformers in this Congressional campaign.

87

Griffith and

Bowman both attacked Jones and the reformers, while Wurtele conducted
an anti-New Deal campaign.
Sanders received widespread support from Jones leaders throughout
the Sixth District, and Jones in his written endorsement cited the
advantages of Sanders’ prior service in Congress, as well as "his
into synthetic rubber, and had designed a mechanical cane harvester.
He had also attempted to dabble in international politics. When
Adolph Hitler demanded the city of Danzig and the Polish Corridor in
1938, Wurtele posted $5,000 as a start toward collecting $70,000,000
to buy the area and turn it over to Hitler in order to avoid spending
"5,000,000 human-lives and $100,'000,000'." Wurtele-'remarked when he
announced his Congressional candidacy that the plan "sounded silly when
it really was an extremely sane solution to the crisis at the time."
87
T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp.
271-272; Hammond Vindicator, July 5, 1940. The younger Sanders had
served in Congress from 1934 until 1936, when, he claimed, Richard
Leche and the Longites counted him out of office. Congressional Direc
tory 77th Congress 1 Session, p. 43. Sanders' 1934 election revealed
the strength with which good government forces had to fight the Longite
machine. Incumbent Sixth District Congressman Boliver Kemp died in
1933. Huey Long and Governor Oscar Allfen preferred to appoint a Long
ite as Kemp's successor, but a group of Sixth District residents led
by former United States Senator E. J. Gay demanded an election, and
threatened to hold one with or without Allen's approval. Allen subse
quently called an election to be held five days later, in which Mrs.
Boliver Kemp was elected. The citizens’ committee held its own elec
tion twenty-two days later, in which Sanders was elected. The House
refused to seat either Mrs. Kemp or Sanders, so Allen called another
election, and the Longite machine backed Agriculture Commissioner
Harry D. Wilson. Sanders was elected again, and this time the House
accepted the legitimacy of his election. J. Y. Sanders, Sr. commented
of the Sixth District that it was "the only one Huey Long has never been
able to dominate." Item, September 1, 1939.
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intimate knowledge of the,strawberry and dairy problems" as reasons
for his support-

The Hammond Democratic Club endorsed Sanders because

"we are all desirous of carrying on the work of reconstruction begun
by the recent gubernatorial election of the Hon. Sam Jones," and "[you
have] carried the banner of decency and honest government shoulder to
shoulder with us in our recent fight for the restoration of democracy
•
n88
m TLouisiana.

Sanders gratefully accepted the proffered support of the re
formers.

He expressed his sympathy with Jones' reform program and

told a Sixth District Sam Jones rally in Baton Rouge that the main
choice in the race was "between the two schools of thought in Louisiana,
those who believe in the graft and corruption of the past 12 years,
and those who are for honesty and decency in government."89
Sanders opened his campaign in Franklinton with a speech in which
he declared that democracy was indeed on trial "right here in the
United States." He commented, "Not only were these people who stole
public funds at fault, but the system in the state of Louisiana which
allowed such stealing and grafting to take place was also at fault."
Sanders touched on the national defense issue in a speech at Mandeville
in which he warned of the need for the United States to be armed and
trained now that only the British fleet stood between the New World
and the Nazis, but he concentrated his attack on the "Maestri-Longgg

Hammond Vindicator, August 9, 16, 1940; Times—Picayune, August 14,
1940.
89

Town Talk, August 6 , 1940; Hammond Vindicator, August 9, 16, 1940.
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Leche machine" which had supported Griffith in 1936 and 1938. 90
Representative Griffith began his campaign in absentia, with a
political advertisement in which he maintained that "world conditions
are such that it is necessary for Congress to remain in session and
this prevents my returning home at this time to conduct a personal
campaign"and stressed the importance of his membership on a "major
committee" (Naval Affairs). "Local Democratic Friends" paid for an
other advertisement which asked voters to "Return John K. Griffith to
Congress" because "This is no time to play petty politics in National
Affairs and there should be no change made in our Congressmen or Senators in Washington that would delay the preparedness program."91
Griffith also launched virulent attacks on both Sanders and Jones.
He charged that Jones "is attempting to drive the people like cattle
and to tell them how to vote" with his endorsement of Sanders and re
marked that "there has never been in Louisiana's political history a
dictator so oppressive in his domination, a governor so arrogant and
vindictive as the present occupant of the executive mansion in Baton
Rouge.

He holds that any man who raises his voice against him is un

fit for public office." Griffith also attacked Sanders ("It is not safe
to send such a man to Congress in perilous times.") for alleged exces90
Morning Advocate, August 18, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, August 30,
1940.
91
Hammond Vindicator, August 23, 30, 1940.
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sive absence during his previous Congressional term. 92
Sidney Bowman, the third candidate in the Sixth District race,
also waged an anti—Jones and anti-Sanders campaign.

Bowman also at

tacked Sanders' absence on crucial Congressional roll call votes and
charged that Sanders had been only a minor figure in Jones' guberna
torial campaign and "only blossom[ed] forth after this administration
went into power, and then he and they went haywire promising jobs."
Furthermore, Bowman attacked Governor Jones, who, he said, "has re
placed dictatorship with autocracy." He also remarked that the Jones
reoganization amendment, which was also on the ballot in the 1940
fall election, "does to the government of Louisiana what Hitler,
Stalin, and Mussolini did to their countries." Bowman asked rhetori
cally "who do you imagine they found to do the job of reorganizing
Louisiana?" and answered his own question:

"It was Griffenhagen & Co.,

a good old German firm with a good old German background."93 Neverthe
less, Sanders profited from his association with the reformers and de
feated both his opponents in the first Democratic primary.
The Louisiana Seventh District campaign was no contest.

Incumbent

Congressman Rene L- DeRouen announced that he would not run for reelection because of poor health.

The only candidate who qualified to

run for DeRouen's seat was Vance Plauche, a Lake Charles attorney who
92Morning Advocate, Spetember 4, 9, 1940. Griffith-also attacked the
younger Sanders for the senior Sanders’ absences during his own Con
gressional career. Griffith maintained that the elder Sanders missed
every roll call during December, 1919, and January, 1920, while he was
in Louisiana campaigning for gubernatorial candidate John M. Parker.
93

Ibid., August 31, September 1, 9, 1940.
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was also Sam Jones' friend, campaign co-manager, and Jones' first head
of Civil Service.

Jones enthusiastically endorsed Plauche's candidacy.

Plauche ran unopposed in both the Democratic primaries and the general
election. 94
The Eighth District race, in contrast, featured a thoroughgoing
Longite, a thoroughgoing reformer, and a genuine Long.

Incumbent

Longite Congressman A. Leonard Allen was an educator in rural Grant
and Winn Parishes before entering the legal profession in Winnfield in
1922.

Allen was first elected to Congress in 1936. 95 The Long family

member in the race was Dr. George Shannon Long, Huey and Earl’s older
brother who had been a dentist and state representative in Oklahoma
before moving back to Louisiana in 1934, originally to Monroe, and then
to the small community of Dry Prong in rural Grant parish.

George

Long, unlike his brothers, was a World War I veteran and thus avoided
the cowardice charges which had dogged Huey and Earl. 96
James B. Aswell, Jr., ably represented the reformers in the Eighth
District race.

Aswell was the son of former State Superintendent of

Education (1904-08) and Eighth District Congressman (1913-31) James
B. Aswell, who, along with Governor Newton Crain Blanchard, had

Town Talk, July 18, 1940; Times-Picayune, July 19, 1940; Congression
al Directory 77 Congress 1 Session, p. 43. John B. Foumet to Rene L.
DeRouen, July 22, 1940, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Fournet Collection).
95Town Talk, September 6 , 1940; Congressional Directory
1 Session, p. 43.

77 Congress

^Town Talk, July 5, 1940; Williams, Huey Long, p. 16, 22; Congression
al Directory 83 Congress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States
Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 53.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

297

established a modem education system in the state-

The younger

Aswell had a promising national literary career during the 1920s and
1930s.

Short stories he wrote appeared in major magazines of those

decades, including Collier’s, and became a mainstay of College Humor.
Aswell by 1927 had also begun a newspaper column, "My New York," and
by 1931 became Broadway correspondent for the Central Press Association.

97

Increasing difficulty in selling his material during the

late 1930s, however, led to Aswell's deep disillusionment with the
American literary establishment and prompted his return to Natchitoches
Parish in September, 1938, to become a "Farmer-Writer," as he described
himself.

Aswell hitched his wagon to the Sam Jones star in 1939 as a

Jones campaign leader in the Eighth District and became State Director
of Publicity following Jones' election. 98
Aswell was displeased with Congressman Allen’s representation of

Rodney Cline, Builders of Louisiana Education (Baton Rouge, Bureau
of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education, Louisiana
State University, 1963), pp. 14-16; Merritt. Hubbard to Ann Watkins,
October 28, 1929; Polly Hightower to James B. Aswell, Jr., December
12, 1927; H. N. Swanson to Aswell, December 9, 1929; Swanson to Carol
Hill, January 13, 1930; Anne L. Young to Aswell, November 11, 1929;
Mark Hellinger to Aswell, March, 1931, Aswell Collection.
98
James B. Aswell, Jr. to Ann Watkins, January 15, 1935; Watkins to
Aswell, January 8 , 1935; H. N. Swanson to Aswell, July 31, 1933; re
jection slips from Ladies Home Journal, April 4, 1930, Cosmopolitan,
June 2, 1930; Aswell 1938 Voter Registration Certificate, Aswell Col
lection; Morning 'Advocate, June 23, 1942. Aswell’s deepening bitter
ness is clearly evident in his papers. On July 29, 1933, he wrote to
Swanson that "I am interested in telling stories and this columning
business is getting in my har . . .I'm sick of it and sick of New York.
I want new stimuli, new surroundings, new color, new friends." By
1939, however, he was much more blunti "To hell with the whole God
damned bunch of pink old ladies who run the three or four magazines
which can make or break a writer’s career. I'll devote myself to an
other career which leads to a point where I can make or break them."
Aswell to Sydney A. Sanders, July 3, 1939, Aswell Collection.
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the Eighth District.

He remarked early in 1940 that "the people might

as well send a postcard up there [Washington] as to depend upon the
incumbent's efforts."

This perception of Allen, plus Aswell's determi

nation to help rid the state of all vestiges of Longism, led him to
announce his candidacy for the Eighth District post. 99
Aswell waged a campaign at once anti-Long and pro-preparedness.
In his opening campaign speech, a radio broadcast from Alexandria, the
major city of the Eighth District, Aswell recalled that Allen "defended
the regime of graft and corruption from every stump he could get hold
of" in the recent gubernatorial campaign.

He later dubbed Allen "the

zero Congressman of the United States" because no bill he introduced
had ever passed both houses of Congress, and called him "a little
machine congressman. ,,100
Aswell also stressed his support for United States preparedness,
referring often to the fall of the French republic to the Nazi jugger
naut:

"as Marshall Petain said, France fell because the citizens had

become soft and divided and self-indulgent.

[Teachers] must toughen

and steel the young people in their care for the greatest crisis this
country has ever faced." His Fourth of July address brimmed with
patriotic fervor:

'

From here on out we must be tough; we must be
99
Town Talk., April 26, 1940: Aswell to Mrs. J. W. Smith, July 30,
1939, Aswell Collection. Aswell wrote to Mrs, Smith that "I love this
country and the people in it. They do not deserve to be governed by
thieves and incompetents, and if enough of us yell 'Thief!' maybe a
majority of them will be caught and jailed. I'm going to keep on
yelling."
^^Town Talk, July 18, August 27, 30, 1940.
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tough in our determination to keep this island
of democracy free in a world where chains clank
and the marching feet of aggressors sound
louder and louder . . . Our Maginot line con
sists in (sicy the steel resolution of our own
characters. If that line holds, America is
safe from any foe on earth.
Aswell also linked Allen with the tired old politicians who had lost
France:

"France had too many Leonard Allens in office and we have too

many xn ....
washxngton. fflOl
Aswell did not wage only a negative campaign.

He outlined his

plans for conservation, reforestation, industrialization, and voca
tional education, including a proposal to gear vocational training to
acutal industrial need, but centered most of his campaign on attacking

... 102
Allen.
The established reformers joined in his effort to unseat Allen.
Precinct captains, co-captains, and campaign workers of the Jones
organization in Alexandria endorsed Aswell.

Jones-Noe alliance forces

throughout the Eighth District met in Alexandria and unconditionally
endorsed Aswell.

Governor Jones formally endorsed him on August 12,

calling him "the only one of the candidates who supported the present
administration and is able, courageous, and fearless." 103
Aswell also relied on a network of "Junior Jim Aswell Clubs,"
organizations of young voters dedicated to electing a young man (Aswell

^ ^ Ibid., June 26, July 5, August 27, 1940.
102

Ibid., July 18, August 27, 1940.

103Ibid., August 2, 5, 13, 1940.
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was born, in 1908, Allen in 1891, Long in 1883) to represent them-

As

club director Cecil Roberts remarked, ’’Since we are the ones to have
to live under future governments, we want a young man who understands
our needs to lay a strong foundation for that government.’’ Following
the failure to defeat Allen in 1940, Aswell wrote to Roberts, ”Do your
best to keep the Jim Aswell clubs alive during the next two years and
we will hand Allen a defeat next time."^^
In the face of the reformers allied against him, Congressman Allen
drew the mantle of his incumbency tightly around himself-

"To dis

charge an experienced representative at this critical time is like
discharging a skilled surgeon in the midst of a major operation," he
wrote.

Allen’s secretary, D- M. Riddle, announced, however, that the

Congressman was too busy in Washington to campaign full-time in the
district. 105
*

Allen also identified himself as "a consistent foe of un-Ameri
canism, [who has] supported every move in Congress to stamp out unAmerican ’isms’ and has always championed Congressman Dies," and noted

Ibid., July 17, 1940; James B. Aswell to Cecil Roberts, September
12, 1940, Aswell Collection; Congressional Directory 77 Congress 1
Session, p. 43; Congressional Directory 83 Congress 1 Session, p. 53.
Allen retained his Eighth District seat until 1952, when George Long
was elected. Long, in turn, served until 1958, when he was defeated
by Harold McSween. Congressional Directory 86 Congress 1 Session
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1959),
p. 60.
^ ^Town Talk, July 15, 1940. A Leonard Allen to Dr. Joseph Bath, July
27, 1940, Aswell Collection. Aswell thought Allen’s absence from the
district was only a coy deception. He recalled Allen’s two trips to
Louisiana to campaign for Earl Long only a few months previously and
remarked that Allen seemed to be willing "to go 2,000 miles . . . to
defend graft and corruption anywhere it cropped up." Town Talk, July
18, 1940.
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that he had authored a bill to deport American Communist Party leader
Harry Bridges.

While he defended his support of preparedness ("Mr.

Allen has long supported adequate national defense . . . and time has
proven the wisdom of his position"), he continued to oppose active
American intervention in the shooting war ("We must not sentence the
flower of American manhood to die on the battlefields of Europe . . .
The mothers and fathers know that he can be depended upon to continue
his fight to keep our boys out of Europe").
Allen eventually campaigned personally in the district, but he
also utilized a new refinement of Huey Long's old practice of using
sound equipment mounted on trucks.
Huey Long’s campaign caravans.

Sound trucks became staples of

By 1940, however, new improvements in

the quality of sound recording made the live politician unnecessary.
Allen utilized two sound trucks equipped with tape recordings of his
speeches and the amplifiers necessary to broadcast them.^^

Unfortu-

Town Talk, July 16, 1940- Allen's patriotic stance led Major Gen
eral 0. R. Gellette, Adjutant General of the Order of the Stars and
Bars, to call upon all Confederate veterans, and widows, children, and
friends of Confederate veterans to vote for Allen because of "his
fight against the sinister forces of foreign 'isms' which are now
seeking to undermine and destroy our great nation." Town Talk, August
1, 1940. Apparently, no one thought it strange for a Confederate vet
eran to speak out against "forces . . . which are now seeking to under
mine and destroy” the United States just as he had once done.
^ ^ Ibid., August 31, 1940. The Town Talk, however, immediately real
ized the long-range implications of this campaign device and commented
that "if television could be hooked up to the new type broadcast
trucks, a politician could 'visit' in person and carry on a campaign
throughout his district or state and remain comfortable in his office
all at the same time.." The later widespread use of television recievers, of course, made it possible for politicians to wage their cam
paigns without bothering with the sound trucks. Louisiana had received
its first look at television on September 11, 1939., when RCA set up
special broadcasting and receiving equipment at the D. H. Holmes depart
ment store in New Orleans. The demonstration broadcast included state
ments by Robert Lienhard, president of Holmes, Leo Hirsch, president of
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nately, no extant records reveal how many potential voters were willing
to attend a political rally in which they looked at a truck and lis
tened to a taped political speech.
Despite his largely absentee campaign, Allen was renominated in
the first Democratic primary, but by only a slim 503 vote margin over
the combined votes of his opponents.

Allen received 21,835 votes to

Aswell’s 17,013 and Long's 4,219.108
Overall, Governor Jones was pleased with the result of the 1940
election.

Even though the reformers failed to make a clean sweep of

the Congressional seats, reformers now sat in five of them. Moreover,
the three incumbent Congressmen, sensing the depth of reform sentiment,
promised to cooperate with the state administration "toward the up
building of a better and greater state and the securing of national
recognition. ,.109
The 1942 midterm Congressional elections in Louisiana were, as
most midterm elections are, much less exciting than the elections which
coincide with presidential elections-

The 1942 political season was a

relatively quiet interlude between the major campaigns of 1940 and
1944.

The 1942 contests are notable, however, for the Old Regular

switch from their temporary alliance with the reformers supporting Hale
the local RCA supply company, and an interview with Tulane football
coach Lowell "Red" Dawson and Athletic Director Dr- Wilbur C. Smith.
Stores in Louisiana were not selling televisions in 1939 because there
were no broadcast stations in the area, but Holmes assured its cus
tomers that new RCA radios came equipped with adapters which would
allow the radios to receive television signals when New Orleans built
a television station.
108
Town Talk, September 11, 1940.
109Morning Advocate, November 7, 1940.
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Boggs in the Second District, J. Y. Sanders’ loss to James H- Morrison
in the Sixth District, and Longite Allen J. Ellender's re-election to
the United States Senate even though reformer E. A. Stephens attempted
to unseat him.
Early speculation that former Governor James A. Noe would run for
Ellender’s Senate seat faded away in 1942 as federal investigators
closed in on Noe in the Win or Lose Oil Company tax evasion case.^^
By 1942, moreover, Noe and Sam Jones had reached the end of their
temporary alliance.

Therefore, New Orleans businessman and former

President of the New Orleans Dock Board, E. A. Stephens, a reformer
who had worked in Jones’ gubernatorial campaign, took up the reform
banner in the Senate campaign.
Stephens cast his campaign as an attempt to stop "dictatorship
[that] is again attempting to raise its ugly head in this state with
a carefully worked out and well-financed plan." Stephens portrayed
Ellender as an integral component of the Longite machine who was
serving as a point man in an attempted Longite resurgence with which
the machine hoped to place Robert Maestri in the governor's chair in
1944.111
Ellender and his allies struck back at the reformers.

They had

considered Stephens a suspicious character since Jones appointed him

^*^Noe received a gold pen from the audience at a testimonial dinner
in his honor held at Farmerville in April, 1940. The Master of Cere
monies told him that they hoped he would sign committee reports with
it "when you go to Washington to serve in that great body [the Senate]."
Robert M. McGehee to Allen J. Ellender, April 19, 1940, Ellender Col
lection.
*^ Morning Advocate, June 16, July 9, 14, 1942.
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to the Dock Board• The Farmer’s Friend, newspaper of the Farmers'
Protective Union and mouthpiece of James H. Morrison, attacked Stephens
as a "pal and cohort of Hitler’s No. 1 U. S. Agent Baron von Spiegel."113
(Edgar von Spiegel was the German consul in New Orleans until he was
expelled along with other German diplomats by President Roosevelt in
June, 1941.)

Stephens replied that while he served as president of

the Dock Board, he was coolly civil to the German consul but had not
developed a warm friendship with him.
Ellender also attempted to build a consensus of all Louisianians
by playing on the war issue.

"This is no time for factional or person

al politics," he said in his formal statement of his candidacy.

"I do

not believe that anyone should turn their thoughts to personal politi
cal matters, but that we should all pull together." This belief, how
ever, did not prevent Ellender from launching a personal attack on
Stephens for his supposed "foreign" birth (Stephens was a native of
Virginia).

The Farmer’s Friend, a newspaper not noted for its objectivity, al
so remarked that "This latest obnoxious appointment made by stupid Sam
Jones will give the Nazis an inside track into the biggest and most
important utility in the State of Louisiana." Farmer’s Friend, (n.d.),
Fournet Collection.
,
113
In fact, the reformers themselves had been suspicious of von Spiegel.
Governor Jones requested Secretary of State Cordell Hull to investigate
the German’s activities as early as the summer of 1940. Times-Picayune, June 18, 1940; States, June 16, 1941.
114
Morning Advocate July 22, August 19, 1942. Dr. George Long, in his
statement endorsing Stephens, remarked of Ellender that "I know the
friends of Huey Long. I know the Huey Long program inside out, and I
also know a hypocrite when I see one.” Stephens wondered whether
Maestri and Ellender, had they been alive in 1815, would have rushed
to the Chalmette Battlefield and shouted to Andrew Jackson, "Stop! You
can't save our city and our nation! You are a foreigner from Tennessee!"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

305

The striking feature of the 1942 Senate race in Louisiana is its
aura of "politics as usual." The war became a poor second best issue
as the factions battled for the Senate seat.

Ellender retained the

seat, and that, as a matter of fact, signaled something of a Longite
resurgence, just as the reformers feared.
The Congressional races in 1942 were generally lackluster.

Vance

Plauche chose not to run for re-election from the Seventh District,
leaving that race wide open.

State Representative William J. Dodd

considered a campaign for the office, but the Army draft called him
into service, and he chose not to ask for a deferment to run for
Congress.

Opelousas insurance man Henry D. Larcade was subsequently

elected to the post over J. L. McHugh, who had Governor Jones’ active
«. 115
support.
Among Congressional races, however, the Sixth District proved to
be the most rousing because of James H. Morrison’s entry in the cam
paign.

J. Y. Sanders opened his campaign in July with a ringing an

nouncement of his support for President Roosevelt’s conduct of the war.
Morrison, however, questioned Sanders’ participation in the conduct of
that war.

"While our beloved people were beset with worries that their

sons in the armed forces be given adequate equipment," Morrison fumed,
what was this Sam Jones rubber stamp doing?" He then answered his own
question:

”. . . little J. Y. Sanders was helping to author, support,

and vote for a pension bill for himself . . . , was securing for him-

*^William J, Dodd to John B. Fournet, March 10, 1942, August 21, 1942,
October 2, 1942, Fournet Collection; Congressional Directory 78 Con
gress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing
Office, 1942), p. 43; Morning Advocate, October 15, 1942.
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self an X [unlimited gasoline] rationing card, and playing petty
politics at the request and dictates of Gov. Jones."^^
Morrison's platform was a mixture of planks pledging "to do every
thing possible to win the war as soon as possible," as well as "to
support President Roosevelt’s war policy 100%," and also planks
promising jobs and benefits for the Sixth District:

army camps along

with the civilian jobs they provided, more federal funds for old age
pension and welfare rolls, and "100% cooperation with all labor organi
zations."

Sanders objected to Morrison promising to support the war

in Congress when he had not supported it by serving in the armed
forces.

"By his own actions and utterances," Sanders said, "he has

branded himself an Isolationist, and Obstructionist, an Objector to
Military Service in time of war, an advocate of the America First Com
mittee, and the German Bund, and a sympathizer of [Burton K.] Wheeler,
[Hamilton] Fish, and [Charles] Lindbergh.
Despite Sanders' plea with Sixth District voters not to vote "a
draft exemption to ’allergic-to-khaki’ Morrison," he lost the elec
tion by the slim margin of 27,990 votes to 29,078 for Morrison.
While the 1942 off-year elections stirred little interest in
Louisiana, the 1944 presidential election year attracted a great deal
of attention within the state.

President Franklin Roosevelt during

his unprecedented four elections to the presidency created deep

*^Morning Advocate, July 8, 12, 1942. Sanders maintained that he
had not voted for a $4,000 pension for himself, and that statements
to the contrary were "either malicious fabrications of a perverted
intellect or they are the delusions of a diseased imagination.”
**^Ibid., October 2, 4, 15, 1942.
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divisions within the Democratic party as it adopted a more liberal
agenda to attract the allegiance of the increasingly urban American
population.

This shift left the conservative rural South behind.

Its

frustration led to overt attempts to wrest control of the party from
the liberal forces which had increasingly controlled its agenda since
Roosevelt’s election in 1932.
Governor Jones reflected the frustration felt by both Louisiana
and the South in his article "Will Dixie Bolt the New Deal?" pub
lished in the March 6 , 1943, issue of the Saturday Evening Post.
Jones argued that Roosevelt, despite his lengthy residence at his
"Little White House" at Warm Springs, Georgia, knew little about the
South, and that New Deal economic policies "continued to kick an al
ready prostrate South in the face." The national administration had
denied the South its due share of public investments, and had contin
ued the railroad freight-rate disparity between North and South which
worked to the detriment of the South.

Moreover, Roosevelt had shown

sympathy for the stirrings of the black struggle for civil rights.
Therefore, Jones suggested, it was time for the Solid South to abandon
its blind allegiance to the Democratic party. 118
Jones did not come suddenly to his conclusions.

In late December

1942, he had remarked:
I can’t see why we should continue to give ad
herence to a party which has treated us worse
than the Republican party has ever treated us
118Sam H. Jones, "Will Dixie Bolt the New Deal?" Saturday Evening
Post, March 6 , 1943, pp. 20-21, 42, 45; Garson, The Democratic Party
and the Politics of Sectionalism, p. 95..
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on these issues [allocation of war contracts].
I can’t see why we should adhere to the Demo
cratic party if we are going to be a step
child. I don't see why we shouldn’t form our
own Democratic party and join with the people
of the Middle West.H9
The Morning Advocate editorially endorsed Jones' proposals.

The

governor’s concerns, the newspaper remarked, "highlights a growing re
volt by Southern leaders against what they consider unfair legislation
and economic discrimination." Furthermore, "What we have had in
Washington for ten years is of all things, not the Democratic party
the South knows." The answer to the problem appeared obvious to the
editorial writers:
fathers.

"We should not be chased out of the home of our

Rather, we should throw out those who have usurped the party

a
raiment and
its name. ,,120
*

Not all Louisianians shared these feelings.

Roosevelt still re

tained a strong and loyal following within the.state.

J. F. McDougall

wrote a letter to the editor of the New Orleans States in May, 1942,
full of glowing praise for the president:
From George Washington, down through the years to
the present time, He [God] has never failed us.
At this time when the whole world is at war, when
if this nation ever needed a man of great wisdom
and understanding, God has proved that He loves
us and the things we are fighting for, humanity,
peace, and honor, by giving us a great leader, our
119Morning Advocate, December 3, 1942.
120

Ibid., December 10, 1942.
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beloved President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Senator Allen Ellender urged the United States Senate to designate
Roosevelt as "supreme leader" of the Allied war effort during the
summer of 1942.

In April, 1944, the Louisiana State Federation of

Labor urged Roosevelt to accept the Democratic party nomination for an
unprecedented fourth term as president.

New Orleans industrialist

Andrew Jackson Higgins in a national radio speech in May, 1943, said
that if the war lasted until 1944, Roosevelt should be returned to
office because "This war is not time for discord."

Higgins by then

also realized the economic benefit Louisiana reaped from the war. He
alone employed some 20,000 people at seven plants producing war goods
in New Orleans
As usual, the main bout in Louisiana during the 1944 presidential
election concerned the Democratic party.

Louisiana's delegation to the

Republican National Convention in Chicago unanimously voted to nominate
the eventual Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey of New York, and
Louisiana Republican National Committeeman John E. Jackson of New
Orleans issued a statement that "The people of Louisiana, as well as
the rest of the South, are tired of the New Deal, and I believe [they]
121

States, May 5, 1942; Shreveport Journal, June. 25, 1942; Morning Ad
vocate, April 9, .1943, April 5, 1944; Town Talk, May 17, 1943; Jack B.
McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics,” Louisiana His
tory, Summer, 1974, pp. 274-275. Despite the State Federation of Labor
endorsement, however, not all of Louisiana’s working class favored
Roosevelt. Federal Marshals shot and wounded Cylton Moses of Rapides
Parish when they arrested him in December, 1943, for "making threaten
ing remarks against the bodily welfare of the president of the United
States." In addition, Frank Joseph Daulong, a railroad telegraph oper
ator from Ruston, pled "not guilty" in April, 1945, to charges that he
had threatened Roosevelt’s life. Witnesses, however, claimed that he
said, "If someone does not kill him soon, T have a notion of doing it
myself," on one occasion, and "I hope someone gets him tonight. If
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will go along with the Republican ticket."

122

Republican politics in

Louisiana, however, remained the sideshow while the Democrats dominated
the midway.
The Democrats felt rumblings of discontent throughout 1943.

Gov

ernor Jones joined with Governor Ellis Amall of Georgia at the 1943
Southern Governor’s Conference and called for an end of the Democratic
Solid South so that both parties would have to solicit the South’s
electoral votes.

The Democratic National Committee called for cam

paign funds, and Francis J. Whitehead, Assistant Secretary of the
Louisiana Democratic Central Committee, replied that requests of funds
would probably go unheeded "unless the Democrats soon straighten out
their politics respecting the South . . . "

Louisiana Senator John

Overton denounced a fourth term for Roosevelt:

"I opposed a third

term and I will:even more strongly oppose a fourth term, war or no war.
The precedent established when our government was formed should not be
broken.

We will be plagued in years to come for our present actions."123

The election year of 1944 brought no end to the incipient Southern
rebellion in Louisiana.

Forty Democratic leaders from South Carolina

they don’t, I’ll go do it myself,” on another.
December 24, 1943, April 4,- 1945.

Morning Advocate,

122

Shreveport Times, June 26, 1944; States, June 29, 1944. Political
contributions to the DNC from the South were an especially important
lever because Southern Congressional elections were almost invariably
settled in the Democratic primaries.. This meant that the Southern con
tributions could be channeled into Northern Congressional races in
which Democrats faced strong Republican challengers,.and thus needed
extra money. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics'of Sec
tionalism,.p. 97*
123 ■• ■
■........
Town Talk, March 26, June 17;, 19, 1943; Shreveport Times, July 9,
1943.
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Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida met in Shreveport about one
month before the Democratic National Convention in June.

The dis

gruntled delegates agreed "to drive the New Deal, the CIO Communists
and negroes'(sic) out of control of the Democratic party and restore
state’s rights."

The delegates hoped to put together a one-hundred

vote block of delegates to the national convention who were opposed to
10/
Roosevelt’s nomination.
Insurgent Louisiana Democrats threatened further action.

Demo

cratic State Chairman Frank Looney announced on July 4, that resolu
tions to declare the Louisiana electors "free agents with the right to
cast their vote for a Democrat for president and vice president other
than the nominee of the party" would be introduced at the Committee’s
next meeting in September.

In addition, the Committee elected Repre

sentative Henry Clay Sevier of Tallulah as the new national committee
man to replace House Speaker Norman Bauer, who resigned to devote more
time to his personal and House business.
Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Sevier was an avowed foe of

125

Franklin Roosevelt announced during July that he would accept a
fourth nomination.

As the Democratic delegates gathered in Chicago

for the national convention, Sam Jones met with the Louisiana delegates
and announced that his informal poll of the delegation had revealed a
great deal of support for conservative Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia
^A *

‘

‘

Shreveport Times, June 10, 1944; Morning Advocate,'June 10, 1944.
The Democrats had abandoned .the "two-thirds rule” only in 1932 (partly
at the insistence of Huey Long),.when Roosevelt’s.supporters-attracted
enough votes at the national convention to overturn it.
105

•

Shreveport Times, July’5, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 5, 1944.
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for president, and that "we will join with other Southern states in
opposing the nomination of Mr. Wallace for vice-president." Old Regu
lar delegates, however, were not so sure that Louisiana should abandon
the president.

Typically, the Old Regulars held that Roosevelt's

nomination was certain, even with the threatened Southern revolt, and
that Louisiana should protect its interests by staying with the
winner. 126
When the Louisiana delegation met in caucus to decide which candi
date to support for president, the insurgents carried the day.

Demo

cratic Committeeman Sevier moved that Louisiana endorse Harry Byrd.
Before Sevier's motion came to a vote, however, Old Regular James
Comisky of New Orleans made a substitute motion to endorse Roosevelt.
Comisky’s motion came to a vote first, and lost by a 14-6 margin.
Sevier's original motion then carried on a 16-4 vote.

Under the unit

rule, therefore, all 22 of Louisiana's votes (two delegates were ab
sent from the caucus) went to Senator Byrd.

The caucus also approved

by a voice vote ("a unanimous roar") a resolution presented by visitor
Wright Morrow of Texas which included opposition "with all vigor" to
any platform plank favoring social equality between the races, favoring
anti-poll tax legislation, and advocating the right of all states to
manage their domestic affairs without restraint from the federal
127
government.

.

^ ^States, July 18., 1944.
127
........
Item, July 19, 1944?' Morning Advocate, July 19, 1944.
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Even though he suffered defections on the Southern front, Roose
velt easily garnered his fourth nomination as president.

He received

1,176 votes on the first ballot, compared to eighty-nine votes for
Byrd (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia), and one vote for James A.
Farley.

Louisiana’s standard, however, did not join the exuberant

victory demonstration on the convention floor.

One of the anti-

Roosevelt delegates tied it tightly in place with a handkerchief to
keep an enthusiast
tion.

from unauthorized use of it during the demonstra

(The Mississippi and Texas standards were similarly tied in

.128
place.)
Following Roosevelt’s nomination, attention turned to the vicepresidential nomination.

The South was still opposed to Vice-president

Henry Wallace, and this time Roosevelt was not disposed to save him.
He still personally supported Wallace but bowed to the wishes of
leading urban party bosses who believed that Wallace had no chance of
nomination because of opposition from the Southern states and turned
to United States Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri. 129
Sam Jones had to dampen a vice-presidential boomlet in his favor.
Walter Sillers, chairman of the Mississippi delegation, George Butler
of the Texas delegation, and Louisiana’£ John Fred Odom attempted to
128
Item, July 21, 1944; Morning Advocate, July 21, 1944,.
129
............. . ................................
Garson, The Democratic Party and the-Politicsiof Sectionalism, pp.
119—122; Merle Miller, Plain Speaking An Oral Biography "of Barry S.
Truman (New York, Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1974);, p. 189;. Cabell
Phillips; The Truman Presidency 'The History of a'Triumphant Succes
sion .(New York, The Macmillan Company, 1966)., p. 44; Alonzo .L.. Hamby,
Beyond the New Deal: Harry'S. Truman and American Liberalism (New
York, Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 32,'41..
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start a stampede toward Jones for vice-president, but Jones thought
that the Southern delegates should not "scatter their shots" on the
vice-presidential ballot, and instead hold their votes together in an
attempt to defeat Wallace.

Jones received promises of support from

five other states, but told a caucus of those states to focus their
support on a man who could obtain more national support than he could
count on.

The Louisiana delegation subsequently voted unanimously to

support Truman to the bitter end in order to defeat Wallace.

Truman

received the vice-presidential nomination on the second ballot. 130
Truman's nomination removed some of the bluster from the Southern
rebellion.

Sam Jones, interviewed late in the convention by Major

James E. Crown, remarked that "The defeat of the radical Easterners"
was the major accomplishment of the convention.

And the South, Jones

said, had led "[a] bold, courageous and determined fight . . . to pro
tect the traditions and principles the South-holds dear.” Had it not
been for the South, "the Democratic nominee for vice president would
not have been Senator Truman, but would have been a man who brazenly
flouted the traditions of the South." Southerners felt comfortable with
Harry Truman, grandson of slaveholders, because of his background in a
border state.

Their desperate attempt to nominate "anybody but Wallace"

however, caused them to overlook. Truman's support of the Hew Deal, and
his exposure to the problems of urban minority groupis as an associate
of the Pendergast organization in Kansas City.

Truman, while not an

ardent liberal, was more moderate than most of the South.. Southerners
130

*

:

.................

............................................

States, July 19-21, 1944'; Garson, The Democratic Party.:and the Poli
tics of'Sectionalism, p. 122;- Phillips, The' Truman Presidency, p. 47.
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would, therefore, feel betrayed when he supported liberal causes
during his own presidency, especially his order to desegregate the
armed forces and his attempt to renew the Fair Employment Practices
Commission.
Not all Louisianians swung to Roosevelt’s support in 1944, even
with Truman nominated as his running mate.

Irving L. Lyons wrote to

the States editor that he was planning to vote for Thomas Dewey:
". . . I am enough of an optimist to believe that this country has
not degenerated to the point where we have only one leader measuring
up to the demands of the times, critical though they may he . . ."
The "Southern Anti-New Deal Association," headquartered in Shreveport,
attacked Sidney Hillman, one of the founders of the Congress of In
dustrial Organizations and its National Political Action Committee and
a Roosevelt advisor: "today we have the foreign-born

Hi li man

pulling

the strings in the campaign to re-elect Roosevelt and the New Deal
..."

J. T. Powell, a New Orleans attorney, formed a "Democratic

Committee in Favor of Dewey," which instructed Democrats how to split
their ballots and vote for Dewey for President and Democratic candidates for local offices.

132

The gravest challenge to the Roosevelt-Truman candidacy in
Louisiana occurred when some of the state’s Democratic electors
131
~
.......
■States, July 22, 1.944; Morning Advocate, July 22,-1944; Miller,
Plain Speaking, pp. 79-80; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp, 41—56;
Alonzo L-. Hamby,. ’.'The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth,"
Journal of American History;.March, 1970, pp.-859-867. Jonathan
Daniels, The Man of Independence (New York, Lippincott> 1950), p. 234
maintains .that "Truman was.nominated by men ^ . .. who. knew what they
wanted, but did not know what .they were getting,.” •
132 ....
........
'
States, July 25, 1944;-'Town Talk, October 18, November 4, 1944.
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refused to sign a pledge to vote for Roosevelt and Truman, as re
quested by the Democratic State Central Committee.

Most members of

the state committee, except for a few Southern zealots, accepted the
Democratic ticket with the addition of Truman.
caused the main fireworks in the campaign.

The zealots, however,

The State Central Commit

tee replaced seven electors in October because four resigned rather
than sign the pledge, and an additional three electors refused to sign
but hoped to retain their posts.

These three, E. Wales Brown of

Shreveport, Bronier Thibault of Donaldsonville, and George Billeaud
of Broussard, filed suit seeking to overturn the Committee's action
dismissing them, but the Nineteenth Judicial District Court and the
First Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the Committee's action, citing
the Louisiana Supreme Court ruling in the 1940 Earl K. Long v. Wade
0. Martin, Sr. case, which upheld the State Central Committee's right
to determine Democratic nominees.

The Louisiana Supreme Court refused

to hear the case of the dissident electors. 133
Senator Truman personally brought the Democratic

ca m p a i gn

Louisiana with.a campaign trip to New Orleans in mid-October.

into
He.

toured the New Orleans waterfront and addressed the Mississippi Valley
Flood Control Association.

When asked about Democratic changes in the

election, Truman confidently replied that the South would remain Demo
cratic : "All a Southerner has to do is read the speeches of Dewey
and they will be all right." Furthermore, the continuation of the war
provided a strong attraction to the incumbent president:

"I.don't

^Morning Advocate, September 28, October 14-15, 1944;- States,
October'7, 17, 1944; Town Talk,'October 8,"1944.
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think people interested in winning the war will take the chance of
upsetting the cordial relations with our Allies and losing any more
* our young men. «134
of

Truman’s expectations for Democratic success were well founded in
Louisiana.

The Democratic ticket carried the state, and all ten of

Louisiana’s electors cast their votes for Roosevelt when they met in
December.

135

Moreover, the old threat of the summer before to with

hold Louisiana contributions from Democratic coffers did not material
ize.

A Congressional committee examining campaign expenditures in

April, 1945, found that Louisianians contributed $40,000 to Roose
velt’s campaign.

One-half the amount, however, came from New Orleans

industrialist Andrew J. Higgins, recipient of millions of dollars
worth of war contracts, and his family. 136
The 1944 Congressional elections resulted in the re-election of
all Louisiana's incumbent Congressmen.
occurred in the Sixth District.

The only spirited campaign

Incumbent Congressman James H. Morri

son drew several opponents, the most prominent of whom were East Baton
Rouge State Senator H. Alva Brumfield, and Tangipahoa Parish District
134
States, October 14-15, 1944. Truman later recalled of the 1944
campaign that "I found little evidence of any inclination to change
leaders during the war." He also remarked that people "just never
did trust” Dewey: "He had a moustache, for one thing, and since in
those days, during the war, people were aware of Hitler, that mous
tache didn’t do him any good.” Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S.
Truman One Year of Decisions (Garden City, New Jersey, Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1955), p. 193; Miller, Plain Speaking, p. 188.
135Morning Advocate, December 19, 1944.
136
Ibid., May 1, 1945; McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential
Politics," pp. 174-175.
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Attorney Boliver E. Kemp, Jr.

Morrison required a second primary to

defeat Brumfield. 137

United States Senator John Holmes Overton also faced a challenge
for his Senate seat when his term expired in 1944.

Overton at first

threw the race wide open when he announced in March, 1944, that he
intended to retire from politics and return to his Alexandria home.
(He was then sixty-nine years old.)

During Overton’s absence from

the race, several other candidates emerged.

Former Governor Noe an

nounced his intention to run for Overton’s seat but withdrew when his
campaign again failed to draw adequate support.

Former Governor Earl

Long announced that if Overton did not carry the Longite banner in the
Senate campaign, then he would become a candidate. E. A. Stephens
138
also announced his candidacy. Sam Jones, however, announced that he
would stick to his pledge to return to private life after his guber
natorial term, but "if the time should come when other vital issues
are at stake, I shall not hesitate to once again answer the call as I
did in 1939." Overton, however, changed his mind at the behest of
"Democratic colleagues in Washington," and "insistent demands from all
political factions in the state" and announced his candidacy for
re-election. 139
Overton based his campaign on both his record of support for the

^ ^ Morning Advocate, December 19, 1944.
*^Ibid., May 12, July 23, September 21, 1944.
^~^Ibid., May 18, 24, July 6 , 9, 1944; Item, May 24, 1944? Town Talk,
June 29, July 8 , 1944; States, July 8, 1944; John H.. Overton to W.
Scott Heywood, April 1, 1944, Heywood to Sam Jones, May 6 , 1944, Jones
to Heywood, May 12, 1944, Jennings-Heywood Collection.
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United States war effort and his efforts which provided "several
hundred million dollars" worth of flood control, navigation, irriga
tion, and reclamation projects to Louisiana.

He also revealed an un

easiness with the growth of the federal government.

The war, he said,

caused "a very appreciable amount of regimentation," but
I wish to assure you . . . that as soon as the
battle flags are furled I shall do all in my
power to abolish the mushroom agencies that have
grown overnight as adjunct to the prosecution
of the war and that I will undertake to drive
bureaucrats out of our federal government and
return to the basic principles of American
democracy.*40
Senator Overton, despite his announcement during 1943 that he
had been "stabbed in the back" by the Old Regulars who planned to
support James A. Noe in the 1944 Senatorial campaign, received support
from the Old Regulars and also from Senator Allen J. Ellender, who
asked Louisianians to "leave the team of Overton and Ellender intact
to carry the ball for Louisiana." Overton also received support from
some North Louisiana interests not normally associated with Longites.
The Shreveport Times revealed the reason for its support in its edi
torial endorsing Overton:

if Overton left the Senate, then both Louisi

ana Senators would be from South Louisiana.

His defeat would leave

North and Central Louisiana without the one Senate seat they normally
held by Louisiana political custom.

^ ^Morning Advocate, July 7, 25, August 9. 1944.
^ Ibid., July 27, August 16, 1944; Shreveport Times, July 30, 1944.
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Harry Truman's nomination as the Democratic vice-presidential
candidate permitted Overton to utilize the Missouri Senator’s support.
Several of Overton's campaign advertisements featured quotes from Sen
ator Truman praising Overton's defense preparedness record.

A typical

quote read, "we have need of you in the Congress, especially in the
furtherance of the war effort and in handling the very complicated
problems following the war." 142

It is impossible to imagine a Sena

torial candidate in Louisiana using Henry Wallace's endorsement in a
similar manner.

Indeed, the candidate’s opponent would have reaped

much more benefit than the candidate Wallace endorsed.
Overton's principal opponent in the 1944 Senate race was Stephens,
a veteran of the Sam Jones and Jimmie Davis gubernatorial campaigns,
and loser to Ellender in 1942.

Stephens flailed away at Overton,

attacking his age ("the country and this state need strongmen in the
U. S. Senate who are both mentally and physically able to help win this
peace"); his Longite alliance ("The issue is clear.

It is to turn over

the important post of United States Senator to [Robert] Maestri . . .
through the medium of my opponent and thus give Maestri a toe hold to
take over the state a few years from now . . ."); his opposition to
Roosevelt’s successful attempts to change the arms embargo at the be
ginning of World War II in order to ship arms to Britain and France
(Overton "joined hands with Senator [Gerald P.] Nye of North Dakota,
an avowed champion of Hitler, before Pearl Harbor").

143

142 :
Town Talk, August 30, 1944; Item, September 12, 1944.143
■
•
Morning Advocate, July 28, August 11, 1944; States August 11,
1944.
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Overton overcame his challengers in the first Democratic primary.
He defeated Stephens as well as his other two challengers in the race,
Fourteenth Judicial District Attorney Griffen T. Hawkins of Lake
Charles, and New Orleans real estate liquidator Charles S. Gerth.

The

New Orleans Item, in a post-mortem editorial on Stephens* candidacy,
found three reasons why he had lost: Sam Jones and Jimmie Davis chose
not to support him openly; many reformers chose to support Overton;
and late in the campaign, Stephens attempted to swing toward a more
liberal stance by endorsing the New Deal, thus causing some voters to
consider him indecisive and insincere. 144
The 1944 Presidential and Congressional races terminated federal
elections in Louisiana during the World War II years.

Contests for

the federal offices had several times reflected the bifactional di
vision in the state.

Despite the agreements between reformers and

Longites in some districts in the 1940 Congressional election, and the
reformers* decision not to endorse John Overton’s opponent in 1944,
federal elections in Louisiana during the war years were contested
along bifactional lines.

The two factions may have temporarily united

in support of a given candidate, but the rival political organizations
did not disappear.

When a temporary alliance unraveled, as did the Old

Regular/reformer alliance created in 1940, for example, the two fac
tions remained intact and ready to oppose each other.
The victory of the reformers in the 1940 Congressional elections,
following closely Sam Jones' displacement of the Longites on the state

^^Morhihg Advocate, September 21, 1944; Item, September 14, 1944.
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level, was the zenith of success for the anti-Long faction in federal
elections during the war years.

Voter displeasure with the Longites

contributed to reform success in five districts that year, but the
reformers failed to hold their gains as the excesses of the Louisiana
Scandals became only a memory.

Moreover, the reform faction could not

dislodge Longite control of both Louisiana's Senate seats.

Therefore,

while reformers enjoyed their success in several races during the war,
the Longite faction remained strong and fully capable of reasserting
its control of the state as it did in Earl Long's triumphant return as
governor in 1948.
Just as some Longites remained in power on the state level, other
members of the faction retained federal office.

After 1940, however,

their domination of Louisiana's Congressional delegation was not as
sured.

The 1940 state elections proved that Longites could be dis

lodged from state office and the 1940 federal elections proved that
they could be dislodged from Congressional office.

As the 1940s pro

gressed, however, and the Longite faction recovered its strength and
regained its voter appeal, that possibility became increasingly remote.
The war years also sowed the seeds of major discord in national
politics which burst forth during the later days of peace.

The Demo

cratic party in 1940 and 1944 beat back full-fledged Southern revolts
because of the political power, record of leadership, and overpowering
personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

By 1948, however, the South’s

anger at the Democratic party — by then well on its way to becoming
even more urban, liberal, and northern and thus less rural, conserva
tive, and Southern — could no longer be contained by President Harry
S.. Truman, and the party split apart.

Louisiana’s role in the post
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war era, however, lies beyond the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER VII

LOUISIANA OPINION AND THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II
As war spread across the European continent after the German
invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, public reaction in the
United States was divided, but generally supported the British and
French in their military opposition to German aggression.*- Robert
Dallek’s study of American reaction reveals that 80 per cent of the
American public in early September favored the Allies, and that from
50 per cent to 60 per cent specifically favored American aid to Britain and France.

2

Even with their pronounced preference for the

Allies, however, a majority of Americans unequivocally wished to keep
the United States out of the war, although the South tended to be more
pro-British and to support a more interventionist foreign policy than
did other sections of the country. 3
According to Leila Sussman, United States public opinion during

T. Harry Williams, ’’Interlude: 1918-1939” in The Selected Essays
of T. Harry Williams (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press,
1983), pp. 129-130; Arnold A. Offner, ”F. D. R. Remembered: Statesman
of Peaceful Means," Organization of American Historians Newsletter,
May, 1983, p. 24; Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt & the Isolationists 193245 (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 11.
2

Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,
1932-1945 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 201, 208.
3
James MacGregor Bums, Roosevelt the Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945
(New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp. 37, 41, 43;
Alfred 0. Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs (Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana State University Press, 1965), pp. 74-76; Howard K. Smith inter
viewed by Gus Weill, broadcast on WLPB, November 29, 1983.
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1940 was divided into three distinct groups:

an isolationist wing, a

pro-Ally wing, and a middle group sympathetic to the Allies, but
anxious to stay out of war-

Sussman also found that the last group
4
was larger than the other two.

Sources reflecting public opinion in Louisiana during the months
between German invasion of Poland in 1939 and United States entry into
the war in December, 1941, reveal that public reaction in Louisiana
was also divided, and that Sussman's three divisions of opinion con
form with sentiment in Louisiana as well as in the United States.

No

major Louisiana newspaper immediately called for United States entry
into the war on either side, and no major Louisiana newspaper was proAxis.

Most Louisiana editorial opinion clearly fell into Sussman's

third category:

sympathetic to the. Allies but wary of United States

involvement in the war.

In some newspapers, however, this wariness

was so pronounced that it bordered on outright isolationism.^
The outbreak of war did not catch Louisiana newspapermen com
pletely by surprise.

They had reported Adolph Hitler's early threats

to the safety of Europe, and as conflict neared, they focused on the
attempts to settle the crisis peacefully.
As the attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement failed, the
major Louisiana newspapers hoped that the United States would remain
aloof from the conflict.

For example, the New Orleans States on

—4

Leila Sussman, Dear F. D. R. A Study of Political Letter-Writing
(Totowa, New Jersey, The Bedminister Press, 1963), pp. 105-106.

^Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Louisiana Public Opinion and the Beginning of
World War II," paper presented to the Louisiana Historical Association
Annual Convention, March 26, 1983.
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September 1, 1939, maintained that the United States "must keep out of
this conflict . . . If European nations want to fight, let them spill
their own blood and provide their own materials, munitions, and
money." The New Orleans Item, meanwhile, was just as strongly com
mitted to keeping the United States out of war.

Citing a popular

isolationist contention that American participation in World War I
had come to nothing, the Item reminded its readers on September 2
that the unhappy nations of Europe, having
slaughtered each other at frequent intervals
for 2000 years, are not amenable to suasion
by us, [and] that our effort to help compose
their age-old quarrels for them and advance
civilization as a whole, by intervening in
their latest and greatest war, [World War I]
was frightfully injurious to ourselves without
doing them or civilization any proportional
good . . . their wars are no longer any of
our business.®
The strongest proponent in North Louisiana of strict American
neutrality in the new war was the Monroe Morning World. It warned on
the eve of war that "Europe is an unhappy, stricken land and nothing
is to be gained by casting our lot with hers . . . We will be worse
than foolish if we travel three thousand miles to throw ourselves once
again into the seething cauldron." The specter of World War I loomed
large before the Morning World: "We have not forgotten that thousands
of American lives and untold billions in American wealth and resources
were sacrificed.

Only history will reveal what good, if any, came

C.

New Orleans States, September 1, 1939, New Orleans Item, September
2, 1939.
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from that war."^
Isolationism, however, was not the unanimous reaction in North
Louisiana to the outbreak of war.

The Monroe afternoon daily news

paper, the News-Star, suggested that the new war began in part because
the United States had remained too aloof from world affairs following
World War I.
bother us."

"Now we shall find that World affairs are going to
In addition, the major North Louisiana daily newspaper,

the Shreveport Times, emerged in the early days of the war as a firm
supporter of Britain and France.

While the Morning World reminded its

readers that "many of our people came here to escape [Europe's
hatreds]," and the States regretted "that humanity is being shamefully
violated in Europe, that the blood of innocents is being shed.

But

there’s nothing we can do about it . . .," the Shreveport Times as
serted that the United States would only help Germany if it withheld
aid from Britain and France.

If the United States retained the ban on

munitions sales, the Times maintained, "we give encouragement to
further aggression . . . "

The Times also did not believe that the

American people were either disillusioned with the outcome of World
War I, or at least did not believe that the American people were so
disillusioned that they would, abandon the democracies to a Nazi future:
"Any attempt to do so, under the guise of safety and pacifism, would
be an injury to the conscience of the nation." Even though it had
no hesitation about accepting American material intervention in the
war, the Times was not immediately ready to commit American soldiers

^Monroe Morning World, August 30, 1939, September 20, 1939.
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to the fight-

Instead, the Times hoped that the supplies would take

the place of American soldiers." "Repeal of the [arms] embargo would
in reality be a sensible compromise, giving the democracies helpful
assistance but withholding from them the active military support of
Q

the United States."
In south Louisiana this sentiment in favor of supplying American
material aid to the Allies emerged in the editorial pages of the
Times-Picayune, which also considered judicious revision of national
neutrality policy a necessary American reaction to the war.

The

Times-Picayune recognized at once that the United States could not
allow a German victory.

It noted on the eve of the war that the

United States was "not prepared to let the present [neutrality] law
work its crippling effect on France and Britain as it did on Loyalist
Spain," and soon after the invasion of Poland the paper recognized
that "A vast American majority feels that upon [Hitler’s] decisive
defeat, with its demonstration that might does not make right, may
depend

survival of institutions, principles, and humane philosophies

prized by all civilized men and women."

The Times-Picayune, however,

also wanted American aid to go no further than equipment and supplies.
The question of whether the United'States should revise its
neutrality laws became an important issue after President Franklin
Roosevelt on September 13, 1939, called a special session of Congress
to meet on September 21 to consider a revision of the regulations in
O
Monroe News-Star, September 23, 1939; Morning World, August 30, 1939
States, September 4, 1939; Shreveport Times, September 9, 22, October
23, 1939.
9
New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 31, September 4, 1939-
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order to allow supply sales to the Allies on a "cash and carry"
basis
Roosevelt’s move toward providing material aid to the Allies
caused a strong reaction in Louisiana public opinion.

The Item re

ported that Louisianians were divided "about 50-50” on the question,
but, unfortunately, it did not provide the results of any scientific
polling by which it reached its conclusion.

Its perception of the

split in Louisiana, however, matches the split that newspaper columnist
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., found in his travels throughout the South
and which he reported to Roosevelt.
The north Louisiana newspapers split on this first important
issue of the new war into factions which lasted until June, 1940. The
Shreveport Times accepted Roosevelt's reasons for the amendments:
. . . if we retain the ban on munitions sales,
we merely help Germany by injuring her enemies.
That is, we say to Britain and France that de
spite the sea supremacy which they have won at
heavy cost, they are barred from buying munitions
in the United States, even though they pay cash
and carry the munitions on their own ships.
A silent acceptance of the need for Allied victory is implied in this
paragraph, and is given greater emphasis in the next paragraph of the
same editorial:

*^Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 200.
**Item, September 21, 1939; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American
Foreign Policy, p. 200.
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At a time when Germany is gathering fresh reserves
of munitions and supplies through her conquest of
Poland, we give encouragement to further aggres
sion by depriving the two great democracies of ac
cess to normal peacetime sources of supply.^
Even more strongly, the Shreveport Times stated tendayslater:
This law, which effectively aligns the United
States with the dictatorships by depriving
Britain and France . . . of an important source
of war supplies, should be torn down. That is
the least this country can do, in a time of
peril abroad, to show that it opposes domination
of the world by stark, merciless force.13
The Shreveport Times offered two reasons for maintaingits view
point of the neutrality amendments.

It first held that

. . . under any neutrality program, our own
belief is that an embargo system which chokes
off the sales of goods to belligerents, thus
causing unemployment and deepening the depres
sion, would promote the war spirit far more
quickly than would sale of munitions to all
comers.1^
It is important to remember that World War II broke out as the
Great Depression began to diminish, though none of the editorial
writers perceived at the time that economic conditions were improving
steadily, if slowly.

This explains why the Shreveport Times considered

economic reasons early in its policy formulation.

The United States

had just survived ten years of misery and knew of the latent violence
12

Shreveport Times, September 9, 1939.

^Ibid., September 19, 1939.
^Ibid., September 13, 1939.
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among unemployed men.

However fragile Roosevelt's recovery program,

the Times desired to "keep . . . busines on an even keel, avoiding
either a slump or a war boom." It had experienced enough of the
former, and was unprepared for the unimagined horrors of the latter.
The Times' second reason for accepting changes in the neutrality
law was more idealistic:
It is not in the mood of the American people
to withhold all aid from Great Britain and
France in the crucial struggle which they
face. Any attempt to do so, under the guise
of safety and pacifism, would be an injury
to the conscience of the nation, and would
in the end, generate the war spirit which all
hope now to c u r b .
Nevertheless, the Times could not completely abandon its prag
matic reasons for supporting the amendments:
Repeal of the embargo would in reality be a
sensible compromise, giving the democracies
helpful assistance but withholding from them
the active military support of the United
States — support which might require sending
American soldiers to fight on Europe's soil.-1®
Even though the Times * rhetoric was not jingoistic interventionism,
the results of the policy it advocated proved to be a step toward
sending American soldiers to fight on European soil, even though by
then in a conflict generally regarded as the United States' war, also.
The Morning World, meanwhile, maintained in its Armistice Day

^ Ibid., Septmeber 22, 1939.
16Ibid., October 23, 1939.
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editorial that "Our business is here.

We may be about all that is

left of a civilization where individual initiative has a fair chance.
The United States, it thought, was in continual danger, and it called
upon Congress for "a strong neutrality law which would be foolproof
and serve to discourage Europe from attempting to lure us into its
endless and cruel disputes." 18
This idealization created an anomalous picture of the United
States.

One Morning World editorial portrayed the United States as

the surviving hope for individual freedom and creativity in the world
gone mad, while analysis of another editorial reveals a shoddy, hard
hearted, calculating Uncle Sam:
News of air atrocities by Hitler's forces will
continue to come over the cables, and every
American deplores such barbarism.
But sympathy does not bring involvement in war
in this the Twentieth century. Not a combatant
in Europe today is in the war because of sym
pathy for some other nation. The law of selfpreservation has brought about the present
line-up. The law of self-preservation will
keep this nation out of it.*9
The Morning World continued to follow its noninterventionist line
during December, 1939, when it held that the United States would
actually harm the Allied cause if it joined in the fight:

^ Morning World, November 11, 1939.
18
Ibid., September 6 , 1939.
^Ibid., September 5, 1939.
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The messier this whole affair becomes, the more
evident it should be to the United States that
the biggest contribution we can make toward
better world conditions is to remain aloof.
Our whole democratic spirit may revolt at the
strangulation of helpless neutrals elsewhere
. . . But we could do nothing more than compli
cate things further by throwing ourselves into
the international r i o t . 20
The Morning World thought that the United States must concentrate
on itself with increased efforts toward self-purification and selfpreservation, an outlook not unlike its acceptance of other puritani
cal ideas for the country:
.We must concern ourselves with unemployment,
with security, with national economy. We must
try to set up a sound agricultural program and
to improve housing conditions. We must do all
these things while, at the same time, we keep
out of Europe's struggle, except insofar as we
can help in establishing peace.21
The Morning World, like the Shreveport Times, feared anything
that promised to cause economic disruption, even though they dis
agreed on how the United States should prevent that disruption.

The

Morning World was much more disillusioned by the outcome of World War
I and thought that war-time experience sufficient reason for keeping
the country out of the new war:
We have not forgotten the World war. It sowed
the seeds for the years of social discontent and
depression that followed. We have not forgotten
that thousands of American lives and untold

^Ibid., December 29, 1939.
^Ibid., December 31, 1939'.
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billions in American wealth and resources were
sacrificed. Only history will reveal what good,
if any, came from that war.22
The editorial writers of the Monroe News-Star remembered World
War I, also, but used the experience to stand the Morning World’s
reason for staying out of the new war on its head.

The News-Star

thought that the United States would indeed be involved in the new
war because they were not sufficiently involved in the last one:
Had we done our duty by the cause of world peace
and civilization, this war would have never got
going.
The fact is that we Americans welshed
after the world war was won . . . when we had
the job half completed, we quit . . .
Had we been an active member of the League of
Nations from its inception, the entire world
picture today would be different . . .
But we in the United States simply did not wish
to be bothered by world affairs. Now we shall
find that world affairs are going to bother us. J
The Shreveport Journal recognized early that Britain and France
were waging a war for civilization as they knew it, a concept that che
Morning

World did not recognize until later, but even so, the Journal

did not call for early American intervention in the struggle:
*
The sympathies of America, naturally, are with
the British and French and Polish peoples —
three nations which are at war to preserve
civilization from attack by forces directed by
a maniac.

^ Ibid., September 20, 1939.
^News-Star, September 23, 1939.
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[But] until there is some overt act aimed squarely
at the rights of the American people, it is their
duty to remain calm, do nothing that would provoke
criticism, make no wild assertions or threats.24
A local battle for arms embargo revision occurred in the "Letters
to the Editor" column of the New Orleans States. Joseph William Flynn
began the controversy with a letter published on September 13, in
which he maintained that the "cash and carry clause will eventually
lead us into war.

England will control the seas as she did in the

last war; we will then be aiding England.

Germany will then find some

25
way of retaliating and we will be drawn into the conflict."
Flynn soon received support from other New Orleanians who were
also opposed to neutrality revision.

T. M. Heidelburg wrote that "the

forces of war, of intervention and of internationalism are again at
work in America, determined, if possible, to break down the remaining
barriers that separate our country from the perpetual infernos of death
which sweep Europe every few years." Dr. J. C. Hary also warned New
Orleanians not to be brainwashed by the film "Nurse Edith Cavell" then
showing at the Orpheum Theater.

Hary thought that the film about the

World War I nurse executed by Germans for alleged spying was "pure
British propaganda," and pled, "if you are opposed to propaganda, dis
courage this form and try to keep our people out of Europe’s bloodshed.
26
We were fools once; let history not repeat itself."
24Shreveport Journal, September 2, 4, 1939.
25

States, September 19, 1939.

^Ibid., September 27-28, 1939.
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The pro-Allied side, meanwhile, was busy with its own letterwriting campaign.

These writers generally recognized that Britain and

France were fighting not only for their survival but for the survival
of the United States, as well.

An individual using the pseudonym "A

Reader" noted that opponents of revision frequently stated that Germany
could not possibly invade the United States, but asked "in the event
that France and England are defeated in the present struggle, what
could stop Hitler, say in 10 or 15 years from now, from making an
attempt to conquer the United States?"

"A Reader" was not yet ready

to send American troops to Europe but urged revision to allow the
27
Allies any war materiel they required from the United StatesR. B. Pitkin best stated the deep-seated commitment to the Euro
pean democracies felt by pro-Allied New Orleanians:

"If Germany

chooses to force a war on France and Great Britain, I, an American,
feel that it is the duty of all freedom-loving Americans to see that
the right side wins.

To me the right side is and will always be the

Allies.’"28
The Times-Picayune added its editorial influence to the pro-Allied
sentiment in New Orleans.

As Congress debated Roosevelt's proposed

adjustments, the Times-Picayune lamented "all our unfortunate adven
tures with neutrality laws over the last four years," and applauded a
27

Ibid., September 28, 1939. Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse
Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York, The Free Press, 1947), p.
271, notes the fallacy behind the pro-neutrality argument: people who
thought the United States safe as long as Europe bled itself white
missed the fact that victorious nations gain resources with each vic
tory. Thus, as Germany continued to triumph, Hitler’s regime would
grow materially and strategically stronger.
28

States, October 2, 1939.
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coalition of Democratic and Republican leaders who supported the presi
dent in his attempt to "allow this country to return to the rules of
international law and again consent to the sales of arms . . . "

29

Congress responded to Roosevelt's request for more flexibility in
American "neutrality" by passing the Fourth Neutrality Law, which
allowed the "cash and carry" sales of armaments he wanted in late
October, 1939.
The event that awakened the United States from its reluctance to
consider possible involvement in the European war was the fall of
France in June, 1940, and its attendent threat to England, the country
then considered the last citadel of civilization in Europe.

France

was to Louisiana, and especially to south Louisiana, a shining symbol
of freedom and its most immediate connection to the Old World.

The

sentimental attachment to France, however, did not overshadow the
hard realization that with France gone, only Britain stood between
civilization and barbarism. 30 By June 7, any hesitation about the
United States supplying material aid.to the Allies felt by some
Louisianians during the previous autumn was gone.

The States on that

day recognized that "If Britain and France both go down . . . it will
dawn on us that, alone, deprived of the armies and fleets . . . we

^Times-Picayune, September 23-24, 1939.
Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, pp. 258-261 chronicles this reali
zation throughout the United States. See also John Morton Blum, V
Was For Victory Politics and American Culture During World War II
(New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 7; Robert E. Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins An Intimate History (New York, Harper & Broth
ers, 1948), pp. 150-151; Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American
Neutrality 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press,
1955), pp. 152-166.
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must face a victorious world superpower marching on in furious revo
lution and destructive conquest." In addition, the faculty of Cente
nary College told Fourth District Representative Overton Brooks that
"(we believe) that it is vital to the interest of the United States
that England not be defeated; that the President and Congress should
.

. . give immediate and effective aid to England in the form of im-

plements of war, munitions, and credits."31
The Monroe Morning World also altered its opinion about American
aid to the Allies.

Between September, 1939, and June, 1940, the

Morning World evolved from a strong proponent of isolation to a warm
proponent of American aid to ensure an Allied victory.

By mid-June,

1940, it stopped just short of calling for armed American intervention:
If this war were between two nations of the same
kind . . . we could well afford to take an abso
lutely neutral stand and say it was none of our
business . . . But . . . it is a war to the
finish against reincarnated barbarism — against
the unleashed forces of evil . . . Just how it
is possible for a nation with the ideals of the
United States not to throw its influence against
Germany in this struggle . . . is beyond compre
hension . . . Only through the defeat of Hitler
and Mussolini, or by an armed state that will awe
them, can the United States be reasonably certain
that it will be spared the horrors that now beset
France.^
The Shreveport Times recognized early the importance of French
31States, June 7, 1940; Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session
Appendix Volume 87 Part 10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government
Printing Office, 1941), p. A88; William M. Tuttle, "Aid-to-the-AlliesShort-of-War versus American Intervention, 1940: A Reappraisal of
William Allen White’s Leadership," The Journal of American History,
March, 1970, pp. 840-841.
^Morning World, June 16, 18, 1940.
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contributions to Western European civilization, and lamented its pas
sing to German puppet control:
It was freedom that made Paris great. Men and
women were free to utilize their, full talents
without restraints. . .
If the German armies march into Paris, all this
will be plunged into the dustbin of history.
The event will send dour echoes down through
the future, influencing the course of human
thought and action.^3
The fall of Verdun reminded the Shreveport Times of a firebell
warning the United States of the spreading danger.

Contrasting stub

born French defense of Verdun in 1915 with virtual abandonment in 1940,
it said:

"It serves stern warning that the new way of war practiced

by the Nazis is deadly for the old ways of defense."34 No amount of
American aid would be too much in this new combat, and the Shreveport
Times thought that aid must be delivered to France, even if American
merchant ships had to carry it, a strong veer toward American inter
vention in the war:

"What the French ask for, they should be given,

at top speed . . . If there is a shortage of trans-Atlantic shipping
space, then arrangements should be made to transfer merchants to
35
registry allowing their use."
The Shreveport Times eclipsed even this belligerent attitude
later in the month in an editorial that all but acknowledged that the
"33

Shreveport Times, June 14, 1940.

3^Ibid., June 16, 1940.
35Ibid., June 12, 1940.
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United States was at war and needed to create a war economy and
society.

In support of a military draft bill introduced in Congress,

the Shreveport Times recalled the 1917-1918 draft:
. . . the broad result of the draft system was
good. It taught the nation discipline. Too,
when one saw the whole country moving forward
under a co-ordinated plan for summoning its man
power, one could sense the might of democracy.
The draft system produced confidence which was
an important factor in winning the war.36
The fall of France also welded the sentiments of two of the
smaller north Louisiana dailies to the Allied cause.

The Shreveport

Journal wrote:
That the people of the United States regard Italy’s
decision to fight on the side of the dictator as
a distinct threat to the peace of the whole world,
including the American continents, is the generally
accepted view . . . Congress should put on 'full
speed ahead' in the enactment of whatever legisla
tion is necessary and in the providing of funds,
regardless of the cost.
. . . there is no alternative for the United States
save preparation to meet any emergency which may be
forced by the German maniac and his Italian partner.
For this work of preparedness the American people
are ready to give their money unstintedly and of
their lives if necessary, lest this great democracy
of the western hemisphere suffer the fate that has
befallen its friends across the Atlantic.37
The Monroe News-Star recognized that the European fight was being
waged for the existence of the United States, also, but was selfishly

36Ibid., June 24, 1940.
37Shreveport Journal, June 11, 15, 1940.
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jubilant that this country was not yet involved in the struggle:
If our boys were over there fighting this war,
we would send them everything they need which
we have or could get. Then why should we not
do all in our power to help the boys over there,
who are fighting our fight over there, and thank
God that the war is not over here and that those
boys are not our boys?3®
The Louisiana/France connection was also poignantly revealed in
the sentiments felt by the Marianite Sisters of Holy Cross College in
New Orleans.

Their Mother House in LeMans, France was now in Nazi-

occupied territory.

The Our Lady of Holy Cross Chronicles reported:

Our hearts are torn with anguish at the thought
of the anxiety and suffering of our dear Reverend
Mother and her Sisters. Many times a day our
prayers rise heavenward, begging God to protect
them in this hour of dire need and peril. May
our dear Mother of Sorrows be their solace in
this great affliction.39
The Allied military setbacks of 1940 were a severe shock to the
American people.

In Louisiana these events, especially the fall of

France, led to increasingly widespread acceptance of the possibility
that American troops might eventually be needed overseas, and that at
the least Britain needed more supplies than it could buy with cash in
order to

continue

the struggle against Nazi Germany.By

November,

1940, several major Louisiana newspapers began advocating loans or
38
News-Star, June 5, 1940.

—

39Our Lady of Holy Cross Chronicle, quoted in Betty L. Morrison, "A
History of Our Lady of Holy Cross College, New Orleans, Louisiana"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1976), p. 50.
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outright gifts to keep Britain supplied and American boys at home.^
One Louisiana public official, United States Senator Allen J.
Ellender, however, warned at the end of 1940 that continued drift of
public opinion toward providing loans to England, President Roosevelt's
so-called "Lend-Lease" proposals, might well lead to war.

"Should we

determine to change existing laws so as to further aid England, we
might as well make up our minds to go the whole way and do some
41
fighting."

Ellender*s comments, however, failed to stop the con

tinued drift of public opinion toward acceptance of possible United
States involvement.
By "the beginning of 1941, many Louisianians believed that perhaps
the United States was no longer in control of its own destiny.

The

editor of the Lafayette Daily Advertiser recognized that the question
of peace or war was not wholly for the United States to decide and re
marked that keeping the country out of the war was an excellent idea
"if we can only find the way to do it . . . [but] events may take the
decision out of the hands of Americans."
said even more directly:

Or, as the Morning Advocate

"Should the United States ever enter this

war . . . it will be because the logic of events shall have gradually
40Times-Picayune, March 15, 1940; Morning Advocate, November 27, 1940;
Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 27, November 27, December 26, 1940.
41Morning Advocate, December 25, 1940. Ellender's position closely
reflected that of his Senate colleague, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio,
an isolationist. See Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 282. Ellen
der also wrote to a constituent that "You may be sure that I am whole
heartedly in favor of the United States maintaining its neutrality in
the present European conflict and I am absolutely opposed to sending
our soldiers to fight the battles of other countries." Allen J. Ellen
der to J. C. Curry, April 26, 1940, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J.
Ellender Archives, Allen J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State Univer
sity, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
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drawn us into the position . . . in which the likely results of not
fighting is [sic] less tolerable than all the horror of war itself."
The Baton Rouge Kiwanis Club also passed a resolution on May 1, 1941,
which recognized "that no nation or people anywhere on the globe can
hope to remain neutral except on terms and conditions specified by
[the Axis] and to end in becoming their tool and vassal" and "that the
vital interests and perhaps the very survival of our American democracy
42
are at stake in this World War."
President Roosevelt decided in July, 1941, that the safety of
the United States and the North Atlantic shipping lanes to England
required that he dispatch American soldiers to protect Iceland from
threatened German subjugation after the fall of Denmark.
met with widespread approval in Louisiana.

This move

The Shreveport Times

wrote:
There can be no question in Hitler’s mind now
that this nation really means business.
Either we [keep the Atlantic shipping lanes open]
or everything that has been done and everything
that has been said of what we are willing to do
to defeat Hitler must be classed as empty phrase
ology and idle gesture.^
While the Morning World also supported the president’s action,
it also soberly reflected on its possible outcome:
42Lafayette Daily Advertiser, January 2,- -1941; Morning Advocate, Janu
ary 16, 1941; Congressional Record, 77 Congress 1 Session Volume 87
Part 11 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1941), p. A2139I
/

Shreveport Times, July 8 , 1941; Drummond, The Passing of American
Neutrality, pp. 245-246; Cole, Roosevelt & the Isolationists, pp. 431433.
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. . . the war is entering upon an intensified
stage, and the United States is drawing ever
nearer to hostilities as the nation’s defense
effort is providing more and more of the sinews
of war.44
North Louisiana press attitude toward the American move into Ice
land was best summarized in a thoughtful editorial in the Shreveport
Journal:
That President Roosevelt acted upon his own
initiative and then informed Congress, is . . .
worthy or note — and of commendation . . .
here is one instance, at last, where a Demo
cratic government has taken decisive action
before it was ’eternally too late’ . . . the
friendly move into Iceland • . . means that
Hitler can not under any possible set of cir
cumstances use it as a base from which to
launch an attack against this country or
against ships in service between the United
States and Great Britain. It was a very wise
and timely action.45
In south Louisiana, the New Orleans States commented of the
United States move into Iceland that "It is encouraging to see one of
the great democracies moving boldly with foresight." The Morning
Advocate added that "The occupation of Iceland by American air and
land forces is the only logical step under the

circumstances .. .

What would it avail us to make goods for Britain if the Nazis had
46
control of the strategic post in the NorthAtlantic?"
Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has maintained that
44
Morning World, July 11, 1941.
45Shreveport Journal, July 10, 1941.
^States, July 8, 1941; Morning Advocate, July 9, 1941.
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Roosevelt’s movement of United States troops into Iceland by executive
agreement constituted a major assumption of power by the president at
the expense of Congress. 47 This consideration mattered little to

many

Louisianians. The States commented that "It is well that he acted
without first submitting the enterprise to Congress for debate that
would have run on interminably and likely resulted in the imposition
of silly restrictions or conditions."48 Other newspapers confidently
commented that if Roosevelt arrogated some powers not normally held
by the presidency, the wartime situation demanded and legitimized such
action.

Furthermore, other wartime presidents, notably Abraham Lincoln

and Woodrow Wilson, had exercised unprecedented wartime powers, but
with the coming of peace, the executive branch had relinquished those
powers.

Roosevelt, they thought, would do the same. 49

The event that unquestionably led to almost unanimous support in
Louisiana for direct American military intervention in the horror of
World War II was the Japanese attack on the American naval base at
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

The immediate American re

action was to shatter nearly all isolationist opposition to the war
and to weld together temporarily a strong base of domestic support for
47Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, Hough
ton Mifflin Company, 1973), pp. 110-112.
48

States, July 8 , 1941.

49Shreveport Times, June 8 , November 8 , 1941; Morning World, June 17,
1941.
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American intervention.^ Again, Louisiana public opinion closely re
flected American public opinion.

The Shreveport Times echoed the

popular idea that "By her vicious assault, the Far Eastern imperialists
have eradicated . . . all the inner dissensions which have hampered
American rearmament in recent months . . . the nation [now] takes up
arms against an enemy who made the fatal error of initiating aggressive
action." The Shreveport Journal called for "Prosecution of the war to
definite and overwhelming victory.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, the Monroe Morning World came
fully about face from its earlier non-interventionist position.

On

December 11, 1941, the Morning World remarked that "the urgent task
is to smite the Japs so hard that they will never be able to take the
offensive in the war." The Monroe News-Star echoed the same sentiment:
"We shall not sheathe [our sword] until the world power of Japan is
52
broken, finally and forever."
The New Orleans newspapers also abandoned completely their pre
vious non-interventionist sentiment.

The Item on December 8 , 1941,

called for "the prosecution of the war against our aggressor enemies
. . . with all our strength and resources." The States commented more
J
^Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, pp. 290-291; T. Harry Williams,
"World War II: The American Involvement," in The Selected Essays of
T. Harry Williams, pp. 143-147; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American Foreign Policy, pp. 311-313; Bums, Roosevelt The Soldier
of Freedom, pp. 166-171; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 437438; Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, pp. 502-505.
"^Shreveport Times, December 8 , 1941; Shreveport Journal, December 8 ,
1941.
52Morning World, December 11, 1941; News-Star, December 15, 1941.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

347

bluntly that "Japan must be blasted off the face of the earth."53
In summary, Louisiana public opinion about World War II from Sep
tember, 1939, until December, 1941, generally followed American public
opinion closely.

The outbreak of war in September, 1939, competed

with the breaking story of the Louisiana Scandals and the gubernatorial
election for Louisiana’s attention and indeed, many opinion-makers in
Louisiana compared the Longite machine and the dictatorial Nazi govern
ment in Germany.

As Louisiana considered the military situation,

however, a general revulsion at the possibility of American involvement
in another "European" war gradually gave way to the realization that
the United States was necessarily going to be involved in the war on
the side of the Allies.

The fall of France in June, 1940, greatly

accelerated that realization, but it was only after the Pearl Harbor
attack that the United States and Louisiana had at last to accept the
fact that the United States had become, though perhaps unavoidably, a
major belligerent.

53

Item, December 8 , 1941; States, December 8 , 1941.
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CHAPTER V I I I

THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II UPON EDUCATION IN LOUISIANA
World War II caused unprecedented problems within the Louisiana
education system, and led to the assumption of new responsibilities
and the placement of greater emphasis on certain portions of the tra
ditional curriculum.

As the conflict began, and as the United States

responded with expanded national defense programs which included
training thousands of soldiers in Louisiana army camps, local school
systems designed to accomodate the local population found themselves
suddenly overrun by children of soldiers who had moved their families
south.

The central Louisiana area including Camps Beauregard, Living

ston, and Claiborne suffered especially from such overcrowding.

State

Superintendent of Education John E. Coxe announced on January 7, 1941,
that the Rapides Parish School System had experienced an increase of
approximately 600 students over the previous year’s enrollment.

More

over, the system expected about 500 additional students by February 15.
Small Pollock High School in neighboring Grant Parish had a one-hundred
student increase over the previous year, and expected an additional
one hundred students within a few weeks.

Nevertheless, Coxe promised

that Louisiana would provide educational facilities for all children
of army men stationed in the state.

Massive federal aid programs

which might have facilitated the absorption of the new students did
not then exist.

The major federal aid program for Louisiana schools

in 1939 was the Works Progress Administration program, co-sponsored by
the State Department of Education, to provide nutritious lunches to

348
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underprivileged children.*
Following the initial increase, however, Louisiana schools experienced declining enrollments.

2

Table 1 illustrates the steady reduc

tion in numbers of both white and black students which began in the

TABLE 1
Students Enrolled in Louisiana Schools, By Race
1938-39 through 1945-46
Year
1938-39
1938-40
1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45
1945-46

White
298,028
298,455
297,486
288,324
277,338
266,061
263,291
264,770

Black
173,300
174,649
174,886
173,511
171,743
163,208
163,553
165,229

Total
471,328
473,104
472,372
461,835
449,081
429,269
426,844
429,999

SOURCE: Louisiana State Department of Education ninetieth Annual Re
port for the Session 1938-39. Louisiana State Department of Education
Annual Report, 1939-40, Louisiana State Department of Education Ninetyfourth Annual Report For the Session 1942-43, Louisiana State Depart
ment of Education Ninety-fifth Annual Report For the Session 1943,
1944, Louisiana State Department of Education Ninety-Sixth Annual Re
port For the Session 1944-45, Louisiana State Department of Education
Ninety-Seventh Annual Report For the Session 1945-46.

Alexandria Daily Town Talk, January 7, 1941 (hereinafter cited as
Town Talk); Jerry W. Valentin, "The WPA and Louisiana Education,"
Louisiana History, Fall, 1968, pp. 391-395.
2

The composition of the student body also underwent a change. By the
1943-44 school year, only in West Feliciana Parish did boys outnumber
girls enrolled in school. Louisiana Department of Education Bulletin
No. 543 Ninety-fifth Annual Report for School Year 1943, 1944, pp.
186-187; Louisiana Department of Education Bulletin No. 548 Official
Proceedings of the State Board of Education January 8 , 1945; James
Adair Mackey, "A History of the Louisiana State University Laboratory
School, 1915-1965" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University,
1971), pp. 90, 92. The Department of Education Bulletins will herein
after be cited as Bulletin with the appropriate number and/or subtitle.
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1941-42 school year and continued through the 1945-46 school year,
with white enrollment continuing to decline until 1946 and black en
rollment increasing only slightly from 1944 to 1946.
Regardless of the number of students enrolled in Louisiana schools
during any wartime year, the state experienced problems providing the
education Coxe had promised in 1941.

The massive army training exer

cises known as the "Louisiana Maneuvers" conducted during 1941 and
again in 1942 caused a delay in opening the school year in the maneuver
area because of the "considerable danger" the State Department of Edu
cation found for school children riding buses on roads crowded with
military vehicles.

Delays in opening schools in these parishes

created an accounting problem.

The school boards preferred beginning

teacher pay periods on the first day of classes, thus retaining control
of payroll funds for an additional time period, while the teachers
themselves and the Louisiana Teachers' Association requested that pay
3
periods begin on the day school would have normally begun.
Wartime gasoline rationing also caused problems within the edu
cation transportation system.

The State Department of Education in

1943 directed all parish superintendents to prepare maps for the
routes of each school bus so that an adequate supply of war-rationed
3

Willoughby Aaron Sullivan, Jr., "The Development of the Louisiana
Teachers' Association," (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Univer
sity, 1968), p. 310; Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, August 14, 1941.
The State Board of Education approved the delay in opening schools in
the maneuver area in 1941, and ordered local school systems to pay
their employees on the same schedule they would use if they followed
their normal calendars. Bulletin No. 460 Official Proceedings August
22, 1941.
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gasoline could be obtained.
The school system also suffered from personnel shortages during
the war years.

Teachers and other school employees left their posts

to enter the armed forces or to accept higher-paying jobs in defense
or war-related industries. As a result of this exodus, the State
Department of Education issued more than 1,000 temporary teaching
certificates during the twelve months between March, 1941, and March,
1942.

The Louisiana Teachers’ Association worried that the tempor

arily-certified teachers would be unqualified, that scholastic achieve
ment in the state would drop, and that "the schools will be subjected
to harsh and unjust criticism ..."■?
Despite these dislocations and annoyances, Louisiana schools were
still obliged to assume additional functions in the war-time society.
Teachers, already under stress because of larger classes than normal,
were expected to provide time for implementing the rationing program
by enrolling people on ration lists, and distributing ration books or
commodities.

Teachers also had to encourage students to buy war stamps

^Bulletin No. 518 Ninety-fourth Annual Report for the Session 194243, p. 20.
'’Town Talk, August 31, 1943; Sullivan, "The Development of the Louisi
ana Teachers* Association," p. 299; E. B. Robert, '!rhe College of Edu
cation of Louisiana State University in the Present Emergency, March
4, 1942" in The Life and Work of E. B. (Ted) Robert (Baton Rouge, The
Bureau of Educational Materials and Research, College of Education,
Louisiana State University, 1972), p. 214; "Minutes of the Executive
Council, May 24, 1941," Louisiana Schools, September, 1941, p. 32;
"Editorial Comment," Louisiana Schools, January, 1942, p. 17; "Shortage
of Teachers With Special Reference to Louisiana," Louisiana Schools,
December, 1942, p. 9. The Class T "Temporary" Certificates were valid
for only one year, and were issued "to applicants of high qualifica
tions on recommendation of the superintendent."
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or bonds to aid the war effort.^
The Louisiana education system, along with other state systems,
had to inculcate both a strong awareness of the national defense needs
of the United States and a vigorous patriotism in students.

The New

Orleans Times-Picayune remarked in August, 1941, that "National de
fense will be an underlying theme of classes from kindergarten through
college."

The Times-Picayune predicted that awareness of national

defense needs would result in increased interest in military training,
and in the introduction of more home nursing, nutrition, physical fit
ness, and skilled trades in the schools.^
A movement toward requiring Louisiana schools to teach the dangers
of the world emergency and to place increased emphasis on patriotism
began during the summer of 1940 when representatives from the American
Legion of Louisiana and the United Veterans Defense Council appeared
before the State Board of Education.

The American Legion requested

that the Board "include as a part of the Educational system of this
state, and to be included in its curricula, a course on flag etiquette."
In addition, the United Veterans Defense Council petitioned the Board
to direct that one hour each week be set aside to educate "Americans
*

. . . in the public schools of the State . . . that a national crisis
now exists." The Board approved the petitions, and directed an

6Town Talk, January 22, February 4, 1942; Sullivan, "The Development
of the Louisiana Teachers' Association," p. 311; Bessie Lawrence
interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, September 10, 1983; Thomas P.
Southerland, "Rules and Regulations Enacted By Rapides Parish School
Board Since 1893 and Their Implications" (Ed.D. dissertation, Louisi
ana State University, 1960), pp. 55-56.

^New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 26, 1941.
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enthusiastic State Department of Education to implement the program, 8
Superintendent Coxe having already reflected much the same sentiment:
the world crisis, he said, "should make us sensitive to the virtue of
democracy and appreciative of our government, as well as deeply aware
of our responsibility to provide training and practice in citizenship
9
for the boys and girls in our schools."
The Department prepared a circular explaining the objectives of
this "intelligent patriotism" program, explaining that
What we need most is a generation trained with
a devotion to [the] principles which will serve
as a guarantee to our freedom against the
enemies of democracy who refuse to value the
lives of the people who constitute the state
— a devotion so strong that we will be willing
to fight for them, and if necessary, die for
them.
The circular included a number of specific goals.

Depending on grade

level, students would learn to understand and appreciate the meaning
of the flag; to sing the national anthem and other patriotic songs;
understand "what our national heroes stood for from the time our govern
ment was founded"; understand "wherein our government is superior to
a state ruled by a dictator"; learn how to condemn dishonesty, corrup
tion, graft, and inefficiency in government; how to discover and use
O
Bulletin No. 438 Official Proceedings August 16, 1940. pp. 25-26,
28-29.
q
Bulletin No. 435 Suggested State Program, 1940-41, p. 18. In 1943,
the State Board of Education made the teaching of patriotism a perman
ent part of the Louisiana education system by adding one year of high
school civics to the requirements for graduation. Bulletin No. 499
Official Proceedings January 11, 1943, p. 7.
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facts against "insidious propaganda"; how to read patriotic stories
and biographies; hold a mock Constitutional Convention and learn that
they could not do so under a dictator; and study the Magna Carta, the
Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights.^
The State Board of Education also passed a resolution in June,
1941, reiterating its approval of the teaching of patriotism, saluting
the flag, and the.Pledge of Allegiance, and commending the local school
authorities for their help in carrying out these goals.
The combined themes of defense and patriotism were greatly empha
sized in school activities throughout Louisiana.

Teachers at Ruston

High School, for example, developed and taught a unit on national
defense during the fall semester of 1941.

Students learned about the

Army and Navy, defense bases, diplomatic policy, the role of industry,
and other aspects of the subject (including one that could have been
most interesting —

"Defense and the Public Pocketbook").12

Forty years after the war, Bessie Lawrence, a third grade teacher
at Buckeye High School in rural Rapides Parish during the 1940s re
membered the patriotic flavor of school life during the early 1940s.
The school day began with the Pledge of Allegiance and salute to the
flag.

School assemblies often were held around the flagpole in front

of the school.

The students sang patriotic songs, a faculty member,

^Bulletin No. 453 Minutes of the Meeting of the State Board of
Education May 5 and 6 , 1941, pp. 26-27.
^"Bulletin No. 459 Official Proceedings June 27, 1941, p. 29.
12

Judith Crymes, "National Defense — A Project," Louisiana Schools,
January, 1941, pp. 19, 32.
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or occasionally a soldier, spoke on a patriotic theme, stressing the
virtue of democracy symbolized by the United States flag.
them that’s what men were fighting for.

"We taught

As long as it flew, we would

be free, but if someone else took us, we would not be free."
Dean E. B. Robert of the Louisiana State University College of
Education told high school graduating classes in 1941, "Every public
school-house in this republic should be a holy temple of democracy,
every public-school teacher a high priest daily administering at its
altar . . . Preparation through education for its duties and obligations is the ordained means for its preservation." 14
In New Orleans, teachers at the Henry W. Allen Elementary School
used the sudden popularity of things military and patriotic to en
courage their students to read more energetically.

They devised a

system of military ranks in which students received promotions for
reading certain books.

Reading any ten approved books made a student

a "second lieutenant" in the army or an "ensign" in the navy; two
historical novels read promoted one to the rank of "second lieutenant"
or "lieutenant j.g." The ranks went all the way to the top —

Tales

From Shakespeare, King Arthur and His Knights of the Round Table, and
Rip Van Winkle carried one upward to "lieutenant commander" or "major,"
while twenty-four poems by Sidney Lanier, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,

13

Bessie Lawrence interviewed by Jerry Purvis Sanson, September 10,
1983.

14
E. B. Robert, "Education As A Safeguard to Democracy," in The Life
and Work of E. B. (Ted) Robert, p. 202. Louisiana educators obviously
took Robert’s admonition to heart.
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James Russell Lowell, and Edgar A. Guest brought the rank of "commander"
or "lieutenant colonel." A student could complete the program by
reading three "oustanding" plays and become an "admiral" or "generalRequirement of patriotic observances in the public schools caused
some disagreement regarding the constitutional relationship between
church and state.

The controversy arose when A. J. Smith, principal

of Evergreen High School in Avoyelles parish, required members of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses attending his school to pledge allegiance to the
flag during classroom exercises.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses objected

because such a pledge conflicted with their religious beliefs, and
Reverend Victor Blackwell of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Richard
Cadwallader, a representative of the Louisiana League for the Preser
vation of Constitutional Rights, protested Smith's requirement to the
State Board of Education.

Louisiana Attorney General Eugene Stanley

advised the Board that because they had passed a resolution requiring
the observance, he could find no reason why they could not enforce it.
Board members themselves were split on the issue.

Most stated their

belief that all students should salute the flag, while other suggested
a compromise by which the Board should specifically exempt Jehovah's
Witnesses from the requirement.

The Board decided to defer action on

the question indefinitely and declined to issue a ruling on the ques
tion during the war years, presumably leaving parish superintendent or

^New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, November 23, 1941.
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school principals to wrestle with the problem themselves.^
In addition to inculcating patriotism in school children, the
State Department of Education also developed plans for the schools to
educate adults about the national emergency.

The Department formulated

this plan in response to a nationwide call by President Franklin
Roosevelt and United States Commissioner of Education John W. Studebaker for development of public education and discussion forums
focused on the national emergency.

The Louisiana plan called for

community meetings to be held in school buildings.

Programs included

the singing of patriotic songs, group recitations of the Pledge of
Allegiance, and discussion of pertinent topics.

Suggested topics in

cluded "The Local Community's Part in the Present Emergency," "Public
Health and the War," "The Farm Family's Part in the Present Emergency,"
"Inter-American Friendship," and "The Bill of Rights.
World War II also initiated a debate concerning the utility of
education during wartime.

Governor Jones called on Louisiana educa

tors to make education more practical:
We ought to scrap or radically revise our educa
tional system and start all over again . . . We
need to teach our children agriculture, how to
farm, and mechanics . . . You can’t face the
problems of life by studying Shakespeare.*®

^Bulletin No. 453 Minutes, May 5 and 6 , 1941, pp. 31-33; Town Talk,
January 8 , 1941; Morning Advocate, April 9, May 7, 1941.
^Bulletin No. 478 Proposed Plan of Citizenship and Civilian Morale
Education for Louisiana, pp. 1-2, 4-7.
18Morning Advocate, August 12, 1941.
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"The plain fact is that our boys and girls are not learning in suffi
cient numbers how to earn a living in their own baliwicks," the
Governor reiterated.

"Somehow, I can’t escape from the notion that

it is more important for a young man in the coastal parishes to know
how to build a boat than to know Latin."19 While the Governor may have
overstated his case in order to be emphatic, he clearly and sincerely
desired that Louisiana train its students for jobs in the traditional
farming, fishing, and trapping occupations, as well as positions in
the newer oil recovery and chemical industries. 20
Not everyone in Louisiana agreed that public education in America
should abandon its responsibilities for teaching the history and
legacies of Western civilization and developing well-rounded intellects
just to impart timely technical knowledge.

John Edward Hardy, writing

in Louisiana Schools remarked:
. . . the purpose of education is not to be de
fined with a cancellation clause effective in
the event of war. If the purpose of educational
activity is well considered and seriously defined
at its inception and is consistently understood
during the building of the tradition of an edu
cational system, it is not subject to capricious
change with a view only to the exegencies of the
moment.
*
All that the new war-time studies can provide is
a knowledge of technique. The necessary develop
ment of the intellect must be accomplished by
other means . . . If [we give the students] only
these techniques and deprive a whole generation
of that knowledge . . . which alone can make
them just and not blind users of the power instru19Times-Picayune, October 21, 1941.
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ments, we are defeated though we conquer those
nations which have appeared as the immediate
incarnation of the forces of evil .'21
While Governor Jones called for an ambitious program of vocation
al education to provide students with practical knowledge they could
apply on the farm or in one of Louisiana's emerging industries, the
increased vocational emphasis during the war years themselves focused
on training more efficient workers for jobs serving the needs of
America's defense effort.

Therefore, both public schools and trade

schools in Louisiana adjusted their curricula to incorporate programs
requested by the federal government.
categories:

These programs were of two

those designed to improve industrial performance, and

others designed to increase agricultural production.
The schools provided additional industrial training under three
plans.

Plan I (Trade and Industrial) included pre-employment re

fresher courses for people drawn from Louisiana State Employment
Office and Works Progress Administration rolls.

These courses in

cluded thirty to forty hours of class time each week.

In addition,

the schools provided refresher courses for people already employed,
which included ten to twelve hours of class time each week.

Plan I

provided refresher courses in welding (both electric and oxy-acetylene),
machine shop, electricity, sheet metal, automobile mechanics, and
radio repair.

The Plan I curriculum did not interfere with regular

courses because it was presented at odd hours when school facilities
were not in use.

By the end of the 1939-40 school year, 4,938 people

21

John Edward Hardy, "War-Time Proposals for High School Curricula
Changes," Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1943, pp. 27, 42,
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were enrolled in courses offered under.Plan I.22
Plan II (Vocational Education for Defense Workers for Rural and
Non—Rural Youth) provided courses specifically for persons just
entering the industrial work force.

Potential enrollees had to be

between seventeen and twenty—five years of age.

This program drew

students from the Civilian Conservation Corps and NYA rolls as well
as from the general population.

Plan II was subdivided into "Pro

grams." Progam A, titled "General Pre-Employment Courses," provided
training in the operation, care, and repair of tractors, trucks, and
automobiles (both gasoline and Diesel engines); metal work, including
simple welds, tempering, drilling and shaping; woodworking; and ele
mentary electricity, including care and repair of electrical equipment.
Program B, titled "Specific Pre-Employment Preparatory Courses,” pro
vided more intensive training in motor mechanics, welding, machine
shop, lathe operation, drill press operation, shaper operation, elec
trical work, sheet metal work, and radio repair.

By the end of the

1939-40 school year, approximately 10,000 Louisianians were enrolled
in the 400 courses offered in Program A, and 1,200 were enrolled in
the 70 courses in Program B.

23

Plan III, entitled "Youth Engaged on NYA Work Projects," offered
courses in three areas:

agriculture, trade and industry, and home

22

Bulletin No. 448 Ninety-first Annual Report for the Session 193940, p. 32; Bulletin No. 473 Manual For Vocational Training for De
fense Workers For Administrators and Teachers of Vocational Training
For Out-Of-School Rural and Non-Rural Youth— Louisiana Program Num
ber 4, p. 11; Bulletin No. 445 Official Proceedings January 3, 1941,
pp. 17-19; Bulletin No. 448 Ninety-first Annual Report, pp. 33-34, 41.
23Bulletin No. 448 Ninety-first Annual Report, pp. 34-35, 41.
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economics. These courses provided intensive training supplementary
to work experience provided hy the NYA, and supposedly eased the ad
justment from NYA jobs to permanent employment-

In addition, Plan III

included programs designed "to enlarge the civic or vocational intel
ligence of young people employed on NYA work projects." Approximately
4,000 of the 5,000 NYA workers in Louisiana at the end of the 1939-40
school year were enrolled in some phase of Plan III.

24

The home economics courses taught in Plan III included instruction
in health and nutrition, home care of the ill, first aid, clothing,
housing, consumer buying, and personal living.

Students enrolled in

the Trade and Industry section of the plan also received training in
federal, state, or local government offices in bookkeeping, filing,
typewriting, manual and machine record keeping, and preparing statisti
cal data.^
While the programs summarized above dealt primarily with individu
als outside the mainstream of Louisiana secondary education, the war
also altered the state’s high school curriculum.
occurred primarily in two areas:

These modifications

implementation of the "High School

Victory Corps" program, and improvement in the Vocational Agriculture
program to improve agricultural education.
The High School Victory Corps caused an extensive expansion in
educational programs.

It required both new emphasis on traditional

subjects and introduction of subjects not normally taught in high

^Ibid., pp. 36, 42.
25Bulletin No. 454~ Louisiana For Defense, pp. 37—41.
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schools.

The High School Victory Corps was originally intended for

high schools desiring an ROTC, but not previously having the facilities
to implement such a program.

The United States Army provided a train

ing curriculum approved by the State. Department of Education; ROTC
departments in colleges and universities throughout the state provided
training sessions for instructors, and also became "sponsoring
agencies."

This assistance from the military helped high schools im

plement the program and maintain acceptable quality.

The object of

the High School Victory Corps was to familiarize boys with army life
and training, and thus shorten the basic training period required for
recruits. 27
Courses studied in the High School Victory Corps included (during
the first year of study) military courtesy and customs of the armed
services, infantry drill regulations, military sanitation and first
aid, military history and policy, military organization, and rifle
marksmanship.

The second year of study included map reading, tech

niques of rifle fire, tactical training of the individual soldier
(as scout, observer, sentinel, listener, sniper, or messenger), auto
matic rifle and machine gun fire, combat training, and infantry
drill. 28

In addition, the High School Victory Corps curriculum in

cluded studies of the opposing philosophies of the Axis and the Allied
powers, patriotic attitudes, progress of the war, recognition of
propaganda, global geography, and the wartime economy.

Community

27

Bulletin No. 520 Military Training and Leadership in High Schools
of Louisiana (High School Victory Corps Program), pp. 1-2.
28

,
c
Ibid.,
pp. o3-5.
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services included school participation in civilian defense, scrap
drives, war stamp and bond drives, and conservation of community
resources. 29
In addition to training future soldiers, Louisiana schools also
helped to train future army clerks by providing training in army pro
cedure and forms.

The State Department of Education suggested that

this course be ranked as a second semester senior course worth onehalf credit toward graduation, but warned that it could not be substituted for regular business courses. 30
The State Board of Education, at the request of the War Depart
ment, also recommended, but did not require, that high school prin
cipals include one or more general pre-induction courses in the funda
mentals of electricity, radio, machines and tools, shop work, and
automobile mechanics.

The War Department had found that inductees

from throughout the United States needed additional training in these
areas in order to shorten their post-induction training period.

31

Not all Louisianians initially favored this headlong rush to
turn the state’s educational system into prep schools for boot camp.
A coalition of Parent-Teachers' Associations defeated a bill requiring
compulsory military training for high school and college students
introduced in the 1940 legislative session.

32

This defeat occurred

29Bulletin No. 496 Wartime Education'Curriculum Changes (Implementing
the High School Victory Corps), pp. 14, 37, 40-57.
30Bulletin No. 511
pp. 1-4.

Pre-induction Training in Army Clerical Procedures,

^ Bulletin No. 502 Official Proceedings April 5, 1943, p. 48.
32
New Orleans Item, June 5, 1940.
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just as Louisiana experienced the shock resulting from the fall of
France.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, cast military

training in a different light and led to a more receptive attitude
toward the teaching of military subjects in Louisiana schools.

Even

then, however, the High School Victory Corps remained a voluntary
program.
Louisiana also adjusted its Vocational Agricultural Education
program to meet the needs of the wartime emergency by providing in
struction in producing specific crops deemed vitally essential by the
Secretary of Agriculture.

The new Vocational Education program

trained high school youths, out-of-school rural youths, and adult
farmers.

The schools provided evening classes for the out-of-school

youth and adults, while high school students participated in Vocational
Agriculture training during the regular school day. 33
The Vocational Agriculture program shared with the general in
dustrial programs an emphasis on care and repair of farm machinery,
welding, metalworking, woodworking, and elementary electricity.

In

addition, training in Vocational Agriculture included instruction on
how to increase production of milk, poultry, eggs, pork, beef, mutton,
•»
34 Agriculture teachers
lamb, wool, soybeans, peanuts, and vegetables.
33
John H. Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agriculture Education in
Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1959), p.
202; S. M. Jackson, "Adjusting the Program of Vocational Agriculture to
Meet the Needs of the War Effort," Louisiana Schools, December, 1942,
pp. 12-13; Jackson, "The Part Rural War Production Training Will Play
in the 1943 Food for Victory Program,” Louisiana Schools, March, 1943,
p. 19.
34
Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisi
ana," p. 202; Bulletin No. 490 Louisiana State Plan for Vocational
Education to Carry Out the Provisions of Public Law No. 647, 77th Con
gress, Chapter 475, 2nd Session, Authorizing a Vocational Program of
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also participated in scrap drives; taught how to preserve and can
food; helped to develop cooperative school-community facilities for
food preservation; and — because of the increased mechanization of
agriculture caused by the agricultural labor shortage —
machinerycare and repair in

stressed farm

their farm shop facilities. 35

In addition to training rural workers, the State Department of
Education also created Emergency Farm Workers' Schools to solve the
agricultural labor shortage.
of age or older for farm work.

These schools prepared persons 14 years
The students were drawn from those

who either had no farm experience, or who needed additional training.
The program accepted both in-school and out-of-school students of
,
. sexes. 36
both
The principal school organization for students of agriculture,
the Future Farmers of America, also suffered from declining enrollment
in the overall school system.

Many vocational agriculture teachers

entered the armed services, and some departments closed for lack of
qualified replacements.

(Membership in the LSU chapter of FFA dropped

from 125 in 1939-40 to none from 1942 until the end of the war in
1945.) 37

The otherschool-related organization for agricultural

Instruction Essential to the War Production Training Program to be Given
for Out-of-School Rural and Non-rural Persons Subdivision (3), p. 32
35Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisi
ana," p. 203; Bulletin No. 518 Ninety-fourth Annual Report for the Ses
sion 1942-43; p. 77; Morning Advocate, August 2, 1943.
36Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education in Louisi
ana," pp. 238, 246.
37Frederick W. Williamson, Origin and Development of Agricultural Exten
sion in Louisiana 1860-1948 How It Opened the Road for Progress in Bet
ter Farming and Rural Living (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Division of Agricultural
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students, the 4-H Club, continued operations during the war years,
even though it experienced the same problems as the FFA:
student population and shortage of sponsoring agents.

declining

Louisiana 4-H

students, nevertheless, participated in numerous war-related scrap
collection and bond sale drives. 38
Modernization of the state educational system began during the
war years because of reform movements within the state and not only
as a response to national defense requirements.

The major internal

change which occurred was the addition of a required twelfth year
for high school graduation.

The additional year of school had been a

goal of the Louisiana Teachers' Association for several years.

Rep

resentative William J. Dodd, who was also state LTA president, had
criticized Superintendent Coxe and Governor Jones for not lobbying
the requirement through the 1940 legislature, and the measure was
enacted in 1944. 39
A problem arose, however, when the state had to decide whether
the extra grade required reclassification of other grades.

In other

words, would the addition of grade twelve mean a difference in the
number of grades classified as grammar school grades or junior high
school grades?

Should the ninth grade be included in junior high

school, or high school?

Dr. Clark Barrow, East Baton Rouge Superinten-

Extension, 1951), pp. 230-231.
38Agricultural Extension Annual Narrative Report (1944), p. 1.
39Charles E. Weimer, "John Easterly Coxe, Louisiana Educator" (Ed.D.
dissertation, Louisiana State Dniverstiy, 1974), p. 21; Anthony Eugene
Pacella, "A History of the Louisiana School Boards Association” (Ed.D.
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1977), p. 41; Bulletin No.
530 Official Proceedings April 10, 1944, p. 25.
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dent of Education, ordered a halt to all school construction in the
parish until the State Board of Education resolved the matter.

The

Board's ruling, he said, would determine how school buildings were to
be constructed and which facilities should be included, depending on
whether the institution was to be a junior high school or a high
,
-* AO
school.

The State Department of Education experienced reorganization on
two levels simultaneously during the war years — by Governor Jones,
and by newly-elected Education Superintendent John Coxe, who took
office in 1940.

While the governor’s reorganization was only temporary

because the courts ruled it unconstitutional, Coxe's revision survived
longer.

Former Superintendent T. H. Harris had preferred a system of

general area supervisors.

(Coxe, himself, had served as Head State

Supervisor of High Schools until Harris dismissed him early in 1939.)
Elected to replace his former boss, Coxe instituted a system of subject
area supervisors.

He also organized the State Department of Education

into three major divisions: Administration and Finance, headed by
John M. Foote; Instruction and Supervision, headed by R. R. Ewerz; and
Higher Education, headed by Joe Farrar. 41
A profound change in Louisiana's traditional methods of instruc40Bulletin No. 533 Official Proceedings June 26, 1944; Morning Advo
cate, November 3, 1944.
^Weimer, "John Easterly Coxe," pp. 9-21; Charles Edward Sutton,
"Activities of the Louisiana State Department of Education on the
Elementary School Level, 1940 to 1964" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University, 1969), p. 61. Coxe, in turn, was defeated for reelection in 1948 by one of his former employees, Shelby M. Jackson,
whom he had fired as Supervisor of Vocational Agriculture in 1945.
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tion occurred during the war years as a result of the increased
availability of visual media, primarily films.

The armed services

first discovered that films were useful aids in training and educating
large numbers of people.

While visual aids had been a peripheral part

of Louisiana education for some time, the war years brought them into
far more classrooms.

Indeed, by 1945 the State Department of Educa

tion had six film depositories throughout the state from which schools
could obtain films.

Money to purchase the films was scarce, but

agencies of the federal government, especially the Agriculture Depart
ment and the War Department, donated approximately one hundred films
to Louisiana schools prior to 1945, primarily on war-related subjects.
The State Department of Education reported in 1943 that it owned 330
prints of 205 film titles.

The Agricultural Extension Service, another

source of films, reported in 1944 that the most requested film in its
library was "Soldiers of the Soil." The new importance of educational
media also caused a change in the curriculum of teacher training pro
grams.

The LSU College of Education added a new short course, Educa

tion 152, taught during the simmers of 1941 and 1943, which covered
the functions and use of audio-visual aids.

42

Louisiana's colleges and universities were affected by many of
the same problems within the public school system during the war years.
War-related jobs or the armed services took many students, especially
males, away from their studies — so many, in fact, that Southern
University President J. S. Clark wrote in June, 1943, that "our campus

Pauline M. Rankin, "The Development of Educational Media in Louisi
ana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1977), pp. 62,
65, 72.
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has almost developed the appearance of a female school.

Less than 50

boys are here in college now."43 Enrollment at Louisiana State Uni
versity dropped from 5,682 to 4,233 between June and December, 1942.
Southeastern Louisiana College (now Southeastern Louisiana University)
at Hammond enrolled 612 students in September, 1940, its largest en
rollment up to that time.

By the beginning of the 1944 school year,

however, only 331 students were on campus.

Enrollment at Xavier

University fell from 1,012 in 1939-40 to 510 in 1944-45.

Other

Louisiana institutions of higher learning, both public and private,
shared the experience of declining enrollments. 44
Louisiana's colleges, of course, needed students to justify their
existence; they therefore sought to replace regular students lost to
the war effort with army recruits who needed specialized training.
The State Board of Education in April, 1943, authorized colleges under
its control to negotiate training contracts with the United States
Army and Navy.

As a result of this authorization, state colleges

commenced a spirited competition among themselves to secure training
43Charles Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern University and
A & M College, 1880-1980 (Baton Rouge, Southern University, 1981), p.
148; An Historical Sketch of Louisiana State Colleges (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State Department of Education, n.d.), p. 40; Oscar Hoffmeyer, Jr., Louisiana College 75 Years (Pineville, Louisiana, Louisi
ana College, 1981), p. 70.
44
Morning Advocate, January 10, August 26, 1943; LeRoy Ancelet, "A
History of Southeastern Louisiana College" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Louisiana State University, 1971), pp. 75, 92; Douglas Coughlin
Marshall, "A History of Higher Education of Negroes in the State of
Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1956), p.
143; Southeastern Louisiana University Fifty Years Foundation for the
Future (Hammond, Louisiana, 50th Anniversary Committee Southeastern
Louisiana University, 1975), pp. 6-8.
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programs for their campuses.

Louisiana Polytechnic Institute (now

Louisiana Polytechnic University), Southwestern Louisiana Institute
(now the University of Southwestern Louisiana), and Louisiana State
Normal College (now Northwestern State University), all launched Army
or Navy training programs.

In addition, Southeastern Louisiana College

acquired a Civilian Aeronautics Authority training program, South
western and Southern Universities offered agricultural refresher
courses, and two of Louisiana's private colleges, Centenary College
and Louisiana College, acquired small Army Air Force programs.

46

Female colleges contributed to the war effort in other ways.

The

Sisters of the Academy of Holy Angels (later Our Lady of Holy Cross
College) in New Orleans, for example, conducted air raid drills, sold
Defense Stamps, and participated in Red Cross activities.

Academy

students constructed 326 garments of various kinds for Red Cross
45
Bulletin No. 502 Official Proceedings April 5, 1943, p. 62; Bulletin
No. 519 Official Proceedings October 5, 1943, pp. 6-11; Bulletin No.
526 Official Proceedings January 11, 1944, pp. 12-14; Bulletin No.
518 Ninety-fourth Annual Report for the Session 1942-43, p. 23; An
Historical Sketch of Louisiana State Colleges, p. 40; Joel L. Fletcher
to Allen J. Ellender, March 3, 1943; Gus Trahan to Ellender, March 3,
1943, Allender J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen
J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana;
James Domengeaux to Overton Brooks, March 2, 1943, Joel L. Fletcher
to Brooks, March 4, 1943, Overton Brooks Papers, Department of Archives
and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Brooks Collection); Florent Hardy,
Jr., A Brief History of the University of Southwestern Louisiana 1900
to 1960 (Baton Rouge, Claitor’s Publishing Division, 1973), pp. 55, 102.
46Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern University, pp. 148-149;
Ancelet, ”A History of Southeastern Louisiana College,” p. 73; Gerard
Banks to Overton Brooks, February 26, 1943, Brooks Collection; Hoffmeyer, Louisiana College, p. 74; Walter M. Lowrey, 150 Centenary Col
lege of Louisiana Sesquicentennial 1825—1975 (Shreveport, Louisiana,
Centenary College Alumni Association, 1975), p. 21.
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distribution to soldiers. 4 7
Louisiana college students adjusted to the grim realities of war
in various ways.

Some became apathetic, others adjusted well to the

new spirit of patriotism, while still others saw in the threat to their
country a reason to do well in their studies.

Many enrolled in mathe

matics and science courses, enrolled in extracurricular first aid
courses, or became air raid wardens. 48 Major General Campbell B.
Hodges, President of LSU, told students in February, 1942, that "Every
man student at the University, down to and including every freshman
man, will see service before this war is over . . . "

Hodges therefore

instituted compulsory physical education for every male undergraduate. 49
While several other schools instituted compulsory physical educa
tion and emphasized intramural sports to improve the physical condition
of male students, the State Board of Education voted on January 11,
1943, to discontinue all intercollegiate athletic contests involving
the colleges under its control.^®

The Morning Advocate applauded the

^Betty L. Morrison, "A History of Our Lady of Holy Cross College, New
Orleans, Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University,
1976), p. 52.
/Q
Andrew W. Hunt, "The College Student and War Morale," Louisiana
Schools, November, 1942, pp. 3, 38.
49Morning Advocate, February 24, 1942. Hodges, a former commandant of
cadets at West Point and military aide to President Herbert Hoover, be
came LSU president on July 1, 1941, when he replaced Law School Dean
Paul M. Hebert, who had been acting president since James Monroe Smith
abruptly resigned and fled the country in June, 1939, in his futile
attempt to escape punishment for his embezzlement of LSU funds.
^ Bulletin No. 498 Official Proceedings December 16, 1942, pp. 4-5;
Bulletin No. 499 Official Proceedings January 11, 1943, pp. 11-12.
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Board's action, noting that "to continued these sports and maintain
their schedules in the face of transportation shortage, and rapidly
dwindling enrollments of eligible students is obviously impossible.
The Board's ban on intercollegiate athletics lasted only nine
months, however.

In October, 1943, the Board authorized resumption of

the contests because it had found that the Navy training program it
had authorized in March (and which several colleges had now obtained)
required that enrollees have the opportunity to participate in college
athletics.

The guidelines for the reinstituted program, however, re

quired that the number of events be held to "a reasonable minimum,"
that students could not be absent from campus more than forty-eight
hours for an athletic event, and that "no means of transportation re
quiring the use of rubber or gasoline shall be used for out-of-town
trips by athletic teams, contestants, or spectators connected with any
college unless OPA [the Office of Price Administration] approves in
advance.

Morning Advocate, January 14, 1943; Hardy, A Brief History of the
University of Southwestern Louisiana, p. 93, reports that Southwestern
lost 7 of its leading football players, 6 of its 9-man basketball
team, and all the sprinters on its track team by 1943. Lowrey, 150
Centenary College of Louisiana, p. 23 reports that the advent of World
War II and soaring costs ended Centenary's intercollegiate football
programs.
52
Bulletin No. 519 Official Proceedings October 5, 1943. p. 66; Bulle
tin No. 526 Official Proceedings January 11, 1944, pp. 19-20; Morning
Advocate, October 6, 1943. Peter Finney, The Fighting Tigers Seventyfive Years of LSU Football (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
Press, 1968), p. 154, maintains that "Beyond doubt, the backbone of
American football in 1943 was the U. S. Navy, with its famed preflight
and physical training courses .
even though LSU managed to field
an all-civilian team. He also relates (p. 156) that some members of
Coach Bernie Moore’s 1943 LSU team physically reached the Orange Bowl
in Miami that year only because Tiger fans had saved their gasoline
rationing coupons for the trip.
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Conditions on Louisiana college campuses did not improve until
after the war, when returning veterans created an abundance of students.
Several of the colleges would establish special Guidance Centers to
help veterans select the proper studies and to assist them in obtaining
53
federal education benefits.
While Louisiana’s entire education system encountered various
problems and challenges during the war years, facilities for black
students remained separate from — and decidedly unequal too — those
for white students.

In 1940-41 there were only forty-five public and

ten private high schools for blacks accredited by the state.

In

addition, twenty-three public and one private high schools were
"approved" by the state.

Incredibly, fourteen parishes provided only

elementary schools for their black students.

The State Department of

Education’s report for 1941 noted that "the number of Negro educables
in several of these parishes does not justify a high school."54 The
report made no mention of the undeveloped potential in those fourteen
parishes.

Thirty-nine parishes employed black supervisors for their

separate black schools, but the black administrators were subordinates
53Vincent, A Centennial History of Southern University, p. 149; Ancelet,
"A History of Southeastern Louisiana College," p. 79; Frank James
Price, Troy H. Middleton A Biography (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State
University Press, 1974), pp. 298-302. The ”G. I. Bill" (the Service
man's Readjustment Act of 1944) also provided a maximum of 52 weeks
unemployment pay, priorities for materials needed by the Veterans’ Ad
ministration, and additional hospital facilities for returning veter
ans as well as the educational assistance which increased college en
rollments . Jack Stokes Ballard, The Shock of Peace Military and Eco
nomic Demobilization After World War II (Washington, D.C., University
Press of America, 1983), pp. 48-49.
^^Bulletin No. 458 Ninety-second Annual Report of the Session 1940-41,
p. 109.
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of both the white supervisors and superintendents.

Black education in

Louisiana continued to focus almost entirely on vocational training:
agriculture, home economics, and industrial arts.

Some schools, how

ever, provided academic courses for the few students who needed them
as a foundation for professional training.^
The State Department of Education had recognized by 1940 that
By no principles of economics or ethics can a
state progress or reach the highest stage of
development with a large proportion of the popu
lation unskilled, shiftless, ignorant, and
diseased. Neglect of the Negro and indifference
to his home life, his health, his education,
and his training for useful and gainful employ
ment are detrimental to public w e l f a r e . 56
Despite this recognition, the Louisiana Educational Survey Commission
found in 1942 that the state had done little to improve black public
education.

The Commission — most often called the Washburne Commis

sion after its head, Dr. Carleton Washburne — repeated almost exactly
the same sentiment as the Department of Education had expressed two
years earlier:
The value of the Negro as a plantation worker,
as a tenant farmer, as a farm owner, as a do
mestic servant, as a laborer, as a mechanic,
as a professional man or woman rendering ser
vice to his own race, can all be greatly in
creased by the right kind of e d u c a t i o n . ^ 7
53Ibid., pp. 109-119.

^^Bulletin No. 432 Ninetieth Annual Report for the Session 1938-39,
p. 14.
"^Carleton Washburne, Louisiana Looks At Its Schools A Summary Report
of the Louisiana Educational Survey (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Educational
Survey Commission, 1942), p. 105.
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The Commission, however, realized that improvement of black edu
cation in Louisiana would be difficult.

Most white Louisianians were

not aware of the poor conditions in black schools, while many others
shared the traditional southern prejudice against educating blacks.
Several parishes even subsidized white education by expropriating the
money provided by the state for black teachers and schools.
education could ill afford the loss.

Black

Louisiana in 1942 spent $66 per

year for the education of each white child but only $15.50 per year
CO

for each black child.
The Commission also found that black schools could do little to
liberate their students from a substandard home environment.

Two- or

three-room frame cabins often housed large black families with barely
adequate shelter.

Parents themselves were often no.more than poorly

educated sharecroppers who could provide no newspapers or books for
supplemental learning. 59

Schools were equally deficient.

About two-

thirds were one-room buildings with several grades demanding the
teacher's attention at the same time.

The school building was usually

on the same level as the surrounding homes — a wood frame structure
heated by a wood stove, providing primitive toilet facilities at best,
and surrounded by inadequate playground space.

In addition, black

schools were typically staffed by teachers who were ill-trained and
paid less than th’eir white counterparts.

Instruction and available

textbooks (often cast-offs from white schools) were also geared to

58Ibid., pp. 114-116.
.
Ibid., pp. 107-109; Bulletin No. 518 Ninety—fourth Annual Report
Session 1942, 1943, pp. 50-56.
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white norms and values, and thus failed to arouse, or even to awaken,
the black children’s desire to learn.^
Despite wartime problems, Louisiana enabled more blacks to re
ceive at least the rudimentary education available in the state's
black schools.

By 1946, the state provided 128 public high schools

(eighty-three state-approved and forty-five non-approved)
The findings of the State Department of Education and of the
Louisiana Educational Survey Commission only reflected part of a
regional pattern.

Blacks in the South had been traditionally relegated

to subservient roles in a society which was content to provide only
substandard facilities for blacks (when it provided any facilities
at all).

World War II, however, changed relations between the races,

both nationally and in the South.

Richard M. Dalfiume notes that the

war marked the turning point at which blacks decided no longer to
accept unequal treatment without protest. ."The dominant attitude in
World War II came to be that the Negro must fight for democracy on two
fronts — at home as well as abroad."62
Louisiana blacks, including black educators, joined in this fight.
Eight black citizens of East Baton Rouge Parish asked the School Board
in May, 1943, to begin adjusting salaries "so that white and black
teachers with equal qualifications and equal experience would receive

^Washburne, Louisiana Looks At Its Schools, pp. 109-114.
^Marshall, "A History of Higher Education of Negroes in the State of
Louisiana,” p. 6062

Richard M. Dalfiume, "The ’Forgotten Years’ of the Negro Revolution,"
The Journal of American History, June 1968, pp. 90, 95.
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equal salaries."

J. K. Haynes, President of the Louisiana Colored

Teachers’ Association, asked Governor Jones in June, 1943, to use his
influence to persuade the State Board of Education to equalize teachers'
salaries in order to prevent more teachers from leaving their profes
sion for jobs in defense industries.

Daniel E. Byrd, State President

of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, also
requested that Jones work for equalized salaries and pointed out that
despite the contention of the white Louisiana Teachers’ Association —
that equalized salaries would mean lower salaries for whites because
the state did not have sufficient funds to increase black salaries to
match those of whites — no such event had occurred in Maryland, Vir
ginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Alabama, Oklahoma, Florida,
Tennessee, Kentucky, or Texas, all former slave states which had al
ready equalized salaries.

And while Jones agreed in principal ("We

cannot consistently hold the Negro to excessively low educational and
economic standards without suffering some of the ill effects of the
low standards"), a revised statewide salary schedule prepared by Super
intendent Coxe based a teacher's salary on experience, education, and
merit, but maintained unequal salaries for blacks and whites. 63
Black educators filed several lawsuits during the war years to
establish equal pay scales for white and black teachers.

The first of

these equalization suits was McKelpin v. New Orleans School Board,
T _n

_

Petition, May 15, 1943; Daniel E. Byrd to Sam Jones, June 14, 1943;
J. K. Haynes to Jones, June 15, 1943; "Meeting of Committee on Equali
zation of Teachers’ Salaries," June 7, 1943; H. W. Wright to Jones,
May 11, 1943; William Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam
Houston Jones, Special Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial
Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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filed in June, 1941.

In this case, McKelpin, a permanent teacher in

New Orleans, claimed that he and other black teachers and principals
in the system received uniformly lower wages than white employees
possessing equal qualifications. The school board lost a motion to
dismiss the case from the federal district court in 1942, and consented
to eliminate salary differences based on race.^

Other cases followed.

In November, 1944, for example, a federal district court in Baton
Rouge heard a suit brought by Wiley Butler McMillon and two other
Iberville Parish teachers.

The plaintiffs had originally filed in

December, 1943, charging that their Parish School Board had violated
their rights to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by maintaining separate
pay scales for black and white teachers.

Upon receipt of the original

suit, the School Board instituted a new salary schedule based on edu
cation, experience, merit, and responsibility.

Thurgood Marshall of

New York, Special Counsel to the NAACP representing the plaintiffs,
argued that the School Board minutes showed the use of color classifi
cation in granting raises, and that the word "race" had not been elimi
nated in salary schedules until late 1944.

Salary lists Marshall

introduced revealed that white teachers in Iberville Parish received
an average salary of $1,749 for a nine-month school year ($194.33 per
month), while black teachers average $637 for seven or eight months
($91 per month for a seven month year). The plaintiffs requested that
64
Leedell Wallace Neyland, "The Negro in Louisiana Since 1900: An
Economic and Social Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University,
1958), p. 95.
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the School Board adopt a salary schedule based solely on education
and experience, and equalize black and white teachers’ salaries for
the 1946-47 school year.^
Black educators failed for the moment, however, to persuade either
the courts or the educational establishment to equalize salaries.

By

1944, black teachers’ average salaries had increased by more than
fifty per cent over the 1940 levels, but that increase occurred mainly
because Orleans Parish, which employed 12 per cent of the state’s
black teachers, had equalized salaries as a result of the McKelpin
case.

Black teachers waited until 1948 for equalized salaries to be

provided statewide by Governor Earl Long as part of his ambitious
legislative program introduced at the beginning of his first full
- , term. 66
gubernatorial
Nor were blacks immediately successful in improving the quality
of black graduate education.

The first black student was admitted to

LSU’s Law School in 1950, and only then as a partial result of the
United States Supreme Courts’ ruling in Sweatt v. Painter, in which
the court found that a "separate" black law school in Texas was "un
equal" to the state’s law school for whites.^
^ Morning Advocate, November 28, 1944; Bulletin No. 548 Official Pro
ceedings January 8 , 1845, pp- 66-68 .
.

.

.

.

Bulletin No. 543 Ninety-fifth Annual Report for the Session 1943,
1944, p. 47; Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long’s Louisiana State Politics,
1920-1952 (Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 210.
^Bulletin No. 530 Official Proceedings April 10, 1944; Marshall, "A
History of Higher Education of Negroes in the State of Louisiana," p.
185; Charles P. Roland, The Impossible Era The South!Since World War
IT (Lexington, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, rev. ed.,
1976), pp..33^34; NumanV. Bartley, The Rise of Massive'Resistance Race
ana Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge, Louisiana
State University Press, 1969), pp.. 6—7.
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In summary, Louisiana’s public schools had grown and taken on
additional responsibilities during the war.

Superintendent Coxe re

ported to the State Board of Education in 1942:
In this supreme effort, our educational forces
have duties as clearly defined as those of our
soldiers . . . there must be drastic action by
the teachers of America . . . May our schools
. . . indoctrinate our children with love of
freedom and will to sacrifice; with passionate
fervor for our living, growing democracy; with
courage, confidence, and conviction in a com
plete victory and a better w o r l d . ^8
Louisiana’s schools successfully met that challenge with sweeping
changes in instructional method and in the curriculum.

The greatest

wartime failure of Louisiana's educational establishment was its in
ability to improve black educational facilities and standards, even
though leaders of both races realized that black education was sub
standard to white education in all respects.

Generations of inequality,

however, had bred acceptance of substandard black education in Louisi
ana, the South, and the nation at large.

The first stirrings of

determined' black protest occurred during World War II, but achievement
of educational equality over the objections of conservative white
southerners who adopted the strategy of "massive resistance" lay far
in the future.^ World War II permanently altered public education
in Louisiana, but it had nowhere near the effect on dismantling racially
segregated public schools as did the United States Supreme Court's
gg

Bulletin No. 480 Wartime Education in Louisiana Schools, p. 3.
^The meaning and.failure of massive-resistance are summarized in
Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, pp. 340-345.
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decision in the case of Brown Et. Al« v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas, Et. Al. (1954).

Those events, however, are well beyond the

scope of this study.
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CHAPTER I X

LOUISIANA AGRICULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II
Louisiana agriculture during 1939-40 retained many of the aspects
which had characterized it since Reconstruction when it adjusted it
self to the loss of slave labor by adopting the tenantry system and
depended on animal power to produce its staple crops.

Louisiana's

farm population in 1939-40 typically lived on a farm consisting of
less than fifty acres.

Of the 150,007 farms in Louisiana in 1940,

12,508 consisted of less than ten acres, 62,989 consisted of ten to
twenty-nine acres, and 33,487 consisted of thirty to forty-nine acres.
Even though a majority of rural Louisianians lived on these small-tomedium size farms, the number of large farms (858 containing 1,000
or more acres, for example) skewed the average farm acreage to just
over sixty-six acres in 1940.*
Many Louisiana farmers in 1939-40 were still tenants.

The Census

Bureau attributes one "operator" to each farm, so it found 150,007
farm operators in Louisiana in 1940.

Of this total, 52,936 were

listed as full owners, 7,376 as part owners, 528 as managers, and
89,167 as tenants (not quite sixty per cent of the total).

Within

the ranks of tenancy, the share tenant (31,460) and the sharecropper
(39,631) far outnumbered the 11,201 cash tenants, the 1,469 sharecash tenants, and the 5,406 tenants who farmed under other arrange-

United States Census of Agriculture: 1950 Counties and State Eco
nomic Areas Louisiana Volume 1 Part 24 (Washington, D.C., United
States Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 3.
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. 2
ments.
The farmers of Louisiana in 1939-40 typically grew at least some
cotton-

Of Louisiana’s 150,007 farms in 1940, 114,291 reported cotton

acreage.
crop:

Cotton produced more farm income in 1940 than any other

$33,540,333 in cotton lint and an additional $6,333,126 in

cotton seed.

(The crop closest to cotton in total income produced
3
was "all cereals" — $28,122,337.)
Each farmer, however, typically
produced only a few bales of cotton.

While 9,210 farmers reported

growing one bale of cotton or less in 1940, 14,011 reported one and
one-half to two bales, 14,779 reported two and one-half to three
bales, 14,984 (the largest number in any category) reported three and
one-half to four bales.

From that point the numbers decline:

13,706

farmers reported four and one-half to five bales, for example, and
11,509 reported five and one-half to six bales.

The Census Bureau

found only twenty-four farmers in Louisiana producing over 400 bales
of cotton in 1940.

Eight farmers reported 400 to 500 bales produced,
4
and sixteen reported over 500 bales.
Louisiana farmers still depended on animal power to produce their

crops.

The 1940 Census found only 6,937 tractors throughout the state.

—2

Ibid., p. 4.

3
Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Agriculture Volume II
Third Series State Reports Part 2 Statistics for Counties, Value of
Farm Products, Farms Classified by Major Source of Income, Farms
Classified by Value of Products (Washington, D.C., United States
Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 672.
4
Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Agriculture Special
Cotton Report (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing
Office, 1943), p. 101.
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Mules and mule colts, on the other hand, constituted the second most
valuable category of livestock on Louisiana farms.

The value of all

cattle and calves totaled $26,591,163, while the value of all-mules
and mule colts totaled $18,981,112.

Moreover, the value of all horses

and colts (many of which were draft animals) totaled an additional
$8,918,969.

The livestock next in value to the draft animals were

hogs and pigs, totaling $3,497,974.^
Louisiana farmers utilized these traditional resources but also
found that they had to abandon or modify many of them during World War
II as they wrestled with "the uncomplimentary requirements of high
farm production caused by war needs, and farm labor shortages caused
by the military draft . . ."^ Despite the difficulties posed by the
latter, Louisiana farmers, with the help of the agricultural estab
lishment, struggled to fulfill the former.
American agriculture in 1939 had survived almost two decades of
severe depression.

Farm prices, temporarily high because of abnormal

demand and scarcity during World War I, collapsed during the early
1920s, long before the Great Depression began to afflict the rest of
the American economy in late 1929 and early 1930.

Gross agricultural

income in the United States fell from $17,700,000 in 1919 to
$10,500,000 in 1921.

Louisiana agriculture shared in the national

"bust." Per capita farm income in Louisiana fell from $322 in 1919

^United States Census of Agriculture:
Sixteenth Census of the United States:
Part 2, p. 672.

1950 Volume 1, Part 24, p. 6 ;
1940 Agriculture Volume II

^J. Philip Dismukes, The Center:' A History of the Development of
Lafayette, Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana, City of Lafayette, 1972),
p. 53.
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to $129 in 1921, and fluctuated throughout the rest of the 1920s, but
always remained less than $250.
burden to Louisiana farmers.

Then, the Great Depression added its

Per capita farm income in the state

sank to $80 in the bleak year of 1932.

By 1933, however, the effects

of early New Deal agricultural programs had initiated a weak recovery.
Farm income reached a Depression high of $207 in 1937 before declining
again to $153 in 1940.
four years:

That income rose dramatically during the next

to $230 in 1941; $360 in 1942; $476 in 1943; $497 in 1944;

and $528 in 1945.

(A post-war boom lasted until 1948, when per capita

income reached $752.)^
President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal wrestled with the problem
of Southern rural poverty throughout the 1930s, but none of the
several programs designed to alleviate it succeeded in eliminating
g

widespread deprivation on southern farms.

Even though George Brown

Tindall found that "The [New. Deal] farm program . . . clearly helped
the South more than any other region in benefits, prices, and income,"
he also found that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the
succeeding Soil Conservation Service both failed to limit production
and thus increase prices.

The 1937 cotton crop, for example, produced

18,946,000 bales, and the surplus on August 1, 1939 exceeded 13,000,000

^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 105; J. P. Montgomery,
Agricultural Statistics for Louisiana 1909-1957 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana
State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Agricultural
Experiment Station, December, 1958), p. 9.
Q
Paul E- Mertz, New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1978), pp. 1-6, 253-262.
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bales, a surplus which depressed the market until 1941.

9

Demand for agricultural produce during the years of World War II,
however, accomplished what the New Deal had not done — war needs sub
stantially raised farm income by creating larger markets for expanded
production.

Louisiana farm income increased every war year except

1944, growing from $113.90 annual cash income per farm in 1940 to
$133.60 in 1941; $192.40 in 1942; $260.50 in 1943; dipping to $248.50
in 1944; and rebounding to $271.40 in 1945.*^ The reasons for this
growth in farm income are simple:

the world needed more food and

fiber than the producing countries could supply, and Louisiana farmers
shared in the rise in agricultural prices, caused by the favorable
operation of the law of supply and demand.
All was not high production and high prices for Louisiana farmers,
however.

Bad weather and insects, the bane of the farmer's existence

from the earliest times that mankind shifted from a food-gathering to
a food-producing creature, plagued Louisiana agriculture.

Bad weather

was the principal reason why the total value of Louisiana's crops de
clined some $24,000,000 from 1939 to 1940.

Drought and boll weevil

infestation devastated the cotton crop in north Louisiana and east
Texas during 1941.

The cotton yield in the area dropped to less than

25 per cent of normal.

Mrs. N. E. Teagle of St. Maurice wrote to

—9

George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South 1913-1945
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 403, 406.

^Stephen D. Reiling and Fred H. Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture, Eco
nomic Trends and Current Status, 1940-1977 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana
State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Center for
Agricultural Sciences and Rural Development, June 1979), p. 22.
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Senator Allen Ellender that the 1942 crop year was no better:

". . .

it has been one of the turbelst (sic) years I have ever expearenced
(sic) and I am 64 years old." Fortunately, New Deal relief agencies
still in operation prevented the destitution that normally would have
followed such a catastrophe.^

In addition, late spring weather,

combined with lack of labor for seedbed preparation and fears of
difficulty in finding labor for harvest in 1944, led to the smallest
number of acres (930,000) planted in cotton in Louisiana since 1915.
The 1944 crop year turned out badly.

A hot, dry summer followed a

late, wet spring, and both total acreage harvested and average yield
per acre declined in most areas.

Fortunately for the farmers, however,

prices increased slightly over 1943.

12

Farmers expect bad weather and occasional poor harvests as a nor
mal course of their business.

The war years, however, brought an

additional problem that was not successfully solved.

The tremendous

demand of the American military machine and war-related industry
which provided relatively high wages and a steady income in contrast
to farming caused a shortage of farm workers.
tempted to solve the labor problem in two ways:

Louisiana farmers at
they increased

Shreveport Times, December 22, 1941; New Orleans States, November 21,
1941; R. S. Wilds to Allen J. Ellender, October 9, 1941; G. J. Posey
to Ellender, October 10, 1941; Max Cockerham to Ellender, October 10,
1941; Lon H. Law to Ellender, November 7, 1941; Grover B. Hill to
Ellender, January 17, 1942; Mrs. N. E. Teagle to Ellender, December
17, 1942, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen
J. Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana
(hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection).
12

Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, July 13, December 22, 1944; New Orleans
Item, April 2, 1945.
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mechanization of farming procedure, and recruited ex—farm or nontraditional farm labor. 13
Mechanization of Louisiana agriculture had proceeded slowly.
There were only 1,691 tractors on Louisiana sugar cane farms in 1930.
By 1940, that number had increased to 3,327 (an increase of 1,636);
by .1945, however, it had increased to 6,499 (an increase of 3,172 in
just five years).

The human labor shortage caused sugar farmers to

switch to mechanical labor wherever possible.

The number of cane

harvesters increased from 79 in 1942 to 124 in 1943; 192 in 1944; 329
in 1945; and 422 in 1946.

In addition, county agents in the sugar

parishes reported 266 flame cultivators (used to replace hand hoeing
of sugar crops) in used in 1945, and 313 in 1946.^
Mechanization of other crop production in Louisiana lagged behind
that of sugar.

The first mechanical cotton picker did not appear in

the state until the 1945 harvest season when it was used on a planta
tion near Cheneyville.

It performed well, even though rain caused a

lengthy delay between defoliation and harvest, so that the machine
gathered an inordinate amount of trash along with the cotton.

Even

though this cotton picker worked, true mechanization of the American
cotton crop did not occur until after the war.

Cotton production

during 1940-1945 still relied as much on hand labor — especially
13
Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Migration House of Representatives 77 Congress 2 Session Part 28
Washington Hearings February 12 and 13, 1942 (Washington, D.C., United
States Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 10857- This Committee,
for example, found that all of south Louisiana and the Mississippi and
Red River valleys in the state sorely needed seasonal farm labor.
*^E. Carl Jones, "Mechanization on Large Sugar Cane Farms in Louisiana"
(M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1947), pp. 17, 65, 79-80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

389

"chopping" (thinning) and picking — as had antebellum cotton
planters.^
Mechanization of rice harvest lagged even further behind.

The

problem with rice was that successful mechanical harvesting required
a moisture content in the grain well in excess of that needed for
successful storage.

While the use of tractors in planting and culti

vation before World War II signaled the beginning of mechanization of
rice production, mechanical harvesting devices could not be utilized
until the development of modern grain drying facilities during the
post-World War II years.

16

While machines helped to fill some of the demand for farm labor,
Louisiana agriculture still relied primarily on hand labor and animal
power.

Even though the number of horses and mules on Louisiana farms

decreased from 317,282 in 1940 to 293,226 in 1945 while the total
number of tractors increased during those same years, only 8.8 per
cent of Louisiana farms in 1945 were equipped with a t r a c t o r . I n
addition, tractors often only supplemented, and did not completely
replace, draft animals or hand labor on many farms where they appeared
during the war.
Therefore, farmers and the agricultural establishment sought to
recruit farm workers from non-traditional sources of rural labor.

^Morning Advocate, September 21, 1945.
^David 0. Whitten, "American Rice Cultivation, 1680-1980:
nary Critique," Southern Studies, Spring, 1982, p. 22.

A Tercente

17W. D. Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends in the Agriculture of
Louisiana Volume 1 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Agricultural Extension Ser
vice, February, 1947), p. 13.
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These sources included people who had never worked on farms before, hut
had agreed to do so. Many of them received training in agricultural
tasks at Emergency Farm Workers' Schools provided by the Louisiana Department of Education.

18

High school students throughout the state

also enrolled in the "Victory Farm Volunteers" to help harvest agri
cultural produce.

In exchange for their work, the students received

small payments —

two cents per pound for picking snap beans and be

tween $1.50 and $3.00 per day (depending on individual ability) for
digging Irish potatoes, for example.

School principals occasionally

rearranged course schedules to allow time for students to work in the
fields, and almost 1,400 students in Terrebonne Parish alone helped
harvest the 1945 crop. 19
Louisiana farmers also hoped to recruit farm labor among former
agricultural laborers who had migrated to towns seeking work (or at
least income) during the Great Depression.

If the former laborers

proved reluctant to return to the farm, then farmers hoped to force
them back by removing the income which permitted them to remain in
town.

The Caddo Parish Police Jury on December 11, 1941, unanimously

passed a resolution calling upon the Works Progress Administration, the
Shreveport City Council, and the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce to
help return "idle labor now on relief rolls" back to farms.

Juror J.

P. Fullilove attacked the "idleness of the city" and begged fellow
jurors:

"For God's sake, let's get these fellows back on the

Tc--------------John H. Mitchell, "Development of Vocational Agricultural Education
in Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1959),
p. 202.
19Morning Advocate, June 3, 1945.
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The next year, J. M. Crutcher, state WPA administrator removed
2,600 farm workers from the WPA rolls, and in addition, removed 7,600
persons from the "awaiting assignment" list and announced that they
would not be considered for WPA payments while farm work was available.
"The WPA will not be a party to such a labor shortage," Crutcher said,
"but will do everything in its power to see that men of farming ex21

perience go back to the farms if the work is there for them."

Louisiana farmers, however, were not desperate enough to accept
unanimously the offer of Harry Itaya, an American citizen of Japanese
descent who wrote to the editor of the Shreveport Times in 1943 from
the relocation camp in Arkansas to which he had been transported after
the beginning of the war.

Itaya suggested that Japanese-Americans

should be released from the internment camps to which the United States
government had assigned them and be relocated on farms and plantations
where they could grow staple and vegetable crops for both military and
civilian use.

Some Louisianians approved Itaya's proposal, calling it

a "wise observance of our great American creed of life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," and "a concrete way to show that democracy
is still alive in our country." Other Louisianians approved it be
cause "a few persons of the type of these Japanese-blood American
citizens can do more work than a large number of negroes (sic) when
it comes to farming and usually can do it better."
20
21

Still other

Shreveport Times, December 12, 1941.

New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 28, 1942.
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Louisianians adamantly disapproved the suggestion, contending that
the "present low standard of living" in Caddo Parish, "would he
dragged lower still."
and wondered:

One person referred to his son in the military

"What he would think if I stood by without opposing it

and let this parish be filled with cheap Jap (sic) labor while he is
risking his life fighting to free this nation of Jap (sic) rule and
22

domination."

Louisiana's opinion, of course, remained a moot point.

The United States internment policy prevented any serious consider
ation of Itaya's suggestion.
While the prejudice against Orientals and the searing memories
of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor prevented utilization of
native Japanese-American labor, Louisiana farmers felt no hesitation
about using German or Italian prisoner of war labor.
Axis prisoners of war came to the United States as a result of
American entry into the war following the Pearl:Harbor attack.

As

American troops participated in the North African campaign against
German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Corps, captured German
soldiers began arriving in the United States.
problem to American authorities:
for the duration of the war?

The prisoners posed a

where could they be safely interned

Decision-makers in Washington eventually

decided that the POW internment camps had to be as isolated and as
29
“Shreveport Times, August 1, 1943; Milton S. Eisenhower, The President
Is Calling (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974),
pp. 95-127. Eisenhower, national director of the relocation, chron
icles the United States government’s imprisonment of Japanese-Americans. The widespread perception of the need to imprison them is also
revealed in the quote from Westbrook Peger (p. 102), who wrote that
"The Japanese in California should be under guard to the last man and
woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is
over."
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heavily guarded as possible.

In order to discourage escape or sabo

tage attempts, emergency wartime regulations decreed that the camps
could not be located within about 170 miles of a coastline, within a
150-mile-wide "zone sanitaire" along the Mexican and Canadian borders,
or near shipyards, munition plants, or vital industries.

Despite

these rulings, approximately two-thirds of the POW base camps (con
taining approximately three-fourths of the prisoners) were located in
the southern and southwestern regions of the country.

23

Officials located the camps in these areas for more than security
reasons.

Maxwell McKnight, Chief of the Administrative Section of the

POW Division, Camp Operations Branch of the Provost Marshal General's
Office during the war, noted that the mild southern climate also
appealed to army planners: "Oil was a problem back in those days
. . . If you could have the prisons down South where the winters were
milder, you had less of a problem with heat." Problems with the extra
screening and sanitation to shield POWs from southern mosquitoes par
tially offset the advantages of the warm climate, but did not stop
construction of the camps.

24

Louisiana received a large share of the southern POW camps.

The

23Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America (New York, Stein
and Day, 1979), pp. 27-28. The United States government eventually
yielded to pressure from the Louisiana Sugar Cane League and Louisiana
Congressmen and allowed the POWs to work in parishes bordering the
Gulf of Mexico.
24
Judith M. Gansberg, Stalag: USA (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Com
pany, 1977), p. 24. Gansberg also noted that the mosquitoes could be
used to the army’s advantage to discipline the POWs, as in an incident
at Camp Wynne, Arkansas, where camp authorities ordered some POWs who
refused an increased work load to stand out-of-doors naked for several
hours exposed to mosquitoes.
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state had more camps than any other southern state except Texas and
Arkansas. Texas had thirty-three such camps, while Arkansas tied
Louisiana for second place among southern states, each with seventeen
camps.25
The United States treated its prisoners of war under the guide
lines set forth at the Geneva Convention of 1929.

These guidelines

stipulated that prisoners of war other than officers could be re
quired to work, but that the work could not be directly related to
war operations, and could not jeopardize the health or the safety of
the prisoners. 26

These restrictions, however, did not preclude agri

cultural labor and prisoners of war in the United States helped to
alleviate the agricultural labor shortage.

In the South, the prisoners

picked cotton, cut sugar cane, harvested tobacco and peanuts, cut
pulpwood, and worked in fertilizer plants. 27
Louisiana first became involved with imprisoning enemies of the
United States in late 1941, when the government sent Japanese, German,
and Italian enemy aliens to the Quarantine Station

at Algiers.

Then

95

Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, p. 31. The other south
ern states and their number of camps are: Mississippi and Georgia —
13 each; Alabama — 11; Florida — 8 ; North and South Carolina — 7
each; Virginia — 5, and Tennessee — 4.
26Lt. Col. Lamar F. Peyton, "Treatment and Utilization of Prisoners of
War By the United States During World War II" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1973), p. 17.
27
Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America, pp. 35, 90; Gansberg,
Stalag: USA, p. 34; Matthew J. Schott and Rosalind Foley, Bayou
Stalags German Prisoners of War in Louisiana (Lafayette, Louisiana,
n.p., 1981), pp. 5-6. Krammer notes that a Huntsville, Texas, farmer
remarked that POWs did not know "a stalk of cotton from a goddamn
cockleburr."
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in 1942, the United States Army Provost Marshal General ordered the
preparation of Camps Livingston, Polk, and Ruston to house enemy
aliens and prisoners of war. 28
Camp Livingston received its first enemy.aliens, all Japanese men,
in early June, 1942.

Newspaper reporters allowed into the camp in

July reported that the camp authorities treated the prisoners well.
The United States had reason to treat the Japanese well, even though
popular sentiment might have demanded otherwise.

The Japanese govern

ment had failed to ratify the Geneva Convention, and was thus not
bound to abide by its guidelines, even though the Japanese had gen
erally agreed to adhere to them.

The difference between the Japanese

government "ratifying" and "agreeing to" an international accord al
lowed the United States some leeway in its treatment of Japanese
prisoners.

29

United States authorities hoped that news of humane

treatment Japanese prisoners received in this country would filter
back into Japan and temper treatment of Americans held captive there. 30
This consideration became increasingly important after the fall of
Corregidor and Bataan in May, 1942, left thousands of American pris
oners in Japanese hands.
German prisoners reached Louisiana on July 9, 1943, when captured
members of Rommel's Afrika Corps arrived at Camp Livingston, just north
of Alexandria in central Louisiana.

Camp Livingston, along with near-

28
Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 2.
29Peyton, "Treatment and Utilization of Prisoners of War," p. 19.
30Alexandria Daily Town Talk, July 14, 1942 (hereinafter cited as
Town Talk).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

396

by Camps Claiborne and Beauregard and Camp Polk near Leesville, were
primarily constructed as training camps for American inductees, but
were also pressed into service to house POWs.

Prisoners boused at

these camps lived a life quite similar to that of an American soldier
in a military prison:

reveille at 5:55 A.M.; roll call at 6:15;

breakfast at. 6:30; lunch break, 11:30-1:00; and end of the work day
31
at 5:00. 1
Louisiana POW camps eventually housed prisoners from virtually
every Axis country, but most authorities permitted little interaction
among the various nationalities.

Camp Claiborne officials located

the German compound southwest of the main entrance of the camp, and
the Italian compound far to the west.

The United States Army also

attempted to separate hardened Nazi POWs from those who had been
drafted into the ranks of the Axis armies.

Subsequently, Camp Ruston

became an anti-Nazi camp with a population primarily composed of nonGermans.

32

The Louisiana POW camps housed thousands of able-bodied young men.
The Geneva Convention governing their treatment did not prevent their
employment in occupations not directly related to the war effort.
Louisiana farmers needed farm hands to replace labor lost to the war
effort.

Therefore, quite logically, the farmers and their spokesmen

began asking for POW labor to cultivate and harvest Louisiana crops.
Their inquiries began even as the German prisoners arrived in the

^ Ibid., August 2, 1943.
32
Ibid., December 8 , 1979; Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 3.
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state.

Charles A. Farwell, educational director of the American Sugar

Cane League, announced on July 3, 1943, that his association had ex
plored the possibility of using the Germans to harvest the fall sugar
cane crop.

Senator Allen Ellender announced on July 8 that Louisiana

would receive farm help from German and Italian POWs, but their use
in the sugar crop would be limited because of Southern Defense Command
prohibition against establishing a prison camp within 150 miles of a
coastline (a restriction which officials later lifted).33 By the
height of the 1943 harvest season in October, more than 950 German
prisoners worked.on farms surrounding Camp Livingston and the sub-camp
established at Franklin specifically to provide laborers for the sugar
harvest.

The Army also permitted an expansion of camps and sub-camps

at various locations throughout the state to house workers near areas
with farm labor shortages.

Camp Claiborne received German prisoners

from Camp Polk on November 4, Port Allen housed POWs at a compound
established at the Parish Fair Grounds, Lafourche Parish received
several temporary camps to house workers beginning with the 1943 har
vest.

Sub-camps at Rayne, Eunice, Jennings, Sulphur, and Welsh housed

POWs used in the rice harvest. 34 The decentralization of the POW popuft

lation continued into 1944 because of the continued shortage of farm
labor.

Senator John Overton, for example, successfully requested a

33
Morning Advocate, July 4, October 6 , 1943; Shreveport Times, July
9, 1943.
34
States, September 29, 1943; Town Talk, October 19, November 5, 1943;
Morning Advocate, December 16, 1943, November 3, 1983; Joseph T.
Butler, "Prisoner of War Labor in the Sugar Cane Fields of Lafourche
Parish, Louisiana: 1943-1944," Louisiana History, Summer, 1973, p. 287.
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sub-camp at Bastrop to house POWs which area farmers wanted to help
harvest the cotton crop. 35
Farmers in an area with a shortage of farm labor worked closely
with State Supervisor of Emergency Farm Labor Carl E. Kemmerly to
establish the sub-camps.

Farmers contributed to the construction of

the prison compounds, then Kemmerly contacted Army inspectors to
certify that the facilities met Geneva Convention housing specifica
tions.

Employers had to provide suitable buildings for kitchens and

mess halls; sanitary facilities had to include one shower per twenty
men and one faucet per fifteen men (counting both prisoners and
guards); and each compound had to be equipped with water and electri
city.

If the facility passed Army inspection, Army guards escorted

prisoners to the site and maintained surveillance of the area.

The

expense of contributing to the construction of the compounds, plus the
daily wage of $1.20 to $1.50 per day (usually seventy cents paid to
the government for operating expenses of the compounds and eighty cents
paid to the prisoner) for a minimum contingent of ten workers meant
that only substantial farmers or businessmen could afford POW labor.

36

Louisiana farmers needed help from any source to harvest the 1943
crop.

Not only had the armed services taken their workers, but war

industries actively recruited farm workers at higher wages than they
35Joseph N. Lockwood, "The German Concentration Camp, Bastrop, Louisi
ana," North Louisiana Historical Association Journal, Spring, 1980, p.
34.
36Peyton, "Treatment and Utilization of Prisoners of War," p. 78; But
ler, "Prisoner of War Labor in the Sugar Cane Fields of Lafourche
Parish, Louisiana," p. 178; Louisiana Farm Bureau News, May, 1980, pp.
1, 4; Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, p. 5.
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received on the farms.

This activity began in 1942, when the boom in

defense industries caused industrial labor shortages.

P. Theo

Landaiche, a St. Gabriel rice farmer, complained to Senator Ellender
in January, 1942, that several individuals who owned trucks facili
tated the farm labor flight to industry by using the vehicles to
transport farm workers to defense industries in Baton Rouge (for a
fee, of course).

Moreover, Landaiche complained, "These jobs are

strickly (sic) a union proposition . . . The pay on these jobs are
(sic) from $4.00 to $6.00 per day for these common farm Negroes . . . "
Congressman Overton Brooks complained to Paul McNutt, Chairman of the
War Manpower Commission, that the WMC placed advertisements in Louisi
ana newspapers offering jobs in both in-state and out-of-state in
dustries, and thus contributed to the drain of Louisiana's agricul
tural labor.

McNutt replied that the WMC and the United States Em

ployment Service carried on their search for available workers nation
wide, and no agency of the federal government had designated northwest
Louisiana a critical labor area. 37
The industrial raids on the agricultural labor pool continued
into 1943.

Mark H. Brown, a Lake Providence lumber mill operator, com

plained in May, 1943, that government contractors sent trucks to
transport labor to their construction sites for "grading, sodding, and
beautifying" frills, while producers of forest products and farmers
lacked sufficient help.

Furthermore, H. B. Naquin, a small-scale

37P. Theo Landaiche to Allen J. Ellender, January 2, 1942; Louis
Krielow to Ellender, February 24, 1943, Ellender Collection; Overton
Brooks to Paul McNutt, May 2, 1944; McNutt to Brooks, May 12, 1944;
Brooks to McNutt, June 23, 1944, Congressional Record 78 Congress 2
Session Appendix Volume 90 Part 10, pp. A3345-A3346.
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manufacturer of a mechanical sugar cane harvester, reported to Presi
dent Roosevelt that the giant Higgins Industries, producing ships and
other war implements, depleted the available labor supply within "40
or 50 miles" in all directions by providing buses to transport workers
from rural areas into New Orleans, and that "our sugar planters cannot
compete with the prices that they are paying per day."38

Instructions

issued by the WMA and the USES subsequently provided that individuals
currently or most recently employed in agriculture could not be re
ferred to non-agricultural employment without prior consultation be
tween the USES and a designated representative of the War Food Admini
stration (usually a County Agent of the State Agricultural Extension
Service).39 This provision proved to be ineffectual. Relocation of
agricultural labor continued to be a problem throughout the war.
Geography, climate, traditional southern racial attitudes, and
legalized segregation in the South thwarted one effort to ease the
labor shortage by utilizing workers from the West Indies.

The govern

ments of the United States and Jamaica agreed in 1943 that Jamaican
workers could come to the.United States.

The major concentration point

for the West Indian laborers was Camp Pontchartrain, adjacent to New
Orleans.

The extra labor was therefore tantalizingly close to Louisi

ana farmers.

The Jamaican government, however, had agreed to export

workers to the mainland only with two stipulations:

they had to re

OO

Mark H. Brown to Allen J. Ellender, May 10, 1943; H. B. Naquin to
Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 15, 1943; Ellender Collection.
39
Paul V. McNutt to Allen J. Ellender, September 15, 1943, Ellender
Collection.
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turn to Jamaica after the 1943 harvest season so they would not be ex
posed to a harsh North American winter, and they could not be used in
the South.

Some south Louisiana farmers asked Senators Ellender and

Overton to prevail upon the federal government to seek changes in the
original bilateral agreement.

The War Food Administration subsequently

asked the Jamaican government to extend the period of employment of
its nationals in the United States, and allow their use in the Louisi
ana and Florida sugar cane fields, where the harvest season extended
far beyond that of other crops.

Despite pleas

from Louisianians,

however, both the Jamaican and Bahamian governments agreed to allow
their nationals to remain in the United States over the winter of 194344, but stipulated that they could be employed only in Florida, where
the winters more closely matched the mild, tropical winter. 40
Failure to secure imported workers left only the POWs as a large
pool of untapped labor.

Their subsequent work in the fields of Louisi

ana brought them into close contact with many more Louisianians than
would have associated with them otherwise.

The attitude of many

Louisianians was more favorable toward the primary enemies, the Ger
mans, than toward Italians, Southern Europeans, or Asians.

Black

Louisianians, closely associated with the POWs in agricultural work,
were of two minds about the prisoners:

some blacks resented the com

petition for their work and the special treatment some prisoners
40
Charles A. Farwell to W. C. Kemper, July 31, 1943; Paul V. McNutt to
Allen J. Ellender, August 17, 1943, September 14, 1943; Walter Godchaux
to Farwell, August 2, 1943; Godchaux to Ellender, August 2, 1943,
September 2, 1943; Wilson R. Buie to Ellender, August 28, 1943; God
chaux to Frank Wurzlow, August 23, 1943, August 30, 1943; Marvin Jones
to Ellender, October 30, 1943; Ellender Collection.
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received; other blacks found satisfaction in seeing whites sharing
menial field work.

Despite official attempts to discourage fraterni

zation, hundreds of personal relationships developed between prisoners
and both black and white Louisianians. 41
Louisiana’s use of POW labor reached its peak during the 1945
crop year after Germany's surrender, but before the prisoners were
repatriated.

Many farmers and others who utilized POW labor in the

forest industry feared continued agricultural labor shortages through
out the South after the war and wanted the government to keep the
POWs for an extended period, but by 1946 POW labor disappeared from
Louisiana.^
Despite the problems posed by bad■weather and the agricultural
labor shortage, Louisiana farmers continued to produce their three
historic major staple crops:

sugar cane, cotton, and rice.

Each

subdivision of agriculture responded to the challenge of the war in
its own way.
Louisiana sugar farmers during the war were confined mainly to
the triangle with apexes in West Baton Rouge, Iberia, and Lafourche
Parishes, covering an average of 266,200 acres during those years.
41Matthew J. Schott, "World War II Prisoners and Internees in Louisi
ana: A Lesson in Racial and Ethnic Stereotyping," paper delivered to
the Louisiana Historical Association Annual Convention, March 25, 1983.
4°

Schott and Foley, Bayou Stalags, .p. 4; R. D. Crowell to Overton
Brooks, January 28, 1944; E. A. Frost to Brooks, January 28, 1944; Q.
T. Hardtner to Brooks, February 9, 1944, Congressional Record 78 Con
gress 2 Session Appendix Volume 90 Part 8 (Washington, D.C., United
States Government Printing Office, 1944), p. A825; Henry D. Larcade to
Colonel Clifford S. Urwiller, February 19, 1945, Congressional Record
79 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 91 Part'10 (Washington, D.C.,
United States Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. A726-A727; Joseph
C. Goulden, The Best Years 1945-1950 (New York, Antheneum, 1976), p.
130.
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Production from 1940 to 1944 averaged 4,800,000 tons.
Act of 1937 regulated that production during the war.

43

The Sugar
Congress

planned the Sugar Act to apply to crops only until 1940, but the
beginning of World War II caused Congress to extend the Act until
1944.44
The Sugar Act of 1937 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
(Henry A. Wallace, until his election to the vice presidency in 1940,
Claude Wickard thereafter) to estimate the annual consumption require
ments of the United States in December of each year, or at other times
if he deemed it necessary, and then allocate portions of the total to
farmers in the sugar-producing areas of the country.

The Secretary of

Agriculture thus had broad powers to manipulate the price of sugar
through his power to determine consumption requirements. 45

In addi

tion, an international agreement reached in 1937 between sugar
importing and sugar exporting countries allowed the exporting coun
tries to produce sugar at high levels, thus in effect helping to hold
down sugar prices.

This international agreement nominally lasted un

til 1942, but the war caused new problems in the international sugar
market before that date.

46

43
Reiling and Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends and Cur
rent Status, p. 33.
44
Rudolph Carrol Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture" (Ph.
D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1973), p. 242; Thomas Becnel,
Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment Louisiana 1887-1976 (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1980), pp. 34-35. .
45
Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 243; Becnel,
Labor, Church, and the Sugar Establishment, p. 35.
46
Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950 A
Study of Their Origin and Development (New York, The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1953), p. 399.
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Following the beginning of the war, American sugar merchants,
many of whom remembered the short supplies experienced during World
War I, bought large quantities of sugar, even though Roosevelt and
Wallace assured them that the United States surplus of 800,000 tons
of sugar would prevent shortages in the new world situation.

Never

theless, the buying spree caused Roosevelt to suspend all quota re
strictions on September 11, 1939.

He reinstated the quotas on Decem

ber 26, 1939, but by then Louisiana sugar farmers had planted a 1940
crop far in excess of any reasonable quotas.

The Department of Agri

culture ruled, therefore, that the farmers could harvest up to 110
per cent of their proportionate share of the 1940 crop without deduc
tion from their payments.
1940 sugar cane crop.

Nature, however, had the last word on the

Adverse weather conditions destroyed much of it.

In addition, Japanese expansion the Pacific threatened United States
imports from Hawaii and the Philippines.

Therefore, the USDA, Secre

tary of State Cordell Hull, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes
agreed in April, 1941, that all acreage restrictions should be lifted
from sugar production.

The marketing quotas remained, however, and

were not lifted until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
After that attack, the government encouraged full production and dis
tribution of sugar.^
Aid to the sugar industry as originally assigned to the Defense
Supplies Corporation, which on October 14, 1942, announced that it
would reimburse United States refiners of Louisiana raw sugar for
47
Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," pp. 255-261.
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certain transportation costs they incurred in shipping the raw sugar
to refineries designated by the War Production Board instead of the
refinery nearest the raw sugar mill.

The government hoped to keep

the raw sugar supply distributed to all available refineries so that
some would not be inundated with raw sugar while others lay idle.

The

Commodity Credit Corporation assumed responsibility for this program
on December 16, 1942, and the CCC continued the reimbursement payments
for the 1943-1946 crop years.

48

The CCC also supplied assistance payments for harvest of the 1943
sugar cane crop.

On October 22, 1943, it offered a payment of 33 cents

per ton of Louisiana standard sugar cane to be paid through the processors to the growers. 49 The early freeze during the 1943 harvest
season threatened to reduce the amount of sugar produced, so the CCC
extended the payment program to include salvage operations for the
freeze-damaged cane.^
Despite these attempts to bolster domestic sugar production, the
United States and its allies supplied less than their need.

Therefore,

United States consumers seldom received all the sugar they could use.
48Earl B. Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls 1941-1947 Volume I
(New York, The Statistical Press, Inc., n.d.), p. 65; Sugar and Its
Wartime Controls Volume II, pp. 592-607. This program was designed
to keep all refineries operating at full capacity. The alternative,
the USDA thought, would be to allow refineries near the raw sugar
mills to be choked with surplus sugar, while refineries further away
operated at partial capacity or stood idle.
49Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, pp. 85-86; Volume
II, pp. 608-612.
^Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, p. 86; Volume II,
pp. 613-614.
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Per capita consumption in the United States fluctuated during the war.
The 1942 per capita consumption of 86.2 pounds fell to 80.3 pounds in
1943, rose to 89.1 pounds in 1944, and sank to 73.6 pounds in 1945.
Furthermore, beginning in 1942, consumers received ration books which
allowed them to purchase only a limited amount of sugar (originally
slightly more than one-half pound per week, eventually falling to less
than one-third pound per week), and then only within a carefully
specified time.'’*'
Cotton crops covered more acres in Louisiana during the war years
than any other single staple crop — an average of 995,000 acres during
1940-1944. 52
state.

Cotton production was also more widely spread over the

A survey in 1945 found cotton on 61.3 per cent of Louisiana

farms, sugar cane grown for sugar on 6.51 per cent and rice on 4.94
per cent.

All areas of the state except Jefferson, Plaquemines, St.

Bernard, and Orleans Parishes produced at least some cotton during the
war. 53
Cotton, of course, was the historic crop of the South, and
southern farmers could grow cotton well — so well, in fact, that they
had repeatedly flooded the market during the 1930s, thus depressing

^*Wilson, Sugar and Its Wartime Controls Volume I, p. 87; Volume IV,
pp. 1321, 1351.
52Louisiana farmers grew com on an average of 1,300,000 acres during
the war, but corn was not a staple crop grown primarily for sale. In
stead, the farmers generally used the com either as food for them
selves or their workstock.
53Reiling and Wiegtnann, Louisiana Agricultural Economic Trends and
Current Status, p. 30; Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends, p. 9.
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prices.

Cotton, because of the use of cotton lint in armament pro

duction, became an important commodity during the war.

Therefore,

the Louisiana Agricultural Extension Service concentrated on improving
the quality of the cotton produced.

The United States Department of

Agriculture, however, recognized that the huge stockpiles of surplus
cotton precluded the need for production stimulation programs.

The

United States in March, 1941, had a carry-over of almost 12,000,000
bales, and the carry-over never fell much below 10,500,000 bales at
any time during the war.^
Therefore, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard introduced a
1941 Supplementary Cotton Program in an attempt to reduce the supply
in two ways:

the USDA paid cotton farmers to reduce their cotton

acreage with stamps which could only be used to purchase cotton
clothing at local stores participating in the program; and it paid
farmers to grow vegetables on land taken out of cotton production.^
The second part of this program met with little success.

The

54
Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 289; Tindall,
The Emergence of the New South, p. 704; Frederick W. Williamson,
Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana 1860-1948
How It Opened the Road for Progress in Better Farming and Rural Living
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechani
cal College, Division of Agricultural Extension, 1951), p. 222. Dr.
Henry G. Knight, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and
Engineering and Regional Research Laboratories, told the House Appro
priations Committee on March 2, 1942, that the Southern Research
Laboratory in New Orleans had developed a way for cotton lint to be
used in the production of smokeless gunpowder. Knight admitted that
the resulting shells were more explosive than shells with regular
linters and therefore required more careful handling, but the use of
cotton virtually guaranteed an unlimited supply. States, March 2,
1942.
^Hammack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," p. 289.
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payment to the farmers was a token $1.50 for a one—fourth acre plot
which had to he protected from livestock and which had to grow at
least six kinds of vegetables.

A farm family could also receive a

$3.00 payment for producing and storing 300 quarts of frozen or canned
foodstuffs."*^ Many farmers, accustomed to producing staple cash
crops, however, disliked vegetable gardening and failed to understand
the importance of family food production in diversified farm manage
ment.^

Despite the admonitions from Georgia Farm Bureau President

R. L. Wingate that "We cannot eat surplus cotton," many cotton farmers
throughout the South, including Louisiana, preferred to continue producing the crop they understood best. 58
Rice, Louisiana’s third staple crop, was confined mostly to the
southwestern corner of the state during the war years.

Between 1940

and 1944, Louisiana rice farmers planted an average 558,400 acres.
Rice was a crop of restricted acreage because it required the imper
vious subsoils found in southwest Louisiana which are used to hold the
irrigation water that discourages weed growth during the growing
season.

Southwest Louisiana produced 83 per cent of Louisiana’s total

Cg

Ibid., p. 290; A. B. Curet, "Food Wins Wars, Too — So Point Coupee
Parish Goes All Out For Victory," Louisiana Municipal Review, SeptemberOctober, 1942, pp. 154-155.
"*^Williamson, Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana,
pp. 218-219; J. L. Lee, "Louisiana Farming in the National Emergency,"
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1942, pp. 44-48.
58
Tindall, Emergence of the New South, pp. 704-705. It should also be •
noted that it was not unprofitable to grow cotton during the war. The
price of cotton on the New Orleans market reached 20.77 cents per pound
including government soil conservation payments in January, 1942. This
price exceeded cotton prices back to 1929. Times-Picayune, January 23,
1942.
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rice harvest during the war years, but Louisiana’s share of the
national rice market fell from 40.6 per cent in 1939 to 28.6 per cent
in 1944.

59

As in most other commodity areas, the United States govern

ment encouraged unlimited rice production and guaranteed prices.

Loss

of normal Asiatic supplies to Japanese expansion sharpened the American
realization that it needed more domestic supplies, and raised total
plantings to the practical limit of 1,500,000 acres over the country.
Louisiana farmers harvested 88,690,000 bushels of rice worth
$147,819,000 between 1941 and 1944.60
Louisiana farmers also increased production of other crops during
the war.

They had grown soybeans for years, but primarily for hay,

forage, and soil improvement.

The federal government, however, called

for more soybeans for vegetable oil production, and Louisiana’s farmers
responded.

Soybeans remained a minor crop during the war, however,

covering an average 31,800 acres between 1941 and 1944.^^
In addition to vegetable crops, Louisiana farmers also increased
production of meat and meat products.

Swine, beef, poultry, egg, and

milk production all increased during the war.
1942 —

The entire pig crop of

1,106,000 — was 7 per cent above that of 1941.

The New

59
Reiling and Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends and
Current Status, pp. 34-35; Whitten, "American Rice Cultivation," p. 21.
^Haramack, "The New Deal and Louisiana Agriculture," pp. 296-298.
^Reiling and Wiegmann, Louisiana Agriculture Economic Trends:and
Current Status, pp. 34-35; Williamson, Origip and Growth of Agricul
tural Extension in Louisiana,' p. 229. The real "boom" in Louisiana
soybeans occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The average yield be
tween 1940 and 1944 was 388,000 bushels. In comparison, average yield
between 1972 and 1976 was 46,500,000 bushels, reaching a high of
63,000,000 bushels in 1976.
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Orleans market received 79,202,000 pounds of milk in 1940, compared
to 105,452,000 pounds in 1941, and 112,651,000 in 1942. Louisiana
farmers produced about 10,000,000 chickens in 1942, and improved egg
production 17 per cent over the previous year.

During the spring and

summer of 1942, Louisiana farms supplied over 100 railroad cars of
eggs — over 1,000,000 dozen — to the egg dehydration plant at Ruston
in north Louisiana.^
Louisiana sweet potatoes provided another source of income to
Louisiana farmers.

The B. F. Trappey family of Jeanerette had moved

their agricultural canning operation to Lafayette shortly after 1930,
and there developed a process for canning formerly discarded sweet
potatoes that were not of the highest quality by packing them in a
heavy sugar syrup which preserved both the shape and sweetness of the
potato.

By the beginning of World War II, the Trappeys had introduced

their "candied yam" to much of the middle South.

The Allied armed

forces included the potatoes in their field ration kits and thus
created an unprecedented demand.

The Trappeys expanded their cannery

and produced about 12,000,000 pounds of canned sweet potatoes for the
military before the end of the war.

In addition, five plants in Lou

isiana — Warriner Starch at St. Francisville; American Foods at
Opelousas, Trappey, and Little and Company at Lafayette, and Frank
Tea and Spice at New Iberia, produced dehydrated sweet potatoes.

These

plants in 1943 used nearly 1,000,000 bushels of raw potatoes, for which
they paid $2,500,000.
£2

The Quartermaster Corps bought their entire

_

Williamson, Origin and Growth of Agricultural Extension in Louisiana,
pp. 225-227; Shreveport Times, July 7, 1942.
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production. 63
Louisiana’s forests also contributed to the war effort-

As the

United States shifted its national defense preparedness program into
high gear, the government became the country's largest lumber consumer.
In September, 1941, alone, the federal government ordered 2,000,000,000
board feet of lumber for the construction of cantonments.^
pine timber producers supplied much of the government’s need.

Southern
Louisi

ana then had about 16,193,000 acres of forest land (about 55 per cent
in public ownership and 88.1 per cent in private ownership. About
one-half of this acreage was in hardwood timber, and the other onev
- i*
65
half
xn
pxne.

The federal government did not impose stringent controls on the
forest industry, but industry trade groups instead organized produc
tion of this valuable source of war material.

The Southern Pine

Association, headquartered in New Orleans, for example, pledged its
full support to the war effort; the government accepted lumber of
poorer grade than it had permitted before, and the timber industry
boomed.

66

By the end of 1945, Louisiana had produced 82,000,000 board

Morning Advocate, May 27, 1944; Dismukes, The Center, pp. 52-53. In
addition to sweet potatoes, the army also bought Louisiana-grown Irish
potatoes. In 1943 the army needed 5 railroad cars (1,500 sacks) each
day for its camps in Louisiana. Town Talk, April 29, 1943.
64
James E. Fickle, The New South and the 'New Competition’ Trade As
sociation Development in the Southern Pine Industry (Urbana, Illinois,
Forest History Society by the University of Illinois Press, 1980), p.
350.
^A. D. Folweiler, Forest Land Ownership in Louisiana and Its Influence
on Timber Production, Louisiana Bulletin No. 377 (Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, December,
1943), p. 9.
66

Fickle, The New South and the 'New Competition*, pp. 350-351; William
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feet of timber in excess of its need, and 475 timber operators in the
state had paid $50,000,000 to some 40,000 people working in the timber
business, even though Louisiana timber producers struggled with
shortages of labor, equipment, and transportation, as did timbermen
in other sections of the United States.^

North Louisiana Soil Con

servation District forestors noted at the end of the war that the
heavier—than-normal cutting caused by war demand had improved the
north Louisiana timber stands by removing many weak "weed” trees of
questionable value and thus leaving room for healthy trees to grow.
World War II caused many changes on Louisiana farms.

68

While the

amount of land devoted to farming remained virtually the same —
9,996,108 acres in 1939 (34.6 per cent of Louisiana's total area), and
10,039,657 acres in 1944 (34.7 per cent of the total area), the number
of farmers declined from 150,007 in 1940 to 129,295 in 1945.

In

addition, the characteristics of the farm population changed notice
ably.

More farmers became full or part owners of the land they

worked during the war.
right.

In 1940, 52,946 farmers owned their farms out

By 1945, that number had increased to 58,761.

ward farm ownership cut across both races.

This trend to

The number of white full

owners increased from 43,410 to 48,357, while the number of black full
owners increased from 9,526 to 10,404.

Overall, the percentage of

G. Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legislators Political Economy of the
Lumber Industry 1890-1941 (College Station, Texas A & M University
Press, 1982), pp. 236-238.
^ Morning Advocate, December 7, 1945; Robbins, Lumberjacks and Legis
lators, p. 238.
68

Shreveport Times, August 26, 1945.
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Louisiana farms operated by owners increased from 40.2 in 1940 to 50.4
in 1944.69
While the number of farm owners increased, the number of farm
tenants declined during the war years as agricultural workers found
jobs in war-related industry or entered the armed services.

The

number of all classes of tenants fell from 89,167 in 1940 to 63,541
in 1945.

The decline occurred in tenants of both races, but more

whites than blacks left tenantry during the war years.

The number of

white tenants fell from 40,787 in 1940 to 25,263 in 1945 (a decline
of 14,524), while the number of black tenants fell from 48,380 to
37,278 (a decline of 11,102).

This trend held true even for the

poorest of Louisiana agricultural workers — the sharecroppers.

The

number of ’croppers fell from 38,631 in 1940 to 25,221 in 1945.

In

this category the decline was greater for blacks than for whites.

The

higher number of black sharecroppers at the beginning of the war,
however, still left more black than white sharecroppers at the end of
the war.

The number of white sharecroppers declined from 12,082 to

6,110 (a decline of 5,972), while the number of black sharecroppers
declined from 27,549 to 19,111 (a decline of 8,438).^
The scarcity of farm labor during the war years is also revealed
in the startling decline in the number of hired hands.

Louisiana

farmers reported 56,712 hired hands on their farms in 1940.

By 1945,

^9Curtis, Statistical Data and Trends in the Agriculture of Louisiana,
pp. 5, 7.
70,..,
_
Ibid., p. 5.
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however, that number had fallen to 18,954,7^ a decline of 37,759.
(No wonder Louisiana farmers agreed to risk using German POWs on
their farms I)
Louisiana farmers also grew older during the war years.

Their

average age in 1940 was 44.2 years, while in 1945, their average age
had increased to 46.7 years.

It is no surprise that the number of

farmers in the "Under 35" age group declined most sharply — from
42,104 in 1940 (29 per cent of the total number of farmers) to 25,707
in 1945 (20 per cent of the total).

The young farmers, of course,

were most susceptible to the draft.

Also, many of them had less of

a stake in farm life, and therefore felt less reluctance to leave the
farm for industrial jobs.

All other age categories of farmers rose

in their percentage of the total number of farmers during the war
years. . The "35-54" age group fell in actual numbers from 64,710 in
1940 to 64,359 in 1945, but their percentage of the total number of
farmers rose from 45 per cent to 50 per cent.
similarly fell in. real numbers —

The ”55-64" age group

from 22,877 to 22,837, but in

creased slightly in percentage from 16 per,cent to 18 per cent.

The

"65 and Above" age group, however, increased in both real numbers and
percentage —

13,948 (10 per cent) in 1940 to 15,106 (12 per cent) in

1945.72
Louisiana agriculture also experienced a slight trend toward
larger farms during the war years.

The "Under 30 Acres" farm

7 *Ibid., p. 14.
72Ibid., p. 6 .
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classification showed a decline from 50.3 per cent of all Louisiana
farms in 1939 to 46.1 per cent in 1944, while all other classifica
tions (30-49 acres; 50—99 acres; 100-179 acres; 180-259 acres; 260499 acres; 500 or more acres) showed increases.
ever, were slight.

These increases, how

The "50-99 acre" classification, for example,

showed the largest percentage increase, and it was only 1.3 per cent.
The "180-259 acres" and "500 or more acres" classifications, in contrast, showed the least increase (.4 per cent). 73
The relative prosperity of the war years also brought more
amenities to farm life.

The number of trucks on Louisiana farms in

creased from 17,005 to 20,974 from 1940 to 1945 (a 23.3 per cent in
crease), while the number of automobiles increased from 34,891 to
74
40,651.
In addition, 17,481 farms in 1945 (13.7 per cent of the
total) reported running water in the main dwelling; 31,558 farms re
ceived electricity (24.4 per cent of the total); 63,025 were equipped
with radios (48.7 per cent of the total); and 6,434 had a telephone
on the premises (5 per cent of the total).7^
In summary, Louisiana agriculture faced many difficult challenges
during the years of World War II which it met with varying degrees of
success.

Perennial problems with bad weather and insects, of course,

are beyond the total control of farmers at any time.

The labor

problem likewise remained beyond the ability of Louisiana farmers to

73Ibid.,
:
p. 8 .
74 Ibid., p. 13.
75Ibid., p. 14.
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solve completely, although several human and mechanical substitutes
were used effectively.
Despite these difficulties, however, the unprecedented worldwide
demand for agricultural products created by the war brought,Louisiana
agriculture out of the economic doldrums caused by the loss of a cap
tive market following World War I and the Great Depression.

The war

demand, however, while it stimulated Louisiana's agricultural economy,
failed to reorient that economy toward new crops.

Louisiana farmers

both before and after the war concentrated on growing their three
traditional staple crops:

cotton, sugar cane, and rice.

Fortunately

for them, the war created demand for these specific commodities —
cotton for both fiber (including military uniforms and accessories)
and ammunition, sugar cane and rice because German naval attacks
threatened to disrupt dependable sources of supply, and because
Japanese expansion in the Pacific and Asia destroyed traditional
sources of both sugar and rice.

Louisiana farmers, therefore, could

sell their favorite crops in a most faborable sellers' market and
enjoy the attendant prosperity — while that market lasted.
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CHAPTER X

LOUISIANA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II
During World War II, the South received some $4,442,000,000 in
federal funds for war plants, 17.6 per cent of the national total.
Louisiana received more of these funds than any other Southern state
except Texas — about $1,773,713,000.^

The South had trained many re

cruits during World War I, and federal officials in World War II, in
cluding President Franklin Roosevelt, remembering that contribution,
sent thousands of new recruits for training in the South again.

In

addition, Southern urban areas contained relatively large pools of
workers needed in wartime industry.

Therefore, the South, and especi

ally Southern cities became important centers in the headlong rush to
enable the United States to participate in the war.

2

Increased federal spending for war projects helped to bring
Louisiana and the South out of the economic doldrums of the Great De
pression, but many people felt a great reluctance to let go of New
Deal agencies which had ensured their subsistence and had attempted to
bolster their morale by emphasizing work rather than charity during
the dark days of the 1930s.

The Works Progress Administration, the

Civilian Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration, and
other agencies had brought hope when there appeared to be no hope

^George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 699-700;
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, January 30, 1945.
2

David R. Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers Southern City and
Region 1607-1980 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982),
pp. 182-183.
417
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during the decade of despair, and such programs remained popular even
after wartime prosperity made them less necessary.

As late as 1939,

the WPA remained a major employer in Central Louisiana, sponsoring a
nursery school in Alexandria, community centers in Grant, Nitchitoches,
Rapides, and Winn Parishes, archeological expeditions studying Indian
village and burial sites in LaSalle and Avoyelles Parishes, the His
torical Records Survey in ten parishes, and a unit of the Veterans*
Graves Registration Program, venereal disease control projects in
Rapides, Natchitoches, LaSalle, and Concordia Parishes, and a Vital
Statistics Project in LaSalle and Rapides Parishes.

The Rapides

Parish Police Jury in 1940 turned over one entire floor of the old
parish courthouse, which the parish government had just vacated to
move to a new building, to the WPA district office and its sixty-nine
employees.

In addition, Alexandria provided all utilities to the WPA
3
office without charge.
Even though the WPA continued approving projects for Louisiana —
street construction and repair for Baton Rouge in March, 1941, and
statewide recreational facilities for soldiers in September, 1941 —
Louisiana’s labor force increasingly moved off WPA rolls and onto
payrolls.

The state led all others in the percentage increase in the

private sector employment rate from September through October, 1940.
Louisiana’s increase was 141.8 per cent.

New Orleans WPA rolls

—3

Alexandria Daily Town Talk, April 23, 27, 1940 (hereinafter cited
as Town Talk); William W. Breme, "Along the 'American Way” 1 The New
Deal's Work Relief Programs for the Unemployed," The Journal of Ameri
can History, December, 1975, pp. 636-652; Fifteenth Biennial Report,
Department of Conservation, State of Louisiana, 1940-1941, p. 59.
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reached their peak in April, 1939, when the agency carried 17,698
names on its payrolls.

By March, 1942, however, only 6,489 names

remained, and about 250 men per week left those rolls as they found
work.^
By December, 1942, when President Roosevelt ordered liquidation
of the WPA, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate thought that the time had
indeed come to issue a eulogy for that beneficial federal agency:
For its purpose, when it was created, the WPA
was one of the soundest experiments of the
emergency relief era. It served the double
purpose of giving the taxpayers some return
for their money, and of helping to preserve
the self-respect of those receiving relief.
But those days of emergency unemployment are
gone — if not forever, at least until the
war has been won.^
The National Youth Administration also shifted the last phase of
its work in Louisiana to the war effort.

The NYA announced in July,

1940, that it planned to spend $1,271,038 in Louisiana during 1941,
and that it would place

increased emphasis on projects designed to

provide work experience and basic training in mechanical pursuits to
provide additional preparation for jobs in industries expected to ex
pand because of increased production for national defense — including
plumbing, electricity, automobile mechanics, welding, painting, car
pentry, blacksmithing, woodworking, cabinet making, truck driving,
4
Shreveport Times, December 4, 1940; Morning Advocate, March 19, 1941;
New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 28, September 18, 1942.

~

^Morning Advocate, December 18, 1942.
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dispatching, telephone work, hospital work, and army messenger work.^
In addition, the Civilian Conservation Corps during the early 1940s
oriented the training of the youths in its program to the war effort.
Some CCC workers, for example, engaged exclusively in work on military
reservations.^
The 1940 Louisiana legislature also enacted a law to ensure
federal-state cooperation in upgrading rural housing.

The statute

created regional housing authorities, to which a farmer could donate
one acre of land.

The housing authority then built a small but sub

stantial home on the property and rented it to the farmer for $4.25
per month.

In addition, the farmer could purchase the house anytime

within the next sixty years.^
The beginning of World War II in Europe brought an immediate boom
to the American economy as businessmen on all levels rushed to stock
up on materials and products which they feared might become scarce
because of war demand.

The immediate boom collapsed after concurrent

public consumption and export booms failed to develop, but the American
g
economy rebounded, albeit more slowly, in 1940.
Louisiana's economy

^Times—Picayune, July 2, 1940; Town Talk, January 9, 1941; New Orleans
States, July 2, 1941.
^Hubert Humphreys, "In a Sense Experimental: The Civilian Conserva
tion Corps in Louisiana," Louisiana History, Fall, 1964, pp. 347, 349350, 367.
Q
E.
M. Morgan, "Federal Rural Housing in Louisiana," Louisiana Police
Jury Review, April, 1941, pp. 72-73.
q
Eliot Janeway, The Struggle For Survival A Chronicle of Economic
Mobilization in World War II (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University
Press, 1951), pp. 146-148.
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improved along with that of the United States during 1940.

Standard

Oil Company in Baton Rouge began an expansion program including syn
thetic rubber production; Higgins Shipyards in New Orleans recorded
banner profits in 1940; the federal government spent approximately
$13,000,000 for construction of training camps around Alexandria; the
Louisiana Employment Service placed approximately 57,000 people in
jobs (16,000 in work on the army camps alone); new passenger car sales
in the state increased from 27,882 in 1939 to 33,064 in 1940; and
crude petroleum production increased from 90,000,000 barrels in 1939
to almost 102,000,000 barrels in 1940.*^ Retail sales in Baton Rouge
during the 1940 Christmas season increased twenty-five per cent over
1939 Christmas sales, and topped the 1929 record sales.

Baton Rouge,

in fact, ranked seventh among United States cities in increased retail
buying power in 1940, according to the Federal Reserve System report
for the year.

In addition, the National Industrial Conference Board

found that earnings per person during 1940 had increased in only three
southern states;

Virginia (to $408), Louisiana (to $390), and South

Carolina (to $296).

All three states stood above the 1929 level of

income per person, but their citizens were only relatively better off.
Even the highest southern state (Virginia) remained well below the
United States average income per person ($546), and received less than
half the earnings per person of the highest state in the Union (Connec
ticut, with $818 per person).*1

1(1Town Talk, December 27, 1940.

11Moming Advocate, December 28, 1940; March 8 , 10, April 1, 1941.
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The construction industry in Louisiana had begun to recover from
the Depression even before the advent of the war.

The Federal Housing

Administration reported that during the first week of March, 1939, it
had accepted more mortgage loans for construction or improvement of
private dwellings than during any comparable time period in its ex
perience in Louisiana.

Following the federal government's decision

to construct training camps in Louisiana, however, the building in
dustry recovered even more, especially in Central Louisiana with its
concentration of war camps and influx of population.

The city of

Alexandria issued sixty-five building permits for construction worth
$75,517 in April, 1940, alone.

Building permits for the entire year

reached a value of $1,276,957 (the 1939 total value had been
$774,460.57).

The value of building permits issued throughout the

state grew 32.4 per cent in 1938; 32.8 per cent in 1939; declined
14.0 per cent in 1940; increased 84.3 per cent in 1941 (height of the
war-camp construction boom) and declined again in 1942 and 1943.

12

Industrial growth during the war occurred throughout Louisiana.
While New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport were the major indus
trial centers, small manufacturers located their plants in smaller
towns.

Most of the state's industrial development, however, occurred

in the three major cities.
Baton Rouge, in 1940 boasted a population of 34,719.

By 1945,

its population numbered 110,000, an increase of 75,281 in just five
~12

"Louisiana FHA Loans Lead the Nation," Louisiana Police Jury Review,
April, 1939, p. 57; Town Talk, May 7, 1940, January 1, 1941; Louisiana
Business Review, March, 1939, p. 15; January, 1940, p. 16; January,
1941, p. 16; January, 1941, p. 18.
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years.

Much of that growth resulted from the city's industrial devel13
opment. Baton Rouge became a major oil refining center following es
tablishment of the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana refinery in 1909
to process oil from the mid-portion of the continent. 14 During the
1940s, the city became a vital cog in the nation's war machine because

of Standard Oil and other major industries located there.

The Standard

Oil complex, alone, included the first catalytic cracking plant ever
built, which contributed heavily to the badly-needed production of
100-octane aviation fuel and also produced by-products useful in

making synthetic rubber.

In addition, the complex included an alky-

lation plant which made high octane blending agents for aviation fuel,
plants synthesizing both ethyl and isopropyl alcohol from petroleum,
and plants which produced synthetic rubber — Buna-S used primarily
to make tires, and special use Buna-N and Butyl rubber.

By June, 1945,

the Standard refinery had produced its one billionth gallon of highoctane aviation fuel, and the government estimated that it had fueled
one plane of every fifteen used in the war effort.^
In addition to Standard Oil, Baton Rouge was also the site of a
bauxite reduction plant, financed by the Defense Plant Corporation of
the federal government and operated by the Aluminum Company of America
"l3Morning Advocate, November 25, 1945.
^Mark T. Carleton, River Capital An Illustrated History of Baton
Rouge (Woodland Hills, California, Windsor Publications, 1981), pp.
153-157; John L. Loos, Oil On Stream! A History of Interstate Oil
Pipe Line Company, 1909-1959 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
Press, 1959), pp. 3-7.
^Morning Advocate, June.l, 1945; W. B. Cotton, Jr., "Baton Rouge Re
finery Converts Petroleum Into War Materials," Louisiana Municipal Re
view, July-August, 1943, pp. 105-106.
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to reduce bauxite ore to aluminum used in aircraft and other construc
tion.

By April, 1944, the Baton Rouge facility produced enough alumi

num for 2,000 fighter planes per month and employed approximately 800
persons.

16

Baton Rouge became■
, finally, a large concentration depot for
United States Army supplies in Louisiana.
doubled

This project more than

railroad trackage capacity in the old Illinois Central Rail

road yards.

The Horning Advocate noted, however, that income from

this source would obviously end with the war.*7
Increased deposits in Baton Rouge banks revealed the city's
growing prosperity.

Deposits set new record levels during 1940.

At

the end of that year, Fidelity Bank and Trust Company reported de
posits of $5,550,537.83 compared to $5,078,262.56 at the end of 1939.
In addition, City National Bank reported $11,009,595.14 on deposit
at the end of 1940, compared to $10,860,227.90 in 1939, and Louisiana
National Bank reported $11,876,391.81 oh deposit compared to
$11,250,811.90 the previous year.
throughout the war.

Growth in bank deposits continued

The three banks during 1942, for example, re-

ceived an additional $15,378,778 in deposits.

18

Baton Rouge was not the only city in Louisiana which experienced
the flush of wartime prosperity.
perity centered in Shreveport.

In northwest Louisiana that pros
The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce

*^Morning Advocate, March 24, 1942; April 16, June 2, 1944.
17Ibid., May 30, 1942.

*^Ibid., January 2, 1941; April 1, 1943.
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sought with determination to bring defense industries, contracts or
army bases (with their attendant payrolls) to northwest Louisiana.
The Chamber sent a committee to Washington to attend a meeting during
which President Roosevelt unveiled his "favored areas" for war in
dustries.

The committee reported that Shreveport was included in a

"favored area," and the Chamber began contacting aircraft manufacturers
in an attempt to obtain a factory near the city.

The Chamber Board of

Directors directed its industry recruiters to offer manufacturers free
sites supplied by the city for their factories provided that the
industry offered sufficient revenue to justify such a contribution. 19
Even though the Chamber failed to lure an airplane manufacturer
to Shreveport and failed in its prolonged effort to convince the
federal government to build an Army cantonment near the city, it pro
vided information on raw material priorities, labor relations, allo
cations, contract services, and other business problems which stemmed
from the war emergency and actively sought small war contracts for
small businesses.^
Several Shreveport businesses contributed to the war effort.

The

J. B. Beaird Company, for example, employed approximately 800 people
in 1943, and produced shell casings, tanks for the production of syn
thetic rubber and storage of high octane gasoline, landing barge an
chors, and armored tank parts.

The Brewster Company plant in Shreve-

yd

Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, June 13, 1940. Microfilm
copy, Microform Division, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge.
20

Ibid., March 13, 15, May 8 , November 6 , December 11, 1941.
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port produced 250-pound aerial bomb bodies.

This plant received raw

steel tubing which it cut, shapred, finished, and then shipped to
shell loading plants. 21
Northwest Louisiana also could load the shell casings it produced.
This step in bomb production, however, was completed not in Shreveport,
but at the shell-loading plant located in Minden, approximately twenty
miles east of Shreveport in Webster Parish.

The Shreveport Chamber

of Commerce began lobbying the Army Ordnance Department in 1940 for a
munitions plant for the Shreveport area.

The. War Department informed

them in February, 1941, that the requirements for munitions plants
were relatively rigid:

sites of at least 6,000 acres, without any

pipelines or oil or mineral leases, served by two railroads and by
highways, and preferably within twenty-five miles of a town of 100,000
population.

Northwest Louisiana could supply these requirements.

(The 1940 Census found just over 110,000 people in metropolitan
Shreveport) and on April 1, 1941 the War Department notified local
officials that it planned to locate the ordnance plant at Minden,
provided it could obtain sufficient land.

The proposed site was then

held by 105 private landowners, but by September the War Department
had acquired sufficient acreage to begin clearing the site of agricul
tural crops, and auctions in November and December disposed of some

H

Shreveport Times, June 25, July 18, 1943; Viola Carruth, Caddo 1000
A History of the Shreveport Area From the Time of the Caddo Indians
to the 1970s (Shreveport, Louisiana, Shreveport Magazine, 1971), p.
173; Allen J. Ellender and John H. Overton to Pat Beaird, August 26,
1941, Allen J. Ellender Papers, Allen J. Ellender Archives, Allen J.
Ellender Library, Nicholls State University, Thibodaux, Louisiana
(hereinafter cited as Ellender Collection).
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600 dwellings and farm buildings.

22

Costs of constructing the Minden Shell-Loading Plant ran higher
than original estimates, because contractors found that the site was
too flat to drain properly without an extensive network of ditches and
canals.

In addition, they found the water table too high and the soil

too unstable for construction without larger and heavier foundations
than originally thought necessary, thus adding to the total cost. 23
Nevetheless, by 1943 the massive plant encompassed 16,025 acres,
and included 430 buildings, one hundred miles of road, forty-eight
miles of railroad, sixty miles of fence, eleven deep water wells,
fifteen miles of sewer line, fifteen miles of gas line, and forty-one
miles of water mains.

War Department officials demanded that muni

tions plants be diffuse for two reasons:

to provide protection against

sabotage bombings and against accidental explosions.

If one building

exploded, the rest of the plant could continue production.

24

War prosperity came to southwest Louisiana at Lake Charles, which
became an important petro-chemical center.
growth began even before the war.

Lake Charles’ industrial

The city and Calcasieu parish in

1921 began constructing a ship channel to connect Lake Charles with
*

the Gulf of Mexico.

By 1926, the ship channel and a newly-completed

port facility provided a new outlet to the Gulf.

By 1931, tonnage at

22

Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, August 8 , 1940, February 13,
1941, July 10, 1941; Shreveport Times, August 11, 1943; Allen J.
Ellender to various radio stations in Shreveport, June 5, 1941; Frank
Wurzlow to various radio stations in Shreveport, July 11, 1941,
Ellender Collection.
23
Shreveport Times, August 11, 1943.
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the port exceeded 1,000,000 tons per year.

(Senator Allen Ellender

intensely lobbied to convince the War Shipping Administration to use
the port of Lake Charles for more rice shipments during the war, especially those to Cuba and Puerto Rico, but met with little success.)

25

Industrial development in Lake Charles began in 1933 when the
Mathieson Alkali Works invested $7,500,000 in a new plant, followed
by Swift Packing Company with a $2,500,000 plant.

Calcasieu Parish

also produced some 12,000,000 barrels of oil annually by 1939 and
about 25,000,000 more barrels moved through the port.

The availability

of petroleum led Continental Oil Company in 1939 to construct a vast
$5,000,000 complex including an oil refinery, a tank farm, and a
pipeline to transport crude oil from large oil fields in the vicinity. 26
The war, however, brought an intensified development of the Lake
Charles petro-chemical industry.
in 1941.

Mathieson enlarged the alkali plant

Cities Service Company built a high octane gasoline refinery

that by 1945 produced 25,000 barrels per day.

Firestone Rubber Com

pany produced synthetic rubber at a plant financed by the Defense Plant
Corporation, which also financed a butadiene plant, an ammonia plant,
25
Kathleen Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World,"
Louisiana Heritage, Volume II, Number III, pp. 13-14; E. S. Land to
Allen J. Ellender, May 29, 1943, July 2, 1943; T. A. Smith to Alva
P. Frith, July 8 , 1943; Frith to Ellender, July 27, 1943; Ellender to
Frith, August 5, 1943, Ellender Collection. Ellender eventually had
to report that the WSA would not promise to ship the entire 1943
Louisiana rice crop through the port of Lake Charles, as its boosters
wanted.
26Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World," pp. 14-15;
"Facts About Calcasieu Parish," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April,
1939, p. 35; John W. Harrop, Jr., "Lake Charles — A Decade of Prog
ress," Louisiana Municipal Review, September-October, 1941, pp. 140141.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

429

and a magnesium plant in Lake Charles.

27

While much of Louisiana's economic development centered in cities,
other areas of the state also shared in the wartime prosperity.
Louisiana's oil and gas industry had experienced dramatic growth
during the latter half of the 1930s.

The value of Louisiana petroleum

products doubled between 1935 and 1938, reaching slightly above
$130,000,000 in the latter year, according to official figures.

Lou

isiana oil operators,spurred on by the national defense effort, drilled
some 202 holes in 1941, and discovered twenty-nine new fields.

These

new discoveries brought the state's known reserves officially to
925,972,000 barrels (third in the nation).

Again according to official

figures, Louisiana's production of crude oil rose from 214,888,995
barrels in 1940-41 to 275,709,168 barrels in 1944-45.

Lack of labor

and steel for oil field production caused the number of wells drilled
in Louisiana during 1942 to drop to 137.

By 1943, however, Louisiana's

approximately 7,300 wells spread over forty-six parishes produced eight
per cent of the entire United States output. 28
27
Collins, "Lake Charles Claims Rarest Port in the World," p. 15;
Morning Advocate, June 15, 1941; Lake Charles American Press, December
2, 1941; Shreveport Times, May 27, 1944; New Orleans Item, August 23,
1945. The Defense Plant Corporation was a division of the Reconstruc
tion Finance Corporation created to finance the construction of de
fense production facilities and to stockpile strategic materials.
Janeway, The Struggle For Survival, p. 167.
28

States, December 29, 1941; William G. Rankin, "The Conservation of
Louisiana's Natural Resrouces," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April,
1939, pp. 54-55; Petroleum Investigation (Crude Oil Prices and Exten
sion of Cole Pipe Line Act) Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Com
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce House of Representatives 78
Congress 1 Session (Washington, D.C., United States Government Print
ing Office, 1944), pp. 137-138, 156; Sixteenth Biennial Report, Depart
ment of Conservation, State of Louisiana, 1942-1943, p. 214; Seven
teenth Biennial Report, Department of Conservation, State of Louisiana,
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Oil and gas contributed more severance tax revenue to the state
than any other natural resource.

State Collector of Revenue Roland

P. Cocreham reported that during the 1944 fiscal year, Louisiana col
lected a total of $16,015,733 in severance taxes from all sources.
(Oil tax contributed $13,344,804 of the total, while gas contributed
$1,661,998.)

Sulphur, produced principally in the marshy Mississippi

Delta of Plaquemines Parish and used in producing steel for armored
plate, gasoline, and synthetic rubber, contributed $715,463 in sev
erance taxes.

(Timber was the only other natural resource to produce

more than $100,000 in revenue — $257,771 — all other resources together produced only $135,092.)

29

While many parts of Louisiana shared in the wartime industrial
development, New Orleans remained the state’s most industrialized
area, producing a myriad of goods ranging from Liberty Ships to tents.
Louisiana Shipyards, Delta Shipbuilding Company, and Higgins Indus
tries all built ships in New Orleans.

Delta Shipbuilding, for example,

launched its first Liberty Ship in May, 1942, after working on it 242
days.

Improvements in construction techniques cut the time necessary

for Delta to build a Liberty Ship to slightly over sixty-seven days
1944-1945, p. 15. L. M. Moffit, secretary-treasurer of the Triangle
Drilling Company of Shreveport, testified to this subcommittee that
many independent operators dared not start drilling a well without
having all the necessary casing already on the site. Otherwise, he
might drill to a productive sand and then find a delay in bringing
the well into production.
29
Morning Advocate, September 26, 1945; E- D. Wingfield, "Louisiana
Sulphur Aids Defense," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1941, pp.
51-52. Louisiana’s total severance tax jumped from $9,160,500 in
1939-40 to $16,751,199.47 in 1946-47.
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by January, 1943, when the yard launched its thirty-first ship (the
"Leonidas Polk") .^
In addition, Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation of Downey,
California also operated an aircraft production plant in New Orleans,
building, among others, the Consolidated Model 31, a "flying boat"
ordered by the Navy, powered by two 1,000 horsepower Wright engines
and capable of cruising at 160 miles per hour at high altitudes. 31
New Orleans also had a number of smaller manufacturing plants
that produced an astonishing array of war materiel.

Rheem Manufac

turing Company produced 105-millimeter shell casings; the Neptune
Boat and Davit Company built lifeboats; Edwin H. Blum manufactured
161,000 pairs of trousers in 1944; the Federal Fiber Mills produced
manila and sisal rope (the only such plant in the South, which, by
1944, had produced enough rope to encircle the globe); the Snider
Poster Process Company produced decals which speeded production of
airplanes by eliminating handlettering of instrument panels; the
National Blow Pipe and Manufacturing Company produced metal ammunition
shipping containers; the Crescent Bed Company built berths for Liberty
Ships; the International Lubricant Corporation produced specialized
greases ordered by the armed forces to keep their equipment running
when exposed to sea water or extremes in temperatures. 32 Other plants
30

Morning Advocate, April 8 , 1941; Item, July 18, 1941; Times-Picayune,
March 28, 1942, January 8 , 1943.
^ States, July 11, 1943, October 5, 1944; Item, July 11, 1943.
32Morning Advocate, August 12, 1941, December 31, 1944; States, Janu
ary 19, 1945; Allen J. Ellender and John H. Overton to Robert S. Maes
tri, September 13, 1941, Ellender Collection.
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produced other goods, but listing them would only belabor the point —
New Orleans became a prominent war-materiel production center.
New Orleans’ most dominant war industry, however, was the manu
facturing empire of Andrew Jackson Higgins.

Higgins' business career

began in his hometown of Columbus, Nebraska at age nine when he began
a lawn care service.

He migrated south, first to Mobile, Alabama in

1906, and on to New Orleans in 1910, where he entered the lumber busi
ness.

His limber business crashed in the post-war slump in 1922, but

Higgins recouped his fortunes as a boatbuilder.

During 1930 and 1931,

his boats set New Orleans to St. Louis speed records on the Missis
sippi River (seventy-two hours, four minutes). In his work designing
racing boats, Higgins evolved a design which allowed his boats to
jump logs and small spits of land without injuring vital components.
From that discovery, he developed the Higgins Eureka, a thirty-sixfoot motorboat that could rush onto a beach without damage.

Oil

companies quickly realized the usefulness of Higgins' design, and
used his boats in their oil exploration forays into the marshes of
Louisiana, the Amazon Basin, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East.
1935, Higgins was selling $87,000 worth of boats per year.

By

His asso

ciation with the armed forces began in 1936, when the Army ordered
two river steamer inspection boats.

The Onited States Navy ordered

its first landing boats from him in 1938, and Higgins produced Eurekas
for the United States, Britain, Finland, and Holland.

By 1941 he was

selling landing boats, ramp-type welded steel tank lighters, and patrol
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torpedo (PT) boats worth $1,000,000 per month.^
Higgins, like the more famous Henry J. Kaiser, used radical new
production methods to build ships quickly.
company employed 400 production workers.

In September, 1940, his
By 1941, Higgins employed

1,800 workers and spent $700,000 monthly for Louisiana labor and
products.

By 1944, the number of Higgins employees had grown to some

20 ,000 , blacks as well as whites, turning out twenty-five landing

craft and PT boats daily in seven different manufacturing units in New
Orleans.

The company eventually sold more than 14,000 combat boats of

all types to the Allies.

In September, 1943, the United States Navy

reported that 12,964 of its 14,072 vessels were either designed or
built by Andrew Jackson Higgins. 34
Higgins, however, shared in the misfortune common among American
manufacturers during the war years.

He planned to operate a vast new

shipyard built by the federal government in which he proposed aban
doning convential shipways containing only one keel at a time and sub
stituting larger ways accomodating several keels at once.

A keel would

"Higgins Is the Name," Time, May 4, 1942, pp. 76, 78; Jack B.
McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics,” Louisiana His
tory, Summer, 1974, pp. 274-275; A. A. poeling, Home Front USA (New
York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. 52; Hearing Before a Spe
cial Committee Investigating the National Defense Program United States
Senate 78 Congress 1 Session Part 17 (Washington, B.C., United States
Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 6999; Morning Advocate, March
25, 1941; Times-Picayune, August 24, 1941; Shreveport Times, October
24, 1943; Andrew J. Higgins to Allen J. Ellender, December 2, 1940,
Ellender Collection.
34
McGuire, "Andrew Higgins Plays Presidential Politics," p. 275;
Morning Advocate, March 25, 1941; Item, May 22, 1944; Morton Sosna,
"More Important Than The Civil War? The Social Impact of World War II
on the South," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southern
Historical Association, November 5, 1982, p. 11, typescript copy,
author's collection.
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be placed on rollers at the head of the way and eased toward the
water’s edge.

Workers would construct the ship as the keel slid

gradually toward the water.

The United States Maritime Commission in

1942, however, canceled its order for 200 Liberty Ships which Higgins
planned to construct at this yard because of the shortage of steel
necessary to construct both the ways and the ships. 35
Higgins criticized the "dollar-a-year" men who ordered cancella
tion of his Liberty Ship contract for the Michaud plant, but despite
a rare agreement between Governor Jones and New Orleans Mayor Robert
Maestri, both of whom peppered Washington with appeals to restore the
Liberty Ship contract, the Maritime Commission chose to cancel the
order permanently.

Higgins then cast about for another war product

to build at his huge Michaud plant and settled upon airplanes.

He

first hoped to build the Curtiss C-76 Caravan all wood-troop transport,
but the Army canceled its plans for wooden airplanes.

A complex series

of negotiations with federal defense officials brought Higgins Air
craft, Incorporated, a contract in 1942 for 1,200 Curtiss C-46 Com
mandos, an all-metal transport designed to carry paratroopers, light
'artillery, or freight.

The plant had turned out only one of these

35

"Crepe Hung in Louisiana," Time, July 27, 1942, pp. 13, 74; Congres
sional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 Part 5 (Washington, D.
C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 6635-6640;
Congressional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 Part 10 Appendix
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), p.
A2983; Sam Jones to Allen J. Ellender, May 16, 1941, Ellender Collec
tion; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?", p. 11. Some of
Higgins' innovations included constructing his landing boats on the
second floor of his plant and then lowering them on a 35-ton elevator
to railroad flatcars which then transported them to Bayou Sara for
testing, and weaving them strips of birch and mahogany into a wooden
tubing which replaced virtually all scarce metal tubing in boat con
struction. Morning Advocate, October 5, 1942.
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airplanes when the Army canceled the C-46 contract in August, 1944.
Higgins then expanded production in the Michaud plant of a newlydesigned rescue boat sturdy enough to be dropped by parachute from
high altitudes to airplane crash or shipwreck survivors.

The Michaud

plant also produced parts for the Atomic bomb designed by the Manhattan Project. 36
Higgins' difficulty in obtaining and keeping war production con
tracts demonstrated the vagaries of fortune experienced by business
men who turned.most of their industrial production to war contracts
and thus depended upon the continuing need of the federal government
for specialized products which changes in the military situation
might make obsolete overnight.

Even beyond that difficulty lay the

problem of obtaining sufficient workers to produce the goods, and the
question of labor union representation for those workers.
The increased industrialization of Louisiana created labor union
conflicts within the state.

Louisiana labor troubles symbolized the

larger labor problem which existed in the United States during the
war.

The labor union movement was then still split into the rival

American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organiza
tions.

Each group capitalized on the favorable union attitude of the

federal government and the shortage of manpower, and each increased
membership in the South. 37 Unions made these gains despite a growing
Morning Advocate, August 4, October 31, 1942; Town Talk, August 12,
17, 1944; Congressional Record 78 Congress 2 Session Appendix Volume
90 Part 10 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1944), pp. A3541-A3545; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?",
p. 12; Hoeling, Home Front USA, p. 53.
37F. Ray Marshall, Labor In the South (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 225-227.
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antiunion sentiment which increasingly equated unionism with dangerous
radicalism.

Many Louisianians shared this sentiment, even though

Louisiana remained more friendly to unionism than other southern states.
By the summer of 1943, for example, the AFL reported its organization
of the Aluminum Company of America, DuPont Chemical, Copolymer, and
Bell Telephone workers in Baton Rouge.

In New Orleans, union con

tracts protected metal trades workers in marine repair shops, the
Delta Shipyards, and Higgins Industries, as well as about 500 office
workers and an unspecified number of teamsters, who were members of
new locals of their unions. In addition, the Louisiana legislature
refused to pass anti-labor legislation (primarily "right to work" laws
and other measures limited strikes or regulating union internal af
fairs), while other southern states including Texas, Arkansas, Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi enacted such laws as part of a conservative
anti-union reaction during 1943. 38
The United States labor union movement sought to preserve during
the wartime emergency the improvements it had obtained for workers
since the New Deal came to power in 1933.

The Roosevelt Administration

wanted peace within the factories to ensure production of war materials
to meet the emergencies of the 1940s.

In exchange for unions in

general agreeing not to stage strikes detrimental to war production
(even though some walk-outs occurred), the unions obtained support of
"maintenance of membership" — a union could recruit enough new members
to keep its membership at pre-war levels — and protection of wages

38Ibid., pp. 225-226, 241-242.
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from the effects of inflation —

the "Little Steel" formula by which

wages were pegged to the cost of living increase between January 1,
1942 and May 1, 1942.39 Nevertheless, major strikes occurred in the
coal, steel, and railroad industries and caused severe criticism of
"greedy" unions endangering the lives of American soldiers by not pro
ducing the maximum number of armaments the factories could turn out.
Many Americans also resented the relatively heavy initiation fees
they had to pay to join unions working on defense-related jobs. 40
Union, therefore, lived an uneasy

coexistence with individuals, news

papers, and officials ready to criticize their every perceived misstep
and curtail their hard-won rights, if possible, at least for the
duration of the war.
Despite a resolution passed on May 11, 1942 by the Louisiana
State Federation of Labor urging all affiliated unions to adhere to a
strict no-strike policy for the duration of the national emergency,
some conservative Louisianians remained heavily critical of unionism.

4

Unions in Louisiana suffered from the disrepute cast upon unionism in
general by strikes elsewhere, and because of strikes which affected
Louisiana directly.

39

Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph The American
People 1939-1945 (New York, Coward, McCann, and Geohagen, 1973), pp.
264-265.
40
Richard R. Lingeman, Don’t You Know There’s a War ON? The American
Home Front 1941-1945 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Son, 1970), pp. 136137; Roy Hoopes, Americans Remember the Home Front An Oral Narrative
(New York, Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1977), p. 103.
41
Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 87 Part
12 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941),
p. A3090.
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Governor Jones noted the rising anti-union sentiment in the nation
and state as early as April, 1941, and told the state American Feder
ation of Labor convention in Baton Rouge that "I want you to keep your
right to strike; I want you to share fully in all the profits of
defense industries — but unless you keep first and primarily the
confidence of the American people you stand in grave danger of losing
all the things labor has won for itself in a bloody, uphill struggle
42
over half a century.”
Unions in Louisiana had much public sentiment to overcome.

The

Morning Advocate in March, 1941, derided "greedy professional labor
leaders” who were "winning some battles in America for Mr. Hitler" by
"sabotaging the national defense program." Later in the month, the
newspaper railed against reports that construction jobs on the new
airport being built north of the city were reserved for union members,
and that only about one-half of the construction jobs at Camp Polk
near Leesville were filled by Louisiana men because of union member,.
.
43
ship requirements.
The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution on Decem
ber 11, 1941, which decried "unnecessary strikes delaying war prepar
ation work" and called upon President Roosevelt, Congress, "and other
such persons as may be in position of authority" to pass legislation
outlawing strikes in industry essential to warfare during the
42

Sam Jones Address, April 7, 1941, James B. Aswell, Jr., and Family
Papers, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Li
brary, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge43
Morning Advocate, March 23, 27, 1941.
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emergency period. 44
A Times-Picayune editorial of March 18, 1942, attacking labor
unions elicited comments both favorable and unfavorable.

Mrs. W. F.

Russo reminded Times-Picayune readers that her two sons in the armed
forces "are on duty 24 hours a day and $21 a month is the miserable
Sian they get," while labor unions clamored for increased wages at
home.

Another reader wrote that the proposed "time-and-a-half" pay

for overtime work would only be "the incentive for deliberate slow
downs which prevent the government from getting a fair output per
worker at the established normal union wage scale," and observed that
too strict observance of "business as usual" in the face of threats
from Adolf Hitler "ruined France." Carl Mitchell of Bogalusa, a
self-styled "working man," condemned "selfish, greedy groups of socalled labor leaders who are destroying the influence of labor by
taking advantage of war to promote a labor dictatorship." Labor also
found its defenders in this episode.

Mrs. Bertha T. North of Algiers

wrote that "your lying, filthy editorial . . . should be condemned by
every decent working man and woman in the city of New Orleans . . . "
and Henry Gegenheimer remarked that the newspaper attempted "through
distortion of the facts, to assign to the laboring man the dubious role
of profiteers, which said role seems to be the motive of the interests
you seem to be serving."45
Official union spokesmen in Louisiana also fought back.

E. H.

44Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, December 11, 1941.
45
Times-Picayune, March 18, 20, 26, 1942.
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(Lige) Williams, state AFL president, in April, 1942, described recent
attacks on organized labor as "well thought out."

They reminded him,

he said, "of the well-known Hitler plan to divide and conquer." Also,
Steve Quarles, president of the Central Trades and Labor Council of
New Orleans, reminded Louisianians that union members had sons in the
armed forces "just as are the sons of the manufacturers' association
and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States . . . and labor today
is not asking for more than it has been asking in the past 60 years,
so we are not profiteering in this crisis."

In addition, labor union

leaders in Winnfield reported to Representative A. Leonard Allen that
they had denounced press attempts to stampede Louisiana officials into
precipitate antiunion action:

"There is no more loyal and patriotic

group in America than organized labor."^
Despite the encouraging words from labor leaders, Louisiana experi
enced several strikes during the war years.

A small group of workers

walked off their construction jobs at Camp Polk in April, 1941, be
cause they thought that negotiations between union and government
representatives were too slow.

Their wildcat strike idled 400 other

workers until international union officials ordered them back to work.

47

Workers established a picket line (even though Industrial, Pipefitters,
Welders, and Helpers Union [AFL] business agent R. 0. Middleton in
sisted that "no strike was called") against Stone and Webster Construc
tion Company, which was constructing the expansion of the Ethyl Gasoline
46
States, April 6 , 1942; Town Talk, April 3, 1942.
47
Morning Advocate, April 5, 1941.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

441

plant at Baton Rouge.

The unions demanded a "closed shop" and that

workers who refused to join the unions be discharged.

The dispute

ended some two weeks later when Paul A. Rasmussun, president of the
Baton Rouge Building Trades Council, announced that the Ethyl plant
would reopen as a "union shop" with Union members given preference in
employment. 48 Members of Local 260 United Construction Workers Organ
izing Committee (CIO) struck the Johns-Manville Products Corporation
plant in Marrero, in August, 1941, and idled about 400 workers in a
dispute concerning overtime pay.

Louisiana Shipyards and Delta Ship

building Company both faced strikes in 1941 called to enforce demands
for a closed shop.

And garbage men and incinerator workers in New

Orleans struck for higher wages during 1943- 49
As the war neared an end in 1945, Louisiana experienced even more
strikes.

Employees at the Cities Service refinery, at Lake Charles

struck in April, 1945, to protest recent rent increases in the pri
vately-owned Maplewood housing project for war workers.

The strike

was crucial because the Firestone Tire and Rubber plant next door de
pended on the Cities Service refinery for a steady supply of butadine
to use in its production of synthetic rubber.

Subsequently, Governor

Davis asked President Truman to take over and operate the refinery.
Truman, in turn, ordered Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to seize the
plant because interruption of its production would "unduly impede or
delay" the war effort.
48

The workers, however, agreed to return to their

Ibid., Jun 4, 1941; States, June 20, 1941.

49
Times-Picayune, August 19, Septmeber 27, 30, 1941; States, September
15, 1943.
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jobs the next day, but continued working for rent reductions in Maple
wood and requested the Federal Housing Authority to take over the
privately-owned property.^
Louisiana was also directly affected by a strike against Grey
hound Bus Lines which spread across five southeastern states in July,
1945 in support of five employees discharged on June 14, because they
had refused to drive their assigned buses on May 1, when the union
called a one-day walk-out to protest the War Labor Board ruling in a
retroactive pay case.

The Bus Drivers Union (AFL) claimed that the

five drivers were arbitrarily fired, and called the July strike.

The

Eighth Regional War Labor Board in Dallas ordered the striking em
ployees back to work On July 31, but about 950 employees of the Teche
Greyhound Bus Lines serving Louisiana refused.

The strike ended soon

after that, however, when the WLB adamantly refused to consider the
strikers' grievances until they returned to work.***
Louisiana’s two bitterest strikes occurred early and late in the
war.

The first of these was the 1941 strike called by the Interna

tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL) against Gulf States
Utilities.

The IBEW maintained that GSU refused to bargain collec

tively with it, and instead negotiated with the Gulf States Electric
Employees' Association, a company union.

GSU, however, maintained

that the National Labor Relations Board on May 10 had ruled that "we
find that the unit contended for by the brotherhood is inappropriate

Morning Advocate, April 13-14, 18-20, 1945; Town Talk, April 19-20,
1945.
^Morning Advocate, July 30-31, 1945; Item, August 1, 3, 1945.
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for purposes of collective bargaining and shall, therefore, grant the
motions of the Company and the Association to dismiss the petition for
investigation and certification of representatives filed by the
Brotherhood," and that the IBEW now illegally tried to force its recognition as the collective bargaining agent despite the NLRB ruling.52
The Morning Advocate recognized that "The right to strike and the
right to picket peacefully are well-established principles of law" but
also commented that when massed picketers prevented other employees
from working or threatened their personal safety, then "law enforcement officers should come on the scene."53 The public mood against
the strikers became even more sour after a blackout left large sections
of Baton Rouge and the surrounding area in darkness during the night
of July 12-13.

GSU officials maintained that the blackout resulted

from the work of saboteurs who had drained the oil from a transformer
at Oak Grove in Ascension Parish causing it to explode.

The officials

also announced that the saboteurs could be prosecuted under federal
anti-sabotage acts which made the disruption of the flow of electri
city to the national defense effort illegal.

In addition to the power

supplied to local defense industries, the lines at Oak Grove fed
electricity into the Tennessee Valley Authority system, which, in turn,
supplied power for the manufacture of aluminum.

GSU offered $500 re

ward for information leading to arrest of the saboteurs and strongly
implied that IBEW members had drained the oil from the Oak Grove

53Ibid., July 13, 1941.
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transformer.5^
The utility presented its side of the dispute in a series of ad
vertisements published in Baton Rouge newspapers portraying the
strikers as slackers who neglected the national defense:

"The experi

enced men who are on strike are needed on the job so that Gulf States
service to homes, stores, factories, and to industries so vital to our
local and national welfare again will have behind it a full personnel
adequate to take care of emergencies and growth.”55
Howard Colvin, southern regional director of the Labor Department
Conciliation Service, announced on July 20 that he had failed to
settle the dispute between the IBEW and GSU, and the Defense Mediation
Board assumed jurisdiction over the case while extra patrols of deputy
sheriffs, city police, and state police guarded company property.

The

NLRB issued the last ruling in the dispute in February, 1942, when it
held that GSU had not interfered with the right of its employees to
organize and had not dominated the formation of the Gulf States Elec
tric Service Employees’ Association, which it held to be a labor union
within the provision of the National Labor Relations Act.

The NLRB

also recommended dismissal of charges brought against GSU by the
IBEW.56
The bitterest strike Louisiana experienced during the war years
occurred at Higgins Industries as the war drew to a close during 1945.

55Ibid., July 18, 20, 1941.
56Ibid., July 20, 22, 23, 1941, February 4, 1942.
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In 1943, Andrew Higgins had portrayed a cozy relationship between labor
and management at his New Orleans plants when he testified in Washing
ton before the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program (the Truman Committee). Higgins reported that his was
an organized shop with his workers represented by the American Feder
ation of Labor.

Senator Truman inserted into the record a letter from

Holt Ross of the AFL in which he maintained that "Labor has an abiding
confidence in Mr. Higgins and the teamwork between him and his em
ployees is remarkable." Higgins added that when grievances arose, he
called his business managers and the union leaders together "in a
soundproof room" and settled the problem.

Labor union bands helped

him to boost the workers' morale when larger rush orders for boats ar
rived by providing patriotic music for pep rallies he held to convince
his employees to work harder and complete such assignments.

("When

the tears are running down their eyes (sic), then I have the silvertongued labor leader tell them what's expected of them.
how they are going to do it, and we get along fine.")

I ask them
Unions helped

keep absenteeism low at the Higgins plants by detailing members to
find out why a person missed work.^
By late 1944, however, any good feelings built up between manage
ment and labor at the Higgins yards disappeared in acrimonious charges
and countercharges further complicated by a CIO attempt to supplant
the AFL as representative of a majority of Higgins workers.

Higgins

and the AFL had negotiated their closed shop agreement during August,

"^Investigation of the National Defense Program Fart 17, pp. 69997005; Sosna, "More Important Than the Civil War?", p. 10.
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1940, and the agreement was scheduled to remain in force until Septem
ber 13, 1945.

The company, however, terminated the agreement on

January 1, 1945, charging the AFL with a "substantial breach of con
tract.” The dispute arose over a fundamental difference in labor
philosophy:

Higgins preferred to negotiate only one contract with

all workers; the AFL sought to negotiate separate agreements for each
trade.
episode.

The dispute broke into the open over the so-called "Hot Ship"
The problem arose as the winter of 1944-45 approached.

Great Lakes shipbuilders had about one hundred ships under construc
tion and the delays threatened by the approaching winter weather caused
the Navy to request that they be completed in ice-free areas.
agreed to finish a portion of them and received one.

Higgins

His unions, how

ever, declared this work to be ship repair or conversion, and asked
for double wage rates for overtime work.

The United States Maritime

Commission refused to let Higgins pay the higher wage scale and the
unions thereafter ordered their members not to work on the "Hot Ship."
Between thirty and fifty anticipated ships were not sent to Higgins
for completion, and on November 30, 1944, Higgins notified the unions
that their contracted would be canceled January 1, 1945.

The CIO

muddied the situation even more when it filed for an election to
determine which labor organization legitimately represented Higgins’
workers.
Trouble developed soon after the beginning of 1945.

Higgins first

CO

Item, November 1-2, 1945; Stuart S. Heilman to Allen J. Ellender,
June 8 , 1945; Stuart S- Heilman, Background of Present Dispute Be
tween Higgins Industries Incorporated and the American Federation of
Labor (n.p., n.d.), p. 3. Ellender Collection.
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sought to close his facilities, but announced that he would keep his
plants in operation soon after the National Labor Relations Board
ordered a collective bargaining election to determine whether his
workers wanted to be represented by the AFL or the CIO.59
Labor trouble simmered at the Higgins plants throughout 1945.
In June, some 7,000 members of the Building Trades and Metal Trades
unions walked off their jobs, thus idling about 5,000 additional
workers, because Higgins had hired ex-servicemen to work at the plants
without requiring them to join unions.

Morris Gottesman, treasurer of

Higgins Industries, subsequently announced that his office was pre
paring a list of the names of striking workers eligible for the draft
which he would forward to General Raymond H. Fleming, Selective Service
Director in Louisiana.

A union spokesman replied that union members

would "rather fight the Japs than be browbeaten by Higgins.
The War Labor Board directed the strikers to return to work, but
the employees on June 5 refused to do so.

The next day, John P. Frye,

international president of the Metal Trades Workers, directed the New
Orleans local to resume work at Higgins’ plants pending appeal of the
War Labor Board approval of Higgins' cancellation of the original con
tract.

As long as the appeal was not settled, he maintained, the con

tract remained in effect.

Local union officials added their approval

of Frye's plea and recommended a fifteen-day return to work during
which they hoped to iron out their differences with Higgins.

The

59Morning Advocate, January 6 , 1945.
^States, June 4-5, 1945; Heilman, Background of Present Dispute, p. 3.
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strikers, however, voted to remain off their jobs, and did not return
to work until July 13, after union leaders informed them that Army and
Navy officials had reported to them that the strike was depriving both
branches of the armed service of badly-needed war equipment.

The

strikers formally announced that they were returning to work because
of the armed service need for boats, not as a favor to Andrew Higgins.^
Higgins, however, realized that cutbacks in war contracts caused
by the winding down of the conflict gave him new leverage in the situ
ation.

He announced during the first week of June that some 1,500 of

the strikers would not be needed at his City Park plant alone, even if
they voted to return to work.

Treasurer Gottesman announced on August

16 that the company planned a $25,000,000 reconversion from production
of landing craft to producion of boats for civilian use, but cancella
tion of Higgins Industries' remaining $20,000,000 in war contracts
meant that about two-thirds of its workers would be laid off, many of
them permanently. 62
His diminishing need for workers allowed Higgins to act more in
dependently than he had in the past.

In October, he walked out of a

Washington meeting with members of the NLRB and the union, declaring
that he could no longer work with the unions. A work stoppage occurred
at his plants again on October 29.

Union members claimed that Higgins

had locked them out and declared an open shop.

Higgins, meanwhile,

said that he knew nothing of such action; that while he had not

^ States, June 6-7, 9, 12, 1945; Morning Advocate, June 6 , 13, 1945.
62

Morning Advocate, August 16-17, 1945; Times-Picayune, August 17, 1945.
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received official notification of a strike, union members were not on
their jobs; and that the CIO unions (which then claimed to represent
a majority of Higgins workers, even though the election had not yet
been held) had called the walk-out because he had broken off contract
negotiations with them.

This action proved the last straw for Higgins,

and he announced that he planned to close his three remaining New
Orleans shipbuilding plants (at City Park, Industrial Canal,

and

Bayou St. John — the Michaud plant was government-owned) — sell them
to the highest bidder, and subcontract his remaining obligations to
other firms.

He would devote his energy then, he said, "to [a] crusade

to see that men who want work can get it without paying tribute to
anybody.
Jack Rawls, vice president of the New Orleans Metal Trades Coun
cil, called the closures a "red herring" and AFL spokesman William L.
Donnels, joint chairman of the Metal Trades and the Building Trades
Council, said that Higgins had "the mind and spirit of an old-time
plantation overseer," but Higgins remained adamant that he would not
negotiate with the unions under prevailing conditions. 64
Higgins hinted, however, that he did not completely discount con
tinuing boat production in New Orleans under a different arrangement.
Subsequently, he announced that he planned to liquidate all his
holdings (Higgins Industries, Incorporated [the boat division], Higgins
Aircraft, and Higgins Plastics) out of court, and carry on his
"63
States, October 29, 1945; Item, November 1-2, 5, 1945; Morning Advo
cate, November 2-3, 1945.
64
Item, November 2, 1945; Morning Advocate, November 5, 1945.
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operations with a new firm, Higgins, Incorporated, which would, in
effect, take over and consolidate all his old holdings.

Union leaders

claimed that his action was only an attempt to break the strike by
means of questionable legality, but police protected prospective em
ployees who lined up for the jobs Higgins offered.^

He was no more

successful with the new company than he had been with the old, and
continued labor disputes eventually forced the closure of Higgins’
boat-building empire.
While other areas of the state attracted industrial develop
ment along with its attendent problems, the central Louisiana area's
economic development during the war rested on the training of United
States Army troops.

This training program included both a series of

massive maneuvers which brought thousands of soldiers into the area
and the construction of more permanent army posts in which inductees
received their regular basic training.
Central Louisiana’s association with training camps had begun
during World War I. Late in 1917, workers completed Camp Beauregard
just north of Alexandria as one of sixteen centers built to train
National Guard units from Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Missis
sippi.

During the post-war demobiliation, however, the Army sold

most of Beauregard’s 5,200 acres, but retained a small area to provide
facilities for training Louisiana National Guard troops.

Between the

World Wars, Louisiana National Guard units used Beauregard as a summer
training ground and target range.

The camp also became a Citizens*

£C
Morning Advocate, November 6 , December 1, 1945, January 8 , February
2, 1946; Item, November 10, 29, 29, 1945.
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Military Training Camp.

The CMTC nation-wide program began soon after

World War I in response to the realization that American youth had
been poorly prepared for military training when called upon in 1917.
The CMTC program provided high school boys with thirty days experience
in military organization, management, discipline, instruction, ath
letics, recreation, and social contacts during their summer vacation
from school.^
Adolph Hitler's stunning conquests of his European neighbors
brought a quickening of life at Camp Beauregard.

The Army resumed

work on a military air field just north of Beauregard in 1939, and
during 1940 Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embrick of the United States
Army Fourth Corps Area headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, selected
the central Louisiana area as the site of Army training maneuvers.
The 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers began in May and eventually involved more
than 70,000 troops spread over Rapides, Natchitoches, Sabine, and Ver
non Parishes.

Foot soldiers cursed Louisiana's mud and heat, but the

maneuver area pleased Army officials so well that they returned in the
autumn of 1940, and in 1941, 1942, and 1943.^
The maneuvers brought Central Louisiana to the nation's attention,
and brought thousands of Americans from'other regions into Central
Louisiana.

Alexandria Mayor V. V. Lamkin reserved a block of parking

TZ

Town Talk, July 29, 1957; Jerry Purvis Sanson, "Cenla During World
War II," Alexandria Daily Town Talk Centennial Edition, April 8 , 1983,
p. 18; The Peep Sight Camp Beauregard Louisiana 1931 (n.p., 1931), pp.
20-23.
67Sanson, "Cenla During World War II," p. 18; "Extensive War Games in
Louisiana," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1940, pp. 67-68;
Town Talk, March 25, April 8 , 1940.
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spaces near the Visitor’s Bureau at Hotel Bentley in the downtown area
for exclusive use of the Army during the spring, 1940, maneuvers, and
announced that because of the heavy traffic the city’s traffic lights
would continue to function until 12:00 midnight instead of going off
at 10:00 P.M. as they had in the past.

68

The soldiers and the civilian population showed a keen interest
in each other.

Hundreds of local residents drove to Camp Beauregard

to see the weekly progress of the tent city which rose at an astonish
ingly rapid rate.

The Town Talk remarked that "The men in the ranks

have taken to Alexandria as though it were their home — and have
received a royal welcome.” Never were they more welcome, of course,
than the occasions when they stormed into the city on week-end leave
with money to spend.
an influx.

A warm week-end in early May, 1940, brought such

The Town Talk reported that "Every roadside establishment

in the local area was crowded with troopers . . . and while they were
here there was a steady tinkle of cash drawers in every establishment
where refreshments and sandwiches could be obtained."69
The 1940 Maneuvers pumped large amounts of money into the Central
Louisiana economy.

The troops involved in the fall maneuvers, for

example, received some $700,000 in pay and allowances, and needed
approximately $130,000 in goods for subsistence.

(The total cost of

these maneuvers was $1,826,200 or some $87,000 per day.)^

Not all

To

Town Talk, April 19, May 3, 9, 1940.
69Ibid., May 6 , 11, 1940.

^Times-Picayune, August 17., 1940; Town Talk, August 21, 1940. The
crush of business experienced by small firms is revealed by the sales
of the Olympia Cafe in Alexandria on August 23, 1940: 1,448 sand
wiches, 362 pies, and 362 dishes of potato salad. Town Talk, August
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of the money found its way into the Central Louisiana economy, of
course, but the amount that did whetted Central Louisiana's appetite
for more.
It had not long to wait.

The 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers easily

eclipsed the magnitude of the 1940 exercises.

Army officials sought

to make the maneuvers as close to real battlefield experience as
possible.

They formulated a background scenario in which the "nations"

of Kotmk (Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, and Kentucky, with its
capital at Houston), and Almat (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Tennessee, with its capital at Birmingham) squared off
for battle as tensions between the two, increasingly tense since the
end of a war between them in 1919, broke down over failure to secure
Kotmk navigation rights on the Mississippi River.
Preliminary maneuvers began in late May as the two "countries"
began deploying their troops to strategic locations as the navigation
conference between their Inland Waterways Commissions supposedly
dragged on at Memphis.

Troops arriving early were acclimated to

battle noises by recordings of dive bombers, machine guns, cannon, and
the wail of gas-warning sirens broadcast over loudspeakers placed
throughout the Beauregard practice range.

The first skirmish of the

maneuvers occurred on June 17, but full "hostilities" broke out in
August.

As the starting date of the maneuvers neared, Central Louisiana

24, 1940.
^ Morning Advocate, August 3, 5-6, 1941. One has to wonder why Army
planners obviously spent so much time constructing this elaborate
plan, which included jeering slogans "Almat" troops could hurl at
"Kotmk" troops about Kotmk Premier Kodunkis: "Kodunkis is the Bunkis"!
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was inundated with people.

During the latter part of July, between

300 and 400 Army vehicles passed through Alexandria each day.

Soldiers

arrived at the nearby camps by the thousands — about 5,000 on July 30;
10,000 on July 31; and 5,000 on August 1.^
The Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, the largest peace-time maneuvers
in American history up to that time, were a landmark in the development
of the United States Army’s strategy and planning for war because they
proved the usefulness of tanks in modern warfare.

The Spring, 1940,

maneuvers had demonstrated the capability of armored columns to over
run a defending army as General Joseph Stilwell commanded a "blitz
krieg” invasion of Louisiana just as Hitler's forces had used similar
tactics to slice through the Low Countries and France.

The 1941

maneuvers further revealed the weakness of conventional defense against
armored might as General George S. Patton proved that tanks could
operate effectively even in the marshes of Louisiana.

In addition,

the Army learned about reconnaissance and troop supply problems en
countered in battlefield situations during the fall of 1941, and thus
had several months to seek solutions to these problems before the
United States entered the war. 73
72
Morning Advocate, May 5, 9, 30, June 6 , 10, 17, 1941; Town Talk,
July 30-August 1, 1941.
73Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, United
States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, Volume I, The Or
ganization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, D.C., Historical Divi
sion, Department of the Army, 1947), pp. 44-45; Barbara W. Tuchman,
Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York,
The MacMillan Company, 1971), pp. 208-209; Ladislas Farago, Patton
Ordeal and Triumph (New York, Ivan Obolensky, 1963), pp. 161-165;
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York, Double
day & Company, Incorporated, 1948), pp. 10-13; J. Lawton Collins,
Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1979), pp. 111-115.
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Just as the 1941 maneuvers were important to the development of
an effective United States fighting machine, they were also important
to the Louisiana economy.

The Array payroll for the last part of

August, for example, was the largest made up in Shreveport up to that
time — approximately $900,000 issued through the Commercial National
Bank.

Alexandria merchants stocked their shelves in anticipation of

extra-heavy business, and they were not disappointed.

Most of them

remained open on Labor Day, and troops on holiday crowded stores in
the maneuver area, sometimes buying out a store's entire stock, es
pecially tobacco, candy, and refreshments.

Theaters and restaurants

both experienced continuous lines for seats, and some smaller store
owners reported selling as much in a day as they normally sold in a
year.

One study of the maneuvers estimates that they were worth about

$25,000,000 to the state.

74

The Army descended upon Central Louisiana again in 1942 and 1943
for more maneuvers but these exercises were much less extensive than
the massive 1941 maneuvers.

Additional maneuvers planned for April,

1944 did not occur because the Army needed the units scheduled for
participation in the maneuvers to bolster the forces then being readied
for the cross-Channel invasion of Europe.7^

74Viola Carruth, Caddo 1000, p. 173; Town Talk, August 29-September 1,
1941; G. Patrick Murray, "The Louisiana Maneuvers: Practice for War,"
Louisiana History, Spring, 1972, p. 123.
7^Morning Advocate, August 2, 1942, February 2, 1943; Town Talk, August
3, 1942, February 1, 1943; Shreveport Times, August 31, 1943; Robert R.
Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, United States Army in World
War II, The Army Ground Forces, Volume II, The Procurement and Training
of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, D.C., Historical Division, Depart
ment of the Army, 1948), pp. 384, 470.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

456

While the maneuvers contributed to the Louisiana economy through
payrolls and purchase of supplies, they also contributed to problems
that hampered transportation of people and goods in the maneuver area
throughout the war.

The Army recognized that its training exercises

would damage roads and bridges not designed for heavy use and reques
ted that the Louisiana Highway Commission station a representative in
Alexandria to cooperate with them in road maintenance and repair.

The

average vehicular traffic in the maneuver area during 1941 rose to
95,023 vehicles per day (from 40,762 daily in 1940), an increase of
133 per cent over the previous year.

Louisiana requested $1,407,150

from the Public Works Administration in August, 1941, for improvement
of highway markings for nightime driving during the maneuvers, and in
December, 1941, presented the United States Public Roads Administration
a bill for $2,014,689.30 to repair road damage in the maneuver area.

76

The state found, however, that it faced a great deal of difficulty
with bureaucratic red tape, and labor and material shortages.
fore, road damage within the maneuver area remained a problem.

There
Many

people had difficulty reaching their jobs at Camp Polk; adequate sup
plies failed to

reach rural stores; school buses and mail carriers

often failed to

make their rounds; doctors sometimes failed toreach

their patients; and farmers found it difficult to bring their produce
to market.

The Public Roads Administration started repair work on

February 1, 1944, and comandeered some engineer troops to assist in

7^Town Talk, May 6 , 1940, December 31, 1941; Morning Advocate,May 30,
August 9, 1941; Shreveport Times, January 1, 1942.
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grading and hauling, but only had $400,000 for its maintenance program. 77
The maneuvers held in Louisiana brought thousands of troops, the
attention of the nation, and the excitement of "war" to Louisiana, but
the training camps constructed in the state contributed more steadily
to the local economy.

The complex of camps around Alexandria, called

"the center of national defense activity in the state," began as the
1940 maneuvers ended, when Representative A. Leonard Allen and Governor
Jones announced that the Army planned to take over Camp Beauregard from
the Louisiana National Guard.

Jones and Louisiana National Guard Com

mander Raymond H. Fleming had traveled to Washington in May, 1940 to
propose to Army officials that they use Beauregard as a training facil
ity for National Guard troops as soon as Congress passed the bill (then
pending) calling Guard units into one year of active service.

Congress

passed the Guard bill on August 27, 1940, and work began almost immediately on Camp Beauregard. 78
In September, the Army announced plans to construct two additional
training camps in Central Louisiana, one near Tioga, just north of
Alexandria (eventually named Camp Livingston), and one near Forest
Hill, some eighteen miles south of Alexandria (eventually named Camp

^J. H. Anderson to Allen J. Ellender, December 31, 1943; J. G. Chris
tiansen to Ellender, February 29, 1944, General Richard Donovan to
Ellender, March 9, 1944, Lois Whittaker to Ellender, May 29, 1944,
Thomas McDonald to Ellender, September 28, 1944, Ellender Collection;
Shreveport Times, January 1, 1942.
78
Town Talk, August 21-22, 28, 1940; Isaac D. Chapman, "Louisiana’s
Natural Resources and National Defense," Louisiana Conservation Review,
Autumn, 1940, p. 35.
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Claiborne). The need for still more training facilities led to plans
announced in October to construct a large training camp for an armored
contingent of about 10,000 troops near Leesville in Vernon Parish
(eventually named Camp Polk) which became the largest armored force
training camp in the United States.

By April, 1941, over 32,000

troops were training in the camps around Alexandria. 79
These camps, plus the Alexandria (now England) Air Base, Barksdale
Field near Shreveport, other air bases at Baton Rouge and New Orleans,
and the Coast Guard base in New Orleans, provided both construction
jobs and income from maintenance and service requirements.

By October,

1940, some 8,000 workmen were employed constructing Camps Beauregard
and Livingston.

The number employed grew to a peak of 36,857 in

January, 1941, before tapering off.

In April, 1941, however, con

struction employees at these two camps plus Camps Claiborne and Polk
numbered 80,000.

It is impossible to determine exactly how many of

these workers were residents of the area, but the United States House
of Representatives found in 1941 that seventy-five per cent were non
residents of Rapides Parish, even though Rapides Assessor Trent L.
James had set up an employment headquarters at his office in the court
house to secure work for unemployed citizens of Central Louisiana.
The nonresident group included residents of other parishes and non
residents of Louisiana brought in by construction companies or unions.
The Louisiana State Employment Service, for example, had directed many

~7§
Morning Advocate, October 20-21, 1940; Item, November 18, 1940; Town
Talk, December 7, 18, 1940, January 3, 11, 21, 1941, July 29, 1957;
New Orleans Times-Picayune New Orleans States, August 22, 1943; Shreve
port Times, August 31, 1943.
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sugar workers into jobs at the camps.

The workers were available for

immediate placement at the end of the short 1940 harvest season, and
needed the money because of the poor crop.

Army camp constuction,

however, paid as much as $1 per hour for an eight hour day, six days
per week, and many farm workers continued to hold these jobs rather
than return to the uncertain income from farm labor. 80
General Fleming commented in August, 1940, that placement of
the training camps in Louisiana would mean "the expenditure of mil
lions of dollars more in Louisiana for the subsistence of men."
General Fleming proved to be correct.

The Army estimated in November,

1940, that the costs of operating Camps Livingston and Claiborne
would reach some $500,000 per day, and that they planned to use local
suppliers for perishable and immediately expendable supplies ($12,000
per day for gasoline and $600 per day for stovewood, for example)
whenever possible.

Louisiana farmers also often found a ready market

for their produce at the Army camps, even though they sometimes com
plained of Army purchasing procedures that seemed unnecessarily strin—
gent or complex.

81

80

Morning Advocate, September 21-22, October 20, 1940; Town Talk, Sep
tember 18, 1940, July 29, 1957; Chapman, "Louisiana’s Natural Resources
and National Defense," p. 36; National Defense Migration Hearings Be
fore the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
House of Representatives, 77 Congress 1 Session, Part 11 (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 4663-4665;
"Defense Program Casts Louisiana in Leading Role," Louisiana Police
Jury Review, April, 1941, p. 79; Mrs. L. J. Barrios to Allen J. Ellender, February 1, 1943; Julius Maillian, John Gamer, Sam Domico, Jr.,
Bob Conran, and Roy C. Bridges to Ellender, February 26, 1943; Paul
McNutt to Ellender, March 19, 1943, May 3, 1943; L. M. Green to Ellen
der, March 23, 1943; Major General E. Reybold to Ellender, May 18, 1943,
Ellender Collection.
81Town Talk, August 22, 1940; New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, Novem-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

460

In summary, the war had a significant impact on the Louisiana
economy.
state.

Most elementally, the war brought more people into the
In addition, those people made more money and paid more taxes.

The 1940 Census found 2,363,880 people in Louisiana, while 1950 found
2,683,516, an increase of 13.5 per cent.

Louisiana's population

growth occurred primarily in the urban industrial areas or the train
ing camp areas.

Greater New Orleans, for example, grew by 64,463 (to

559,000) individuals between 1940 and November, 1945; greater Shreve
port grew by 17,775 (to 130,000) inhabitants during the same years,
while Baton Rouge grew by 75,281 (to 110,000); Alexandria and Pineville
by 28,756 (to 60,119); Lafayette by 5,790 (to 25,000).82
This sharp increase in population strained the ability of many
areas to provide housing and basic services.

Fresh ground-water use

increased ten per cent from 1940 to 1943 (to about 50,000,000 gallons
per day), for example.

Rental property in Alexandria became virtually

ber 24, 1940; Raymond Fleming to Roy Dibuono, October 28, 1940; Harry
D. Wilson to Quartermaster Marketing Center, Chattanooga, Tennessee,
May 13, 1941; Wilson to Allen J. Ellender, March 27, 1942, William
Walter Jones Collection of the Papers of Sam Houston Jones, Special
Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer
sity, New Orleans, Louisiana.
82
States, July 5, 1944; Morning Advocate, November 25, 1945; J. C.
Maher, "Water Supplies and Louisiana's War Effort," Louisiana Municipal
Review, January-February, 1943, p. 8; T. A. Pittman to Warren M. Simon,
January 2, 1943; Pittman to Jack Stewart, March 8, 1945, John B. Fournet Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton
Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; Sixteenth Census of
Inhabitants (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1942), p. 435; A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the
United States, Census of Population: 1950 Volume I Number of Inhabi
tants (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1952), p. 18.
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unobtainable.

By October, 1941, 693 Army personnel paid $31,497 in

combined monthly rent in Alexandria; 8,437.25 in Pineville; $1,132.50
in Bunkie; and $2,059.50 at Glenmora (near Camp Claiborne). War
workers moved into the Fournet War Housing Project in New Orleans even
before New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated, could connect the
electricity and gas. Alexandria’s number of gas meters increased from
4,125 in 1941 to 6,142 in 1943.

During the same period, the number of

electricity meters increased from 6,900 to 8,672 and the number of
water meters from 5,500 to 6,237.

Renters in many areas around army

camps in central and north Louisiana complained of unjust rent in
creases.

A survey of rental rates in the Shreveport area in December,

1941, for example, found that rents had decreased slightly during 1939
and 1940, but had increased after September, 1941, as new workers and
armed forces personnel began arriving in greater numbers and thus
created unprecedented demand. 83
This increased population resulted in more income and more taxes.
The United States Department of Commerce reported in 1942 that incomes
of people in Louisiana-had broken their record 1929 levels in 1941..
Combined income of Louisianians had been $863,000,000 in 1929, had
fallen to 86,600,000 in 1940, and shot up to 1,028,000,000 in 1941.
Louisiana received $7,655,654.30 from income taxes in 1941;
$8,541,137.84 in 1942; $9,039,769.82 in 1943; $11,213,417.96 in 1944;
QO

Town Talk, November 28, December 31, 1940, October .1, 1941., July 11,
22, 1942, October 9, 1943, May 30, 1944; Shreveport Times, November 21,
1940; Shreveport Journal, December 10, 1941; Hermann Colvin, "Alexan
dria Goes to War," Louisiana Municipal Review,.January-February, 1941,
pp. 4-5; Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers, pp. 183-184.
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and $11,464,000 in 1945-

Total state revenue rose from $96,830,000

in 1939 to $145,000,000 in 1945-

In addition, bank deposits in LouisiA/

ana topped $1,000,000,000 for the first time in October, 1943.
Many Louisianians shared with other Americans a surplus of money
and a scarcity of consumer goods.
steadily throughout the war.

Therefore, bank deposits increased

Bank deposits increased by 7.7 per cent

in 1940; 10.8 per cent in 1941; 33.5 per cent in 1942; 15.8 per cent
in 1943; 21.4 per cent in 1944;and 21.9 per cent in

1945.

Reappear

ance. of consumer goods on the market in 1946 brought bank deposits
down by 7.5 per cent from 1945.

The steady increase in bank deposits,

however, did not mean that Louisiana business suffered.

Department

store sales, for example, grew 12.6 per cent in 1940; 14.8 per cent in
1941; 14.6 per cent in 1942; 24.9 per cent in 1943; 15.6 per cent in
1944; and 11 paer cent in 1945.

(They spurted to 25.3 per cent growth

in 1946.)85
84
Shreveport.Times, July 20, 1942; Times-Picayune, October 16, 1943;
Louisiana Revenue Bulletin, July 25, 1943, pp. 8-9; January 25, 1944,
pp. 6-8; July 15, 1944, pp. 6-7; July, 1945, pp..14-15; Financial
Statistics of States: 1939 Louisiana Volume I Number 20 (Washington,
D.C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1941), p. 1; State
Government Finances in 1945: Louisiana Volume I (Washington, D.C.,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1946), p. 1. The rela
tive prosperity of urban areas is demonstrated in the tax returns. In
1943, for example, St. Helena Parish (the lowest) had only 25 inhabi
tants who paid income tax (a total of $544.69), while Orleans Parish
(the highest) had 34,290 inhabitants who paid a total of $1,775,508.63
income tax. The second-highest parish, Caddo, had 7,356 people who
paid $485,168.03. Furthermore, Cameron, Red River, St. Helena, and
West Carroll had no firms which paid corporate income tax, while Or
leans had 705 and Caddo had 180. Louisiana Revenue Bulletin, March 25,
1944.
g5 ••
•
Louisiana Business Review, January, 1941, p. 16; January, 1942, p.
18; January, 1943, p. 18; January, 1944, p. 19; January, 1945, p. 19;
January, 1946, p. 19; January, 1947, p. 19. The 1946 spurt may have
also resulted from the introduction of Charga-Plate, a credit card
acceptable at 12 area stores introduced in New Orleans late in 1945.
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Much of Louisiana's wartime prosperity, of course, stemmed directly
from federal government expenditures.

The state received $1,733,713,000

worth of war contracts issued between June 1, 1940 and October 1, 1944
(compared to some $205,000,000,000 issued throughout the United States).
Some Louisianians, Governor Jones among them, hoped that the industri
alization brought on by the war would result in a more balanced econ
omy with less dependence on agriculture.

The Louisiana Department of

Commerce and Industry created a fifty-member Economic Development
Committee to help attract businesses to Louisiana in the post-war
period to provide jobs.
war, however.

Louisiana remained a rural state during the

In 1945, for example, 192,836 people worked on farms,

while in 1947, only 132,464 people worked in manufacturing in Louisi-

A composite index of overall Louisiana business activity using
the activity of the average month of the period 1937-1939 as 100, re
veals that the overall index stood at 105.2 in 1940; 130.3 in 1941;
179.3 in 1942; 205.0 in 1943, and 210.4 in 1944.87 The years of World
States, October 5, 1945.
86

Morning Advocate, March 10, 1941, January.30, May 6, 1945; Overton
Brooks, "Louisiana's Part in the War," Louisiana Police Jury Review,
April, 1942, p. 12; United States Census of Agriculture: 1950 Counties
and State Economic Areas Louisiana Volume I Part 24 (Washington, D.C.,
United States Government.Printing Office, 1952), p. 4; Census of Manu
facturers: 1947 Volume III Statistics by States (Washington, D.C.,
United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 251. Louisiana
shared this trend toward urbanization with the rest of the South, but
the United States Census did not find that the region had become urban
until 1960, Goldfield, Cotton Fields and Skyscrapers, pp. 142-143.
gy

......... .

Louisiana Business Review, January, 1942, p. 3; January, 1943, p. 3;
January, 1944, p. 3; January, 1945, p. 3.
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War II thus marked Louisiana's return from the economic doldrums of the
Great Depression — a fundamental shift in which employment offices
quit attempting to find a job for every applicant and instead frantically sought a worker for every job. 88 And while the war did not
completely industrialize Louisiana, it did set Louisiana's economy
on the road to industrialization — a trend it shared with the rest
of the South.

Its further industrialization during the late 1940s and

thereafter, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

88
Manpower Review, May, 1943, p. 16.
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CHAPTER X I

LIFE IN WARTIME LOUISIANA
Military concerns and requirements intruded into Louisiana's
society and culture during World War II.

The conflict moved people

to unfamiliar locales, rearranged relationships within families, cur
tailed freedoms generally enjoyed by American citizens, removed many
consumer goods from store shelves, altered traditional holiday themes,
demanded money and scrap, and helped set in motion civil rights move
ments which gathered momentum in the ensuing decades.

World War II,

in short, affected almost every aspect of life in Louisiana.
It was impossible to escape the war.

Soon after the conflict be

gan, the American Radio Relay League prohibited amateur shortwave radio
operators from contacting anyone in the warring countries.

Moreover,

they were not to voice an opinion or lament the existence of the war
when talking to citizens of neutral countries.^While such prohibitions affected few Louisianians, many more wit
nessed the Nazi invasion of Europe at movie theaters.

Louisianians

during the terrible spring of 1940 could choose among movie-houses
offering "My Favorite Wife," starring Irene Dunn; "Gone With the Wind"
("shown here in its entirety, exactly as presented at Atlanta and
Broadway premiers"), starring Clark Gable and Vivien Leigh; "Typhoon"
(a "Tornado of Tropic Love!
typhoon!

See tidal wave!

See forest fire!

See

RED LIPS . . . WHITE ARMS . . . BLACK PEARLS") starring

Dorothy Lamour and Robert Preston; among others.

The newsreels,

*New Orleans Sunday Item-Tribune, October 1, 1939.
465
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however, brought the war into Louisiana's visual consciousness:

"GER

MAN BLITZKRIEG in Holland and Belgium"; "War Bulletin! Europe Aflame!
Paramount newsreel flown from war zone gives first graphic evidence
of chaos of 1940!"^
While some Louisianians saw only the destruction the war caused
in Europe, other glimpsed a deeper meaning in the chaos.

The Seventh-

Day Adventist Church in Baton Rouge offered "The Way Out of the pres
ent World Muddle" in 1940.

The war was not the end of the world.

In

stead, "This is the Earth's Hour of Destiny . . . the solution of its
age-long problems — War, Disease, Poverty, Crime, Insecurity — is at
hand.

The evidence is so clear that you will rejoice in the bright
3
prospects of the future."
The war also spawned a change in clothing styles throughout the

United States.

Vests, cuffs, ruffles, and patch pockets disappeared

to conserve cloth.

The summer of 1940 also brought on a boom in red,

white, and blue costume jewelry — American flags, eagles, and stars.
Deeper changes also occurred in Louisiana society.

4

Many debu

tantes in New Orleans in 1941 abandoned the usual round of parties for
civilian defense activities, learning about air raid procedures, ambu
lance driving, and other skills useful in wartime society.

New Orleans,

_
New Orleans States, January 25, 1940; New Orleans Times-Picayune,
May 16, 22-23, 1940. The producers of "If I Had My Way" starring Bing
Crosby, however, used a different tack: "Forget the Blitzkrieg! Come
Laugh and Sing and Enjoy the Year's Hit Show!"
3
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, October 27, 1940.
4
Times-Picayune, March 14, 1940; States, August 6 , 1940; Alexandria
Daily Town Talk, April 15, 1942 (hereinafter cited as Town Talk);
Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph The American
People 1939-1945 (New York, Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1973),
pp. 134-135.
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the state’s premier "party town," found its social ranks thinned.
Weddings and other less spectacular observances substituted for the
glittering social events of other seasons.

New Orleans held a Wash

ington’s Birthday dinner in February, 1942, for example, which attrac
ted 449 people including Mrs. Claire Chenault.

James A. Noe announced

that proceeds from the dinner would be split evenly between a contri
bution to the Democratic National Committee to help erase its debt
and a donation to the fund he had created to buy a bomber for General
Chenault, a native Louisianian then in charge of American volunteers
readying China’s air defenses against Japanese attack.^
Providing entertainment for soldiers stationed in the state
partially replaced normal means of recreation.

Between 500 and 1,000

Shreveport girls agreed to become "military maids" and attend dances
for soldiers on one or two Saturday nights per month.

The Young Men's

Business Club in New Orleans scheduled picnics, athletic contests, and
seafood dinners for visiting soldiers.

Baton Rouge provided block

dances, private homes opened to soldiers for a meal, and the Elks Club
and YMCA provided showers at a nominal five cents for soldiers travel
ing through the city.

The Masons located a Masonic Service Center at

Alexandria to provide stationery, stamps, magazines, newspapers, books,
games, and puzzles, available to all soldiers.

DeRidder received the

first United Service Organization (USO) Center completed in the United
States, in December, 1941.

The one and one-half story white frame

building provided an auditorium, showers, locker rooms, library, game

^States, December 18, 1941; Times-Picayune, January 30, February 24,
1942.
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room, and kitchen for soldiers at nearby Camp Polk.

Recreation facili

ties remained segregated, however, as did most of the rest of the
society.

Newspapers throughout the war reported activity schedules

for the USO centers and separate schedules for the "Colored" USO cen
ters, as they were known.®
Louisianians shared with other Americans an interest in reading
during the war.

The Louisiana State Library loaned 1,300,000 books in

1941, and filled 78,000 additional requests for information.
books —

Technical

"how to" books of skills development, nutrition, the current

world situation — vied with books of inspiration, escape, and adven
ture for readers’ attention.

The most popular books at the East Baton

Rouge Parish Library in March, 1945, were:

Nonfiction — Wendell Will-

kie’s One World; Robert Scott’s God Is My Co-Pilot; Sumner Welles’ A
Time For Decision; Walter Lippman’s TJ. S. War Aims; Ernie Pyle’s Brave
Men and Here Is Your War; and Gordon S. Seagrave's Burma Surgeon.
Fiction — Frances Parkinson Keyes’ Crescent Carnival; Lloyd C. Doug
las’ The Robe; Somerset Maugham’s The Razor’s Edge; and Betty Smith’s
A Tree Grow in Brooklyn.^
The war caused an increase in marriages as men "popped the ques
tion" either to avoid the draft (which usually proved futile) or to

^Morning Advocate, May 28, July 7, 12, August 3, 9, 1941; New Orleans
Item, July 5-6, 1941; Town Talk, July 22, 26, December 1, 3, 1941; Lake
Charles American Press, December 1, 1941; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce
Minutes, April 10, 1941, microfilm copy, Microform Division,Troy H.
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
^States, June 3, 1942; Morning Advocate, June 10, 1942, March 4, 1945;
Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph, p. 238.
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marry just before leaving for an overseas assignment.
marriages drifted upward during 1940.

The number of

In Orleans Parish, for example,

marriages during the first quarter of the year ran behind those for
1939, then approximately equalled the 1939 level by mid-1940.
Congress passed the Selective Service Act in August.

Then

In October, 581

couples married in New Orleans, up from 283 in October, 1939, and
second only to June, 1920, when soldiers returning from World War I
helped escalate the number of marriages to 628.

Marriages in Rapides

Parish more than trebled between 1939 and 1941, and especially in
creased after the army troops arrived in the area during the last
quarter of 1940.
Parish.

In all of 1940, only 889 couples married in Rapides

In 1941, however, 2,212 couples bought marriage licenses at

the parish courthouse.

The number of marriages continued climbing in

1942 (to 3,766), then tapered off in 1943 (3,736) and 1944 (2,693).
Rapides Clerk of Court Julius P. Arial estimated that about one-third
of the 1941 and 1942 licenses had been issued to out-of-town couples,
and that about one-half of all licenses issued between 1940 and 1945
had been issued to couples at least one member of which was a native
g

of central Louisiana.
The crime rate in Louisiana fluctuated during the war.

Alexandria,

with its concentration of army troops, in 1942 added twenty officers
to its police force, which was augmented by one hundred military
police.

The city court collected fines totaling $16,845 in 1940 and

g

Sunday Item-Tribune, July 26, 1940; States, August 27, 1940; Item,
November 1, 1940; Town Talk, December 2, 1941, January 2, July 1, 17,
1942, August 22, 1945.
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$36,452 in 19411941.

The police made 4,746 arrests in 1940 and 5,963 in

Over the state, the crimes of arson, burglary, confidence games,

narcotics, and sexual offenses generally increased, while murder, man
slaughter, assault, embezzlement, forgery, kidnapping, counterfeiting,
and felonious assault generally decreased. 9
Officials of the federal Narcotics Bureau in New Orleans reported
that supplies of illegal drugs in the city had dropped during the war,
while prices had skyrocketed.

As peacetime sources of these drugs —

Japan, Japanese-mandate Pacific islands, and the Balkans — became
inaccessible, drug users had to pay exorbitant prices for inferior
Mexican drugs.

Marijuana cigarettes, formerly available on the streets

of New Orleans for the price of two for twenty-five cents, by 1945
sold for $1.50 each.

A pack of marijuana cigarettes, which cost three

dollars before the war, rose to fifteen dollars when available.

The

New Orleans community conducted an extensive anti-marijuana campaign
during the spring of 1942. At that time, police officials suspected
the existence of two marijuana cigarette factories and about one hun
dred street peddlers in the city.

The street peddlers worked crowded

street corners, barrooms, night clubs, and poolrooms.

Customers ap

proached a peddler and asked either "Where’s the boy?" or "What’s that
you’re holding?" as a code to indicate that they wanted marijuana.
Police officials also reported that black users of marijuana outnum
bered white users by about three to one, and that most users were men,
primarily between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

Heroin, once

__

Town Talk, January 7, September 13, 1941, February 5, 28, 1942;
Times-Picayune, August 30, September 18, 23-26, 1941.
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twenty-five to thirty per cent pure in the New Orleans trade and priced
at twenty dollars per ounce, by 1945 was one per cent pure and cost
$150 per ounce.

The supply situation became so acute that some addicts

forged prescriptions, broke into drugstores, or raided doctor’s medi
cal, bags to obtain drugs, while others gave up and conquered their
dependency.^
Gambling, especially in New Orleans and its suburbs, continued
throughout the war, despite periodic ineffectual police raids.

The

Smoke House Bar, the Blue Eagle Lottery Company, the Louisiana Daily
Keeno Combination, were only a few of the gambling establishments
raided by New Orleans police.

Such raids typically drove gambling

enderground a few days until officials again looked the other way.^
The presence of illegal activity in the state offended the sensi
bilities of several groups.

The New Orleans Ministerial Union launched

a massive crusade against gambling in 1944.

In that same year, the

East Baton Rouge Police Jury recognized "open and widespread gambling
in the parish," and called on all law enforcement agencies having
jurisdiction to enforce anti-gambling laws.

Other groups deplored il

legal activity, and attempted to use the war to reform American and
Louisiana morals.

The East Louisiana Baptist Association complained

in October, 1941, that beer was available to soldiers even in camps
located in "dry" parishes and wards, and that during the recent maneu
vers "Government trucks were used and men in uniform doing the

^States, January 24, 1945; Item, March 19-26, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, September 5, 1944; Times-Picayune., September 18.,
* 23-26, 1941.
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delivering, and that protest by citizens was met with rough retort."
The Association protested "the action of the Army officials in deliv
ering our soldiers over to the tender mercies of the brewers, whose
sole purpose is to exploit them for their pitiful army wages . . . "
The First Baptist Church of Ashland, Louisiana in 1942 protested the
use of scarce sugar in the production of intoxicating liquors.

The

Women's Missionary Union of Zion Hill Baptist Church in Winnfield
urged the prohibition of the sale of liquor and suppression of vice
within specified zones around army camps, and industrial or other stra
tegic areas.

The Louisiana Moral and Civic Foundation ("representing

and supported by 350,000 Protestant citizens of Louisiana") petitioned
President Roosevelt to close "all night clubs and gambling halls in
these United States . . . until one year after peace is declared . . ."
The Foundation held that such places were non-essential to the war
effort, caused absenteeism, used supplies of gasoline and rubber,
absorbed money in profit that people could otherwise use to buy War
Bonds, and contributed to juvenile delinquency and the overall crime
*
12
rate.

Perhaps the most stringent suggestion for the suppression of
supposed immoral activity came from the*Winn Parish Baptist Associa
tion on November 16, 1942.

The Association called on Congress for a

law closing all establishments in the United States engaged in the

^Morning Advocate, September 5, November 22, 1944, January 2, 1945;
Congressional Record 77 Congress 1 Session Appendix Volume 87 Part 14
(Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1941),
pp. A5285-A5283; Congressional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88
Part 2 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office,
1942), p. 1805; Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph, pp. 239240.
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the manufacture, sale, or storage of alcoholic beverages; a law to
place all "diseased" prostitutes in "concentration camps" and treat
them as saboteurs and to conscript healthy prostitutes into war in
dustry; a law to conscript all men with venereal disease in the United
States, along with all criminals, and place them in a "foreign legion";
and a declaration of a period of prayer every night except Sunday at
9:00 P.M. throughout the country.

United States Representative A.

Leonard Allen dutifully introduced this petition, and it disappeared
into the Military Affairs Committee. 13
The war affected almost every aspect of life in Louisiana.

Cities

reduced garbage pick-ups, many stores stopped delivering packages,
dairies reduced deliveries, and launderies no longer used bags to cover
clothes after they were cleaned.

State Highway Directory W. Prescott

Foster and Superintendent of State Police Steve Alford warned Louisi
ana drivers, pedestrians, and boat operators in 1942 not to loiter
around the state's bridges.

The state posted armed guards to protect

these vital links in the transportation system and "any motor vehicle
driver, owner or operator of a boat, or pedestrian not observing the
warning may be seriously injured or killed." Transportation systems
struggled to maintain schedules in the crush of increased numbers of
riders and the scarcity of replacement parts for buses.

Traditional

vacation trips virtually disappeared during the war because of gasoline
and tire rationing and overcrowded public transportation.

New Orleans

__

Congressional Record 77 Congress 2 Session Volume 88 Part 7 (Washing
ton, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 8896,
9186.
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beer drinkers found their beer bottled in quart bottles by the New
Orleans Brewers' Association in order to save scarce metal bottle caps
("Let us serve you beer in quarts and split the serving with a friend,"
the Association urged). Sliced bread disappeared from store shelves
in 1943 when the Office of Price Administration allowed bakers to stop
slicing bread in order to offset an increase in wheat prices without
raising bread prices.

Unsliced bread caused many hardships among

younger housewives unfamiliar with the task of slicing bread, and
furthermore, many older housewives had donated their bread knives to
scrap metal drives, confident that they had no more use for them.

Un-

*

sliced bread lasted from January to March, 1943, when Food Administra
tor Claude R. Wickard announced that he would again allow bakeries to
sell sliced bread because "the savings are not as much as we had ex* a ..I*
pected.
Insurance agents warned their clients in 1942 that normal home
owner's automobile, and property insurance would not cover damages re
sulting from military attack, and offered "as a patriotic war gesture"
a new War Risk and Bombardment Policy.
clauses.

The policy had some quirky

It covered, for example, loss of personal or real property

resulting from enemy attack or from United States military defense,
but did not cover loss caused by America's allies resisting an attack
in one's neighborhood.*^

_
Town Talk, March 23, 1942; States, April 2, June 11, 29, 1942; Item,
June 8 , 17, 1942; Morning Advocate, July 25, 1942, January 3, 28,
March 9, 1943, February 27, 1944.
*^Item, June 9, 1942.
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Despite a widespread feeling throughout the United States and
Louisiana that Americans were not sufficiently patriotic early in the
war, Louisianians joined enthusiastically in various patriotic gestures.
The Town Talk suggested in May, 1942, "Let's Have Some Hoop-La:"
One thing missing in this war is the good old
hoop-la that gets under the toughest hide, brings
one's heart up into his throat, and turns humdrum
mechanics and prosaic clerks into dashing heroes.
We need the firecracker enthusiasm of 1917 and 1918.
We need flag waving, troops marching, one-minute
speakers. We need war songs that will spring to
our lips as spontaneously as "[It's A Long Way to]
Tipperary" and "Over There" did a quarter of a
century ago.
Let’s have some songs, some slogans, some cheer
leaders, some flag-waving, some name-calling,
some enthusiasm, something to let the ten mil
lions who are going to be in uniform know that
we're with them, not away behind.16
Town Talk editorial writers need not have worried.

Louisianians

responded to the patriotic tenor of wartime life, even though their
initial enthusiasm for scrap and bond drives waned during the later
war years.

Paul Maloney, Federal Revenue Collector in New Orleans,

even noticed in 1941 and 1942 a change of attitude on the part of
people paying their income taxes.

About 200 Louisianians in 1941 made

voluntary tax contributions ranging from $1.50 to $1,000.
feeling persisted into 1942.

The same

One individual return in that year in

cluded an extra $20 and a note:

"I felt I owed something more than

$3 to a government that's doing so much for me, and also upholding
freedom in the world."

One man came to Maloney's office and handed a

16Town Talk, May 6 , 1942.
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deputy collector $5, remarking "I expect a Jap for every dollar.
guess they* re worth a dollar each dead . . . "

I

Crowds waiting to pay

taxes, silent and sullen in previous years, now talked openly of Hitler
and the Japanese and expressed a militaristic outlook:

"I want my

money used to kill a regiment," for example.^
Many Louisianians left on the home front felt that they could
contribute most directly to the war effort by their unstinting support
for scrap collection and war bond and stamp sales rallies. These
activities brought the war home to many people, and gave them a purpose
and a place in the war effort.

They may have been unable because of

age, health, or sex to fight against Germany and Japan on the battle
field, but they could help supply scrap to be recycled into war
materiel, or provide the money necessary to buy new supplies.
The collection drives began in Louisiana early in 1941, primarily
to aid Britain and France.

The local "Bundles for Britain" chapter in

Baton Rouge collected money and merchandise, and made hospital gowns
for shipment overseas.

Shreveport patriotic societies began collec

ting old automobile license plates as a source of scrap metal for ship
ment to England;

By March 1, 1941 (some two months after they began),

Louisiana had collected about eighteen tons of old license plates.
Students at John McDonogh High School in New Orleans organized a
British War Relief Club in March, 1941, which collected old clothes,
wool, silk, and cotton for quilts and air-raid covers, and raised money
for British Relief.

(After Pearl Harbor, this organization became the

^Morning Advocate, March 19, 1941; Times-Picayune, February 29, 1942;
Item, March 12, 1942.
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War Relief Club and widened its scope to "all countries helping to preserve democracy.") 18
Scrap drives for domestic use began before American involvement
in the war, with the aluminum scrap drive during the summer of 1941.
The Item predicted accurately that the aluminum drive "will be small
training for larger things later." Louisiana threw itself into this
first of the nationwide scrap drives. Mayor Robert Maestri’s

AT um i n um

Committee met with principals of forty-five black schools in New Or
leans to ensure participation by black schoolchildren (some 25,000 volun
teered) . The New Orleans posts of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and
United Spanish War Veterans staged a parade to begin the aluminum
drive in the business sections of the city.

Xavier University held a

bazaar and charged one piece of aluminum per person as admission.
Members of Rapides Parish 4-H clubs collected scrap. (4-H club agent
B. W. Baker challenged them to "Let's see what we can find for the
cause of democracy and the defeat of the powers that are trying to
destroy democracy.")

Boy Scouts in Metairie, Pineville, Baton Rouge,

and other areas served as collection agents.

Edmund D. Davis, execu

tive director of Louisiana's National Defense Council, reported in
September that Louisiana had contributed 132,090 pounds of aluminum
to the drive.

New Orleans led thelist with 53,000 pounds, followed

by Shreveport with 20,306 pounds, which in turn wasfollowed closely
by Baton Rouge with 16,540 pounds, Alexandria with 16,407 pounds, and

Morning Advocate, January 7, March 1, June 10, 1941; Town Talk, Janu
ary 13, 1941; "The War Relief Clubof the John McDonogh High School,"
Louisiana Schools, December, 1942,pp. 14-15.
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Lafayette with 16,102 pounds. 19
Utilization of material previously thought worthless, however, be
gan in earnest after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent
United States entry into the war.

Governor Jones appointed Oakdale

businessman Parrish Fuller to head the state’s "Salvage for Victory"
campaign in February, 1942, and Louisiana was soon rummaging through
attics,

barnyards, and back lots for waste paper, rags, metal, and

articles made of natural rubber to recycle for use in the war effort.
Housewives began saving waste cooking fats in the summer of 1942, af
ter the government asked for them because they could be used to pro
duce glycerin for explosives.^
Louisiana organized itself for participation in the massive
nationwide scrap drive held during the autumn of 1942.

Fuller's office

cooperated with parish school systems to enlist schoolchildren.
Teachers and school administrators explained carefully to the children
the items they were to collect, and assigned each child a specific
section of the community to canvass, held poster and slogan contests
in each school to focus attention on the campaign, and integrated the
scrap drive into English classes by directing each student to write
three letters in which they expressed iii their own words the purposes
of the drive and its uses in the war.

Students then hand-delivered

the letters to their parents, and to the people living on either side
of them.

Local schools offered War Stamp prizes to the student who

Tg

Item, July 3, 1941; Sunday Item-Tribune, July 13, 1941; States, July
19, 1941; Town Talk, July 21, September 21, 1941; Morning Advocate,
July 22, 25, 1941.
20
Morning Advocate, February 27, 1942; Town Talk, July 17, 1942.
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collected the most scrap each week, and many schools also granted "mili
tary rank" to students based on the amount of salvageable material col
lected:

any scrap earned the rank of "private;" ten pounds brought the

rank "private first class;" twenty pounds equaled "corporal;" thirty
pounds equaled "sergeant;" forty pounds equaled "top sergeant;" fifty
pounds equaled "2nd lieutenant;" and seventy-five pounds equaled "1st
lieutenant.
In addition, Louisiana's newspapers sponsored an intensive houseto-house search for scrap metal throughout the state on October 5,
underwrote the expenses of the campaign, and provided cash prizes for
the most scrap collected in certain geographical areas.
metal drive turned up an odd assortment of objects.

The scrap

Shreveport mayor

Sam Caldwell donated the city's old firebell to the newspaper scrap
metal drive.

0. P. Oglivie, publisher of the Coushatta Citizen, do

nated a complete press retired from service in 1935 and standing use
less since then.

The 1942 scrap metal drive also uncovered old steam

boat paddlewheels, World War I helmets and bomb casings, Civil War
cannonballs, cooking pots and swords, abandoned cars and appliances,
all of which went to provide metal to the war effort.

In addition,

Baton Rougeans contributed brass, nickel, silver, and copper for war
industries to a "Victory Key Kan" drive conducted independently of the
newspaper scrap metal drive during the autumn of 1942.

22

21

Parrish Fuller, "Outline of Overall Plan For Enlisting School Child
ren In The Collection Of Scrap Iron, Rags, Rubber, Etc.," Louisiana
Schools, September, 1942, pp. 10-11, 30; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel,
October 23, 1942, H. S. Weigel Family Papers, Division of Archives and
Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge (hereinafter cited as Weigel Collection).
22

Shreveport Times, September 19, October 5-6, 1942; Morning Advocate,
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The Shreveport Times commented of the concerted effort to collect
scrap that "This isn't just another drive.

It's a do-or-die drive

and it's the boys in uniform — our sons and our neighbor's son who
die if we don't do." This concept of the importance of the drive
caused an extreme episode in Baton Rouge suggestive of surveillance
methods used in totalitarian countries.

The Morning Advocate on October

6 published a "Kibitzer's Koupon" to be clipped out by anyone knowing

of uncollected scrap and mailed to the local scrap drive chairman:
I'm no snooper, but I think that somebody ought
to know about the scrap I have seen at the
following location: ______________________
I hope somebody will call at this location and
get this cleaned up before the scrap drive is
over.
Yours for Victory
(No Signature Required)
Louisianians responded so well to the scrap drive that, ironically,
collectors ran out of space to store it until it could be used. 23
Collection drives continued throughout the war.

Alexandria’s

abandoned street car rails fell victim to the war in 1943, and the DDay invasion of France spurred an increase of blood donations to the
Red Cross for use by the armed services at the collection center in
New Orleans.
ted goals.

By 1944, however, most scrap drives lagged behind projec
The States noted in July that from June 27 until July 18,

October 4, 1942.
23
Shreveport Times, October 6 , 1942; Morning Advocate, October 6 , 11,
1942.
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New Orleans had collected only about two ounces of waste paper per
person.

The Morning Advocate reported in August that previously unused

tin cans could now be "detinned" at a new plant in Birmingham, Alabama,
and urged people to salvage them.

By the end of the month, however,

Baton Rougeans had collected only enough tin cans to fill about onethird of one boxcar.

24

Excess patriotic zeal remaining after the scrap drives could be
directed into war stamp and bond sales.

The federal government sold

war stamps and bonds in seven issues heralded with much fanfare to help
meet the enormous economic burden of the war.

The first series of

stamps and bonds appeared in 1941, and were dubbed "defense" stamps
and bonds.

Louisiana entered into the spirit of stamp and bond sales

just as it did the scrap drives.

Members of the Alexandria Chamber

of Commerce agreed to sell stamps in their stores to make them more
available to the public.

In addition, delivery boys for the Times-

Picayune , States, Morning Advocate, and State Times delivered stamps
to their customers.

Students at Tulane University held a "Blackout

Ball" in the school gymnasium and used the proceeds to buy defense
stamps and bonds.

(A "Blackout Ball" featured a one minute "lights

out" every fifteen minutes.)

During the months May to December, 1941,

Louisianians purchased over $11,000,000 in savings bonds and
$5,418,000 in stamps.

(In comparison, Mississippi purchased $7,090,000

24
Town Talk, June 8 , 1944; Morning Advocate, July 24, August 9, 31,
1944; States, July 26, 1944.
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in bonds and $3,259,000 in stamps during the same period.) 25
Louisianians continued buying war stamps and bonds during 1942,
even before the first of the big war bond drives, in September.

The

Town Talk congratulated its readers for their continued orders for
stamps and for asking

for

stamps in lieu of change when they made a

purchase.

and

Lindsey store inAmite created a "Defense

The Morgan

Window" in June, 1942, displaying pictures of local residents in the
armed services in an effort to boost bond sales.

The Shreveport Re

tail Merchants' Association sold $601,615.85 in War Bonds in July.
The total bond sales in Caddo Parish that month reached $1,489,000.

26

Each War Bond drive in Louisiana followed the same general pattern:
numerous newspaper advertisements extolling the patriotic and economic
virtues of War Stamps

and

Bonds; business,civic, and fraternal organi

zation membersmanning booths or otherwise assisting in bond sales;
visits by celebrities who entertained at rallies boosting war bond
sales.

The later bond drives often also included appearances by mem

bers of the armed forces demonstrating equipment purchased with bond
sales, and programs in both black and white schools to encourage
schoolchildren to purchase war stamps.
The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce urged its members to buy as
many bonds as they could afford and give their time and energy to bond
25
Town Talk, September 10, 1941; Times-Picayune New Orleans States,
November 23, 1941; States, November 26, 1941; Morning Advocate, Janu
ary 18, February 21, 1942; Times-Picayune, December 12, 1941, February
8 , 1942.
26
Town Talk, April 14, 1942; Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes,
August 13, 1942; Merle Weigel to H. S. Wiegel, June 28, 1942, Weigel
Collection.
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drives.

The Louisiana Councils of the Knights of Columbus added war

bond sales to their varied war activities.

Hollywood luminaries who

came to Louisiana to sell bonds included Laraine Day and Andy Devine,
who appeared at the Baton Rouge dinner which cost a $1,000 war bond
to attend

(The dinner raised $340,000); Fred Astaire, James Cagney,

Lucille Ball, Judy Garland, Mickey Rooney, Betty Hutton, Greer Garson,
and Harpo Marx, who attracted over 100,000 people to a "Cavalcade of
Hollywood Stars" rally in New Orleans — each member of the audience
had to present a receipt for a Third War Loan Drive Bond to gain ad
mittance; and Robert Young, who appeared at a mock invasion rally in
Baton Rouge.

27

As the seemingly interminable war bond rallies continued, the
federal government attempted to whip up patriotic fervor by enlisting
soldiers to sell bonds.

Some 600 soldiers "invaded" Canal Street in

Infantry Day ceremonies to boost Fifth War Loan Bond sales (and inci
dentally to celebrate the anniversary of George Washington assuming
command of the Continental Army during the Revolution). Richard W.
Leche, Jr. described to his father a rally he had attended at New
Orleans City Park Stadium in 1942: displays included jeeps, motor
cycles, six-ton trucks, light trucks, and howitzers.
tions included flame throwers and tank destroyers.

Live demonstra
(A live demonstra

tion of phosphorus grenades in New Orleans in 1945 resulted in 250
27Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes., April 8, 1943; Roger Baudier
and Millard F. Everett, Anchor and Fleur-De-Lis Knights of Columbus in
Louisiana 1902-1962 (New Orleans, Louisiana State Council, Knights of
Columbus, 1965), pp. 351, 354; Morning Advocate, September.17, 26, 1942,
June 13, 15, 1945; States, November 16, 1943; Times-Picayune, September
21, 1943.
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spectators receiving bums when one grenade landed too close to them.)
Baton Rouge witnessed an "invasion" of the Louisiana State University
football stadium during the Fifth War Loan Drive.

"The roar of cannon

and the crackle of machine gun fire, punctuated by soaring, varicolored
flares, gave the crowd a small sample of what infantrymen are enduring
in their section of hell in France." The Seventh War Loan Drive
brought a mock air attack on Harding Field north of the city.

Alex

andria witnessed an "invasion" by Higgins boats and Camp Livingston
soldiers during the same drive. 28
Louisiana exceeded its quota in each of the War Loan Drives, be
ginning with the First Drive, in which it bought $11,778,000 in bonds
compared to the quota of $8,250,000.

The later bond sales slowed, es

pecially the "E" small denomination bond for the individual investor.
Editorial writers pushed the "E" bonds in the Fifth War Loan Drive by
appeals to patriotism.

The Morning Advocate reminded its readers to

Just remember that each time you buy a bond you
are furnishing a fighting man with the equipment
he needs to win . . . each time you buy a bond
you destroy one more Nazi or one more Jap . . .
The States similarly reminded its readers that while firecrackers were
*
outlawed for Fourth of July celebrations,
Bombs for Berlin and Tokyo, and grenades and
shells to shoot against the Nazis and Nippies
are not. Your bond will buy a bomb that will
28
• .
Item, June 15, 1944; Morning Advocate-, June 16, 1944, May 31, June
18, 1945; Town Talk, June 13, 1945; Richard W. Leche, Jr. to Richard
W. Leche, Sr., November 30, 1942, Richard W. Leche Papers, Division of
Archives and Manuscripts, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge.
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destroy a German pillbox or a plane factory,
depending on the size of your investment ...29
State War Finance Committee Chairman Leon Tujacque announced in
August, 1945, that Louisiana had exceeded its quota in each of the war
loan drives by the following amounts: 30
BOND DRIVE
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

LOUISIANA QUOTA$8,250,000
$50,515,000
$123,000,000
$96,000,000
$126,000,000
$110,000,000
$112,000,000

LOUISIANA SALES
$11,778,000
$79,721,768
$139,750,693
$126,839,300
$165,995,100
$146,149,065
$177,882,000

Louisianians also found that they could contribute to the war
effort and fill time left empty by the disappearance of traditional
leisure activities by working in Civilian Defense.

Louisiana, with

its miles of unpopulated coastline, war production facilities, and
concentration of training camps, was considered a prime target for
enemy infiltration.

The warning network for such attack established

by the United States Office of Civilian Defense depended on citizen
volunteers "of known probity" scanning the skies for approaching enemy
airplanes twenty-four hours a day throughout the United States.

The

29
Town Talk, October 13, 1942; Item, June 13, 17, July 12, 1944;
Morning Advocate, June 8 , July 9, August 9, 1944, July 18, 1945, Janu
ary 11, 1946; States, July 3, 7, August 1, 1944. Warden D. D. Bazer
reported in September, 1943, that Angola prisoners had exceeded their
quota in bond purchases (quota — $8,271; sales — $13,375) in the
Third War Loan Drive, largely because of the dedicated efforts of the
prison’s inmate bond sales director - James Monroe Smith. TimesPicayune, September 19, 1943.
30
Item, August 20, 1945.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

486

object of this system, of course, was to alert the Air Force of enemy
attack at the earliest possible moment so it could intercept the in
vaders before they inflicted heavy damage on important installations.
The effectiveness of this system rested on a close distribution of
watchers so enemy aircraft could not slip through the network undetec
ted.

When that distribution was not possible because of the scarcity

of population in coastal parishes in Louisiana, the Office of Civilian
Defense depended on intracoastal bargemen, fishermen, trappers, and
oystermen who knew the marshy coastal areas well. 31

In other areas

of the state — New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, for example —
volunteers enrolled in the more common air warning system.

32

The National Defense Council of Louisiana chaired by Colonel L.
Kemper Williams, spearheaded Civilian Defense in the state after its
organizational meeting on July 23, 1940.

In addition, Civilian De

fense received support from fraternal and civic organizations and from
the state government.

The Shreveport Chamber of Commerce, for example,

created a National Defense Committee to help develop a community-wide
organized effort to prevent sabotage and "fifth column" activity.

The

31Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy and Lieutenant Hodding Carter, Civilian De
fense of the United States (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, Incorpor
ated, 1942), pp. 22-27; Sam H. Jones, "Civilian Defense in Louisiana,"
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1942, pp. 20-21; Joseph W. Reid,
Jr., "The Geography of Louisiana's Civilian Defense Organization I,"
Louisiana Municipal Review, March-April, 1942, pp. 44-45; Louisiana
Department of Education Bulletin No. 480 Wartime Education in Louisiana
Schools, p. 12; Frederick J. Stielow, "Isolation and Development on a
Louisiana Gulfcoast Island: Grand Isle, 1781-1962" (Ph.D. disserta
tion, Indiana University, 1977), p. 214.
^^Morning Advocate, August 1, 1941; Item, December 8 , 12, 1941; Shreve
port Times, December 10, 1941, February 5, March 12, 1942; Town Talk,
February 6 , 1942.
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Hammond Veterans of Foreign Wars urged all former members of the World
War I American Expeditionary Force to volunteer for civilian defense
work at an open VFW meeting.

In addition, the Louisiana State Police

conducted a two-week workshop in blackout enforcement, anti-sabotage,
and other police duties related to national defense for peace officers
during 1940.^
By 1942, over 100,000 Louisianians had either received training
or were receiving training in some phase of national defense work.
Air raid warden was the most popular job, with 17,982 individuals
enrolled, while aircraft spotter was in second place with 13,700.
Other Civilian Defense jobs attracted fewer volunteers.

In general,

however, Louisiana’s urban areas and their surrounding parishes organ
ized more thoroughly for Civilian Defense than did the more rural
areas. 34 By 1942, for example, Caddo Parish boasted both a Shreveport
Defense Council and a Caddo Parish Defense Council.

Other parishes

had one parish defense council, typically located in the largest town
in the parish, usually open only part-time.

In some rural parishes,

especially in North Louisiana away from the coast, unless they con
tained a defense-related activity, Civilian Defense remained largely
non-existent, even though many of these parishes cooperated fully in
33
States, July 23, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, January 17, 1941; Shreve
port Chamber of Commerce Minutes, July 11, 1940; Baudier and Everett,
Anchor and Fleur-De-Lis, pp. 351-354; Roman Heleniak, Soldiers of the
Law; Louisiana's State Police (Topeka, Kansas, Josten’s Publications,
1980), p. 53.
Sam H. Jones, "Civilian Defense in Louisiana — A Review of 1942,"
Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1943, pp. 17-21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4 88

bond and scrap drives. 35
Louisiana, of course, did not experience an enemy invasion during
the war.

The closest combat to Louisiana’s shores consisted of a

series of offshore torpedo and depth charge incidents.

For instance,

at least three torpedoes struck and sank a United States cargo ship
just as it entered the mouth of theMississippi River south of New
Orleans at 3:05 P.M., May 12, 1942, bringing warfare to the lower
Mississippi for the first time since 1862.
members killed and 14 seriously burned.

The ship lost 27 crew

In addition, a mysterious

explosion (suspected to have resulted from a torpedo) had damaged a
jetty earlier that same day.

Two more ships sank on May 13 at an un

specified location in the Gulf of Mexico, and the survivors were
brought to New Orleans and Key West, Florida for treatment.36 Even
though the threat to American ships lessened after the 1942 rash of
attacks, the sinkings brought the war dangerously close to home in
Louisiana.
Louisiana also experienced no major espionage episodes during the
war, but attacks on ships in the nearby Gulf and the frightening
rapidity with which Adolph Hitler's forces brought the horror of war
to the civilian population of Europe left many Louisianians convinced
35Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 9, 1942; Joseph W.
Reid, Jr., "Civilian Defense," Louisiana Municipal Review, May-June,
1943, pp. 68-69, 81; Leonard B. Watt, Jr., "Lincoln Parish Prepares
for 'Total War,'" Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1942, pp. 1415.
36
Shreveport Journal, May 15, 1942; States, May 16, 18, 1942; Item,
June 6 , 1942; Stielow, "Isolation and Development on a Louisiana Gulfcoast Island," pp. 214-215; Thomas L. Karnes, Tropical Enterprise The
Standard Fruit and Steamship Company in Latin America (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, 1978), pp. 217-218.
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of the need for adequate preparation within the United States and sus
picious of any activity perceived to be friendly toward the Axis
powers-

Discovery of Nazi flags flying from flagpoles at Martin Behr-

man High School and a playground in Algiers on May 24, 1940, led local
citizens to form the "American Vigilance Committee of Algiers" to in
vestigate all un-American activity in the area.

Baton Rouge was

rocked in July, 1940, by the discovery of four men digging under a
wire fence at the DuPont Ethyl plant.
four sticks of dynamite and a mystery.

The men escaped, leaving behind
East Baton Rouge Sheriff

Newman deBritten dispatched deputies and bloodhounds to the scene, but
the men (spies? saboteurs? someone with a grudge against the company?)
had disappeared into the night.

This episode, occurring so close to

a vital war plant — only one other plant in the country, DuPont’s
facility at Wilmington, Delaware produced the tetraethyl high-octane
leaded fuel produced at the Baton Rouge plant —

led State Police

officials to redouble their security measures. 37
On at least two occasions, however, common occurences caused a
flurry of undeserved excitement because of wartime anxiety.

An un

announced flight of four airplanes excited Baton Rouge on the night of
September 9-10, 1940.

People jammed telephone lines reporting the

flight as the airplanes faded away into the night.

After the excite

ment passed, sheriff’s deputies learned that the airplanes were on
night training maneuvers from Barksdale Air Force Base.

In another

instance, Alexandrians awakened on the morning of March 21, 1942, and
37

States, May 24, July 6 , 1940; Item, July 6-8 , 1940; Morning Advocate,
July 6-9, 1940; Heleniak, Soldiers of the Law, p. 52.
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found a fine, yellow dust covering the outdoors.

Speculation that the

powder might be a poison or residue of a poison gas sprayed by enemy
airplanes during the night caused a flurry of concern until chemists
from Camp Beauregard and Louisiana College confirmed in separate tests
that the mysterious yellow powder was, in fact, normal spring pollen
blown from trees in an especially powerful March wind.

38

The perception that Louisiana was vulnerable to an enemy attack
contributed to the development of Civilian Defense in the state.

Al-

cee Legendre, coordinator of Civilian Defense in the New Orleans area,
stated on December 9, 1941 that his office was already laying the
groundwork for practice blackouts in the area.

City attorneys in New

Orleans discovered, however, that the city had no ordinances covering
violations of blackout orders, so the city council had to pass a
special blackout ordinance providing ninety days in jail and a $100
fine for anyone failing to comply with blackout orders.

New Orleanians

rushed to hardware stores to purchase flashlights and candles, thus
quadrupling normal demand for these items, and also created a "run"
on guns and ammunition in local gun stores.

New Orleans newspapers

on December 15 published a full-page instruction sheet prepared by the
United States Office of Civilian Defensfe informing people what action
to take during an air raid: 1. Keep Cool[!]
Out Lights

2. Stay Home

3. Put

4. Lie Down 5. Stay Away From Windows (the instructions

also included directions for handling any unexploded incendiary bombs
that happened to fall near you:

"Spray a fine mist of water [over it].

OQ
Morning Advocate, September 10, 1940; Town Talk, March 21, 1942.
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Streams or buckets of water will make it explode.")

The Orleans

Parish School Board cancelled all night activities in the public
schools to remove any possible interference with the blackouts. 39
As the initial outburst of enthusiasm for Civilian Defense waned
during 1942, some Louisianians maintained that many of their fellow
citizens had not yet fully realized the importance of Civilian De
fense in a war of such magnitude as World War II.

The Shreveport

Times commented early in 1942 that a "vital defense plant destroyed in
a token air raid is just as completely destroyed as by any other type
of attack . . . " while the Town Talk remarked "It is time to pinch
ourselves, wake up, and decided we better [sic] dig a few trenches,
build some bomb shelters, and do something — anything — to remind
us that we are living in a dangerous age." The height of this atti
tude in Louisiana appeared in a Louisiana Municipal Review editorial
entitled "America Needs to be Bombed," which maintained that Americans
were too worried about high taxes, profits, and rationing of consumer
goods, and not worried enough about winning the war.

Governor Jones

expressed much the same sentiment in a Shreveport speech:

"We are

still judging this war as being the same kind of war we had in 19171918.

That war was a mere fist fight in a side street compared to

40
this world-wide conflict."
New Orleans held its first test blackout on the night of March
39
Times-Picayune, December 10, 15, 1941; Item, December 12, 18, 1941;
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, December 14, 1941.
^Shreveport Times, February 7, 1942; Town Talk, February 9-10, 19,
March 3, 1942; "America Needs to be Bombed," Louisiana Municipal Re
view, July-August, 1942, pp. 99, 121.
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6-7, 1942.

Legendre proclaimed the test "99% effective," but repor

ters in an airplane circling the city reported that some automobile
headlights remained on, lights stayed on along the wharves, as did
streetlights along the waterfront, that aircraft warning beacons atop
the WWL radio transmitting tower, and the Mississippi River bridge
navigation warning lights remained on, all of which clearly outlined
highly vulnerable locations in the city.

Baton Rouge followed with

its first practice blackout on the night.of March 31-April 1, and met
with similar results, but this time officials ordered lights atop the
state capitol, the Mississippi River bridge, and the WJBO radio tower '
to remain on.

(Soon after, however, Manager of Executive Buildings

Frank Grevemberg ordered the spotlight illuminating Huey Long's
grave extinguished for the duration of the war.)

The first statewide

practice blackout did not occur until the night of February 5-6, 1943,
almost fourteen months after the beginning of the war. 41
World War II intruded on daily life in Louisiana in other ways
as well.

Consumers faced shortages and rationing of many commodities

to which they had become ^accustomed. The first shortage developed
after the federal government announced its seizure of all raw silk
supplies in the nation for the national defense program as Japanese
expansion threatened normal supply areas in Asia.

American women

clogged department stores as they rushed to stock up on silk stockings,
despite official assurances that a new duPont chemical plant would as
sure an adequate supply of substitute nylon hose.

Hosiery, however,

TT

Item, March 7, 1942; Morning Advocate, April 1, May 31, 1942; TimesPicayune , May 17,-1942; Town Talk, February 6 , 1942.
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continued to be a scarce item during the war. 42
Automobile owners faced the twin trials of tire and gasoline
rationing.

Tire rationing began in January, 1942, in order to con

serve supplies of natural, and later synthetic, rubber for use of the
armed forces.

Gasoline rationing followed in the spring of 1942 in

order to conserve gasoline itself, and also to suppress needless use
of tires by eliminating all but essential driving.
provisions were stringent.

Tire rationing

Parish ration boards could not issue

certificates authorizing an individual to buy a tire until inspection
showed the old tire to be no longer safe at the speeds the individual
would normally be expected to drive even if retreaded and recapped.
Furthermore, a certificate did not guarantee a tire.

Each parish re

ceived a monthly allotment of tires and people holding valid certifi
cates often encountered great difficulty locating an available tire.
Rapides Parish, for example, received an allotment of 42 passenger car
tires and 143 truck and bus tires in January, 1942.

Orleans Parish,

with about 100,000 cars and trucks registered, received an allotment
of 1,282 tires for the same month.

Scarcity of tires led to theft.

Citizens of Shreveport formed the Automobile Vigilante Society in
March, 1942, to combat the increasing occurance of tire theft.

New

Orleanians reported 823 tires stolen between December, 1941, and
43
August, 1942 (159 in July alone).
42
Morning Advocate, August 5, 1941.
43Town Talk, January 2, 1942; Times-Picayune New Orleans States, Janu
ary 4, 1942; Item, March 3, 1942; States, August 10, 1942; L. E. Frazar and J. E. Brumfield to All Members of War Price and Rationing
Boards State of Louisiana, June 22, 1943, Sam Jones to W. Scott Heywood,
December 28, 1943, Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate Records, Troy H.
Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge (hereinafter
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Gasoline and tire rationing caused various problems throughout
the state.

Workers sometimes faced great difficulty obtaining suffi

cient gasoline to drive to defense or other vital jobs and had to
plan their trips carefully.

Ration boards received instructions to

urge compliance with the thirty-five mile-per-hour speed limit to
conserve fuel and tires. 44
Gasoline rationing in a state which produced as much oil as
Louisiana seemed pointless to many people, including Governor Jones.
Jones maintained that gasoline rationing would wreck the state’s
petroleum-based economy.

The otherwise rebellious 1942 legislature

agreed with the Governor, and sent President Roosevelt a resolution
decrying the expected slump in oil and other business in the state.
The Morning Advocate, however, adopted a positive attitude toward
gasoline rationing.

The United States needed to conserve its rubber

supply, and moreover, "maybe the states will find some way to get
along without depending on the motorist for such a large chunk of
cited as Jennings-Heywood Collection); Martha Byrd, "The Home Front —
World War II," American History Illustrated, July, 1979, p. 10.
44
W. Scott Heywood to Ray C. Martin, July 1, 1943, Heywood to Major
B. A. Hardey, October 12, 1943, Heywood to To Whom It May Concern,
December 30, 1943, F. J. Gimble, Charles A. Clark, and W. Scott Hey
wood to All Motorists, May, 1944, Jennings-Heywood Collection; Merle
Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 3, 1942, November 15, 1942, Weigel
Collection. The severe limitations placed on Louisiana motorists is
revealed in the state’s shipments of motor gasoline during November,
1943, when it shipped 44,796 barrels. Only 9,437 barrels of this total
were shipped for local demand. Minutes of Natural Gas and Natural
Gasoline Committee District 3 Records, Cline Room, Magale Library,
Centenary College, Shreveport, Louisiana.
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revenue.,,45
Louisianians also experienced either stringent rationing programs
or shortages of food supplies.

They lined up at local schools to

register for sugar rationing books which entitled the individual to
purchase a limited amount of sugar within a specific time period.
Sugar coupon number one, for example, was valid only from May 5 until
May 16, 1942, number two from May 17 until May 30.

Sugar rationing

continued to be a common reminder of wartime sacrifice.

As late as

May, 1945, for example, Baton Rougeans sought to stock up as much as
possible on sugar after hearing a rumor that sugar allotments were to
be reduced.^
Rationing and shortages caused various changes in Louisiana.
Coffee, a mainstay of many Louisianians, became scarce.

Merle Weigel

reported to her husband her surprise that refreshments at a recent
club meeting in January, 1943, included coffee "even second cups —
and plenty of sugar."

In February, she reported that the shortage of

coffee had boosted afternoon tea consumption in its place, but "I
guess I’m just Southern enough that nothing can ever really take the
place of coffee . . . "

In May, she reported that visitors often

brought along their own coffee, butter, and sugar so they would not
deplete their host's supply of rationed items.
disappeared from-store shelves.

Ice cream virtually

Mrs. Weigel wrote to her husband that

45
Morning Advocate, May 25, 28, June 2, November 27, December 4, 1942.
46
Ibid., February 19, April 27, 1942, May 6 , 1945; States, May 4,
1942; Town Talk, May 6 , 1945.
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rationing "makes us very careful with our food — we can’t waste it,
and we can't make fancy desserts, pastries, etc. — hut those are
really unnecessary . . . " 47
Intermittent food shortages also plagued Louisianians during the
war.

Restaurants instituted "Meatless Tuesdays" in 1942, substituting

fowl, animal organ meat, or egg dishes for traditional meat dishes.
Abbatoirs throughout the state closed in 1943 until the Office of
Price Administration could establish slaughtering quotas.

Louisiana

existed on "short rations" and.tight supplies for much of the war.
Restaurants reduced portion sizes early in 1943, and some began
serving meat dishes only every other day.

Shreveporters formed the

Shreveport Clean Plate Club to reduce food waste.

Officials at Charity

Hospital in New Orleans announced in 1945 that a shortage in the hos
pital’s rationing point allotment caused undesirable modifications in
patient diets.
shortages.

OPA officials could offer little help during these

New Orleans district director Gilbert J. Fortier reassured

people in July, 1945, that "There is still enough for all of us to
eat,” but also reminded them that "Not until after the war is over and
the liberated peoples are self-sustaining will we be able to buy and
eat as extravagantly as we did before Pdarl Harbor."48
Other, more minor, shortages developed during the war.

Chewing

gum became a war casualty in 1942, because of shortages of both sugar

Merle Weigel to H. S. Wiegel, January 14, February 1, 7, April 8 ,
May 3, 28, 1943, Wiegel Collection.
^Morning Advocate, November 18, 1942, February 26, 1943, July 14, 17,
1945; Town Talk, February 4, 12, March 25, 1943, July 11, 1945;
Shreveport Times, July 12, 1943; States, July 12, 1945.
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and chicle, a product of South America temporarily displaced by war
materials in intercontinental shipping and a major ingredient of gum.
Louisianians suffered through a shortage of seafood because fishing
boats lacked crews, fuel, and spare parts.

Black pepper became scarce

because suppliers and the OPA could not agree on an adequate price for
it.

Ice became scarce in New Orleans during the simmer of 1944 be

cause of a labor shortage at the ice—house until the War Manpower Com
mission directed the United.States Employment Service to scour the city
for able-bodied workers.

Metal license plates disappeared from Louisi

ana in 1943, replaced by a new fiber plate to conserve steel.
(Louisiana also then switched from requiring both front and rear
plates to rear plates only.)49
As often happens in situations in which people are deprived of
products to which they have become accustomed, some Louisianians sought
ways to circumvent rationing requirements.

Thieves broke into the

safe in the rationing board office in the Old State Capitol in Baton
Rouge in April, 1944, and stole rationing coupons for gasoline, shoes,
food, and sugar.

Those not bold enough to break into rationing board

offices, but who still desired additional goods could patronize the
black market.

Illegal markets existed for sugar, hosiery, and meat.

Revenue Collector J. 0. Fernandez reported in 1945 that eight indi
viduals had admitted participating in black market vending in New
Orleans and paid $71,968.39 tax on an estimated $1,500,000 unreported
profit for the past year.

Some New Orleans consumers who banded

49
Item, June 8 , 1942, February 23, July 1, 4, 1944; Morning Advocate,
February 3, 1943; Shreveport Times, October 1, 1943; States, December
1, 1943.
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together to oppose both black market activity and some grocers* prac
tice of charging more for items than the OPA allowed found that their
grocers refused to sell them groceries.^®
It is impossible to determine exactly how much black marketing
occurred in Louisiana during World War II.

The very nature of the

enterprise makes it impossible to determine its dimensions.

It is

safe to say, however, that a black market existed because some
Louisianians were eager to supply scarce items and reap a profit and
others were just as eager to obtain a lion’s share of rationed items,
even at an expensive price and the constant risk of detection.
World War II also impinged upon traditional holiday celebrations
in Louisiana, in general imbuing each with a new patriotic flavor not
normally associated with them.

Traditional American holidays, of

course, provided even more reason for patriotic themes.

This new

tendency to make holidays into quasi-patriotic celebrations is es
pecially obvious in wartime Christmases.
America*s last peacetime Christmas gave people the opportunity
to reflect on their good fortune at living in a country still at peace.
Many of them also sought to symbolize this appreciation (and inciden
tally celebrate the first flush Christmas some of them had enjoyed
since 1928) by making Christmas, 1940, into a joy-filled, light-filled
holiday.

New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated (a utility which

also wanted to sell increased amounts of electricity) accurately re
flected this feeling in an advertisement published early in December:

^Morning Advocate, April 1, 3, June 18, 1944, March 11, April 22,
1945; Times-Picayune, June 18-19, 1944, April 22, 1945.
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Abroad there is fear and blackout.
there is liberty and light.

In America

Thus, Christmas lighting now becomes the symbol
of the freedom that shines in the heart of every
American. That is your warrant for making the
lighting of your tree and your home this year a
ceremony to drive home this truth, that liberty
and light go together.51
Other, more economically disinterested, sources reflected the
same opinion.

The Hammond Vindicator asked its readers to light what

ever lights they controlled on a Christmas Eve Night of Light "to
show the light of liberty still in the United States." The Alexandria
Garden Club offered $100 in prizes for the best decorated lawn, porch,
and tree.

Times-Picayune editorial writers looked over Canal Street

and rhapsodized that "one inevitably thinks of the blackouts in Europe
and realizes that what is seen here is almost too good to be true."52
Sam Jones, however, raised the ghost at the banquet:

"The only

note of sadness in this Christmas," he said, "is the war in Europe."
Indeed, the war news of December 25, 1940 portended darker days ahead.
Some 300,000 Nazi soldiers invaded Rumania from Hungary as Adolph
Hitler secured a Balkans base for his proposed spring offensive against
Russia. 53 The West, of course, saw only the expansion of Naziism,
without knowing of Hitler’s secret plan that lay behind it.
The next Christmas, the "Pearl Harbor Christmas," was dominated

States, December 11, 1940.
52
Town Talk, December 7, 1940; States, December 11, 1940; TimesPicayune , December 24, 1940; Hammond Vindicator, December 20, 1940.
53
Morning Advocate, December 23, 26, 1940; William L. Shirer, The Rise
and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp.
811, 822-823.
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by the Japanese attack in Hawaii and the awesome task that now faced
the United States as a full belligerent in the conflict.

The Lake

Charles American Press editorialized on the overriding bittersweetness
of the day:

"It is the opportunity to share Christmas one more time

with those who are dear to.us . . ." The States used the occasion to
assure its readers that the Christ whose birthday they celebrated was
undoubtedly on their side in the conflict:
Christ was no isolationist. He believed in the
brotherhood of man . . . He wouldn’t have be
lieved in the rule of the Hitlers and Mussolinis
and their yellow and grinning Allies. He would
have believed in the kind of rulers that [sic]
are asking their people to never give up the
fight until freedom is won . . .54
Despite the dark foreboding which clung to this Christmas, many
people attempted to keep the ritual as normal as possible.

Catholic

and Episcopal churches held their regular midnight services, chari
table organizations distributed gift baskets to the poor, and carolers
serenaded their friends.

But everything was not the same. As the

Item commented,
The soldiers aren't tin soldiers, the rumble of
tanks and the roar of guns form a backdrop for
’Peace on Earth, good will to men,' the swelling
notes of ’Oh, Say Can You See’ mingle with
tinkling 'Jingle Bells' . . . there is no peace
on earth.55

54American Press, December 11, 1941; States, December 25, 1941.
~*~*Item, December 24, 1941; States, December 25, 1941; Times-Picayune,
December 26, 1941.
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Later Christmases continued the military theme.

In 1942, for

example, the theme of the Town Talk's Doll and Toy Fund, by which it
solicited donations to purchase toys for poor children, was "Give
Scrap to Kill a Jap and Bring Joy to a Girl or Boy." Donors were to
donate scrap metal to be sold to scrap dealers for the war effort and
the proceeds used to purchase dolls and toys.^

An individual could

thus be patriotic and philanthropic at the same time.

As the tide of

war turned in favor of the Allies, Christmas celebrations retained
their militaristic overtones, but also took on a more positive cast
than the early wartime celebrations.

The Christmas holiday did not

return to normal, however, until the 1945 holiday season witnessed the
most joyous Christmas mood since Pearl Harbor.^
The New Year's holiday similarly gave Louisianians a pause to re
flect upon the conditions of the world and their unique place in it.
New Year's Day, 1941, dawned on gloomy predictions about life in
Louisiana for the next year.

A. L. Wedgeworth, President of the Shreve

port Chamber of Commerce, expected "A cessation of living for indi
vidual gain and the lighter things of life." Walter E. Jacobs, presi
dent of Shreveport's First National Bank remarked that " . . . our
Democracy cannot be maintained as we have known it by wishing.

It is

going to be necessary to work harder and to make sacrifices that our
generation has never known." Despite predictions of hardship and
sacrifice, however, other Louisianians reflected a happier mood.

^Town Talk, November 11, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, December 22, 1944, December 24, 1945.
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Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell called for "living to the fullest extent
of the present age . • . and embrac[ing] progressive ideas and oppor
tunities." The Town Talk remembered the years of economic want ex
perienced during the Great Depression, and hoped that "1941 will be a
happy and prosperous era to the people of Louisiana . . . and that the
hardships and vicissitudes experienced in the past will not arise to
plague and harass the people."58
The year 1941 Ibrought some measure of economic recovery to the
United States, but, of course, it also brought war in early December.
Therefore, New Year’s celebrations welcoming 1942 were relatively sub
dued and quieter than usual, even though many people realized that it
might be their last holiday together for several years.

Also, offi

cials prohibited use of industrial whistles to welcome the New Year
because they were also used as air raid warnings and therefore could
.59
cause a panic.
Rain began to fall in Louisiana at dark on New Year’s Eve, 1944,
so the state quietly ushered in the year that proved to be the last of
the war (New Year’s Eve was also a Sunday).

New Year's Day, 1946,

however, saw a revived holiday celebration as Louisiana followed
its first peacetime Christmas with a return to traditional New Year's
Day activities.

Shreveport Times, December 29, 1940; Town Talk, January 1, 1941.
59

States, December 30, 1941; Item, December 30, 1941; Times-Picayune,
December 31, 1941; Shreveport Journal, January 1, 1942.
^Morning Advocate, January 1, 1945, January 1, 1946.
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The holiday most publicly . connected to Louisiana, Mardi Gras,
was a war casualty.

The last wartime Mardi Gras occurred in 1941,

one of the largest, giddiest celebrations up to that time, with thirtyfive balls and twelve large parades:
Outflanking the ramparts jealously guarded by high
society, the common people, seeking relief from
thoughts of bombs, blitzkriegs, and blockades in
the fantastic world of Mardi Gras, make carnival
its greatest success in nearly a century of mad
ness.
Only five days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, governing com
mittees of New Orleans carnival organizations announced that "because
it would be inconsistent with the present status of the nation," there
would be no Mardi Gras parades or balls in 1942, thus cancelling the
celebration for the first time since 1919.

The School of Design, spon

sor of the Rex Parade, asked its members for full 1942 dues to cover
expenses already incurred in design and construction of 1942 floats,
then assessed reduced "stand-by" dues for the rest of the war.

The

Harlequin Rrewe held the only ball of the 1942 season, a dance in
honor of 1,500 visiting servicemen.

The theme of the ball was mili-

tary — The Occupation of Iceland. 62
Mardi Gras day, February 17, 1942, found not the usual crowds of
revelers in the streets of New Orleans, but instead found the normal

^Ibid., February 16, 1941; Times-Picayune, February 19-26, 1941.
62
States, December 12, 1941; Item, December 12, 1941; Times-Picayune,
December 13, 28, 1941; Charles L. Dufour and Leonard V. Huber, If Ever
I Cease To Love One Hundred Years of Rex 1872-1971 (New Orleans, The
School of Design, 1970), pp. 191, 111. Mardi Gras celebrations had
been cancelled twice before — during the Civil War and during World
War I.
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business-day crowd.

New Orleanians celebrated by purchasing War Bonds

— between $150,000 and $200,000 on Mardi Gras day alone.

New Orleans

continued to use Mardi Gras to boost bond sales for the remainder of
the war.

The 1943 sale brought in $1,000,000 during Mardi Gras week.

The 1945 season featured twenty costumed individuals selling bonds
outdoors on Canal Street, and retail merchants throughout the city
participated in the sales drive either by purchasing bonds or setting
aside a small space in their establishments for bond sales.

As the

war ended, however, officials of the Mardi Gras krewes decided in the
latter part of August, 1945, to hold the 1946 carnival season as
i 63
usual.
Other holidays acquired a military tinge.

The New Orleans St.

Patrick’s Day parade was cancelled and replaced by church services
and bond sales rallies.
of April 1, 1943:

Observers commented also on the seriousness

". . . perhaps [the April Fool] was too busy at his

defense job, preparing to give the world's greatest hotfoot to those
dignitaries Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo . . . "

Easter, the traditional

holiday of hope among Christians, became an even greater symbol of
hope.

The Morning Advocate commented in 1941 that Easter symbolized

"something immortal and immutable in the soul of man that cannot be
crushed by oppression and hatred," and noted that "This bright Easter
is a challenge to the spirit of man . . . to out-live and overcome
despair.

Few years have needed Easter's promise and hope more." While

the traditional trappings of Easter disappeared (the chocolate Easter

Times-Picayune, February 18, 1942; Morning Advocate, March 14, 1943,
August 19, 1945; States, February 13, 1945.
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bunny and candy eggs were casualties of sugar rationing, and a tempo
rary downturn in egg production caused a shortage of eggs in 1943)
the spirit of Easter remained strong throughout the war.

The Morning

Advocate commented on the last wartime Easter that:
Today we can give thanks not alone for the sacri
fices of Him who died for mankind but as well for
the sacrifices of the many thousands who have
died that freedom and the principles of Christ
might not be driven back into the catacombs.^
The changes in holidays, hemlines, diets, and restrictions of
unlimited movement caused by the war proved temporary.

The years of

World War II also brought the beginning of more permanent change in
Louisiana’s social life.

These changes are most graphically illus

trated by the experiences of two groups:

blacks and women, both of

which edged closer toward equal treatment during the war.
American blacks at the beginning of World War II still experienced
the inequality which had historically dominated race relations in the
United States.

Many students of the civil rights movement see the

years of World War II as the turning point at which many blacks de
cided not to accept continued unequal treatment without protest. Many
blacks still harbored bitter memories of World War I, when they had
followed W. E. B. DuBois' admonition to subdue racial grievances only
to be subjected to lynchings, race riots, and continued discrimination
during the 1920s and 1930s.

"The dominant attitude during World War

II came to be that the Negro must fight for democracy on two fronts —
64
States, March 2, 16, 1942; Item, March 17, 1942; Morning Advocate,
April 13, 1941, April 4, 7, 1943, April 1, 1945.
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at home as well as abroad."^
Black Americans had to overcome the effects of generations of un
equal treatment in politics, education, and employment.

Their secon

dary role in American life was revealed in a study completed during
1940. During World War II, the black population of the United States
numbered about 12,000,000 and about 2 ,200,000 were between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-four.

Of these, at least 500,000 were unemployed.

Moreover, the average black youth with a job worked forty-nine hours
per week for $8.71, while the average white person in the same age
group worked forty-four hours per week for $15.17.

In addition, 9.5

per cent of the black youth obtained semi-skilled jobs, compared to
twenty per cent of white youths, and only two per cent received skilled
jobs, compared to eight per cent of white youth.

It did blacks little

good to hope for redress from the political system, for they had vir
tually no political voice.

Ten states used poll taxes, head taxes,

educational tests, or outright intimidation to deprive blacks of the
right to vote, while fifteen states segregated public conveyances and
places, and eighteen states provided segregated school facilities. 66
World War II, however, provided a bit of hope for improvement
among black Americans.

The labor shortage, for example, provided

opportunities for black workers to enter new fields of work and

^Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution,"
The Journal of American History, June, 1968, pp. 90-96.
^Al-Tony Gilmore, "The Black Southerner's Response to the Southern
System of Race Relations," in The Age of Segregation: Race Relations
in the South, 1890-1945, ed. by Robert Haus (Jackson, University Press
of Mississippi, 1978), pp. 67-76; "Age: 19 Color: Negro Occupation:
None," Look, December 3, 1940, pp. 20-22.
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establish a recognized position before the post-war slump, which many
economists predicted, forced workers back out of jobs.

Economic

development also set southerners on the course of acquiring more edu
cation and increased sophistication, which helped to undermine tra
ditional systems of race relations based on economic relationships in
an agricultural society.

The war — "the fight for democracy" —

provided blacks the opportunity to prick the conscience of white
America by stressing the anomolous position created for the United
States:

fighting for liberty in foreign countries and yet maintaining

an unequal status quo at home.

As one black soldier commented:

"If

I’ve got to die for democracy, I might as well die for some of it right
here and now."^
Black Americans also responded to the same stirrings of patriotism
as did other Americans, but contributions to the war effort could also
be used in future drives for equality.

As Dr. Felton G. Clark, Negro

Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," p. 96;
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma The Negro Problem and Modern Democ
racy Volume I (New York, Harper and Row, reprint ed., 1962), p. 409;
George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 716; Robert Higgs,
"Race and Economy in the South, 1890-1950," in The Age of Segregation,
p. 90; Byrd, "The Home Front — World War II," p. 17. Many blacks
found their first industrial employment in shipyards which pioneered
their use in many occupations. They remained in a segregated society,
however. In New Orleans, for example, the Longshoremen maintained two
units: Local 1418 with about 700 white members and Local 1419 with
about 2,100 black members. Southern whites also noticed a decline in
the number of available female domestic servants as black sons, hus
bands, or brothers found steady jobs. Employment Security Review,
July, 1942, p. 10; Town Talk, August 29, 1942; Leedell Wallace Neyland,
"The Negro in Louisiana Since 1900: An Economic and Social Study,"
(Ph. D. dissertation, New York University, 1958), p. 45; Merle Weigel
to H. S. Weigel, July 19, 1943, Wiegel Collection.
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Coordinator of the United States Civilian Defense program in Louisiana,
remarked:
No better argument for a better integration of
the Negro into the opportunities of American
life and democracy can be given than the record
of serving his country in a crucial hour as the
present one . . .68
Various segments of the black community made concentrated efforts
to focus attention on the war effort.

The theme of the Annual Parish

Achievement Day for Rural Negro Schools in East Baton Rouge Parish in
1941 was "Home-school-community coordination for national defense.”
The Louisiana Colored Teachers’ Association conducted a drive to urge
all black schoolchildren to buy at least one Defense Stamp per week for
the duration of the war, and also urged its members to join the payroll
allotment plan for the regular purchase of War Bonds.

A report in 1944

revealed that blacks in New Orleans had bought $585,000 worth of bonds
in the current bond drive, while blacks in Bogalousa had bought
$12,000, in St. John the Baptist Parish $5,000, and in Ouachita Parish
$2,500.

The Baton Rouge Negro Chamber of Commerce in 1944 pledged its

support of the Community War Chest Drive. 69
Black Louisianians received recognition from some sources of
opinion within the white establishment.

The Monroe News-Star, for

example, in 1941, remarked that "It is wise and right that both in the
military services and in defense industries, broadening opportunities
gg

Times-Picayune, December 23, 1941.
69
Morning Advocate, April.2, 1941, December 5, 1942, October 13, 1944,
June 12, 1945; Times-Picayune, March 20, 1942.
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should be opening up for Americans of colored blood.
Nevertheless, other Louisianians looked less benignly on the
stirrings of change in the black community.

The Town Talk suspected

that "fifth columnists" were at work among the black population
"spread[ing] . . . theories of Naziism." E. A. Stephens, in his 1942
Senate campaign against Allen Ellender, raised the "black threat"
issue, just as did other southern politicians engaged in a difficult
campaign.

Stephens pointed out that draft boards inducted more whites

than blacks, thereby "depleting the white manhood in the South." The
emerging situation, Stephens said, was intolerable:

" . . . we of the

South cannot pour out our young manhood and leave our streets and roads
populated by negroes incited by northerners to seek social equality."
Southern parents were willing to sacrifice their sons to protect the
United States, he maintained, but "they must not pay for this patrio
tism by the loss of their dignity and the social balance that we know
to be right and just."^*
The specter of the "outside agitator" haunted thought about the
problem of racial inequality during the war.

Charlton H. Lyons told

fellow members of the Shreveport Chamber of Commerce that white men
of the south should begin solving the problems associated with the
"negro question" before outside agitators attempted to settle those
problems without proper knowledge of the south’s social structure.
The same organization passed a resolution in April, 1943, asking
7 0 --------------------------------

Monroe News-Star, July 7, 1941.

^ Town Talk, July 27, 1940, August 10, 1942.
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Louisiana Congressmen and state officials to stop Office of War Infor
mation distribution of a booklet the OWX had published recounting
("extolling” in the parlance of the Chamber) black contributions to
the war.

The Chamber held that "most of this literature is prepared

by individuals not acquainted with the negro problem and not acquainted
with the problems of the south, and who are imbued only with the
theory of an impractical approach of the social worker."

It further

held that "distribution of such literature in the south tends to cre
ate racial unrest and misgivings, promote a feeling among the negroes
that the federal government desires social equality between the races."
The Shreveport Times urged all Louisianians to close ranks to prevent
racial unrest "regardless of any outside influences."

In his retiring

speech to Congress in 1944, James Domengeaux said that "[e]xcept when
aroused by self-seeking demagogues" southern blacks "were always as
sured of a security far surpassing in its real benevolence the bureau
cratic schemes of modern days . . ." The culprits, he said, were
"self-seeking demagogues" who "lure [blacks] by false promises to hope
72
for a status they know [they] can never attain."
The federal Fair Employment Practices Commission appeared to the
white south to be the ultimate "outside agitator" of the race question.
The Morning Advocate commented cattily that the FEPC sought to protect
blacks and Mexicans, but ignored "tens of thousands of persons avail
able for work" — the Japanese-Americans. The Shreveport Chamber of
Commerce maintained that FEPC actions "had created ill will between
72
Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, April 8 , 1943, July 8, 1943;
Shreveport Times, June 25, 1943, April 5, 1944.
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races," and opposed any further existence for the Commission.

Fifth

District Congressman Charles E. McKenzie called the FEPC a "fraud on
American constitutional rights” which had "tried to make it appear
that the South is a hot bed of prejudice and bigotry."73
The conservative reaction against the FEPC and stirrings of
equality proved to be ineffectual attempts to turn the tide of pro
gress.

The South learned that the federal government had a new com

mitment to equality, and that it had no hesitation to reinforce that
commitment by granting or withholding federal funds.

Shreveport, for

example, lost $67,000 in federal funds for construction of a health
center because the city administration refused to acquiesce to the
requirement that twelve per cent of the unskilled workers on the job
be black.

Mayor Caldwell angrily criticized "bureaucrats in Washing

ton" for attempting "to cram the negro down our throats."

"We have

lost the health center," Caldwell said,, "but thank God we have re
tained our respect and white supremacy. We are not going to be bribed
by federal funds to accept the negro as our political or social
equal.
The tide of social and political equality, however, was too strong
to be stemmed.

Local southern officials might stymie federal action

by refusing to accept federal money available only with the stipulation
73
Morning Advocate, August 16, 1943, August 2, 1945; Shreveport Cham
ber of Commerce Minutes, June 8 , 1944. Louisianians were not alone
in their condemnation of the FEPC. John Rankin of Mississippi, for
example, called it "the beginning of a communistic dictatorship."
The FEPC expired in June, 1945. Tindall, The Emergence of the New
South, p. 715.
74
Morning Advocate, Septmeber 17, 1943.
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that blacks also be included in the benefits, but they found that
United States Supreme Court writs ran throughout the South, even when
they overturned traditional political and social practices.

The

Court, for example, ruled in the 1944 Smith v. Allwright case that
the Texas system of all white Democratic party primaries, which ef
fectively excluded blacks from voting, was unconstitutional.

Politi

cal leaders throughout the South were outraged, not least in Louisi
ana.

Senator John Overton pledged that "The South at all costs will

maintain the rule of white supremacy."

If white primaries were now

ineffective, "The negro can be kept from the polls by educational
qualification tests . . . "

The Shreveport Times editorialized that

the decision bore two potential dangers:

it brought the Supreme

Court into disrepute, and, more seriously, it set the stage "for new,
unwanted, and needless conflict between the people of this nation on
racial philosophies . . . "

State Senator Wellborn Jack of Caddo

Parish introduced a new "white primary” bill in the 1944 session of
the legislature, but the House Committee on Elections sidetracked it
with an unfavorable report.

Committee members and members of the

Davis administration thought that present state laws were adequate to
prevent black voter registration without conflicting with the Court
-.-75
ruling.
While the Court's ruling in Smith v. Allwright had the immediate
effect of strengthening the hand of southern conservatives,^ who
^Shreveport Times, April 4-5, May 7, 17, June 7, 1944; Alpheus Thomas
Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Burger (Baton Rouge, Louisiana
State University Press, 1979), pp. 190-192.
^William G. Carleton, "The Southern Politician — 1900 and 1950," The
Journal of Politics, May, 1951, p. 225; George Brown Tindall, The Dis-
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began a rear-guard struggle to preserve the virtual white monopoly of
the ballot box, it also opened the opportunity for black voter regis
tration.

That registration proceeded slowly, however.

Rapides

Registrar of Voters P. T. Haworth reported in August, 1944, that 17
blacks had registered to vote in the parish —

thirteen as Democrats

and four as Republicans. Haworth remarked that no blacks had been
registered to vote in Rapides Parish for twenty years, and that no
one could remember a black registered as a Democrat in the parish,
and also noted that he had disqualified about as many blacks as he
had registered because they could not complete the voters' registration
form "intelligently." Assistant Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa
Parish Merle S. Weigel reported to her soldier-husband in August,
1944, that no blacks had yet attempted to register:

"Of course, we

don't intend to let any register, but don't want any trouble about it."
The number of Louisiana blacks registered to vote rose from 886 (.1
per cent of the total voters) in 1940, to 7,561 (one per cent of the
total) in 1946, but it was not until October, 1964, that every parish
in the state had some blacks registered to vote.^
World War II also witnessed the testing of other racial barriers
in the South, especially by black soldiers used to the relatively
ruption of the Solid South (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1972),
p. 35.
^Town Talk, August 8 , 1944; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, August 11,
1944, Weigel Collection; Riley E. Baker, "Negro Voter Registration in
Louisiana 18769-1964," Louisiana Studies, Winter, 1965, pp. 338-339,
345. Black determination to win the vote was revealed soon after the
war when Edward Hall, a resident of St. John the Baptist Parish, sued
parish registrar T. J. Nagel in November, 1945, claiming that Nagel's
questioning of black registrants but not white registrants violated
the 14th Amendment. States, November 24, 1945.
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freer societies of other areas of the United States.. Public transpor
tation, especially buses, historically segregated in the South, became
increasingly crowded as shortages of gasoline and tires for private
automobiles caused increasing numbers of people to depend upon them
for transportation.

Whites crowded into the rear seats of many buses,

the seats normally assigned to blacks, thus causing blacks to stand
in the aisles, or to be left at the bus stop because the bus contained
no more room.

Nevertheless, southern society demanded maintenance of

traditional roles. For example, two black soldiers from Camp Living
ston attacked Alexandria bus driver L. J. Bell after he attempted to
force them to move from the "white only" section of his bus, where .
they had found seats.

78

Friction between the two races occasionally erupted into violence.
Louisiana's major racial disruption occurred during January, 1942, in
Alexandria.

The incident began on Friday, January 9, when soldiers

crowded into the city following receipt of their paychecks.

Black

military police normally patrolled the black neighborhood centered on
Lee Street where most black entertainment establishments were located.
The "Lee Street Riot" began after a patrol of about sixty white mili
tary police entered the neighborhood and arrested a black soldier be
cause of "disorderly conduct." The ensuing free-for-all fight left
businesses along several blocks of Lee Street with broken windows, and
approximately twenty-eight black soldiers hurt, including three to five

yg

Town Talk, November 14, 16, 1942; Tindall, Emergence of the New
South, pp. 716-717; Merle Weigel to H. S- Weigel, March 11, 1943,
Weigel Collection.
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who were shot and seriously wounded.

One eyewitness later reported

that "Bullets were whistling and bricks were flying.
as well have been attacking as far as I was concerned.

The Japs might
I ducked."

The official army investigation of the incident reported that a show
of force might well have been necessary following the initial arrest,
but that civilian law enforcement officials (some twenty Alexandria
police and ten state troopers), along with one of the military policemen, "indulged in indiscriminate and unnecessary shooting."79
Other incidents between whites and blacks were less damaging than
the Lee Street incident.

A small group of black soldiers attacked

two white military police officers and a white taxicab driver in New
Orleans in 1942 to protest the arrest of two black soldiers for "dis
orderly conduct.
Even though blacks enjoyed some measure of improvement in their
social and economic condition, they remained trapped in a segregated
society in Louisiana during the war years, just as they did in the
rest of the south.

Politically they remained virtually powerless.

The number of blacks registered to vote remained low and thus no
Louisiana politician thought it necessary to accomodate their needs.
Blacks entered the state's political arena only in the form of a
threat, notably during the 1940 gubernatorial election during which
the Longites called their opponents friends of the blacks who wanted
79
Morning Advocate, January 11, 1942; Town Talk, January 12-13, 21, 24,
1942; Myrdal, An American Dilemma Volume One, pp. 419, 421.
80
Town Talk, November 17, 1942, May 3, 1943; Morning Advocate, Septem
ber 27, 1944.
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to enable them to vote and have a voice in the governing of the state,
and in the rumblings of dissatisfaction which emerged as the Roosevelt
administration belatedly aligned the federal government with the as
pirations of blacks for equal protection of the laws and equal eco
nomic opportunity.

Powerful public reaction against the threat to

"the southern way of life" caused by this new federal determination,
however, prevented the dissolution of the segregated society during
the war years.
Blacks, nevertheless, had the opportunity to participate in many
homefront activities — entertaining soldiers, buying war bonds and
stamps, collecting scrap, learning about civilian defense.

This

participation was carefully kept separate from white activities in the
same vein, however, in deference to the fiction of the "separate but
equal" society.
While blacks shared in the enhanced economic opportunity created
by the demand for increased agricultural and industrial production
needed to carry out American participation in the war, they did not
break down all economic barriers which had limited their opportunities
for economic advancement.

Increased prosperity allowed many black

tenants to become landowners, but many more were left in tenantry at
the end of the conflict.

Demand for industrial workers brought black

agricultural workers into higher-paying factory jobs, but many re
mained on the farms.

Those blacks who obtained industrial employment

remained workers and did not move swiftly up the employment scale.
Black education in Louisiana, one of the most visible symbols of
the "separate but equal" society, experienced little improvement during
the war years.

The general survey of Louisiana education ordered by
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the reformers after their 1940 victory revealed the inadequacies of
black schools, and some white public officials publicly recognized
the state's problems with its system of black education.

A shortage

of funds and lack of widespread popular support limited the improve
ments made in black education.

The most impressive gain made by

black educators during the war was the equalization of black and white
teachers' salaries in Orleans parish.

That limited victory still left

sixty-three other parishes with antiquated unequal pay scales for
black and white teachers with equal education and equal experience,
but it provided a promise that the old days of inequality were num
bered .
While the World War II experience did not bring an immediate
realization of a desegregated society in Louisiana, it awakened the
modern resurgence of the drive for black equality.

The comprehensive

achievement of that equality, however, lay well beyond the war years
and the years of conservative reaction which followed.
Another traditionally inhibited minority group began edging closer
to the mainstream of American life during World War II. Women, cus
tomarily relegated to civic pursuits, housework, or "women's jobs" in
the workplace, used the labor shortage caused by the war just as the
blacks used it — to stake a claim on non-traditional forms of employ
ment.

Women became stock board markers at the New Orleans office of

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Bean; they ran parking lots, drove
taxicabs, welded and repaired aircraft, delivered newspapers, worked
in machine shops, and managed stores, often replacing men who had gone
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to war.

In addition, more than 400 Louisiana women applied to the

Women's Auxiliary Army Corps Officers School during the first week
after the government began accepting applications in 1942.82
The movement of women into non-traditional roles received a mixed
reaction in Louisiana.

The Times Picayune New Orleans States editori

alized that:
It would be foolishly optimistic to suppose that
we shall be able to win this war by employing
only a part of human resources . . . It is better
to foresee [the] necessity for the full mobili
zation of our energies and prepare for it, than
to have it dawn on us a little later that we
have neglected another opportunity to ready our
selves .
The Town Talk added that:
Woman’s place now seems to be in the munitions
factory . . .
By thousands and tens of thousands they pour into
the factories and tackle war jobs formerly sacred
to men . . . From their hands come casings for
bombs and a thousand other things.
It looks like an industrial revolution. These
women are not enslaved, but released. And they
are regarded with new r e s p e c t . 83
Nevertheless, women still faced traditional conservative atti
tudes.

The same Town Talk editorial cited above, for example, also

81

Item, December 6 , 1941, March 12, 1942; Times-Picayune, February 8 ,
1942; States, March 28, July 27, 1942; Morning Advocate, February 28,
1943; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, July 1, 1942, Weigel Collection.

82

Item, May 27, June 6 , 1942; Town Talk, July 23, 1942.

83
Times-Picayune New Orleans States, February 22, 1942; Town Talk,
May 25, 1942.
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commented on women's war work that "It is surprising how they take to
it. Especially so when it is remembered how inept with machinery
women were always supposed to be."
Legislators also objected to a bill introduced in 1942 which
would have eliminated the requirement that women had to register
separately for jury duty.

The bill was designed to replenish the

supply of potential jurors, depleted by the large number of men away
at war, by automatically including women as well as men voters on
jury rolls when they registered to vote.

The Louisiana Federation of

Business and Professional Women's Clubs favored'the bill, but it went
down in defeat.

Many legislators obviously agreed with the anonymous

representative who maintained "we [have] already gone too far in
abandoning our southern rights," and another who maintained that women
jurors would sometimes be required to hear unsavory testimony, from
which southern womanhood had to be protected.

The Morning Advocate,

however, commented on the defeat of the bill that "We'll have more of
this sadly comic business as long as the idea persists that women are,
after all, much inferior to men and don't deserve an opportunity to
prove that the holders of these opinions are wrong."84
Women entered the workplace for a variety of reasons.

Michelina

LaCerva, Rosemary Jones, and Ruth Arcenaux, the first women hired at
the Rheems Manufacturing plant in New Orleans, said that "We hope to
turn out our work fast, so that the ones we love can blast the Japs."
84
Morning Advocate, June 26, 1941, June 14, 17, 1942. Mrs. W. D.
Burke, Sr., and Mrs. Inez Creidman became the first women sworn in as
prospective jurors on December 18, 1941, when they volunteered for
jury duty. Item, December 19, 1941.
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A job, however, sometimes also in part assuaged the loneliness experi
enced by many women when their loved one left for war.

Merle Weigel

wrote to her husband that "I’ve been working extra hard lately.

I’m

so glad I have a job for it keeps me busy all day and when I get home
at night I'm tired and can sleep."85
Loneliness became a daily companion for many Louisiana women, just
as it did for Mrs. Ttfeigel, but her feelings can be chronicled in the
collection of letters she wrote to her husband and which are now
available at the Louisiana State University Archives.

Mrs. Weigel

involved herself in numerous war-related activities which replaced her
usual activities.

She resigned from her bridge club, she ’wrote her

husband, because "my heart is not in a bridge game when there are so
many more useful things I can be doing."

She volunteered for Red

Cross bandage-making and knitting, worked at the Ration Board office,
as well as working first in an Amite drug store and then as Assistant
Registrar of Voters in Tangipahoa Parish and being a single parent to
two early adolescent boys. 86
Her numerous activities, however, did not completely fill her
days:

"When I go to the Post Office in the morning and don't get a

OC

States, March 28, 1942; Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, July 10, 1942,
Weigel Collection.
86

Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, October 19, 27, November 30, 1942;
Amite Progress, February 11, 1943, clipping, Weigel Collection. Other
organizations throughout Louisiana went the way of the Amite bridge
club, usually for the same reason. Louis Panzeri and Carole Lawrence,
for example, found that the New Orleans Music Teachers' Association
in 1943 decided to hold only one meeting per year for the duration of
the war because members were too busy with other activities to attend
regularly. Louis Panzeri and Carole Lawrence, New Orleans Music
Teachers' Association 1905-1980 (New Orleans, New Orleans Music Tea
chers' Association, 1981), p. 9.
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letter from you I'm blue all day — and when I get one I'm 'pepped Up'
all the rest of the day," she wrote in June, 1942.
right in any way since you are gone.

"Nothing seems

I get so terribly lonesome for

you — even when everyone is swell to me" she wrote in September.
Holidays she found even more lonely:

"I'd give so much to know where

you are today and what you are doing;" "I dread [Christmas] without
you with us;" "It just seems like everything I go to do brings back
memories of the many good times we've had together;" "You've been in
my mind continually;" "I've been praying for you all day to-day darling
and wondering just where you are today . . . "

87

Despite her worry,

Mrs. Weigel was fortunate because her husband returned at the end of
the war.

For many women, the loneliness, the uncertainty, the adjust

ments caused by the war were only the beginning of even more adjust
ments necessary because their loved one did not return alive from the
war.
Women retreated somewhat from their wartime gains during the late
1940s and 1950s just as did the blacks.

These two groups, however, did

not forget their wartime foray into prosperity and equality.

Their

permanent acceptance into fulltime participation in the American cul
ture and economy, however, occurred some twenty years after the con
clusion of the war, and is therefore beyond the scope of this study.

87
Merle Weigel to H. S. Weigel, June 28, July 2, 4, August 6, Septem
ber 9, 15, December 15, 21, 24, 25, 1942, June 6, 1944.
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CHAPTER XII
LOUISIANA AT WAR'S END
Shortly after the United States became involved in World War II,
its leaders began to consider the economic and social readjustments
that would be necessary to reconvert the country from a military power
to a peacetime society once the conflict had ended.

Many feared that

another economic depression with high unemployment and low industrial
production would occur when the need for war materials ceased.

New

Deal experience with large-scale planning programs to meet social and
economic emergencies, however, provided hope that with careful prep
arations, the country could escape such major social and economic dis
location. *
In Louisiana, concern for the economic dislocations expected at
the end of the war surfaced as early as 1941, and reflected a basic
division among the state's interest groups into those who favored
continued federal spending on peace-time programs to soften the impact
of unemployment with public improvement programs similar to those of
the New Deal, and those who feared that a continuation of federal
spending to support the economy during the reconversion period would
result in severe repercussions later.

Governor Sam Jones, for example,

announced his concern about post-war developments on June 10, 1941,
when he warned Louisianians that even though many of them had found

^Jack Stokes Ballard, The Shock, of Peace Military and Economic De
mobilization After World War II (Washington, D.C., University Press
of America, 1983), pp. 15-59; Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years 19451950 (New York, Antheneum, 1976), p. 9.
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jobs in the new defense industries and thus enjoyed a sudden rush of
prosperity after the lean years of the depression, the industrial
production would, at best, be reduced after the war, and that indus
trial workers should prepare themselves for the possibility of post
war unemployment.

Shreveport Mayor Sam Caldwell, meanwhile, announced

in December of that year that he expected heavy federal spending in
post-war programs to absorb many of the unemployed when the war ended.

2

Many Louisianians, however, remained unconvinced that continued
federal spending- would be a proper way to soften the impact of even
tual reconversion, thus sharing the view of the Truman administration’s
senior reconversion planner, John W. Snyder, who thought that the end
of the war would cause "an immediate and large dislocation of our
economy," but that "we will not manufacture a single shell, nor a
single piece of equipment above absolute minimum military needs, for
the purpose of reducing the shock of terminating war work."

The

Shreveport Chamber of Commerce exemplified the conservative reaction
against massive federal spending programs in January, 1942, when it
warned against "an orgy of spending" by the federal government after
the war and decided to analyze the local economic situation in order
to formulate a plan of reconversion.

The subsequent Post War Readjust

ment Council Report maintained that " . . . the most basic of all [re
conversion] efforts must be directed toward the developing of a better
national understanding of the influences of government and their
ultimate effect, unless property directed, upon the existence of
— 2

Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, June 11, 1941; Shreveport Times, Decem
ber 5, 1941.
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communities and upon the lives of individuals." The report, there
fore, called upon the United States Chamber of Commerce to initiate
a nationwide program to "maintain capitalism or American free enter
prise," while local chapters stood watch over the inevitable spending
of federal money, and proposed that any federal project should benefit
the local area economically — expediting traffic and commerce, for
example.

The Shreveport Chamber's post-war department conducted a

post-war industrial survey, promoted industrial development, and main
tained a file of names of servicemen available for work in the post-war
period.^
The Louisiana Bankers’ Association also formulated post-war plans.
The bankers sought to ease the return of veterans to the community
(and increase bank profits) by establishing a Committee on G. I. Ser
vices which kept abreast of all benefit program developments provided
by. the G. I. Bill and other benefit programs available to veterans,
including, of course, those programs which featured governmentguaranteed loans, and held a series of "G. I. Meetings" explaining
4
these benefits to returning veterans.
In the public sector, the Louisiana Department of Public Works
urged parish police juries to establish a planning board, make an
3Shreveport Chamber of Commerce Minutes, January 8 , 1942, January 13,
1944, no date (1942?), microfilm copy, Department of Microforms, Troy
H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; Goulden,
The Best Years, p. 92.
4
Morning Advocate, June 13, 1945; Golden Jubilee A Publication Com
memorating the Louisiana Bankers' Association Golden Anniversary,
1900-1950 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana Bankers' Association, 1950), p. 72.
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inventory of parish resources and facilities, and develop a three
pronged plan for efficient use of those resources and facilities in
the post-war world.

The plan was to include projects to be completed

by the parish, including improvement of roads, bridges, and drainage
systems; projects carried out by private corporations; and improvement
projects for individual landowners:. East Baton Rouge Parish called
upon its citizens to suggest post-war projects.

The restrictions on

the suggestions, however, were that the project had to facilitate the
return of veterans to civilian life, create wealth-producing jobs
which would increase the income of the community, and create cultural
projects necessary to the growth of the community.^
Governor Jones announced his plan for the post-war South in
August, 1943.

The Governor’s plan called for diversification of agri

culture, utilization of natural resources and raw materials in devel
oping an industrial South, development of commerce by improvement of
waterways, highways, railroads, and air transport facilities, and
abandonment of traditional one-party Democratic political allegiance
which, he thought, had "done nothing but maneuver us into a corner
and further impoverish our people."^
Louisiana’s master plan for post-war development, announced by
Department of Public Works Director DeWitt L. Pyburn in September,
1944, included many of Jones’ ideas, even though by then he had re
linquished the governor's office to Jimmie Davis.

The Louisiana plan,

^Morning Advocate, July 12, 1944; Gertrude Bouque. "Planning and the
Postwar World," Louisiana Police Jury Review, April, 1944, p. 16.
^Morning Advocate, August 20, 1943.
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clearly a product of officials who had accepted the importance of
government spending during the economic reconversion period, provided
for expenditure of approximately $500,000,000 on a vast construction
program including armories, health centers and laboratories, hospitals,
college buildings, farmers’ markets, airports, and wharf and dock
facilities at the New Orleans port, in addition to improvement of
state parks and the state's drainage system.^
While some Louisianians formulated plans to prepare the state's
economy for the cessation of hostilities and the expected downturn,
other Louisianians turned their attention to the diplomatic necessi
ties of the post-war world.

The war years witnessed a continued ac

ceptance of a major role in international relations for the United
States which editorial writers for the state's major newspapers had
developed between the beginning of war in September, 1939, and the
Pearl Harbor attack in December, 1941.
The immediate international consideration, of course, was a
victorious conclusion of the war.

As the Alexandria Daily Town Talk

remarked, "Winning comes first." Or as the Shreveport Times observed:
"What we must do now is put our shoulder to the wheel of war and try
to grind out victory so that we may have a chance to do something when
g

the time for peace comes."
The golden days of peace, however, could only be preserved by
United States participation in a post-war international organization.

^Ibid., September 17, 1944.
g

Alexandria Daily Town Talk, March 6 , 1942 (hereinafter cited as
Town Talk); Shreveport Times, July 23, 1942.
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The lesson of United States failure to undergird the League of Nations
during the 1920s and 1930s haunted discussion of the post-World War II
world.

The Monroe Morning World editorialized in late December, 1941,

that
Surely it would seem apparent to anyone today
that there must be established a League of
Nations which will be capable of enforcing
world peace and of compelling international
justice.
In 1919 after the first World War, our senate
refused to let us join a League of Nations to
preserve world peace.
Now we are compelled to join with other nations
and help fight and finance another world war
in order to save ourselves
World War II, while terribly expensive in money and lives, pro
vided new hope among editorial writers for continued international
cooperation in the post-war world.

The Morning Advocate observed in

January, 1942, that
. . . the allegiance which contributes so momen
tarily to the effective waging of war may well
point the way to alliance in the world in peace
when the war is over.
. . . it took a war to bring [this alliance]
into being. Let us safeguard its spirit of
unity and determination, in the hope that some
of its high courage and fine spirit may be
salvaged to guide us in making peace.10

9
Monroe Morning World, December 26, 1941.
^Morning Advocate, January 11, 1942.
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The Town Talk in February, 1942, speculated on the future of the
"United Nations" (then only the name for the powers allied against the
Axis): "Ties can be strengthened as we fight together for our ideals
. . . close association in a big and righteous war should be in it
self a power to hold the partners together on broad lines of common
interest [in the post-war world].
As the war drew to a close and representatives of the Allied
Powers met in San Francisco, California, to plan a permanent inter
national peacekeeping organization for the post-war world, the
Morning Advocate warned that
If the men at San Francisco fail, if the rest of
us fail, then another Hitler certainly will rise,
perhaps in a comparatively short time. And when
the last explosion of that war dies down, it may
easily be that over the entire world there will
descend the silence of death that has descended
over Berlin, while savage and degenerate sur
vivors pitch their tents in the ruins of civili
zation. 12
While the United States could plan for a peaceful post-war world,
it first had to complete the massive war in which it was engaged.
Louisiana, along with the rest of the country, recognized a major
turning point in the conflict as Allied armies gathered in England
for the cross-channel invasion of Europe during the early summer of
1944.

Several Louisiana mayors issued proclamations as early as the

first week of May designating "D Day," whenever it came, as a day of

**Town Talk, February 16, 1942.
12

Morning Advocate, May 4, 1945.
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devotion and called upon churches to remain open and citizens to
attend prayer services.

Jimmie Davis' first gubernatorial proclamation

called upon Louisianians for prayer and for "spiritual protection,
safety, and success" of American fighting forces on the day of the

_

.
. 1 3
European xnvasxon.

News of the Allied invasion of Europe reached Louisiana on radio
news bulletins broadcast at 2:32 A.M. on June 6 , 1944.

It was a day

of mixed emotions — joy that the invasion at last had begun; concern
for family members or friends who might be involved.

J. E. McLaughlin,

assistant pastor of St- Rita’s Catholic Church in New Orleans began
a forty-hour prayer vigil at 4:00 that morning upon hearing the news.
Navy cadets at Tulane heard the news at the regular 6:45 reveille and
broke into cheers.

Archbishop Joseph Francis Rummel, awakened early

and told the news, issued a statement ("I have absolute faith in the
bravery of our armed forces, and feel that they are determined to
pursue their effort to a victorious conclusion, thus bringing the
prospect of peace nearer"), then paced in his garden.

Mayor Robert

Maestri called upon "all citizens to interrupt the daily routine of
their lives to join in universal prayers for God's blessing upon our
armed forces." Many Alexandria residents stopped by open churches on
their way to work for a few moments of prayer, and others continued to
file in throughout the day.

Governor Davis called a special joint

session of the legislature for 12:00 noon.

Legislators and guests

jammed the House chamber as Davis and Chaplain Edwin Olsen of Harding
Field delivered prayers for the success of the invasion and the
__

.

Town Talk, May 4, 1945; New Orleans Item, May 15, 1944.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

530

protection of Louisiana citizens involved.^
The Normandy beaches bought with such terrible cost on June 6 ,
1944, established a foothold from which Allied soldiers pressed on to
liberate Nazi-dominated Europe.

By the spring of 1945, many observers

realized that Germany could riot sustain the war effort much longer
and looked forward hopefully to a quick end to the war.

The nation,

however, had to pass through one more trial before it could savor a
victory over the Nazis: President Franklin Roosevelt died at his
Warm Springs, Georgia, retreat . on April 12. While some Louisianians
had opposed Roosevelt during his third and fourth campaigns, the
president had nevertheless remained popular in the state.

Lieutenant

Governor J. Emile Verret articulated the feelings of many Louisianians
in his remarks at a memorial service for Roosevelt held in New Iberia:
"I personally had never seen or known the President, yet I personally
feel that I have lost a friend.

Well, I have other friends, nearer to

me perhaps, but still I regret the loss of this particular one.

From

him, I have drawn strength." One unidentified New Orleans woman was in
her yard on the afternoon of April 12 when her neighbor called to her
to turn on her radio.

The woman reported that she started toward her

house to do so when she overheard a report that Roosevelt had died:
"I couldn't get up the steps.

It was like a member of my family [had

died]."15

14Item, June 6 , 1944; New Orleans States, June 6 , 1944; Town Talk,
June 6, 1944; Morning Advocate, June 7, 1944.
15J. Emile Verret, "Eulogy," April 14, 1945, J. Emile Verret Papers,
Dupre Library, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette; Item
April 13, 1945.
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New Orleans stores remained open as usual that night, but clerks
reported that the crowds were lighter than normal and bought very
little.

People gathered around radios in department stores and hotel

lobbies listening for details of the events in Warm Springs and the
transfer of power in Washington.

The Roosevelt Hotel closed both its

lounge and restaurant for lack of business.

A security guard at Pat

O’Brien's club reported that the crowd was "quiet and gloomy." The
city's Catholic churches tolled their bells for five minutes beginning
at 8:00 P.M.
to half-staff.

Mayor Maestri ordered all flags on city buildings lowered
Officials closed parish and parochial schools and all

colleges and universities in the city.

In Baton Rouge, Governor Davis

ordered flags on state buildings lowered, and declared April 15 an
official day of mourning for Roosevelt in Louisiana.

All state of

fices closed on that day, as did many stores, the Stock Exchange, the
Cotton Exchange, and the Board of Trade in New Orleans-

Many people

throughout the state attended memorial services.^
Even while it mourned its fallen leader, Louisiana also welcomed
the new president.

The Morning Advocate reminded its readers that

The place of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the great
humanitarian, the great liberator, the foremost
citizen of our time, will be unique in history.
But there is always a place in the sun for
others. The truly great are always needed and
there is always a place for them.

^Item, April 13-15, 1945; Times-Picayune, April 14-16, 1945;
Morning Advocate, April 13, 1945; Shreveport Times, April 13, 1945.
^ Morning Advocate, April 15, 1945.
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As Allied armies pushed close to Berlin in the spring of 1945,
rumors of peace swept Louisiana, along with the rest of the United
States, beginning in March.

The desperate longing to finish the war

was revealed in the eagerness to confirm any hint of peace.

Callers

jammed the telephone switchboard of the Shreveport Times in late
March, asking whether peace had finally come.

The calls stemmed from

an incident at a local radio station which had "plugged" its news de
partment by announcing that its listeners should stay tuned for later
newscasts and "the big news stories of the day."
again swept through Louisiana in late April.

18

Peace rumors

Bars closed in Shreve

port in accordance with agreements between owners and police attemp
ting to curb excessive celebrating.

Church bells pealed in Baton

Rouge announcing the victory, but official denials of a peace settlemetn quickly scotched the celebrations. 19
Ironically, Louisiana remained calm during the days preceding the
actual German surrender.

Peace rumors of May 5, 1945, brought no new

round of celebrations because skeptics now demanded proof before be
lieving the end of the European war had come.
wait, however.

They had not long to

Germany surrendered at 2:41 A.M., Monday, May 7, 1945

(7:41 P.M. Central War Time, May 6 , in Louisiana).

Louisiana began

its celebration of "Victory in Europe Day" even before President Tru
man officially announced the peace settlement at 8:00 A.M. (local
time), May 8 . Churches throughout the state again opened for prayer
TO

Item, March 17, 1945; Shreveport Times, March 28, 1945.
19
Morning Advocate, April 29, 1945; Shreveport Times, April 29, 1945.
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and meditation, businesses closed, shopkeepers nailed boards across
vulnerable plate glass show windows, workers in the Whitney Bank •
Building and the American Bank Building in New Orleans sent showers
of torn newspaper, telephone books, and other paper items fluttering
down as impromptu confetti.

Old-timers, however, remembered the Armi

stice Day rallies in the city following World War I as rowdier.

The

major reasons for the relatively sober celebration was that only one
phase of the war had ended.

As one New Orleans policeman commented,
20

"bullets are still flying in the Pacific."

During the months between the surrender of Germany and the sur
render of Japan, Americans increasingly turned their thoughts to the
consumer goods which would become available at the end of the war.
An informal survey conducted in New Orleans during August, 1945, asked
what an individual would purchase for dinner in a grocery store fully
stocked with pre-war supplies.

Eight people replied "steak"; two re

plied "meat of any type"; and one each replied "vegetables" and
"chicken." A Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce survey of 2,585 persons
asked, "What will be your first purchase after the war when there are
plentry of things to buy?"
consumer goods:

The replies reveal the pent-up demand for

the most popular reply was electric washing machine,

followed by automobile, hand electric iron, kitchen stove, electric
refrigerator, radio, furniture, furnace, electric mixer, and electric
food freezer.2^
20

States, May 7-8, 1945; Morning Advocate, May 9-10, 1945; Town Talk,
May 8 , 1945.
21Item, August 1, 8 , 1945; Goulden, The Best Years, pp. 93-94.
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Rumors of a peace settlement with Japan swept through Louisiana
as early as August 10, but official confirmation that the Japanese
had indeed surrendered reached the state minutes after it was an
nounced at 6:00 P.M., August 15, 1945.
taneous victory celebration.

The state erupted in a spon

New Orleans witnessed the largest cele

bration since the 1941 Carnival.

Confetti piled six inches deep on

some downtown streets; stores and offices closed; church bells rang;
boats in the harbor sounded their whistles; and shopkeepers again
boarded up vulnerable windows.
arrests, however.)

(New Orleans police made only 107

Crowds jammed Third Street in downtown Baton Rouge

within fifteen minutes of the announcement, and filled the air with
confetti and the noise of whistles, sirens, and bells.
proclaimed a two-day state holiday.

Governor Davis

Shreveport celebrated with closed

stores and offices, joyous celebration, and much noise.

The Alexandria

business district filled minutes after the announcement.
Talk reported comments randomly heard on the streets:

The Town

"Thank God,

it’s done"; "How soon do you suppose my husband will come home"; "Oh,
Gee"; "I'm going to cry"; "Praise the Lord that it's over"; and most
poignantly, "I wish my son could have lived to see this day."22
The federal government announced the end of gasoline rationing
only a few hours after the Japanese surrender and thus initiated
another round of celebration on August 16. Many motorists shared the
pleasure of one Baton Rougean who reported that "I immediately drove
my car to a gas station and said 'fill it up,' something I haven't
22 :

Item, August 10, 15, 1945; Morning Advocate, August 14-16, 1945;
Town Talk, August 14, 1945; Shreveport Times, August 15, 1945.
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been able to do for a long time.

I hope I never need those gas

coupons again." One Baton Rouge gasoline station which had normally
sold 1,000 gallons of fuel per day during rationing, sold 6,000
gallons the day rationing ended.

New Orleans motorists rushed to

filling stations, causing the president of the New Orleans Service
Station Association to comment that "Everybody said ’fill ’er [sic]
23
up' just for the pleasure of saying it."
Even as the state celebrated the end of the war, however, many
Louisianians were concerned about the new weapon which had precipitated
the unconventional conclusion of World War II.

The consequences of

possible misuse of atomic technology concerned editorial writers
throughout the state.

The Town Talk commented on August 7, that

The responsibility of the possession of knowledge
is a serious matter. Lest it become the monster
by which man with his own hands and mind destroys
himself, it behooves us to examine.carefully,
even prayerfully, the uses to which this Franken
stein is put, and the hands in which its secrets
lie . . M
The next day, the Shreveport Times noted that the further mankind pro
gressed, the more it acquired the ability to destroy "vast chunks of
the world."

On the same day, the Item reported that "one common re

action to [the atomic bomb] seems to be that it is very unfortunate
for humanity that so terrible a weapon had to be invented.

For at

least a dozen of our acquaintances have expressed in varying terms the
23
Morning Advocate, August 15-16, 1945; Item, August 16, 1945;
Goulden, The Best Years, p. 91.
24

Town Talk, August 7, 1945.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

536

feelings that atom-cracking will destroy us all, if not the world
25
along with us."
The States speculated on the possibility of out
lawing the new weapon as "the answer to fears that another war will
end civilization":

"It seems to us that attempts to outlaw the

atomic bomb are doomed to failure unless they can be approached
through strong international controls of the very process involved in
the manufacture of atomic power," while the Morning Advocate asked:
"how can any logical person argue that any effort, no matter how
great, on behalf of lasting peace, is not entirely justified?"

26

The threat of nuclear proliferation appeared to some observers
even in the virtual afterglow of the wartime detonations.

This

danger, some thought, might even enhance the possibility of construc
ting a lasting peace.

The Morning Advocate commented that

Against the atomic bomb, there is no defense. From
it, there is no hiding. By this frightful inven
tion, the strongest fortifications known to man can
be crumpled like tinfoil, the deepest shelters can
be blown open, and the very mountains toppled.
We are now trying to establish machinery to keep a
lasting peace. We had better make it work. This
may be our last chance to avoid the pocalyptic [sic]
destruction with which the science of war so long
has threatened us.
Peace will come. Will it come now, or after the
final holocaust when atomic power has split the
world asunder? Will it be the peace of a brave
new world — or the peace of the grave? Atomic
power offers mankind the choice. Mankind must
choose.27
25
Shreveport Times, August 8 , 1945; Item, August 8 , 1945.
26States. October 29, 1945; Morning Advocate, November 29, 1945.
27
Morning Advocate, August 8 , 1945.
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The end of the war, even though it brought unimagined fears and
the brooding threat of atomic warfare, also brought the beginning of
American reconversion to a peace-time society-

Many Louisianians

celebrated Labor Day, 1945, the first peace-time holiday since Thanks
giving, 1941, with short automobile trips fueled by unrationed gasoline.
The telephone company assured Baton Rougeans that new telephones were
on the way to fill the backlog of 33,186 orders for residential or
business telephones-

Scarce china, silver, and crystal appeared on

store shelves and met a brisk demand.

One New Orleans jeweler re

marked that "Victory Brides" created much new demand, but that "many
of our old customers are replenishing their stocks or changing their
china and silver patterns.

They’ve' had to do without fine things for

so long." Ex-servicemen crowded into the state’s colleges.

Long-

awaited floor samples of new Frigidaire electric refrigerators ap
peared on October 31.

Customers could only place an order, but stores

promised "Deliveries As Soon As Frigidaires Are Available." Applica
tions for new trucks numbered 400 for every vehicle brought into the
state.

The Baton Rouge USO held its closing ceremonies in January,

1946.28
The Louisiana economy entered the post-war reconversion when the
war industries announced cancellation of war contracts soon after the
Japanese surrender.
August 16.

Higgins Industries lost all its war contracts by

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft announced that it would com

plete the airplanes actually on the assembly line, but would begin no
28
Morning Advocate, September 2, 19, 27, 1945, January 10, 28, 1946;
States, October 29, 31, 1945; Item, November 15, 1945.
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new construction.

Rheem Manufacturing lost, two of its three war

contracts by August 16.

The last ship left the Delta Shipbuilding

ways on October 11, thus bringing to a close the World War II era of
shipbuilding in New Orleans. 29
The Item regretted the resulting loss of employment, but edi
torialized that "efforts to prolong production at public expense,
without need" would have proven even more costly:

"Sudden increase

in employment at unprecedented wages was an abnormal condition
brought on deliberately to meet the abnormal demands of an abnormal
situation.

Now it is time to return to normal living."

Senator Allen

J. Ellender called on workers to "forget this holiday spree" of high
wartimes wages so that United States production costs could be lowered
sufficiently to allow American products to compete in the international
i * 30
market.

Many workers realized that the future might not be as exciting
(or as profitable) as the past.

An Item survey of workers at the

Consolidated Vultee plant elicited the following comments:

"Before

the war, I was a seamstress, but I'll never go back to it.

I’d rather

starve"; "My husband's in the Pacific and I hope he'll be back soon.
So, I'll keep house for him.

However, I'll sure miss those rivets.

Housekeeping will seem mighty dull now"; "I guess I’ll go back to
[accounting].

I know it won't pay as well, but I figured on that and

will be satisfied."31
29
Item, August 16, 1945; States, October 11, 1945.
30
Item, August 20, 1945; Morning Advocate, August 30, 1945.
31

Item, August 17, 1945.
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Louisiana in 1945 was not the same state it had been in 1939 when
the war began.

While precise measures of change are impossible to

determine for 1945, the entire decade of the 1940s brought continued
population growth to the state.

Louisiana's population in 1950

numbered 2,683,516, an increase of 319,636 (13.5 per cent) over the
1940 total.

Urban growth, moreover, outstripped rural growth.

Total

urban population increased by 383,350 (39.1 per cent) during the
decade, while rural population lost 63,714 (-4.6 per cent) from the
1940 total.

Moreover, the 1950 Census found that Louisiana contained

more population in urban areas (50.8 per cent) than in rural areas
(49.2 per cent).

Urban growth, however, left a recognizable state.

No new urban area emerged to displace New Orleans as the state's most
populous

city.

Urban areas in 1940 continued to be urban areas in

1950, but they had grown rapidly.
uneven.

The state's urban growth had been

New Orleans grew more slowly than any other urban area (15.3

per cent), while Shreveport increased by 19.6 per cent; Alexandria by
29 per cent; Monroe by 36-3 per cent; Lafayette by 74.6 per cent; Lake
Charles by 94.6 per cent; and Baton Rouge by a staggering 261.8 per
cent. 32 The most impressive growth in Louisiana's urban areas during
the 1940s were the gains made by Baton Rouge, which by 1950 threatened
to displace Shreveport as the state’s "second city."
Louisiana, however, ranked fifth in the South in population
growth during the decade.

Florida, Virginia, Texas, and North Carolina

32
A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States
Census of Population: 1950 Volume I Number of Inhabitants (Washington,
D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 18-5.
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grew more rapidly, while Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi grew more slowly. 33
Louisianians in 1950 were also relatively better educated than
they had been ten years before.
for white residents was 8.2.

In 1940, the median grade completed

By 1950, that number had increased

slightly to 8 .8 . Blacks had reported 3.9 as the median grade com<3 /

pleted in 1940.

By 1950, that number had increased to 4.6.

The in

crease for both races however, was slight.
The Census of Manufacturers, completed in 1947, illustrates the
economic shift toward industrialization in the Louisiana economy.
The 1939 Census had found 1,779 manufacturing establishments in the
state employing 70,453 workers and paying wages.of $55,083,540.

The

1947 survey found 2,389 manufacturing establishments, employing
132,464 workers at total wages of $309,871,000.

35

In summary, then, Louisiana had experienced much change since
1939.

Events of the six-year period which began in that year affected

state and national political considerations, the economy, and virtually
every aspect of life on the Louisiana homefront.
State politics had been affected most, however, not by America's
involvement in the war, but by the venality of Longite politicians
who in 1939 incurred the wrath of the voters by their greedy excesses.

33Ibid., p. 18-7.
3^Ibid., p. viii.

35A Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United States
Census of Population: 1950 Volume II Characteristics of the Popula
tion Part 18 Louisiana (Washington, D.C., United States Government
Printing Office, 1952), pp. 18-32.
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Prom Huey Long’s death in 1935 until the exposure of the Louisiana
Scandals in 1939, top officials in the Longite organization lived os
tentatiously expensive lives largely financed by fraudulent or improper
use of state resources.

Their ambition to continue enjoying the "good

life" ran into the political ambition of former Longite James A. Noe,
who alerted federal officials to the misuse of state money.
The result of the federal investigation was that the Longite
machine, exposed as greedy and unworthy, was banished temporarily from
control of the executive branch of the state government which it had
controlled since Huey Long’s election as governor in 1928.

Their

banishment left open the way for the anti-Long faction of the Demo
cratic party to prove its ability to govern Louisiana honestly and
effectively.
Anti-Long forces had been out of power for eleven years, however,
and thus did not have recent experience in governing the kind of state
that Long and his associates had created.

The anti-Longs’ "last

hurrah" before the Louisiana Scandals had been their impeachment of
Long in 1929, which he thwarted.

For eleven years, Long and his allies

had constructed by parliamentary maneuver, legislative act, and execu
tive fiat, a powerful organization capable of keeping virtually all
its opponents out of office.
When that domination of the executive branch ended in 1939, the
reformers who swept into office on the tide of voter disgust had to
learn how to govern and not merely criticize the government in office.
In addition, voter revulsion at the excess of the scandals did not
sweep all Longites out of positions of influence.

Therefore, when
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reform Governor Sam Jones sought to dismantle the highly-centralized
state administration Huey Long and his associates had created, he
found a strong Longite faction in the legislature which sought to
derail his reforms at every turn.

The 1940 legislature granted Jones

many of his reforms because the memory of the scandals was too recent
to ignore.

During the 1942 session, however, Longites in the legis

lature had regrouped and virtually brought the governor’s efforts to
a standstill until he outmaneuvered them by withholding funds from the
New Orleans Charity Hospital.

The Longites subsequently agreed to

certain key measures in a special legislative session.
Moreover, Longites mustered a series of "taxpayer suits" against
Jones’ reform laws which nullified many of his reforms as the courts
examined them closely.

Jones, then, proved that Louisiana could be

governed honestly, but the effectiveness of his reform administration
was blunted by the powerful Longite bloc in the legislature and the
unfavorable judicial decisions.
Jones' successor, James H. Davis, continued the reform thrust in
Louisiana state politics, but his soothing personality, and his fre
quent absences from the state took some of the edge off the factional
strife during the last two years of the war.
Even the relative success of the anti-Long administrations, how
ever, proved that both Long and anti-Long candidates stood a serious
chance at election.

The result was a system of effective bifactional

politics within the Democratic party, which gave Louisiana a political
system resembling somewhat the national two-party system with the
relatively conservative reforms (a rather anomalous concept in itself)
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resembling the Republicans and the more liberal Longites resembling
the Democrats.
This system of effective bifactionalism which began in 1939
lasted until 1960, when the race issue began sweeping aside the old
politics based on economic issues.

While it lasted, however, it gave

Louisiana three reform governors —

Jones, Davis, and Robert Kennon —

and the same Longite governor three times — Earl Long, who carried on
many of his older brother's social welfare programs without the atten
dant concentration of political power that Huey had achieved.
During the war years, Louisiana experienced development on two
levels of national politics:
dential level.

the congressional level and the presi

National politics on the congressional level often re

flected the state's bifactional division with candidates seeking the
endorsement of the Longite organization or the reform administration.
Even though Longite congressmen in the 1940 election suffered along
with their allies at the state level from the exposure of the Louisiana
Scandals, they were not completely eliminated from office.

Six of them

were defeated, but Longites always retained two seats throughout the
war — Overton Brooks' Fourth District and A. Leonard Allen's Eighth
District.

Moreover, Louisiana's two Longite United States Senators,

Allen J. Ellender and John Overton, successfully defeated reform chal
lengers .
Congressional races in Louisiana during the war years generally
turned on two issues:

the corruption of the Longite organization (and

thus reflected the bifactional system), or the United States war ef
fort.

Reformers often concentrated on the former issue, while Longites
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often concentrated on the latter in an attempt to downplay the aura
of fiscal malfeasance which clung to Longite politicians.

Concentra

tion on these two major issues varied from campaign to campaign and
from district to district, depending on the success of the war effort
or the personalities of the candidates involved.

Even in campaigns

which concentrated on the war issue, however, the corruption issue
always loomed as a ready weapon with which a reformer could attack
his Longite opponent.
Franklin Roosevelt overrode all other concerns in presidential
politics throughout the United States during the war years, and the
force of his personality displaced bifactionalism in Louisiana during
presidential campaigns.

No matter how far apart reformers and Long

ites stood on various other issues, they found common ground in their
general support of Roosevelt's presidential candidacies.
Nevertheless, Louisiana shared with the rest of the South some
rumblings of discontent with the continued urban, liberal, and black
drift of Roosevelt's Democratic party.

The stirrings of racial

equality which were a feature of the war years, and which Roosevelt's
brand of New Deal democracy fostered, brought the first stirrings of
unhappiness among many southern white Democrats.

The war emergency

helped to contain the Southern revolt against the party, even when
Roosevelt chose the eccentric Henry A. Wallace as his running mate in
1940, but by the first peace-time presidential election in 1948, Presi
dent Harry Truman could no longer retain the unquestioning loyalty of
the South, and Louisiana, along with three other southern states,
bolted to Strom Thurmond and the States' Rights Democrats.

Once it
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had broken with the Democrats, Louisiana found it easier to do so
again when other parties offered presidential candidates closer to its
conservative ideology in national affairs — Republicans Dwight Eisen
hower in 1956, Barry Goldwater in 1964, Richard Nixon in 1972, Ronald
Reagan in 1980, and American Independent George Wallace in 1968.
Not only in politics, but almost all aspects of life in wartime
Louisiana experienced change.

Sentiments of non-involvement with the

rest of the world gave way in the months between September, 1939, and
December, 1941, to a realization that the necessity of the United
States assuming a major role in defeating the Axis required a repudi
ation of earlier non-intervention.

Major sources of public opinion in

the state, furthermore, adopted the concept that the United States re
pudiation of its international role in the League of Nations during
the 1920s and 1930s had helped lead the world into the explosive situ
ation which burst into World War II.

Therefore, many Louisianians

repudiated any idea of another post-war retreat

into non-interven

tion and embraced the new international organization designed to keep
the peace in the post-World War II international situation.
Louisiana’s educational system met the challenge of World War II
on two levels, one practical the other idealistic.

On the practical

level, Louisiana educators sought to provide technical training re
quired by new workers in both industrial and agricultural pursuits
made necessary by the war effort.

Schools also became major compon

ents of wartime scrap collection and war stamp sales drives, as well
as registration and distribution centers for the federal government’s
rationing program.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

546

On the idealistic level, Louisiana education re-dedicated itself
to the traditional role of inculcating a healthy patriotism in its
students.

Patriotic themes dominated consideration of history and

civics courses, but teachers also used wartime necessity to urge
their students to read more, or to do well in math and science.
Institutions of higher learning in the state suffered from de
clining enrollments as male students became involved in the war ef
fort, but partially offset the resulting loss of income by obtaining
military training programs.

Collegiate athletics suffered a temporary

curtailment, and various curricula were modified to accomodate techno
logical modernization brought on by the war.
The Louisiana educational system achieved many of its goals
during the war years even though it suffered from a shortage of
teachers caused by the military draft and by higher salaries in de
fense industries.

It also experienced change on the domestic level

as Governor Jones and State Superintendent of Public Education John E.
Coxe imposed their own reforms.

Jones included the Department of

Education in his general state reorganization plan in 1940, and thus
the department suffered along with other state agencies in the admini
strative chaos that resulted from the unconstitutionality of the Jones
plan.

While Jones sought to liberate Louisiana's education from the

politicalization it had suffered under the Longites, Superintendent
Coxe imposed internal reorganization to provide a more professional
orderliness in the state educational administration.

Throughout all

these challenges, however, Louisiana’s Department of Education struggled
to continue providing the education required by students in the new,
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threatening world situation.
The Louisiana economy, both agricultural and industrial, shared
in the economic prosperity of the war years which obliterated the
Great Depression of the 1930s by the simple law of supply and demand.
Louisiana agriculture, for example, was called upon to help fill the
insatiable appetite for food and fiber of the Allied war effort and
shared in the attendant prosperity.
The war introduced no major new crops to Louisiana agriculture,
but it did have the fundamental effect of accelerating mechanization
because of the acute shortage of labor on Louisiana farms caused by
United States military needs and the labor requirements of new indus
trialization within the state.

Louisiana farmers attempted to remedy

the labor problem by utilizing the labor of Axis POWs incarcerated in
the state and met with varying degrees of success depending on the
crop and the abilities of individual prisoners, but also relied on in
creased mechanization.
uneven, however.

The mechanization of Louisiana agriculture was

Sugar cane production led the way in mechanization,

while cotton and rice production lagged behind.
Nevertheless, the acceleration of mechanization caused by the war
resulted in major changes in Louisiana's black population during the
late 1940s and on into the 1950s and 1960s, when blacks in increasing
numbers left agriculture and the shanties provided by landowners on
the periphery of the fields and either left the South or moved to one
of its urban areas.
World War II also caused an acceleration of the industrialization
of Louisiana’s economy.

Major manufacturing establishments in the
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state provided vital material and petrochemicals to the Allied war
effort.

Industrialization, however, continued along the paths it had

already begun in the state.

New Orleans, with its major shipbuilding,

aircraft, and other manufacturing plants, remained the state’s major
industrial area.
Lake Charles

Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Monroe, Alexandria, and

continued to be industrial and urban centers as they

had been earlier, while other areas of the state, even though they
slightly increased their industrial production, lagged behind.
Louisianians also shared in the curtailment of American life ex
perienced by the rest of the country during the war.

Shortages and

rationing removed some customer goods from store shelves and made
others difficult to obtain.

The population, used to deprivation during

the 1930s, probably survived these shortages with more equanimity than
they or their descendents would had they occurred during the Age of
Abundance of the 1950s and 1960s, but those with money from war-time
jobs found the shortages galling, for now they had money to spend after
doing without during the lean years of the Depression, but had few
consumer goods to spend it on.

Shortages and rationing of scarce gaso

line and tire supplies severely hindered traditional American freedom
of movement.

Traditional holiday celebrations assumed a military and

patriotic tinge.

Traditional recreation and personal concerns were re

placed in many instances by involvement in civilian defense, scrap
collection drives, and war bond and stamp sales, which provided the
individual a sense of participation in the titanic struggle to rid
world of the Nazi menace in which the country was engaged.
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Two substantial minority groups in Louisiana, blacks and women,
historically denied full access to participation in all aspects of the
state's economy and society, utilized the opportunity presented by the
war years to establish themselves as heirs of the full equality ac
corded other Americans.

Blacks purposefully, and women more by de

fault, moved out of traditional low-paying jobs and into more lucra
tive jobs formerly dominated by white males who were now away at war.
The gains made by both, however, proved only the beginning of true
equality.

Many women retreated to traditional roles with the advent

of peace, and blacks had to endure the white backlash of the 1950s and
beyond, but the experiences of equality sown by the war in both cases
lay ready as a foundation for the struggles to broaden and to achieve
true equality during the 1960s and beyondIn summary, Louisiana changed a great deal during World War II.
Politics, economy, and many aspects of the state's society were recog
nizably different in 1945 from the way they had been in 1939.

World

War II, however, only started many changes. .The forces it unleashed
in the state came to fruition only in the succeeding decades.

Louisi

ana in 1945 had experienced change, but stood on the threshold of even
more change set in motion by the state's experience in the massive
United States war effort and by domestic forces which happened to sur
face during the war years.
George Brown Tindall maintains in his massive study of the New
South that the southern states emerged from World War II with social
and economic conditions much different from those they had known in
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1939 and had even more radical changes in store. 36

Louisiana's ex

perience conforms to this interpretation, even though life in post
war Louisiana resumed many of its pre-war aspects.

After the thou

sands of troops left, Louisiana’s army camps were either abandoned
and torn down or their functions were reduced to fit the needs of
peacetime.

Nevertheless, Louisiana could not return completely to

the pre-war world.

Just as it is still possible to stumble upon a

concrete foundation at the abandoned sites of Camps Livingston or
Claiborne, it is also possible to perceive the permanent changes
wrought in Louisiana and the memories deeply etched into its collec
tive or individual conscience by the war.

36
George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 731.
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